December 2013 - Test - lists.nanog.org

Re: Caps (was Re: AT&T UVERSE Native IPv6, a HOWTO)
by Larry Sheldon 09 Dec '13

09 Dec '13

On 12/8/2013 11:48 PM, Jay Ashworth wrote: > ----- Original Message ----- >> From: "Dave Crocker" <dhc2(a)dcrocker.net> > >> I seem to recall an early bit of research on interactive computing >> (maybe by Sackman) that showed user preference for a /worse/ average >> response time that was more predictable (narrower range of variance) >> than a better average time that was more erratic. > > Very specifically: > > A 3270 that took 5 seconds of delay and then *snapped* the entire screen > up at once was perceived as "faster" than a 9600 tty that painted the same > entire screen in about a second and a half or so. Don't remember who it > was either, but likely Bell Labs. Back in the day we were building a system to run on UNIVAC equipment but some brainiac decided that because we were a Bell System company, we had to use DataSpeed 40's (which buffered the screen and snap it up when the last character is received) instead of the UTS terminals on which the system was developed (which painted each character as it came in. Users weeped and wailed to no effect that the change hurt them badly (which they could prove) because that while the two had the same time from first character to last, the operators could not start composing a reply when the first several lines had painted. -- Requiescas in pace o email Two identifying characteristics of System Administrators: Ex turpi causa non oritur actio Infallibility, and the ability to learn from their mistakes. (Adapted from Stephen Pinker)

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Someone’s Been Siphoning Data Through a Huge Security Hole in the Internet
by Eugen Leitl 09 Dec '13

