September 2001 - NANOG - lists.nanog.org

looking for SLA examples
by Tim Peiffer 23 Sep '01

23 Sep '01

We are looking at putting in contract language surrounding Service Level Agreements and I would like to know what people are doing from the standpoint of latency, packet loss, and bandwidth delivery capability. What examples do people have written in contracts on the above, and what penalties are there for not resolving problems? Example: Service Provider agrees to provide maximum latency guarantees 1) on-net CPE to on-net CPE 60 msec. 2) on-net CPE to off-net peering point 30 msec. 3) End to End 100 msec within the continental US. Remedies for violation of latency guarantee for unresolved latency problems. 1 month 15% off of monthly rate 2 month 25% off of monthly rate 3 month 35% off of monthly rate >3 month customer has option of cancelling remainder of contract. My understanding is that expected latency should be based upon the speed of light in glass 0.6C or roughly 6msec per 1000 fiber route miles plus some amount for router serialization and queuing delays (~5 msec/hop?). What do people use as standard rule of thumb for calculating latency? What do people expect for service level commitments, normal+50% (100?) ? Tim Peiffer peiffer(a)nts.umn.edu Operations Manager - Engineering Automation Networking and Telecommunications Operations University of Minnesota +1 612 626 7884 desk 2218 University Ave +1 612 625 0006 problems +1 612 626 1002 fax Minneapolis MN 55455, USA

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Re: Don't blame Intelligence or Security Agencies.....
by Sean Donelan 22 Sep '01

22 Sep '01

On Thu, 13 September 2001, alex(a)yuriev.com wrote: > > The intelligence agencies in the United States are the best in the world. > > Mossad would disagree with you. > Ever wondered why no one hijacks El Al flights? Ever wonder why no one hijacks Qantas flights? Any topic, pick one. How about Internet on airplanes? How can we do CIDR allocations for aircraft? Does Cisco make a 400Hz airline power supply?

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contact for opentransit.net (in USA)? about DoS attack
by Jim Mercer 22 Sep '01

22 Sep '01

i have a UDP flood going across an expensive international link (to .pk). between the source and destination, i have bbnplanet/genuity and opentransit.net (and a few others whom do not respond or don't have easily identifiable NOC's). i've opened a ticket with genuity, but would like to get ahold of opentransit.net, as they would have a better effect. -- [ Jim Mercer jim(a)reptiles.org +1 416 410-5633 ] [ Now with more and longer words for your reading enjoyment. ]

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RE: (fwd) [Oz-ISP] USG takes control of xpnder off PAS-2
by Roeland Meyer 22 Sep '01

22 Sep '01

|> From: Joe Abley [mailto:jabley@automagic.org] |> Sent: Friday, September 21, 2001 6:22 PM |> You'd think satellite capacity would be subject to some more |> international set of regulations than those of the FCC. Are you |> saying that if I buy preemptable capacity on PAS-N to uplink from |> New Zealand and downlink to Fiji, that the capacity is subject |> to preemption by the US Government under FCC rules? |> |> Or is there an assumption here that there's an (up|down)link on |> US soil involved? I believe that it has more to do with whom owns the bird and what jurisdiction they are under. US-based companies must follow FCC regs.

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The Cidr Report
by CIDR Report 22 Sep '01

