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Re: Using NAT for best-exit routing
by Aleksi Suhonen 12 Sep '98

12 Sep '98

Hello, John Milburn writes: >Using a transparant cache for ingress traffic has the same effect as >a NAT device, and scales with the number of concurrent flows. >A cache farm is more expensive to provision and deploy than a simple NAT, >but has the advantage of allowing for logging of source/destURL pairs, >which may be important to some content providers. Caching can also can >be a significant performance improvement in many cases, such as paths >with high latency*BW links or congested long haul circuits. I'd like to raise an interesting point here. I'm not convinced it's a righteous point though, but since people have been turning the issue on the two sides of client billing and server billing, I'll do the same to this suggestion. I work for a Finnish ISP and from my perspective all you American providers are "one huge Exodus." We battle with the issue by providing customers with an efficient web cache system. So basically what I'm saying is that GTEI could go a long way in solving the problem of asymmetric peering traffic due to web farm providers with an efficient web cache system for their customers. On my continent this is almost an unwritten responsibility of an ISP. My 0.02 Euros, -- Aleksi Suhonen Network Development Saunalahden Serveri Oy Finland AXU-RIPE Ps. I'm not subscribed to the list, so please keep me in the Cc: in follow-ups. Also, if this message doesn't make it to the list, please forward it there.

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Re: Starr report - as seen from MAE East
by Sean Donelan 12 Sep '98

12 Sep '98

I've been swamped and am just now coming up for air. Any reports how the private interconnects did? How did the InternetMCI work for the house.gov server and GTE/BBN for the access.gpo.gov server? >For grins (well actually in response to pressure from our >press relations folk) I made a quick graph of MAE East >utilization for today. > >The result is at: http:/www.mae.net/starr > >There was a jump of about 100 Mbps at 4pm Eastern time. > >There was no sigificant change in traffic at MAE West. -- Sean Donelan, Data Research Associates, Inc, St. Louis, MO Affiliation given for identification not representation

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Re: OUTAGE: train derailment in Atlanta, fiber cut
by James B. Slayden Jr. 11 Sep '98

11 Sep '98

Buckhead a small (yuppy) burb of Altanta, Ga. James S. > From netconfig Fri Sep 11 05:46:32 1998 > From: mwinter(a)exodus.net > Date: Fri, 11 Sep 1998 05:27:54 -0700 (PDT) > X-Sender: mwinter@bengi-w > To: Dave Rand <dlr(a)bungi.com> > cc: Sean Donelan <SEAN(a)SDG.DRA.COM>, nanog(a)merit.edu > Subject: Re: OUTAGE: train derailment in Atlanta, fiber cut > MIME-Version: 1.0 > Content-Type> : > TEXT/PLAIN> ; > charset=US-ASCII> > Sender: owner-nanog(a)merit.edu > Content-Length: 790 > > Worldcom told me more than 800 DS3 are affected on their part. It's a > train derailment between Buckhead (?), Georgia and Social Circle, Georgia. > other carriers are affected too. > > On Fri, 11 Sep 1998, Dave Rand wrote: > > > [In the message entitled "OUTAGE: train derailment in Atlanta, fiber cut" on Sep 11, 5:47, Sean Donelan writes:] > > > Today is off to a great start. > > > > > > A train derailed outside of Atlanta cutting several fiber cables > > > affecting service in the southeast. > > > > MFS has a total of 613 DS3's down at this time - no ETR. No word on > > how many other carriers are affected. Outage began at 02:15 PDT, > > roughly. > > > > Looks like self-healing SONET, isn't. :-( > > Just wait for the self-healing teams to finish their work :-))) > > - Martin Winter > Exodus Communications >

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The Cidr Report
by Tony Bates 11 Sep '98