09 Dec '13

http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2013/12/bgp-hijacking-belarus-iceland/ Someone’s Been Siphoning Data Through a Huge Security Hole in the Internet BY KIM ZETTER12.05.136:30 AM Hijacked traffic went all the way to Iceland, where it may have been copied before being released to its intended destination. The green arrows show the path the traffic should have traveled; the red arrows show the path it took. Map courtesy of Renesys In 2008, two security researchers at the DefCon hacker conference demonstrated a massive security vulnerability in the worldwide internet traffic-routing system — a vulnerability so severe that it could allow intelligence agencies, corporate spies or criminals to intercept massive amounts of data, or even tamper with it on the fly. The traffic hijack, they showed, could be done in such a way that no one would notice because the attackers could simply re-route the traffic to a router they controlled, then forward it to its intended destination once they were done with it, leaving no one the wiser about what had occurred. Now, five years later, this is exactly what has happened. Earlier this year, researchers say, someone mysteriously hijacked internet traffic headed to government agencies, corporate offices and other recipients in the U.S. and elsewhere and redirected it to Belarus and Iceland, before sending it on its way to its legitimate destinations. They did so repeatedly over several months. But luckily someone did notice. And this may not be the first time it has occurred — just the first time it got caught. Analysts at Renesys, a network monitoring firm, said that over several months earlier this year someone diverted the traffic using the same vulnerability in the so-called Border Gateway Protocol, or BGP, that the two security researchers demonstrated in 2008. The BGP attack, a version of the classic man-in-the-middle exploit, allows hijackers to fool other routers into re-directing data to a system they control. When they finally send it to its correct destination, neither the sender nor recipient is aware that their data has made an unscheduled stop. The stakes are potentially enormous, since once data is hijacked, the perpetrator can copy and then comb through any unencrypted data freely — reading email and spreadsheets, extracting credit card numbers, and capturing vast amounts of sensitive information. The attackers initiated the hijacks at least 38 times, grabbing traffic from about 1,500 individual IP blocks — sometimes for minutes, other times for days — and they did it in such a way that, researchers say, it couldn’t have been a mistake. Renesys Senior Analyst Doug Madory says initially he thought the motive was financial, since traffic destined for a large bank got sucked up in the diversion. But then the hijackers began diverting traffic intended for the foreign ministries of several countries he declined to name, as well as a large VoIP provider in the U.S., and ISPs that process the internet communications of thousands of customers. Although the intercepts originated from a number of different systems in Belarus and Iceland, Renesys believes the hijacks are all related, and that the hijackers may have altered the locations to obfuscate their activity. “What makes a man-in-the-middle routing attack different from a simple route hijack? Simply put, the traffic keeps flowing and everything looks fine to the recipient,…” Renesys wrote in a blog post about the hijacks. “It’s possible to drag specific internet traffic halfway around the world, inspect it, modify it if desired, and send it on its way. Who needs fiberoptic taps?” Earlier this year someone mysteriously hijacked internet traffic headed to government agencies, corporate offices and other recipients and redirected it to Belarus and Iceland (above). Photo: Image Source/Getty Renesys cautions that it doesn’t know who is behind the hijacks. Although systems in Belarus and Iceland initiated the hijacks, it’s possible that those systems were hijacked by a third party that simply used them as a proxy for the attacks. Either way, one thing is certain, Madory says: the characteristics of the hijacks indicate they were intentional. Some of the targets whose traffic was hijacked seemed hand-picked by the attackers, he says, especially the foreign ministry domains. “It’s a list [of targets] that you just wouldn’t come by mistake,” Madory told WIRED. The hijackers also appeared to tweak their attack over time to modify and refine it. “In the Belarus example, we saw an evolution of the technique of someone manipulating the attributes of the BGP messages to try to achieve this man-in-the-middle thing,” he said. “To us, that communicated some intention versus a mistake.” BGP eavesdropping has long been a known weakness, but no one is known to have intentionally exploited it like this until now. The technique doesn’t attack a bug or flaw in BGP, but simply takes advantage of the fact that BGP’s architecture is based on trust. To make it easy for e-mail traffic from an ISP in California to reach customers of an ISP in Spain, networks for these providers and others communicate through BGP routers. Each router distributes so-called announcements indicating which IP addresses they’re in the best position to deliver traffic to, for the quickest, most efficient route. But BGP routers assume that when another router says it’s the best path to a specific block of IP addresses, it’s telling the truth. That gullibility makes it easy for eavesdroppers to fool routers into sending them traffic they shouldn’t get. When a user types a website name into his browser or clicks “send” to launch an e-mail, a router belonging to the sender’s ISP consults a BGP table for the best route to the destination. That table is built from the announcements issued by ISPs and other networks declaring the range of IP addresses, or IP prefixes, to which they’ll deliver traffic. The routing table searches for the destination IP address among those prefixes, and if two systems deliver traffic for the address, the one with the narrower, more specific range of prefixes “wins” the traffic. For example, one ISP announces that it delivers to a group of 90,000 IP addresses, while another delivers to a subset of 24,000 of those addresses. If the destination IP address falls within both of these, the e-mail will get sent to the narrower, more specific one. To intercept data, anyone with a BGP router or control of a BGP router could send out an announcement for a range of IP addresses he wished to target that was narrower than the chunk advertised by other network routers. The announcement would take just minutes to propagate worldwide and, just like that, data that should have headed to those networks would begin arriving to the eavesdropper’s router instead. Ordinarily, when an attacker tried to then forward the stolen traffic to its rightful destination, it would boomerang back to him, since other routers would still believe that his was the best destination for the traffic. But the technique demonstrated at DefCon, and now spotted in the wild, allows an attacker to send his announcement in such a way that it is delivered only to select routers. So, once the traffic passes through his router, it gets directed to its rightful destination through routers that never got the bogus announcement. The attack intercepts only traffic headed to target addresses, not from them. BGP hijacking happens in some form or fashion every day, but it’s usually unintentional — the result of a typo in a routing announcement or some other mistake. And when it does occur, it generally results in an outage, as the traffic being routed never reaches its destination. This was the case in 2008 when Pakistan Telecom inadvertently hijacked all of the world’s YouTube traffic when it attempted to prevent just Pakistan citizens from reaching video content the government deemed objectionable. The telecom and its upstream provider mistakenly advertised to routers around the world that it was the best route through which to send all YouTube traffic, and for nearly two hours browsers attempting to reach YouTube fell into a black hole in Pakistan until the problem was corrected. In April 2010, another outage occurred when China Telecom distributed an erroneous announcement for more than 50,000 blocks of IP addresses, and within minutes some of the traffic destined for these domains got sucked into China Telecom’s network for 20 minutes. After analyzing the details, Renesys concluded that this incident, too, was likely a mistake. But the incidents this year have all the characteristics of an intentional intercept, Renesys says. There are legitimate reasons to send out bogus BGP announcements intentionally. Some security firms do this as part of a DDoS protection service. If a victim is being hit with a lot of trash traffic in an effort to knock its servers offline, the security firms will send out bogus announcements to divert traffic away from the client, filter out the trash, and forward the legitimate traffic to the client. But Renesys ruled this out as an explanation for the suspected hijacks after speaking with victims whose IP traffic was hijacked. The first hijacks occurred last February, when an internet service provider called GlobalOneBel based in the Belarusian capital, Minsk, sent out a bogus BGP announcement. The intercepts occurred 21 times throughout the month, with different IP addresses re-routed each day. Some of the intercepts lasted a few minutes, others continued for hours. Countries whose traffic was intercepted included the U.S., Germany, South Korea and Iran. GlobalOneBel’s traffic gets routed through the state-run Bel Telecom, which is where Renesys saw the hijacked traffic go. In one case, traffic headed from New York to Los Angeles took a detour to Moscow and Belarus before being sent back through New York to its destination on the West Coast. In another case, traffic headed from Chicago to Iran, which normally passed through Germany, took a roundabout journey through Canada, London, Amsterdam, Moscow and Belarus before being sent to Iran via Poland, Germany, the UK and New York. The intercepts suddenly halted in March, but then resumed on May 21. This time the hijack appeared to be initiated by a system belonging to Elsat, another ISP in Belarus, whose traffic also gets routed through Belarus’s state-run telecom. The intercepts didn’t last long, though, before the hijackers appeared to change their tactics. The diversion to Belarus stopped, and instead Renesys saw traffic being diverted to a different location, this time in Iceland. The hijack now appeared to be initiated by Nyherji hf, a small internet provider in that country. That intercept lasted just five minutes before the hijack went silent. Nothing occurred again until July 31 when the intercepts resumed with a vengeance, this time appearing to come from Opin Kerfi, another ISP in Iceland. The hijack intercepted 597 IP blocks belonging to a large company in the U.S. that provides VoIP and other services, as well as other IP blocks, most of them in the U.S. Renesys counted 17 intercepts between July 31 and August 19, with nine different ISPs or companies in Iceland initiating the intercepts — all of them downstream customers of Síminn, an internet backbone provider in Iceland. In one case, traffic headed from one location in Denver, Colorado, to another location in Denver flew off to Illinois, Virginia and New York before traveling overseas to London and Iceland. From there it was redirected back to Denver through Canada, Illinois, New York, Texas and Missouri before finally reaching its destination. The bogus BGP announcements that hijacked the traffic went to so-called peering partners of Síminn in London but not to its peering partners elsewhere. Peers are separate networks that have an established connection in order to easily pass traffic back and forth. Map showing the long and winding path taken by traffic headed from Chicago to Iran. The green route represents the normal route the traffic takes; the red route is the hijacked route it took through Belarus. Renesys contacted Síminn to inquire about the redirects and was told the cause was a bug that had since been patched. “A software malfunction in Síminn’s internet gateway in Montreal this summer resulted in the corruption of routing data,” a Síminn security manager wrote Renesys in an email. “The effect of the malfunction was that traffic which was not intended for Síminn or its customers passed through Síminn’s network en route to its intended destination. … The malfunction had the effect that the corrupt routing data appeared to originate from certain customers of Síminn, including Opin Kerfi and Nýherji.” The company said the malfunction was resolved with the assistance of the equipment vendor on August 22nd. Renesys, skeptical of the response, asked for details about the bug and the vendor so that others using the same system could fix it as well, but Síminn didn’t respond. The Síminn manager also did not respond to questions from WIRED. Madory says that if the hijacks to Iceland occurred in isolation, Siminn’s explanation might be plausible, though he still wouldn’t understand how a problem with a system in Montreal resulted in traffic being misrouted through London but then correctly routed through Montreal on its way back from Iceland. But the hijacks to Iceland weren’t isolated; they occurred around the same time as the Belarus attacks. He says he has no doubt that the Belarus hijacks were intentional, and the fact that the last Belarus hijack and the first hijack to Iceland occurred on the same day – May 21 – within minutes of one another appear to link them. “This is a one-in-a-million thing that this would just also happen [on the same day] with some similarities to it,” he says. Renesys discovered the hijacks because it uses an automated system to read global BGP tables daily and tag any that match suspicious parameters. But BGP tables don’t tell the whole story. So Renesys also sends about a quarter of a billion traceroutes a day around the world to measure the health of digital traffic – like a coronary angiography for the internet. This helps verify that the data in routing tables matches what is really happening to data in the stream, and helps them spot outages when undersea cables are cut or when countries like Iran or Syria block users from the internet. Judging by the BGP tables alone, the traffic that got hijacked to Belarus, for example, should have dead-ended there. But when Renesys sent traceroutes along the same path, it got sucked into the stream going to Belarus and then got spit out the other end to continue to its destination. “Which is alarming,” Madory says. BGP hijacking is an “exceedingly blunt instrument” to capture traffic, and is “about as subtle as a firecracker in a funeral home,” Renesys has noted in the past. In all the years Renesys has been monitoring internet traffic, analysts had never seen anything that looked intentional before. Generally, Madory says, mistakes look clumsy and show obvious signs of being mistakes. They also generally last minutes, not days as these did, and they also generally do not result in traffic being re-routed to its legitimate destination, as occurred in these cases. “To achieve this thing where you can get [hijacked] traffic back to its destination, . . . you have to craft your [BGP] messages in a way that you control how far it propagates or where it propagates,” he says. “And we can see these guys experiment over time, modifying different attributes to change the propagation until they’ve achieved the one that they want. We’ve never seen anything like that, that looks very deliberate where someone is tweaking the approach.” But Tony Kapela, VP of data center and network technology at 5Nines in Wisconsin and one of the researchers who exposed the BGP vulnerability in 2008, is shocked that no other signs of intentional hijacking have occurred since their talk five years ago and questions whether this is really the first case, or just the first one seen. Kapela says there are a number of ways that an attacker could hijack traffic so that even Renesys wouldn’t notice — specifically, if attackers wanted to grab a narrow slice of traffic going to a specific destination and did so in a way that prevented a bogus route announcement from being distributed to the entire internet. He gives the example of three networks that are traffic peers. One of the networks could siphon traffic passing between the other two by sending a route announcement that doesn’t get broadcast to the wider internet. The attacker would send an announcement to one of the others with a tag attached, indicating that the announcement should not be broadcast to any other systems. “If you have the ability to give a network route to another provider and say ‘don’t export this,’ and if that provider doesn’t give it to Renesys or the world, it will not be visible,” Kapela says. Renesys has monitoring systems set up throughout the internet in more than 400 networks, but doesn’t see all traffic movement. “Renesys sees whatever lands in the fly trap,” Kapela says. “But if you pick one that doesn’t give a route view to Renesys, you have a good chance of not having this get noticed.” Kapela notes that the first time he and his colleague demonstrated a BGP attack at a conference in Germany, the bogus announcements they sent out did not reach the internet at large, just the specific networks they wanted to affect. Kapela says the culprit doesn’t have to be one of the three entities in the attack scenario, but could actually be an outsider who simply seizes control of one of the systems and sends out the bogus announcement without the owner of the system knowing it. He imagines a scenario where an attacker gains physical access to a router belonging to one of the companies and installs a monitoring device to record data, then gains control of the router console to send out a bogus BGP announcement to redirect traffic through the router. If anyone discovers the redirect, the culprit would appear to be the company that owned the router. Kapela says this kind of attack could become a real risk as data centers and ISPs begin installing centralized router controls. Until now, many ISPs have used proprietary systems and decentralized models of control whereby routers were managed individually. But many are switching to new systems, where control for numerous routers is centralized. If someone can hijack the master control, he can distribute bogus announcements. There may also be ways to feed operators false data to blind them to this manipulation. Renesys and Kapela say that ISPs, credit-card processing companies, government agencies and others should all be monitoring the global routing of their advertised IP prefixes to make sure that someone isn’t hijacking their traffic or using their system to hijack someone else’s traffic. In other words, the future may hold more of these security breaches. As Renesys warned on its blog: “We believe that people are still attempting this because they believe (correctly, in most cases) that nobody is looking.” Kim Zetter is a senior reporter at Wired covering cybercrime, privacy, security and civil liberties. Read more by Kim Zetter Follow @KimZetter and @ThreatLevel on Twitter.