22 Sep '01

This is an auto-generated mail on Fri Sep 21 23:00:01 PDT 2001 It is not checked before it leaves my workstation. However, hopefully you will find this report interesting and will take the time to look through this to see if you can improve the amount of aggregation you perform. Check http://www.employees.org/~tbates/cidr-report.html for a daily update of this report. NEW: Check http://www.employees.org/~tbates/cidr-report-region.html for the regional version of this report. NEW: Check http://www.employees.org/~tbates/autnums.html for a complete list of autonomous system number to name mappings as used by the CIDR-Report. The report is split into sections: 0) General Status List the route table history for the last week, list any possibly bogus routes seen and give some status on ASes. 1) Gains by aggregating at the origin AS level This lists the "Top 30" players who if they decided to aggregate their announced classful prefixes at the origin AS level could make a significant difference in the reduction of the current size of the Internet routing table. This calculation does not take into account the inclusion of holes when forming an aggregate so it is possible even larger reduction should be possible. 2) Weekly Delta A summary of the last weeks changes in terms of withdrawn and added routes. Please note that this is only a snapshot but does give some indication of ASes participating in CIDR. Clearly, it is generally a good thing to see a large amont of withdrawls. 3) Interesting aggregates Interesting here means not an aggregate made as a set of classful routes. Thanks to GX Networks for giving me access to their routing tables once a day. Please send any comments about this report directly to CIDR Report <cidr-report(a)cisco.com>. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ CIDR REPORT for 21Sep01 0) General Status Table History ------------- Date Prefixes 140901 102582 150901 102950 160901 102809 170901 103092 180901 103047 190901 102981 200901 103292 210901 103625 Check http://www.employees.org/~tbates/cidr.plot.html for a plot of the table history. Possible Bogus Routes --------------------- AS Summary ---------- Number of ASes in routing system: 11609 Number of ASes announcing only one prefix: 6928 (3946 cidr, 2982 classful) Largest number of cidr routes: 854 announced by AS701 Largest number of classful routes: 1379 announced by AS701 1) Gains by aggregating at the origin AS level --- 21Sep01 --- ASnum NetsNow NetsCIDR NetGain % Gain Description AS1221 1259 956 303 24.1% Telstra Pty Ltd AS701 1379 1176 203 14.7% UUNET Technologies, Inc. AS4151 296 169 127 42.9% USDA AS577 314 193 121 38.5% Bell Advanced Communications Inc. AS4293 379 270 109 28.8% Cable & Wireless USA AS6595 166 59 107 64.5% DoD Education Activity Network As AS705 249 152 97 39.0% UUNET Technologies, Inc. AS7018 769 672 97 12.6% AT&T AS6429 196 101 95 48.5% AT&T Chile Internet S.A. AS13999 109 15 94 86.2% Mega Cable S.A. de C.V. AS2048 212 120 92 43.4% State of Louisiana AS16473 154 65 89 57.8% Bell South AS4755 210 124 86 41.0% Videsh Sanchar Nigam Ltd. Autonom AS12302 98 28 70 71.4% MobiFon S.A. AS4200 142 74 68 47.9% Apex Global Information Services, AS1239 465 398 67 14.4% Sprint AS7046 317 252 65 20.5% UUNET Technologies, Inc. AS6471 127 62 65 51.2% ENTEL CHILE S.A. AS724 218 155 63 28.9% DLA Systems Automation Center AS17557 125 65 60 48.0% Pakistan Telecom AS19632 67 9 58 86.6% Metropolis Intercom S.A. AS16758 63 6 57 90.5% IKON Office Solutions AS209 313 258 55 17.6% Qwest AS703 301 249 52 17.3% UUNET Technologies, Inc. AS3464 147 95 52 35.4% Alabama SuperComputer Network AS226 145 93 52 35.9% Los Nettos AS17561 113 62 51 45.1% Internet service provision to Wes AS1 535 484 51 9.5% BBN Planet AS4323 249 199 50 20.1% Time Warner Communications, Inc. AS10620 67 20 47 70.1% TVCABLE BOGOTA For the rest of the previous weeks gain information please see http://www.employees.org:80/~tbates/cidr-report.html 2) Weekly Delta Please see http://www.employees.org:80/~tbates/cidr-report.html for this part of the report 3) Interesting aggregates Please see http://www.employees.org:80/~tbates/cidr-report.html for this part of the report

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RE: (fwd) [Oz-ISP] USG takes control of xpnder off PAS-2
by Rowland, Alan D 22 Sep '01

22 Sep '01

Or you could pony up for a non-preemptable circuit. Much more expensive. Your choice. Live with it. -Al Rowland personal capacity only. -----Original Message----- From: Rachel Warren [mailto:rachel@plur.net] Sent: Friday, September 21, 2001 1:00 PM To: nanog(a)merit.edu Subject: (fwd) [Oz-ISP] USG takes control of xpnder off PAS-2 I thought this might interest NANOG: ---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: Fri, 21 Sep 2001 18:11:39 +1000 (EST) From: Terence <terry(a)tdce.com.au> To: aussie-isp(a)aussie.net Cc: AusBONE Members <ausbone-members(a)ausbone.tdce.com.au> Subject: [Oz-ISP] USG takes control of xpnder off PAS-2 Well, there must be a big war coming up, because the US govmint just appropriated our PAS-2 transponder, effectively shutting down our regional operations on October 15. I'm more than happy for journalists to call me. I may be sympathetic to the USG over terrorism, but they can't go around putting AUSTRALIAN REGIONAL ISP's out of business... --- Terence C. Giufre-Sweetser +---------------------------------+--------------------------+ | TereDonn Telecommunications Ltd | Phone +61-[0]7-32369366 | | 1/128 Bowen St, SPRING HILL | FAX +61-[0]7-32369930 | | PO BOX 1054, SPRING HILL 4004 | Mobile +61-[0]414-663053 | | Queensland Australia | http://www.tdce.com.au | +---------------------------------+--------------------------+ Rachel -- http://www.plur.net/~rachel/misc/stock-market-nasdaq.jpg

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Some History on Telco Fires [was: ATT network recovery preparedness... ]
by Frank Coluccio 22 Sep '01