11 Sep '98

This is an auto-generated mail on Fri Sep 11 12:00:00 PDT 1998 It is not checked before it leaves my workstation. However, hopefully you will find this report interesting and will take the time to look through this to see if you can improve the amount of aggregation you perform. The report is split into sections: 0) General Status List the route table history for the last week, list any possibly bogus routes seen and give some status on ASes. 1) Gains by aggregating at the origin AS level This lists the "Top 30" players who if they decided to aggregate their announced classful prefixes at the origin AS level could make a significant difference in the reduction of the current size of the Internet routing table. This calculation does not take into account the inclusion of holes when forming an aggregate so it is possible even larger reduction should be possible. 2) Weekly Delta A summary of the last weeks changes in terms of withdrawn and added routes. Please note that this is only a snapshot but does give some indication of ASes participating in CIDR. Clearly, it is generally a good thing to see a large amont of withdrawls. 3) Interesting aggregates Interesting here means not an aggregate made as a set of classful routes. Thanks to xara.net for giving me access to their routing tables once a day. Please send any comments about this report directly to me. Check http://www.employees.org/~tbates/cidr-report.html for a daily update of this report. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ CIDR REPORT for 11Sep98 0) General Status Table History ------------- Date Prefixes 040998 52828 050998 52652 060998 52614 070998 52667 080998 52746 090998 52823 100998 53697 110998 53238 Check http://www.employees.org/~tbates/cidr.plot.html for a plot of the table history. Possible Bogus Routes --------------------- AS Summary ---------- Number of ASes in routing system: 4054 Number of ASes announcing only one prefix: 1961 (1002 cidr, 959 classful) Largest number of cidr routes: 343 announced by AS3561 Largest number of classful routes: 1185 announced by AS701 1) Gains by aggregating at the origin AS level --- 11Sep98 --- ASnum NetsNow NetsCIDR NetGain % Gain Description AS701 1185 956 229 19.3% Alternet AS271 349 152 197 56.4% BCnet Backbone AS4293 445 258 187 42.0% IMCI AS174 789 611 178 22.6% Performance Systems International AS3749 225 68 157 69.8% TECNET AS2493 373 217 156 41.8% iSTAR Internet, Inc. AS4200 192 100 92 47.9% AGIS (Apex Global Information Ser AS5668 128 41 87 68.0% Century Telephone Inc. AS2685 229 151 78 34.1% IBM Global Network - US AS4755 125 49 76 60.8% Videsh Sanchar Nigam Ltd. India AS3221 117 44 73 62.4% EENet Autonomous System AS4740 404 336 68 16.8% Ozemail Pty Ltd (ASN-OZEMAIL) AS3493 251 183 68 27.1% INTERLINK AS7046 239 172 67 28.0% UUNET-CUSTOMER AS3804 215 157 58 27.0% Bell Solutions AS10928 101 46 55 54.5% UNKNOWN AS549 204 151 53 26.0% ONet Backbone AS8517 123 71 52 42.3% ULAKNET-ASN AS6335 69 20 49 71.0% NTRNET AS72 87 39 48 55.2% Schlumberger Information Network AS1239 548 501 47 8.6% SprintLink Backbone AS803 78 34 44 56.4% SaskNet Backbone AS6181 66 26 40 60.6% FUSE-NET AS4539 67 27 40 59.7% NETROPOLIS AS852 159 120 39 24.5% AGT Advance Communication AS3403 159 120 39 24.5% TIAC AS7122 118 80 38 32.2% MTS ADVANCED Network Policy AS10459 45 10 35 77.8% WANSASN AS2707 64 31 33 51.6% WEC AS6332 89 58 31 34.8% TELNOR For the rest of the previous weeks gain information please see http://www.employees.org:80/~tbates/cidr-report.html 2) Weekly Delta Please see http://www.employees.org:80/~tbates/cidr-report.html for this part of the report 3) Interesting aggregates Please see http://www.employees.org:80/~tbates/cidr-report.html for this part of the report

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NOTICE: mass-media event expected Sep 11, 1998
by Sean Donelan 11 Sep '98