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Empty messages (was Re: Any computer, anywhere?)
by Larry Sheldon 08 Dec '13

08 Dec '13

On 12/8/2013 8:13 AM, Michael Brown wrote: > I've been getting several of these (empty messages) from different people and on different subjects but always on the NANOG list. Secret messages? Or is NSA sucking too hard? -- Requiescas in pace o email Two identifying characteristics of System Administrators: Ex turpi causa non oritur actio Infallibility, and the ability to learn from their mistakes. (Adapted from Stephen Pinker)

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Any computer, anywhere?
by Warren Bailey 08 Dec '13

08 Dec '13

http://m.washingtonpost.com/business/technology/2013/12/06/352ba174-5397-11… Noticed this tonight.. Not saying the WP is always on target, but what software could be installed via a browser on any computer to gather all of that data? And how would it be done without the OS speaking up about it? Far fetched.. Or do the Firefox / chrome guys have some 'splainin to do? Sent from my Mobile Device.

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844 INWATS prefix activated
by Jay Ashworth 08 Dec '13

08 Dec '13

Note, if you're the PBX guy somewhere, too, that the +1 844 toll free prefix was activated at 1200EST today. Cheers, -- jra -- Make Election Day a federal holiday: http://wh.gov/lBm94 100k sigs by 12/14 Jay R. Ashworth Baylink jra(a)baylink.com Designer The Things I Think RFC 2100 Ashworth & Associates http://baylink.pitas.com 2000 Land Rover DII St Petersburg FL USA #natog +1 727 647 1274

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RE: Any computer, anywhere?
by Phil Bedard 08 Dec '13

08 Dec '13

Have you ever heard of Java and Flash? There is a reason why browsers explicitly disable Java, heck OSX removed it from the OS completely. Flash will run sandboxed in newer browsers but Java afaik cannot. Almost all malware is delivered using them, one research company I read about has lists of non-public Java exploits they sell to governments... Phil From: Warren Bailey Sent: 12/8/2013 3:26 To: nanog(a)nanog.org Subject: Any computer, anywhere? http://m.washingtonpost.com/business/technology/2013/12/06/352ba174-5397-11… Noticed this tonight.. Not saying the WP is always on target, but what software could be installed via a browser on any computer to gather all of that data? And how would it be done without the OS speaking up about it? Far fetched.. Or do the Firefox / chrome guys have some 'splainin to do? Sent from my Mobile Device.

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BGP Update Report
by cidr-report＠potaroo.net 06 Dec '13