22 Sep '01

SD: Like yourself, I seem to recall a fire in the early 1970s, but that was rather tame and preceded the 'really big one' by several years, which occurred in February of 1975. That's the one I think you're referring to, I believe. Mayor Beame was in office at the time. A bit of history follows. Sorry if it's OT, but I think that there's a story in here somewhere that is instructive. The story was reported quite accurately in the following, from my recollection. I was the AT&T liason to NY Telephone (now Verizon) at the time, in charge of restoration of all AT&T/WU/OCC services that were transiting the "Second Avenue Central Office" at the time of the fire. The C.O. was located at East 13th Street and Second Avenue in Manhattan, despite an error in the account below, which has the terms "street" and "avenue" reversed in one place. This fire, incidentally, remains the worst ever to befall a communications center, even beyond that which befell the Illinois Bell Hinsdale Central Office in 1987. It's been lost to history, however. I should note here that about a dozen or so fire fighters eventually died from this incident, after the fact, as a result of inhaling massive amounts of toxic fumes which led to varying types of respiratory ailments and cancers. >From one of the few places on the 'Net where this story is documented: http://www.privateline.com/issues/p.l.No11A.html ---begin snip: VII. History -- - The Bell System's worst single service disaster This excerpt is from John Brooks _Telephone_, long out of print. It details how in 1975 a 4,000 man Bell System task force restored service to 170,000 phones knocked out by fire at the 13th Ave. <sic> and Second Street <sic> switching office in New York City. . . "The most local and transient, but not the least dramatic, of these was a fire of unknown origin that swept through a switching center at Second Avenue and Thirteenth Street in lower Manhattan on February 27, 1975, causing the worst single service disaster ever suffered by any single Bell operating company. Starting around midnight in the cable vault under the eleven-story building's basement, the fire spread rapidly upward. Alert work by New York City firemen confined it to the lower floors and saved the building itself from destruction, but dense smoke from burning cable insulation suffused the unburdened parts of the building and virtually all the equipment in it was put out of service. By afternoon, when the fire was finally declared under control -- with no loss of life to either firemen or telephone people-- twelve Manhattan telephone exchanges, embracing three hundred city blocks and 104,00 subscriber lines serving 170,000 telephones, were out of service, and among the institutions bereft of working telephones were six hospitals and medical centers, eleven firehouses, three post offices, one police precinct, nine public schools, and three higher education institutions, including New York University. Before fireman had given telephone repairmen the O.K. to enter the building, the Bell System had begun one of the typical crisis mobilizations of which it is justly proud -- indeed, the largest such mobilization ever. New York Telephone, AT&T Long Lines, Western Electric, and Bell Labs contingents converged on the area, and a crisis headquarters -- inevitably called a war room -- was established in a rented storefront on Fourteenth Street, under the immediate direction of Lee Oberst, New York City area vice- president of New York Telephone. (Oberst, the type-cast hero for such and operation, was a South Bronx- born man of 54 who had started his Bell System career in 1946 as a twenty-eight dollar a week switchman.) Within twenty-four hours, emergency telephone service had been restored to the medical, police and fire facilities affected, and in hardly more time the task force assessing damage and beginning to restore service had reached its peak strength of four thousand, working around the the clock in twelve hour shifts of two thousand each. Western Electric officials were ordered to commandeer or quickly manufacture huge quantities or replacement equipment; shipments by air began the day after the fire, and eventually the amount of equipment shipped in amounted to three thousand tons. The work to be done in the damaged building varied all the way from installing new ESS equipment and writing computer programs for it to cleaning smoke-damaged relays with toothbrushes and Q- tips. A couple of happy circumstances speeded the work along. One of these was the fact that the the third floor of the burned building happened to be standing vacant at the time, thus providing space for the rapid installation of an entirely new main frame for handling trunk calls, which was shipped by cargo jet on February 28 from Western Electric's Hawthorne works. Another was the convenient availability for emergency use of excess switching capacity, from the ESS installations at Seventh Avenue and Eighteenth Street and at New York Telephone headquarters at Sixth and Forty-second. Such capacity could temporarily accommodate 28,000 of the 104,000 served lines. "The miracle on Fourteenth Street," Oberst kept calling it -- a bit melodramatically, and it appeared for a time, overoptimistically. On March 11, New York Telephone announced plans to restore service to all ordinary telephone subscribers on March 16. As that date approached, it developed that water used in the fire-fighting operation had damaged many of the cables entering the building and that the miracle would be postponed. Except for a few stray problem lines, service was restored just before midnight on March 21 -- twenty two days after the disaster, instead of the year or more that would have been required under normal conditions. The restoration was ceremoniously marked by a call from William Ellinghaus, New York Telephone's president, to Mayor Beame of New York at the mayoral residence, Gracie Mansion. The cost of the job, still not precisely calculated six months later, had been about ninety million dollars, of which almost all was covered by insurance, so the disaster cost no increase in rates to subscribers or lost profits to stockholders. It remains a fair question whether New York Telephone had been prudent, in the most telephone-dependent area in the country, to house twelve exchanges and five toll switching machines in a single building. (2) (2) _New York Times_, February 28, March 13, March 24, March 30, 1975; AT&T Share Owners Newsletter, First Quarter 1975. ----end snip -FAC > > On Fri, 21 Sep 2001, David Lesher wrote: > > http://www.att.com/ndr/ndr_e_d.html > > > > Quote: > > (AT&T has never lost an entire central office), > > > > Oh? > > > > I'm thinking of that panel office fire in NYC, circa 1970. > > I've spoke with one of the people involved in the recovery > of that office. The AT&T switch continued to operate through > the fire and several weeks afterwards. They have a tape of > a newscast where Mayor Koch is praising the efforts of New > York Telephone and the people of New York. > > A better example is Hinsdale Illinois. As far as I know, I > haven't met anyone personally involved with that one. It > disrupted a lot of service, I don't think the fire destroyed > the entire building. > > The most recent example is Rochelle Park, NJ; but I believe > that building was officially owned by Bell Atlantic. There the > damage was limited to power equipment. > > With divesture, the pre-divesture disasters as well as the Bell > logo went on to the books of the LECs. AT&T's NDR has only been > around since 1991. So the statement is technically correct, although > it omits some details. > > > > > On Fri, 21 Sep 2001, David Lesher wrote: > > http://www.att.com/ndr/ndr_e_d.html > > > > Quote: > > (AT&T has never lost an entire central office), > > > > Oh? > > > > I'm thinking of that panel office fire in NYC, circa 1970. > > I've spoke with one of the people involved in the recovery > of that office. The AT&T switch continued to operate through > the fire and several weeks afterwards. They have a tape of > a newscast where Mayor Koch is praising the efforts of New > York Telephone and the people of New York. > > A better example is Hinsdale Illinois. As far as I know, I > haven't met anyone personally involved with that one. It > disrupted a lot of service, I don't think the fire destroyed > the entire building. > > The most recent example is Rochelle Park, NJ; but I believe > that building was officially owned by Bell Atlantic. There the > damage was limited to power equipment. > > With divesture, the pre-divesture disasters as well as the Bell > logo went on to the books of the LECs. AT&T's NDR has only been > around since 1991. So the statement is technically correct, although > it omits some details. > > >