11 Sep '98

DRA Net is the Internet Service Provider for the Library of Congress. It is expected the Library's web server(s) will be the primary distribution point for the Office of Independent Counsel report to the House of Representatives. The exact time and and place has not been announced. A sudden large traffic surge is expected report is released. DRA Net has provisioned additional bandwidth, servers and working on other traffic management plans to handle the increased network load. While interest in the report is expected to be high, we don't currently know how much traffic will be generated. The short time period given to prepare means some very good ideas for handling the traffic may not be in place in time. I'm acutely aware that attempts to hurriedly implement other options tend to create other problems. DRA appreciates the several offers of assistance we have received. DRA has begun receiving many inquiries from the public news media. Other network providers, when calling the DRA service desk about a major network problem be prepared to identify yourself and your AS number immediately so we can handle your call properly. I request during the next few days ONLY senior network engineers attempt to call our direct network operations center phone numbers. This contact information has been previous supplied by DRA to each network peering with DRA Net. To avoid problems with "social engineering" DRA reserves the right to screen and implement additional security procedures to verify the authenticity of any callers. Violations of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act and the National Information Infrastructure Protection Act will be referred to appropriate law enforcement authorities. If you peer with DRA Net, and have not previously provided a callback number for your NOC, you may send it to peering(a)dra.net. Please verify BGP peering and routing this evening, access-lists are in place so you will not be able to traceroute into the LOC network, and send a message to peering(a)dra.net if they are incorrect. No new BGP sessions will be setup or changed after 6am Central Time September 11, 1998. Public and media inquiries concerning the report should be directed to the House of Representatives and Library of Congress Public Affairs offices. All decisions controlling the release of the report is determined SOLELY by the United States House of Representatives' rules. DRA can NOT provide information about the report's contents. DRA's media contact is Joe Bonwich, 314-432-1100, joe(a)dra.com during normal business hours. -- Sean Donelan, Data Research Associates, Inc, St. Louis, MO

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Re: OUTAGE: train derailment in Atlanta, fiber cut
by dlr＠bungi.com 11 Sep '98

11 Sep '98

[In the message entitled "OUTAGE: train derailment in Atlanta, fiber cut" on Sep 11, 5:47, Sean Donelan writes:] > Today is off to a great start. > > A train derailed outside of Atlanta cutting several fiber cables > affecting service in the southeast. MFS has a total of 613 DS3's down at this time - no ETR. No word on how many other carriers are affected. Outage began at 02:15 PDT, roughly. Looks like self-healing SONET, isn't. :-( -- Dave Rand dlr(a)bungi.com http://www.bungi.com

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Re: NSI Bulletin 098-012 | New GTLD server
by Simon Leinen 11 Sep '98