06 Dec '13

BGP Update Report Interval: 28-Nov-13 -to- 05-Dec-13 (7 days) Observation Point: BGP Peering with AS131072 TOP 20 Unstable Origin AS Rank ASN Upds % Upds/Pfx AS-Name 1 - AS7545 61106 2.5% 112.1 -- TPG-INTERNET-AP TPG Telecom Limited 2 - AS8402 54975 2.3% 26.2 -- CORBINA-AS OJSC "Vimpelcom" 3 - AS9829 48061 2.0% 51.2 -- BSNL-NIB National Internet Backbone 4 - AS14287 31004 1.3% 5167.3 -- TRIAD-TELECOM - Triad Telecom, Inc. 5 - AS10620 23186 1.0% 11.9 -- Telmex Colombia S.A. 6 - AS13118 22847 0.9% 11423.5 -- ASN-YARTELECOM OJSC Rostelecom 7 - AS29990 22060 0.9% 22060.0 -- ASN-APPNEXUS - AppNexus, Inc 8 - AS36753 21592 0.9% 10796.0 -- SSF-AUTO-PARTS - SSF Imported Autoparts Inc. 9 - AS24964 20919 0.9% 445.1 -- EVO-LTD MOBILTEL EAD 10 - AS4766 20619 0.9% 7.3 -- KIXS-AS-KR Korea Telecom 11 - AS7029 19366 0.8% 9.3 -- WINDSTREAM - Windstream Communications Inc 12 - AS4775 18892 0.8% 2698.9 -- GLOBE-TELECOM-AS Globe Telecoms 13 - AS4538 18347 0.8% 32.8 -- ERX-CERNET-BKB China Education and Research Network Center 14 - AS24085 17912 0.7% 471.4 -- QTSC-AS-VN Quang Trung Software City Development Company 15 - AS28021 17501 0.7% 2187.6 -- ASEGLOB S.A. 16 - AS37004 16453 0.7% 658.1 -- SUBURBAN-AS 17 - AS17488 15662 0.7% 28.7 -- HATHWAY-NET-AP Hathway IP Over Cable Internet 18 - AS13999 15417 0.6% 98.2 -- Mega Cable, S.A. de C.V. 19 - AS45544 14250 0.6% 619.6 -- PAVIETNAM-AS-VN PAVIETNAM Co.,Ltd 20 - AS27738 14104 0.6% 24.5 -- Ecuadortelecom S.A. TOP 20 Unstable Origin AS (Updates per announced prefix) Rank ASN Upds % Upds/Pfx AS-Name 1 - AS29990 22060 0.9% 22060.0 -- ASN-APPNEXUS - AppNexus, Inc 2 - AS13118 22847 0.9% 11423.5 -- ASN-YARTELECOM OJSC Rostelecom 3 - AS36753 21592 0.9% 10796.0 -- SSF-AUTO-PARTS - SSF Imported Autoparts Inc. 4 - AS54465 7287 0.3% 7287.0 -- QPM-AS-1 - QuickPlay Media Inc. 5 - AS59217 6173 0.3% 6173.0 -- AZONNELIMITED-AS-AP Azonne Limited 6 - AS14287 31004 1.3% 5167.3 -- TRIAD-TELECOM - Triad Telecom, Inc. 7 - AS22592 4294 0.2% 4294.0 -- HBP - HBP, Inc. 8 - AS60345 8026 0.3% 4013.0 -- NBITI-AS Nahjol Balagheh International Research Institution 9 - AS52640 3053 0.1% 3053.0 -- ULTRANET SCM - COMUNICACAO MULTIMIDIA LTDA. 10 - AS4775 18892 0.8% 2698.9 -- GLOBE-TELECOM-AS Globe Telecoms 11 - AS32244 6719 0.3% 2239.7 -- LIQUID-WEB-INC - Liquid Web, Inc. 12 - AS37367 2208 0.1% 2208.0 -- CALLKEY 13 - AS28021 17501 0.7% 2187.6 -- ASEGLOB S.A. 14 - AS62431 1975 0.1% 1975.0 -- NCSC-IE-AS National Cyber Security Centre 15 - AS21271 5661 0.2% 1887.0 -- SOTELMABGP 16 - AS7202 8633 0.4% 1726.6 -- FAMU - Florida A & M University 17 - AS45556 1087 0.1% 1087.0 -- SCANCOM-AS-VN Scancom Vietnam Ltd 18 - AS31245 969 0.0% 969.0 -- ATI-ISP 19 - AS37453 9415 0.4% 941.5 -- VODACOM-CONGO 20 - AS37504 1802 0.1% 901.0 -- Meninx TOP 20 Unstable Prefixes Rank Prefix Upds % Origin AS -- AS Name 1 - 109.161.64.0/20 22846 0.9% AS13118 -- ASN-YARTELECOM OJSC Rostelecom 2 - 103.243.220.0/22 22060 0.9% AS29990 -- ASN-APPNEXUS - AppNexus, Inc 3 - 12.68.46.0/24 11241 0.4% AS36753 -- SSF-AUTO-PARTS - SSF Imported Autoparts Inc. 4 - 64.240.174.0/24 10351 0.4% AS36753 -- SSF-AUTO-PARTS - SSF Imported Autoparts Inc. 6 - 222.127.0.0/24 9371 0.4% AS4775 -- GLOBE-TELECOM-AS Globe Telecoms 7 - 38.87.227.0/24 9027 0.3% AS37453 -- VODACOM-CONGO 8 - 192.58.232.0/24 7807 0.3% AS6629 -- NOAA-AS - NOAA 9 - 206.152.15.0/24 7287 0.3% AS54465 -- QPM-AS-1 - QuickPlay Media Inc. 10 - 220.244.72.0/21 6770 0.3% AS7545 -- TPG-INTERNET-AP TPG Telecom Limited 11 - 67.210.190.0/23 6709 0.3% AS11976 -- FIDN - Fidelity Communication International Inc. 12 - 14.202.160.0/22 6545 0.3% AS7545 -- TPG-INTERNET-AP TPG Telecom Limited 13 - 216.162.0.0/20 6204 0.2% AS14287 -- TRIAD-TELECOM - Triad Telecom, Inc. 14 - 208.73.244.0/22 6202 0.2% AS14287 -- TRIAD-TELECOM - Triad Telecom, Inc. 15 - 208.78.116.0/22 6198 0.2% AS14287 -- TRIAD-TELECOM - Triad Telecom, Inc. 16 - 208.88.232.0/22 6196 0.2% AS14287 -- TRIAD-TELECOM - Triad Telecom, Inc. 17 - 208.70.20.0/22 6180 0.2% AS14287 -- TRIAD-TELECOM - Triad Telecom, Inc. 18 - 103.243.164.0/22 6173 0.2% AS59217 -- AZONNELIMITED-AS-AP Azonne Limited 19 - 67.210.188.0/23 6153 0.2% AS11976 -- FIDN - Fidelity Communication International Inc. 20 - 217.64.96.0/20 5655 0.2% AS21271 -- SOTELMABGP Details at http://bgpupdates.potaroo.net ------------------------------------ Copies of this report are mailed to: nanog(a)nanog.org eof-list(a)ripe.net apops(a)apops.net routing-wg(a)ripe.net afnog(a)afnog.org

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The Cidr Report
by cidr-report＠potaroo.net 06 Dec '13