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Tri-GigE or OC-48 For Milwaukee > Chicago Network
by Nick Catalano 22 Sep '01

22 Sep '01

Dear List: We are going to be offering 10/100/1000Mbps Ethernet Services to Milwaukee, WI. We are also opening a 15,000 Sq. Foot Carrier-Neutral Collocation Facility. In order to connect our clients to the public peering exchanges in Chicago do you think we should install multiple Cisco 12,000 series routers in multiple POPs in Downtown Chicago, and then transport all of the data back to the Milwaukee Datacenter via Gigabit Ethernet lines (and then connect those gigabit Ethernet lines into Cisco Switches at the Milwaukee Datacenter) or bring the data back on one redundant OC-48 and have a router in Milwaukee to break up the OC-48? Also, Juniper or Cisco for this situation? What would you go with? ---------------------- Nick Catalano Chief Strategy Officer Nozone, Inc Services from the next generation - Nozone, Inc

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AT&T network recovery preparations
by Sean Donelan 22 Sep '01

22 Sep '01

As far as I know, AT&T is the only carrier which maintained the ability to rebuild an entire central office from a "smoking hole in the ground." Last year the program budget was in danger of being cut, and the program eliminated because it had never been needed. It was an expense, which couldn't be justified. I spoke with one of the managers last year, and he said "It would only take one catastrophe to pay for my entire budget." I don't believe he was thinking of this. http://www.att.com/network/recovery/preparing.html

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Nimda information
by Mo McKinlay 22 Sep '01

22 Sep '01

I'm not sure that this is useful or not, given the large number of advisories that *eventually* made it out, but this is an attempt to collate the known information about Nimda - it's based on information collected here, my own findings, and information taken from the various advisories that were released. http://www.ekto.ekol.co.uk/nimda.php Feel free to e-mail me any corrections/updates, and I'll keep the page up to date. -- Mo McKinlay mmckinlay(a)gnu.org http://ekto.org "but every time you call a function a object orientated fairy dies" -- Richard Palmer, spod. GnuPG/PGP Key: pub 1024D/76A275F9 2000-07-22

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