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RE: Sprint peering policy (fwd)
by Ukyo Kuonji 02 Jul '02

02 Jul '02

>From: Paul A Flores <floresp10(a)cox.net> > >Since this is basically a financial issue (and not really a regulatory >issue), the only way you could make it 'fair' is to have some kind of >mandate from a government body to MAKE peering 'fair'. The only way _I_ >would buy off on that, would be to have some kind of subsidy paid from tax >dollars to the carriers in question to 'force' them to peer with people who >have no other redeeming value. You wouldn't buy the notion of reciprical billing? I think this would most likely be the fairest, but maybe the hardest to implement. It would either have to be done at the end points, or at every interconnect. In this method, if the traffic across an interconnect would truely be a 1 to 1 ratio, then the bills would cancel each other out, where the 1 to 1.6 or so would lean in towards favoring the company taking more traffic onto it's network. It's just a thought, and I am not sure how it would work world-wide. _________________________________________________________________ MSN Photos is the easiest way to share and print your photos: http://photos.msn.com/support/worldwide.aspx

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Re: Sprint peering policy
by Randy Bush 02 Jul '02

02 Jul '02

>>> There is no way for a company to price transit below their peering >>> costs and make money. >> this may be true, but it's the level(3) business model. and the >> rest of the industry got suckered into dropping their drawers to >> match. kinda like a bunch of old men drinking poison to see who >> dies first. > So, what's it going to take to make everyone wise up? the large ones are. this year's strategy is to use chapter 11 to shed the stockholders and lower the debt service burden, see <http://www.thestreet.com/markets/marketfeatures/1359535.html>, or to be bought by an rboc. after kpn/quest and wcom, doing a clean chapter 11 will be seen as honest business. at the same time, the market will continue to narrow and get even more bi-modal, with a few large players and many very small ones. think of it like video stores, you think there is variety at a local level, but blockbuster owns the lion's share of the market. then prices go back up, as it is easy to make the point that then current pricing is not supportable. the large folk make money at last. the small fry, with much higher cost structures struggle along, not making real money, but making good enough statistics to keep government intervention at bay, or even better, to focus the government on protectionism, fixed profits, and/or subsidization. this is a grim picture. but i am confident that the brilliant engineering minds here can come up with an innovative technical solution to this depressing business and social problem. randy

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RE: how is cold-potato done?
by Vandy Hamidi 01 Jul '02

01 Jul '02

>From what I've experience on Cisco routers. The RID isn't the final deciding factor, it has been the route that was first present. I had a router peering with 10.0.0.6 and 10.0.0.7 and if I reset BGP on .6 the .7 route will stick and even though .6 comes back up the .7 route will stay. BGP resets doesn't bring .6 back up. The same applies to resetting .7 Cisco documentation that I've seen has stated the RID is the last criteria. Interesting. -=Vandy=- -----Original Message----- From: Gustavus, Wayne [mailto:wgustavus@gnilink.net] Sent: Wednesday, June 26, 2002 11:18 AM To: 'Ralph Doncaster'; Jared Mauch Cc: nanog(a)merit.edu Subject: RE: how is cold-potato done? Ultimately there won't be any ties, since BGP will eventually have to select a best path. If necessary, the decision will come down to RID. If the metrics really are the same then theoretically it doesn't matter which path it takes. If it does matter, you will have to modify your policy to make a decision based on some other criteria that you are also influencing via policy. ___________________________________________________________ Wayne Gustavus, CCIE #7426 Operations Engineering Verizon Internet Services ___________________________________________________________ -----Original Message----- From: Ralph Doncaster [mailto:ralph@istop.com] Sent: Wednesday, June 26, 2002 2:08 PM To: Jared Mauch Cc: nanog(a)merit.edu Subject: Re: how is cold-potato done? > > If I peer with network X in cities A and B, and receive the same route in > > both cities with an AS-path of X, how do I know which city to use for an > > exit? I can understand how if X uses communities to tag the geographic > > origin of the traffic, but I'm not aware of many networks that do > > this. Lots of networks claim to use cold-potato routing though, so how do > > they do it? > > they use the MED sent on the route (aka metric) from the > other provider to determine which exit where they both interconnect > is the "shortest". > > this can at times provide undesired results because of > aggregation. Besides aggregation, wouldn't this lead to a lot of ties? Let's say the cities are LA & Manhattan, and the route from X originates in Chicago. I would think that it would be a common occurrance for the route to have the same metric in LA & Manhattan. -Ralph

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Re: Sprint peering policy
by Ukyo Kuonji 01 Jul '02