06 Dec '13

This report has been generated at Fri Dec 6 21:13:57 2013 AEST. The report analyses the BGP Routing Table of AS2.0 router and generates a report on aggregation potential within the table. Check http://www.cidr-report.org for a current version of this report. Recent Table History Date Prefixes CIDR Agg 29-11-13 485190 274098 30-11-13 485543 274016 01-12-13 485557 274109 02-12-13 484805 274254 03-12-13 485255 273951 04-12-13 484901 274262 05-12-13 484986 274625 06-12-13 485100 274200 AS Summary 45786 Number of ASes in routing system 18791 Number of ASes announcing only one prefix 4208 Largest number of prefixes announced by an AS AS7029 : WINDSTREAM - Windstream Communications Inc 118909696 Largest address span announced by an AS (/32s) AS4134 : CHINANET-BACKBONE No.31,Jin-rong Street Aggregation Summary The algorithm used in this report proposes aggregation only when there is a precise match using the AS path, so as to preserve traffic transit policies. Aggregation is also proposed across non-advertised address space ('holes'). --- 06Dec13 --- ASnum NetsNow NetsAggr NetGain % Gain Description Table 485084 274137 210947 43.5% All ASes AS28573 3421 96 3325 97.2% NET Serviços de Comunicação S.A. AS6389 3038 56 2982 98.2% BELLSOUTH-NET-BLK - BellSouth.net Inc. AS17974 2720 178 2542 93.5% TELKOMNET-AS2-AP PT Telekomunikasi Indonesia AS7029 4208 1727 2481 59.0% WINDSTREAM - Windstream Communications Inc AS4766 2955 961 1994 67.5% KIXS-AS-KR Korea Telecom AS22773 2299 440 1859 80.9% ASN-CXA-ALL-CCI-22773-RDC - Cox Communications Inc. AS18881 1708 31 1677 98.2% Global Village Telecom AS10620 2693 1070 1623 60.3% Telmex Colombia S.A. AS18566 2051 566 1485 72.4% MEGAPATH5-US - MegaPath Corporation AS4323 2956 1521 1435 48.5% TWTC - tw telecom holdings, inc. AS36998 1854 457 1397 75.4% SDN-MOBITEL AS1785 2048 669 1379 67.3% AS-PAETEC-NET - PaeTec Communications, Inc. AS7303 1736 472 1264 72.8% Telecom Argentina S.A. AS4755 1793 582 1211 67.5% TATACOMM-AS TATA Communications formerly VSNL is Leading ISP AS7552 1202 142 1060 88.2% VIETEL-AS-AP Vietel Corporation AS22561 1239 254 985 79.5% AS22561 - CenturyTel Internet Holdings, Inc. AS9829 1538 636 902 58.6% BSNL-NIB National Internet Backbone AS35908 922 93 829 89.9% VPLSNET - Krypt Technologies AS7545 2113 1301 812 38.4% TPG-INTERNET-AP TPG Telecom Limited AS18101 985 182 803 81.5% RELIANCE-COMMUNICATIONS-IN Reliance Communications Ltd.DAKC MUMBAI AS4808 1144 380 764 66.8% CHINA169-BJ CNCGROUP IP network China169 Beijing Province Network AS24560 1098 369 729 66.4% AIRTELBROADBAND-AS-AP Bharti Airtel Ltd., Telemedia Services AS701 1511 784 727 48.1% UUNET - MCI Communications Services, Inc. d/b/a Verizon Business AS8151 1376 649 727 52.8% Uninet S.A. de C.V. AS6983 1292 578 714 55.3% ITCDELTA - ITC^Deltacom AS13977 855 143 712 83.3% CTELCO - FAIRPOINT COMMUNICATIONS, INC. AS6147 793 108 685 86.4% Telefonica del Peru S.A.A. AS855 732 58 674 92.1% CANET-ASN-4 - Bell Aliant Regional Communications, Inc. AS4780 1020 354 666 65.3% SEEDNET Digital United Inc. AS4788 873 228 645 73.9% TMNET-AS-AP TM Net, Internet Service Provider Total 54173 15085 39088 72.2% Top 30 total Possible Bogus Routes 27.54.116.0/22 AS55452 27.54.116.0/24 AS55452 27.54.119.0/24 AS55452 27.100.7.0/24 AS56096 62.61.220.0/24 AS24974 TACHYON-EU Tachyon Europe BV 62.61.221.0/24 AS24974 TACHYON-EU Tachyon Europe BV 62.122.216.0/22 AS48727 63.247.0.0/19 AS226 LOS-NETTOS-AS - Los Nettos 63.247.0.0/24 AS27609 63.247.1.0/24 AS27609 63.247.2.0/24 AS27609 63.247.3.0/24 AS27609 63.247.4.0/24 AS27609 63.247.5.0/24 AS27609 63.247.6.0/24 AS27609 63.247.7.0/24 AS27609 63.247.8.0/24 AS27609 63.247.9.0/24 AS27609 63.247.10.0/24 AS27609 63.247.11.0/24 AS27609 63.247.13.0/24 AS27609 63.247.14.0/24 AS27609 63.247.15.0/24 AS27609 63.247.16.0/24 AS27609 63.247.17.0/24 AS27609 63.247.18.0/24 AS27609 63.247.19.0/24 AS27609 63.247.20.0/24 AS27609 63.247.21.0/24 AS27609 63.247.22.0/24 AS27609 63.247.23.0/24 AS27609 63.247.24.0/24 AS27609 63.247.25.0/24 AS27609 63.247.26.0/24 AS27609 63.247.27.0/24 AS27609 63.247.28.0/24 AS27609 63.247.29.0/24 AS27609 64.25.16.0/23 AS19535 64.25.20.0/24 AS19535 64.25.21.0/24 AS19535 64.25.22.0/24 AS19535 64.25.27.0/24 AS7046 RFC2270-UUNET-CUSTOMER - MCI Communications Services, Inc. d/b/a Verizon Business 64.111.0.0/20 AS8039 CCC-ASN-1 - Cinergy Communications 64.111.160.0/20 AS40551 64.111.160.0/24 AS40551 64.111.161.0/24 AS40551 64.111.162.0/24 AS40551 64.111.167.0/24 AS40551 64.111.169.0/24 AS40551 64.111.170.0/24 AS40551 64.111.171.0/24 AS40551 64.111.172.0/24 AS40551 64.111.173.0/24 AS40551 64.111.174.0/24 AS40551 64.111.175.0/24 AS40551 64.185.224.0/24 AS27431 JTLNET - JTL Networks Inc. 64.185.225.0/24 AS27431 JTLNET - JTL Networks Inc. 64.185.226.0/24 AS27431 JTLNET - JTL Networks Inc. 64.185.227.0/24 AS27431 JTLNET - JTL Networks Inc. 64.185.228.0/24 AS27431 JTLNET - JTL Networks Inc. 64.185.229.0/24 AS27431 JTLNET - JTL Networks Inc. 64.185.230.0/24 AS27431 JTLNET - JTL Networks Inc. 64.185.231.0/24 AS27431 JTLNET - JTL Networks Inc. 64.185.232.0/24 AS27431 JTLNET - JTL Networks Inc. 64.185.233.0/24 AS27431 JTLNET - JTL Networks Inc. 64.185.234.0/24 AS27431 JTLNET - JTL Networks Inc. 64.185.235.0/24 AS27431 JTLNET - JTL Networks Inc. 64.185.236.0/24 AS27431 JTLNET - JTL Networks Inc. 64.185.237.0/24 AS27431 JTLNET - JTL Networks Inc. 64.185.238.0/24 AS27431 JTLNET - JTL Networks Inc. 64.185.239.0/24 AS27431 JTLNET - JTL Networks Inc. 64.202.48.0/22 AS23380 64.202.52.0/23 AS23380 64.202.54.0/24 AS23380 64.202.55.0/24 AS23380 64.202.56.0/22 AS23380 64.202.60.0/24 AS23380 64.202.61.0/24 AS23380 64.202.62.0/24 AS23380 64.202.63.0/24 AS23380 65.75.216.0/23 AS10494 AAI - Accurate Automation, Inc. 65.75.217.0/24 AS10494 AAI - Accurate Automation, Inc. 65.111.1.0/24 AS32258 SDNGLOBAL - SDN Global 66.11.112.0/20 AS14572 66.55.96.0/23 AS17203 66.55.98.0/24 AS17203 66.55.99.0/24 AS17203 66.55.100.0/22 AS17203 66.55.102.0/23 AS17203 66.55.104.0/21 AS17203 66.180.64.0/21 AS32558 ZEUTER - Zeuter Development Corporation 66.180.239.0/24 AS35888 VIGNETTE - VIGNETTE CORPORATION 66.187.240.0/20 AS14552 ACS-SOUTHEASTDATACENTER - Affiliated Computer Services, Inc. 66.205.224.0/19 AS16526 BIRCH-TELECOM - Birch Telecom, Inc. 66.206.208.0/22 AS23380 66.206.211.0/24 AS14288 MPINET - MPInet 66.206.212.0/24 AS23380 66.206.213.0/24 AS14288 MPINET - MPInet 66.206.214.0/24 AS23380 66.206.215.0/24 AS23380 66.206.216.0/23 AS14288 MPINET - MPInet 66.206.218.0/23 AS23380 66.206.220.0/22 AS23380 66.251.128.0/24 AS33227 BLUEBRIDGE-NETWORKS - Blue Bridge Networks 66.251.133.0/24 AS33227 BLUEBRIDGE-NETWORKS - Blue Bridge Networks 66.251.134.0/24 AS33227 BLUEBRIDGE-NETWORKS - Blue Bridge Networks 66.251.136.0/21 AS33227 BLUEBRIDGE-NETWORKS - Blue Bridge Networks 66.251.140.0/24 AS33227 BLUEBRIDGE-NETWORKS - Blue Bridge Networks 66.251.141.0/24 AS33227 BLUEBRIDGE-NETWORKS - Blue Bridge Networks 66.251.142.0/24 AS33227 BLUEBRIDGE-NETWORKS - Blue Bridge Networks 66.254.160.0/20 AS11402 CCCAS-1 - Charlotte Colocation Center, LLc 66.254.176.0/21 AS11402 CCCAS-1 - Charlotte Colocation Center, LLc 66.254.184.0/22 AS11402 CCCAS-1 - Charlotte Colocation Center, LLc 66.254.188.0/22 AS35916 MULTA-ASN1 - MULTACOM CORPORATION 67.21.144.0/22 AS174 COGENT Cogent/PSI 67.21.148.0/22 AS174 COGENT Cogent/PSI 69.46.224.0/20 AS32592 HUNT-BROTHERS-OF-LOUISIANA-LLC - Hunt Brothers 69.46.236.0/24 AS32592 HUNT-BROTHERS-OF-LOUISIANA-LLC - Hunt Brothers 71.19.134.0/23 AS3313 INET-AS BT Italia S.p.A. 72.19.0.0/19 AS16526 BIRCH-TELECOM - Birch Telecom, Inc. 72.35.224.0/22 AS30097 NUWAVE - NuWave 72.35.232.0/21 AS6246 AVALONTEL - AvalonTel 72.44.16.0/20 AS15054 NORTHEAST-TEXAS-BROADBAND-LLC - Northeast Texas Broadband, LLC 74.112.100.0/22 AS16764 74.113.200.0/23 AS46939 74.114.52.0/22 AS40818 74.114.52.0/23 AS40818 74.114.52.0/24 AS40818 74.114.53.0/24 AS40818 74.114.54.0/23 AS40818 74.114.54.0/24 AS40818 74.114.55.0/24 AS40818 74.114.140.0/22 AS32757 74.115.124.0/23 AS46540 NARSASN - National Asset Recovery Services, Inc 74.118.132.0/22 AS5117 91.193.60.0/22 AS3356 LEVEL3 Level 3 Communications 91.195.66.0/23 AS3356 LEVEL3 Level 3 Communications 91.197.36.0/22 AS43359 91.199.90.0/24 AS44330 91.207.152.0/24 AS64100 91.207.153.0/24 AS64100 91.209.115.0/24 AS31103 KEYWEB-AS Keyweb AG 91.212.54.0/24 AS21409 IKOULA Ikoula Net SAS 93.190.8.0/24 AS47254 93.190.9.0/24 AS47254 93.190.10.0/24 AS47254 94.158.16.0/22 AS3257 TINET-BACKBONE Tinet SpA 94.158.20.0/22 AS3257 TINET-BACKBONE Tinet SpA 94.158.24.0/22 AS3257 TINET-BACKBONE Tinet SpA 94.158.28.0/22 AS3257 TINET-BACKBONE Tinet SpA 100.100.0.0/24 AS4847 CNIX-AP China Networks Inter-Exchange 102.2.88.0/22 AS38456 PACTEL-AS-AP Pacific Teleports. 103.11.1.0/24 AS9822 AMNET-AU-AP Amnet IT Services Pty Ltd 103.13.184.0/23 AS58674 103.15.228.0/22 AS38809 NXGNET-AS-AP Nextgen Networks 103.15.228.0/23 AS38809 NXGNET-AS-AP Nextgen Networks 103.15.230.0/23 AS38809 NXGNET-AS-AP Nextgen Networks 103.21.72.0/22 AS13244 103.21.75.0/24 AS13244 116.206.72.0/24 AS6461 MFNX MFN - Metromedia Fiber Network 116.206.85.0/24 AS6461 MFNX MFN - Metromedia Fiber Network 116.206.103.0/24 AS6461 MFNX MFN - Metromedia Fiber Network 117.120.56.0/21 AS4755 TATACOMM-AS TATA Communications formerly VSNL is Leading ISP 121.46.0.0/16 AS4134 CHINANET-BACKBONE No.31,Jin-rong Street 124.64.0.0/10 AS4847 CNIX-AP China Networks Inter-Exchange 164.40.184.0/24 AS19821 172.102.0.0/22 AS4812 CHINANET-SH-AP China Telecom (Group) 172.116.0.0/24 AS7018 ATT-INTERNET4 - AT&T Services, Inc. 174.136.192.0/18 AS14572 178.218.240.0/24 AS44109 PROJECT-A-AS Stroy-Industria-1 LLC 178.218.241.0/24 AS44109 PROJECT-A-AS Stroy-Industria-1 LLC 178.218.242.0/24 AS44109 PROJECT-A-AS Stroy-Industria-1 LLC 178.218.243.0/24 AS44109 PROJECT-A-AS Stroy-Industria-1 LLC 178.218.244.0/24 AS44109 PROJECT-A-AS Stroy-Industria-1 LLC 178.218.245.0/24 AS44109 PROJECT-A-AS Stroy-Industria-1 LLC 178.218.246.0/24 AS44109 PROJECT-A-AS Stroy-Industria-1 LLC 178.218.247.0/24 AS44109 PROJECT-A-AS Stroy-Industria-1 LLC 178.218.248.0/24 AS44109 PROJECT-A-AS Stroy-Industria-1 LLC 178.218.249.0/24 AS44109 PROJECT-A-AS Stroy-Industria-1 LLC 178.218.250.0/24 AS44109 PROJECT-A-AS Stroy-Industria-1 LLC 178.218.251.0/24 AS44109 PROJECT-A-AS Stroy-Industria-1 LLC 178.218.252.0/24 AS44109 PROJECT-A-AS Stroy-Industria-1 LLC 178.218.253.0/24 AS44109 PROJECT-A-AS Stroy-Industria-1 LLC 178.218.254.0/24 AS44109 PROJECT-A-AS Stroy-Industria-1 LLC 178.218.255.0/24 AS44109 PROJECT-A-AS Stroy-Industria-1 LLC 185.42.96.0/22 AS47139 INDIGO-TADZHIKISTAN-AS CJSC INDIGO TAJIKISTAN 185.42.96.0/23 AS47139 INDIGO-TADZHIKISTAN-AS CJSC INDIGO TAJIKISTAN 185.42.98.0/23 AS47139 INDIGO-TADZHIKISTAN-AS CJSC INDIGO TAJIKISTAN 190.3.160.0/21 AS27975 SYNAPSIS COLOMBIA SAS 190.15.72.0/21 AS15146 CABLEBAHAMAS - Cable Bahamas 190.124.252.0/22 AS7303 Telecom Argentina S.A. 192.166.32.0/20 AS702 AS702 Verizon Business EMEA - Commercial IP service provider in Europe 193.9.59.0/24 AS1257 TELE2 193.16.106.0/24 AS31539 193.22.224.0/20 AS3322 193.22.238.0/23 AS6824 HERMES-NETWORK Hermes Telecom International Ltd 193.109.15.0/24 AS12690 MKSNET-AS MKS Autonomous System 193.164.152.0/24 AS3356 LEVEL3 Level 3 Communications 193.178.217.0/24 AS20737 193.188.252.0/24 AS8697 JTC-AS8697 Jordan Telecommunications Company 193.202.8.0/21 AS3322 193.254.218.0/23 AS25229 VOLIA-AS Kyivski Telekomunikatsiyni Merezhi LLC 194.34.56.0/24 AS3549 GBLX Global Crossing Ltd. 194.34.56.0/25 AS3549 GBLX Global Crossing Ltd. 194.34.56.128/26 AS3549 GBLX Global Crossing Ltd. 194.50.82.0/24 AS16276 OVH OVH Systems 194.63.152.0/22 AS3356 LEVEL3 Level 3 Communications 194.79.48.0/22 AS39117 194.113.27.0/24 AS12518 SHLINK SHLINK Internet Service 194.126.219.0/24 AS34545 195.28.168.0/23 AS8655 195.114.4.0/23 AS41158 195.128.240.0/23 AS21202 DCSNET-AS Bredband2 AB 195.130.208.0/24 AS16265 LEASEWEB LeaseWeb B.V. 195.216.234.0/24 AS31309 NMV-AS New Media Ventures BVBA 195.234.156.0/24 AS25028 200.1.112.0/24 AS29754 GO2TEL GO2TEL.COM INC. 200.18.112.0/20 AS1916 Associação Rede Nacional de Ensino e Pesquisa 200.58.248.0/21 AS27849 201.71.16.0/20 AS28638 EMTEC EMPRESA DE TECNOLOGIA EMPREENDIMENTOS DE COM 202.8.106.0/24 AS9530 SHINSEGAE-AS SHINSEGAE I&C Co., Ltd. 202.12.123.0/24 AS57792 PROVITEX-AS PE Glazunov Yuriy Anatol'yevich 202.49.33.0/24 AS7657 VODAFONE-NZ-NGN-AS Vodafone NZ Ltd. 202.58.113.0/24 AS19161 202.59.240.0/24 AS17477 MCT-SYDNEY Macquarie Telecom 202.83.120.0/21 AS37972 