11 Sep '98

Is GlobalCenter the intended location of the K.GTLD-SERVERS.NET? What was wrong with the LINX service network where the K.ROOT-SERVERS.NET is installed? When K.ROOT-SERVERS.NET was moved to London, we invested some effort to optimize routing towards the LINX from the European research networks. Is the plan that we do this again for the new gTLD server? Right now a query/response to the new gTLD server in England takes four transatlantic hops from Switzerland. I don't really see the improvement with respect to the other name servers, except for those who peer with GlobalCenter in Europe. $ ping -sv k.gtld-servers.net. 140 10 PING k.gtld-servers.net: 140 data bytes 148 bytes from 195.8.99.11: icmp_seq=1. time=239. ms 148 bytes from 195.8.99.11: icmp_seq=2. time=308. ms 148 bytes from 195.8.99.11: icmp_seq=3. time=437. ms 148 bytes from 195.8.99.11: icmp_seq=4. time=466. ms 148 bytes from 195.8.99.11: icmp_seq=6. time=442. ms 148 bytes from 195.8.99.11: icmp_seq=7. time=456. ms 148 bytes from 195.8.99.11: icmp_seq=8. time=467. ms ----k.gtld-servers.net PING Statistics---- 10 packets transmitted, 7 packets received, 30% packet loss round-trip (ms) min/avg/max = 239/402/467 $ ping -sv k.root-servers.net. 140 10 PING k.root-servers.net: 140 data bytes 148 bytes from k.root-servers.net (193.0.14.129): icmp_seq=0. time=39. ms 148 bytes from k.root-servers.net (193.0.14.129): icmp_seq=1. time=41. ms 148 bytes from k.root-servers.net (193.0.14.129): icmp_seq=2. time=44. ms 148 bytes from k.root-servers.net (193.0.14.129): icmp_seq=3. time=38. ms 148 bytes from k.root-servers.net (193.0.14.129): icmp_seq=4. time=36. ms 148 bytes from k.root-servers.net (193.0.14.129): icmp_seq=5. time=52. ms 148 bytes from k.root-servers.net (193.0.14.129): icmp_seq=6. time=46. ms 148 bytes from k.root-servers.net (193.0.14.129): icmp_seq=7. time=40. ms 148 bytes from k.root-servers.net (193.0.14.129): icmp_seq=8. time=34. ms 148 bytes from k.root-servers.net (193.0.14.129): icmp_seq=9. time=35. ms ----k.root-servers.net PING Statistics---- 10 packets transmitted, 10 packets received, 0% packet loss round-trip (ms) min/avg/max = 34/40/52 Regards, -- Simon. SWITCH http://www.switch.ch/ Swiss Academic & Research Network >>>>> "jr" == James Rishaw <jamie(a)dilbert.ais.net> writes: > ;; ANSWER SECTION: > k.gtld-servers.net. 3d9h11m26s IN A 195.8.99.11 > inetnum: 195.8.98.0 - 195.8.99.255 > netname: ISI-NET-LHR2-A > descr: Frontier GlobalCenter (formerly Internet Systems) > descr: Internet Service Provider (GB)

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OUTAGE: train derailment in Atlanta, fiber cut
by Sean Donelan 11 Sep '98

11 Sep '98

Today is off to a great start. A train derailed outside of Atlanta cutting several fiber cables affecting service in the southeast. If anyone sees some backhoes congregating outside the US Capital today, will you please shoo them away. Thanks. (for :-) impaired) IBM got years to prepare for the Olympics, we got 48 hours. This is also wrecking my CCIE study plans. CISCO WARNING: If I call the TAC today, you had better get that call escalated to intelligent life quickly. I got little sleep tonight, and I won't be amused by people reading the manual to me. PLEASE feel free to mirror any information on your web sites for your own users after it is released. We are now plugged into the CAIDA web cache at mae-west, for those using that. Most major media web sites are making plans to mirror the report on their sites. For your cisco config: ip go faster -- Sean Donelan, Data Research Associates, Inc, St. Louis, MO Affiliation given for identification not representation

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Crazy flying netbios packets
by Pete Ashdown 11 Sep '98

11 Sep '98

Has anyone done any estimates on how much net-wide traffic is useless netbios udp? Are there any suggestions for cutting large chunks of this out of my network without punishing SAMBA and other users who need it?

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Mirroring web sites
by Sean Donelan 11 Sep '98

11 Sep '98

Thanks for the offers of mirroring. In case anyone didn't notice, there are some layer 8 & 9 issues going on. All the 'official' mirror sites are currently under the control of the legislative branch of government. The seperation of powers comes to the Internet. I have no inside information, but expect the response to be posted on an executive web site, e.g. www.whitehouse.gov. Hopefully by tomorrow afternoon there should be about 5 official sites. At the present time here are the mirror sites up and running: InternetMCI http://www.house.gov/icreport DRA Net http://thomas.loc.gov/icreport GTEI/BBN http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/icreport Media outlets looking for 'favored' access should contact the public affairs office of either the House, the Library of Congress, or the Government Printing Office. Access is controlled by the House of Representatives. I would ask anyone who has set up a robot to automatically check the web sites for updated pages, and try to copy them, to make sure they are well-behaved. Ill-behaved robots may be mistaken for a denial of service attack, and action may be taken to block them. I don't know what InternetMCI or GTE have prepared. -- Sean Donelan, Data Research Associates, Inc, St. Louis, MO Affiliation given for identification not representation

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