01 Jul '02

>From: dre <andre(a)operations.net> > > >You might be able to sit in a colo and buy some cheap transit from one >provider (especially if the colo isn't carrier neutral). However, if you >want diversity in your upstreams, peering quickly becomes a reality. If you have to buy an OC48 (or dark fiber) from your CO to PAIX/PE, then where is your single point of failure? What help does having redundany peers (which are not redundant anyways) at the same peering facility if you can't get to it? I think I would much rather have two circuits to two different transit providers for the same money. Also, unless you actually have all your CO equipment at the PE facilities, you will still have to have a CO (co-located or not) from which to serve your customers in that market. I don't know what PAIX charges for this ability, or if they even allow it, but... It seems that this would get real expensive real fast. Now, for joe-blow ISP, maybe it's a good deal to be there. But he probably doesn't meet the peering requirements for larger players anyways. I don't believe in free-for-all peering. Who would you sell to if you peered with everyone? >You have to look at all the advantages/disadvantages for your organization. Of course. As I have already stated, I'm not against peering. Actaully, I am all for it. It is just that I am for it for different reasons than others may be. I don't believe that it's a great cost saveings today. Maybe in a year, things will change again, and we will all start making a profit off bandwidth. Maybe 90% of the companies will be gone, and we'll be back to where we were 10 years ago. Who knows? >People have in the past and will continue in the future to use peering to >lower costs for their networks. This is a foolhearty reason to do this. If you are only looking at the financial benefit, you are opening yourself up to a whole can of worms. If you are peered with everyone, and it is costing you $x a meg to get off your network, then you should cancel all peering the minute it is seen that it will cost $x-1 for transit. I seriously doubt that this was the main reason why peering was started anyways. >how long can providers sell transit at $50/meg? Indeed. I hope that it isn't that long, but when you are only charging $3- to $50 a meg to your cable-modem/DSL subscriber, what profit are you making be paying more than that? >If you want to talk about advantages of transit vs. peering I think everyone knows the technical advantages and disadvantages of both peering and transit. I don't think it really has anything to do with this discussion. This discussion is more to do with that is cheaper at this time, peering or transit? Maybe I completely missed the boat on this one, but if we are talking about regulation so someone doesn't get cheated... We are talking about money. And since I brought it up, I'm not particularly interested in governmental regulation either. _________________________________________________________________ Send and receive Hotmail on your mobile device: http://mobile.msn.com

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RE: Sprint peering policy
by Phil Rosenthal 01 Jul '02

01 Jul '02

But if you were hungrier, and they were the only place that had food, they *COULD* charge whatever they want, and you'd be willing to pay it, no? --Phil -----Original Message----- From: owner-nanog(a)merit.edu [mailto:owner-nanog@merit.edu] On Behalf Of David Schwartz Sent: Monday, July 01, 2002 12:45 PM To: vgill(a)vijaygill.com; Mike Leber Cc: nanog(a)merit.edu Subject: Re: Sprint peering policy On 29 Jun 2002 02:32:03 +0000, Vijay Gill wrote: > >Mike Leber <mleber(a)he.net> writes: > >>Sprint's peers aren't equal to Sprint or each other when considered by >>revenue, profitability, number of customers, or geographical coverage. > >A good proxy for the above is to ask the question: > >Do X and Y feel they derive equal value (for some value of equal) by >interconnecting with each other? > >If they think they do, then an interconnection is set up between X and >Y. However, if one party feels that they do NOT derive equal value by >interconnecting with the other, than that party usually balks. This doesn't make any sense at all. Why should X care how much value Y gets out of the deal at all?! This is like saying that Burger King should charge hungrier people more for a Whopper. DS

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Game Theory (was: RE: Sprint peering policy)
by Scott A Crosby 01 Jul '02

01 Jul '02

On Mon, 1 Jul 2002, David Schwartz wrote: > On Mon, 1 Jul 2002 12:11:46 -0500, Paul A Flores wrote: > > >Since it seems we are speaking of 'zero cost' interconnects, if Either X OR > >Y feel like they are getting ripped, they won't (and shouldn't) do it. If > >party X feels that party Y is gaining more from the interconnect that they > >are, X might feel the need to lay some surcharges of some time on the > >connection, which is only fair, if they feel they aren't receiving value for > >value. > > Suppose that X is presented with a take it or leave it deal. Suppose further > that X, on net, benefits from this deal. Why should they care how much or how > little Y, Z, or T benefit from the deal? What kind of business sense does > that make? > > >Otherwise, esp. now that enough people have gotten their hands caught in the > >cookie jars, why would they GIVE away 'free' services for nothing in return? > > We're not talking about "nothing in return". We're talking about an > arrangement between two parties that both benefit from. Why should one party > care how much the other benefits? (Except, of course, as possible leverage to > negotiate a better deal.) > What you're describing is a game theory problem.. The situation you describe, where neither party charges for as long as both parties benefit, this only occurs when the parties have no information on each other. Lets say you have two parties, A&B, and zero transaction costs. Furthermore, both parties wish to obtain the MAXIMUM benefit from the deal. A benefits $ 50 B benefits $100 Now, there are 4 situations: 1. A knows nothing about how much B will benefit and vice versa. In this case, if either party tries to charge the other, they run a risk of having the deal fall through, and getting no benefit. The optimal situation is for neither party to request any payment from the other. (This situation is theoretical, in real business, you could make guesses as to the benefit obtained by another party.) Total benefit is $50 & $100 2. B knows that A will benefit by $50. A knows nothing. Then, B could demand a charge of $49. A would choose to pay it, for they would obtain a net benefit of $1. Note that in this case, B who's already benefitting the most would get paid by A! Total benefit is $1 & $149 3. A knows that B will benefit by $100. B knows nothing. Then A could demand a charge of $99. B would choose to pay it, for they would obtain a net benefit of $1. Total benefit is $149 and $1. 4. A and B both know how much the other benefits. Then.. I'm not exactly sure how game theory reasons this out. In reality, there is more than one party, and imperfect information on respective benefits. I believe one would use an economic and statistical argument, and the expected result would be that B paid A $25. > Actually, I think you can make peering fair in a much more simple way. > Simply explain to people a sensible and rational way to evaluate their > peering decisions. "Does it benefit me as much as or more than anyone else" > is neither sensible not rational. "Does it benefit me more than it costs me?" > and "Is it the best deal I can negotiate for this amount of benefit?", on the > other hand, are sensible, rational, and fair. Knowing how much the other benefits from a particular transaction can lead to a remarkable difference in how valuable the transaction is to the respective parties. And maximizing revenue is the purpose of business. Scott