202.83.124.0/24 AS37972 202.83.125.0/24 AS37972 202.83.126.0/24 AS37972 202.94.1.0/24 AS4808 CHINA169-BJ CNCGROUP IP network China169 Beijing Province Network 202.129.208.0/24 AS57792 PROVITEX-AS PE Glazunov Yuriy Anatol'yevich 202.158.251.0/24 AS9255 CONNECTPLUS-AS Singapore Telecom 202.174.125.0/24 AS9498 BBIL-AP BHARTI Airtel Ltd. 202.179.134.0/24 AS23966 LDN-AS-PK LINKdotNET Telecom Limited 203.23.1.0/24 AS18111 NETSPEED-AS-AP Netspeed Internet Communications 203.24.38.0/24 AS18111 NETSPEED-AS-AP Netspeed Internet Communications 203.30.127.0/24 AS18111 NETSPEED-AS-AP Netspeed Internet Communications 203.32.86.0/23 AS18111 NETSPEED-AS-AP Netspeed Internet Communications 203.32.86.0/24 AS18111 NETSPEED-AS-AP Netspeed Internet Communications 203.32.87.0/24 AS18111 NETSPEED-AS-AP Netspeed Internet Communications 203.142.219.0/24 AS45149 203.191.56.0/21 AS38042 INCOMNET-MONGOLIA-AS-AP Incomnet LLC, Mongolia, VSAT and Wireless service 204.9.32.0/24 AS25617 204.9.33.0/24 AS25617 204.9.34.0/24 AS25617 204.9.35.0/24 AS25617 204.9.116.0/22 AS30097 NUWAVE - NuWave 204.10.88.0/21 AS3356 LEVEL3 Level 3 Communications 204.10.92.0/23 AS30097 NUWAVE - NuWave 204.10.94.0/23 AS30097 NUWAVE - NuWave 204.13.12.0/22 AS32952 204.14.208.0/21 AS32952 204.14.213.0/24 AS40067 NEWEGG - Newegg Inc. 204.15.208.0/22 AS13706 COMPLETEWEBNET - CompleteWeb.Net LLC 204.69.144.0/24 AS27283 RJF-INTERNET - Raymond James Financial, Inc. 204.106.16.0/24 AS4323 TWTC - tw telecom holdings, inc. 204.115.110.0/23 AS53709 204.187.11.0/24 AS51113 ELEKTA-AS Elekta 204.225.173.0/24 AS6407 PRIMUS-AS6407 - Primus Telecommunications Canada Inc. 205.159.44.0/24 AS40157 ADESA-CORP-AS - ADESA Corp 205.207.66.0/24 AS15290 ALLST-15290 - Allstream Corp. 205.211.160.0/24 AS30045 UHN-ASN - University Health Network 205.236.71.0/24 AS852 ASN852 - TELUS Communications Inc. 206.81.112.0/20 AS32618 ADKNO-KC - Adknowledge, Inc. 206.197.184.0/24 AS23304 DATOTEL-STL-AS - Datotel LLC, a NetLabs LLC Company 206.221.176.0/24 AS27431 JTLNET - JTL Networks Inc. 206.221.177.0/24 AS27431 JTLNET - JTL Networks Inc. 206.221.178.0/24 AS27431 JTLNET - JTL Networks Inc. 206.221.179.0/24 AS27431 JTLNET - JTL Networks Inc. 206.221.180.0/24 AS27431 JTLNET - JTL Networks Inc. 206.221.181.0/24 AS27431 JTLNET - JTL Networks Inc. 206.221.182.0/24 AS27431 JTLNET - JTL Networks Inc. 206.221.183.0/24 AS27431 JTLNET - JTL Networks Inc. 206.221.184.0/24 AS27431 JTLNET - JTL Networks Inc. 206.221.185.0/24 AS27431 JTLNET - JTL Networks Inc. 206.221.186.0/24 AS27431 JTLNET - JTL Networks Inc. 206.221.187.0/24 AS27431 JTLNET - JTL Networks Inc. 206.221.188.0/24 AS27431 JTLNET - JTL Networks Inc. 206.221.189.0/24 AS27431 JTLNET - JTL Networks Inc. 206.221.190.0/24 AS27431 JTLNET - JTL Networks Inc. 206.221.191.0/24 AS27431 JTLNET - JTL Networks Inc. 207.174.131.0/24 AS26116 INDRA - Indra's Net Inc 207.174.132.0/23 AS26116 INDRA - Indra's Net Inc 207.174.152.0/23 AS26116 INDRA - Indra's Net Inc 207.174.154.0/24 AS26116 INDRA - Indra's Net Inc 207.174.155.0/24 AS26116 INDRA - Indra's Net Inc 207.174.200.0/24 AS22658 EARTHNET - Earthnet, Inc. 207.231.96.0/19 AS11194 NUNETPA - NuNet Inc. 207.254.128.0/21 AS30689 FLOW-NET - FLOW 207.254.128.0/24 AS30689 FLOW-NET - FLOW 207.254.136.0/21 AS30689 FLOW-NET - FLOW 208.66.120.0/22 AS32757 208.68.180.0/22 AS4323 TWTC - tw telecom holdings, inc. 208.74.16.0/21 AS32952 208.74.224.0/22 AS174 COGENT Cogent/PSI 208.75.152.0/21 AS32146 208.76.20.0/24 AS31812 208.76.21.0/24 AS31812 208.77.164.0/24 AS22659 208.77.165.0/24 AS22659 208.77.166.0/24 AS22659 208.77.167.0/24 AS22659 208.83.53.0/24 AS40569 YGOMI-AS - Ygomi LLC 208.84.232.0/24 AS33131 208.84.234.0/24 AS33131 208.84.237.0/24 AS33131 208.84.238.0/24 AS33131 208.85.116.0/23 AS25956 ALPHEUS - Alpheus Data Services, L.L.C. 208.85.212.0/22 AS32618 ADKNO-KC - Adknowledge, Inc. 208.89.32.0/24 AS27431 JTLNET - JTL Networks Inc. 208.89.33.0/24 AS27431 JTLNET - JTL Networks Inc. 208.89.34.0/24 AS27431 JTLNET - JTL Networks Inc. 208.89.35.0/24 AS27431 JTLNET - JTL Networks Inc. 208.91.72.0/24 AS17361 BRASS - Sungard Trading System (ASC) 208.91.73.0/24 AS17361 BRASS - Sungard Trading System (ASC) 208.91.76.0/23 AS21681 ANDOVER-TRADING - ANDOVER TRADING 208.91.164.0/22 AS46099 208.92.224.0/22 AS32757 208.92.226.0/24 AS32757 209.161.96.0/20 AS8039 CCC-ASN-1 - Cinergy Communications 209.177.64.0/20 AS6461 MFNX MFN - Metromedia Fiber Network 209.193.112.0/20 AS209 ASN-QWEST-US NOVARTIS-DMZ-US 209.209.51.0/24 AS18687 MPOWER-2 - MPOWER COMMUNICATIONS CORP. 209.209.64.0/20 AS46851 IPARADIGMS - iParadigms, LLC 209.212.63.0/24 AS16467 ASN-NEXTWEB-R1 - Nextweb, Inc 209.213.0.0/20 AS33005 ELTOPIA - Eltopia.com, LLC 209.234.112.0/23 AS32252 209.234.114.0/23 AS32252 209.234.116.0/24 AS32252 209.234.117.0/24 AS32252 209.234.118.0/24 AS32252 209.234.119.0/24 AS32252 209.234.120.0/24 AS32252 209.234.121.0/24 AS32252 209.234.122.0/24 AS32252 212.119.32.0/19 AS12550 213.184.64.0/24 AS13071 213.184.65.0/24 AS13071 213.184.66.0/24 AS13071 213.184.67.0/24 AS13071 213.184.68.0/24 AS13071 213.184.69.0/24 AS13071 213.184.70.0/24 AS13071 213.184.71.0/24 AS13071 213.184.72.0/24 AS13071 213.184.73.0/24 AS13071 213.184.74.0/24 AS13071 213.184.75.0/24 AS13071 213.184.76.0/24 AS13071 213.184.77.0/24 AS13071 213.184.78.0/24 AS13071 216.12.163.0/24 AS26627 AS-PILOSOFT - Pilosoft, Inc. 216.14.64.0/20 AS14728 216.146.0.0/19 AS11915 TELWEST-NETWORK-SVCS-STATIC - TEL WEST COMMUNICATIONS LLC 216.152.24.0/22 AS22773 ASN-CXA-ALL-CCI-22773-RDC - Cox Communications Inc. 216.170.96.0/24 AS4565 MEGAPATH2-US - MegaPath Networks Inc. 216.170.101.0/24 AS4565 MEGAPATH2-US - MegaPath Networks Inc. 216.170.104.0/24 AS4565 MEGAPATH2-US - MegaPath Networks Inc. 216.170.105.0/24 AS4565 MEGAPATH2-US - MegaPath Networks Inc. 216.234.128.0/22 AS14545 ADR-DRIVING-RECORDS - AMERICAN DRIVING RECORDS, INC. 216.234.132.0/24 AS14545 ADR-DRIVING-RECORDS - AMERICAN DRIVING RECORDS, INC. 216.234.139.0/24 AS14545 ADR-DRIVING-RECORDS - AMERICAN DRIVING RECORDS, INC. Please see http://www.cidr-report.org for the full report ------------------------------------ Copies of this report are mailed to: nanog(a)nanog.org eof-list(a)ripe.net apops(a)apops.net routing-wg(a)ripe.net afnog(a)afnog.org