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RE: Sprint peering policy
by Paul A Flores 01 Jul '02

01 Jul '02

> On 29 Jun 2002 02:32:03 +0000, Vijay Gill wrote: > > > >Mike Leber <mleber(a)he.net> writes: > > > >>Sprint's peers aren't equal to Sprint or each other when > considered by > >>revenue, profitability, number of customers, or > geographical coverage. > > > >A good proxy for the above is to ask the question: > > > >Do X and Y feel they derive equal value (for some value of equal) by > >interconnecting with each other? > > > >If they think they do, then an interconnection is set up between X > >and Y. However, if one party feels that they do NOT derive equal > >value by interconnecting with the other, than that party usually > >balks. > > This doesn't make any sense at all. Why should X care > how much value Y gets > out of the deal at all?! This is like saying that Burger King > should charge > hungrier people more for a Whopper. > Don't you think they would if they could? :) Since it seems we are speaking of 'zero cost' interconnects, if Either X OR Y feel like they are getting ripped, they won't (and shouldn't) do it. If party X feels that party Y is gaining more from the interconnect that they are, X might feel the need to lay some surcharges of some time on the connection, which is only fair, if they feel they aren't receiving value for value. Otherwise, esp. now that enough people have gotten their hands caught in the cookie jars, why would they GIVE away 'free' services for nothing in return? Peering with anyone is a pain, but a necessary one. If you don't have something anyone wants, your not going to get peered (for free) with anyone. You have ZERO value to anyone else, therefore, expect to pay for your connections. Does it really have to be more complicated than that? Since this is basically a financial issue (and not really a regulatory issue), the only way you could make it 'fair' is to have some kind of mandate from a government body to MAKE peering 'fair'. The only way _I_ would buy off on that, would be to have some kind of subsidy paid from tax dollars to the carriers in question to 'force' them to peer with people who have no other redeeming value. This way, I get paid, Y gets to brag to his peers that he is hooked up with X and my tax bill goes up... Talk about false progress. Isn't fudging the books how we got here in the 1st place? No thanks. -PF

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Allocated IP blocks
by Mike Batchelor 01 Jul '02

01 Jul '02

Is there a list anywhere of allocated IP blocks? I need to update my IDS sensor's table of valid blocks. It's alarming on some traffic coming from 67, 68 and 219, which I know were not allocated until fairly recently. Is there a simple list somewhere, i.e: 4.0.0.0/8 6.0.0.0/8 .... 219.0.0.0/24 etc... ?? --- "The avalanche has already begun. It is too late for the pebbles to vote." -- Kosh

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how is cold-potato done?
by Ralph Doncaster 01 Jul '02

01 Jul '02

If I peer with network X in cities A and B, and receive the same route in both cities with an AS-path of X, how do I know which city to use for an exit? I can understand how if X uses communities to tag the geographic origin of the traffic, but I'm not aware of many networks that do this. Lots of networks claim to use cold-potato routing though, so how do they do it? Ralph Doncaster principal, IStop.com

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Re: Sprint peering policy
by alex＠yuriev.com 01 Jul '02

01 Jul '02

> >If they think they do, then an interconnection is set up between X > >and Y. However, if one party feels that they do NOT derive equal > >value by interconnecting with the other, than that party usually > >balks. > > This doesn't make any sense at all. Why should X care how much value Y gets > out of the deal at all?! This is like saying that Burger King should charge > hungrier people more for a Whopper. > It is called price descrimination and it does happen, not at burger king though. For example, those who arrive at certail site via Overture referals end up paying more for goods, compared to those who come from comparsion sites. Alex

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