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Re: Someone¹s Been Siphoning Data Through a Huge Security Hole in the Internet
by Scott Weeks 06 Dec '13

06 Dec '13

--- brandon.galbraith(a)gmail.com wrote: From: Brandon Galbraith <brandon.galbraith(a)gmail.com> someone who can splice into your undersea cables undetected. ----------------------------------------------------- Or detected and others framed? SE-WE-ME-4, FLAG, EASSy, SEACOM, etc... {;-) The above is a tin foil hat smiley :-) scott

1 0

Weekly Routing Table Report
by Routing Analysis Role Account 06 Dec '13

06 Dec '13

This is an automated weekly mailing describing the state of the Internet Routing Table as seen from APNIC's router in Japan. The posting is sent to APOPS, NANOG, AfNOG, AusNOG, SANOG, PacNOG, LacNOG, TRNOG, CaribNOG and the RIPE Routing Working Group. Daily listings are sent to bgp-stats(a)lists.apnic.net For historical data, please see http://thyme.rand.apnic.net. If you have any comments please contact Philip Smith <pfsinoz(a)gmail.com>. Routing Table Report 04:00 +10GMT Sat 07 Dec, 2013 Report Website: http://thyme.rand.apnic.net Detailed Analysis: http://thyme.rand.apnic.net/current/ Analysis Summary ---------------- BGP routing table entries examined: 473989 Prefixes after maximum aggregation: 189922 Deaggregation factor: 2.50 Unique aggregates announced to Internet: 235181 Total ASes present in the Internet Routing Table: 45624 Prefixes per ASN: 10.39 Origin-only ASes present in the Internet Routing Table: 35427 Origin ASes announcing only one prefix: 16261 Transit ASes present in the Internet Routing Table: 5952 Transit-only ASes present in the Internet Routing Table: 171 Average AS path length visible in the Internet Routing Table: 4.6 Max AS path length visible: 103 Max AS path prepend of ASN ( 50404) 101 Prefixes from unregistered ASNs in the Routing Table: 1033 Unregistered ASNs in the Routing Table: 289 Number of 32-bit ASNs allocated by the RIRs: 5465 Number of 32-bit ASNs visible in the Routing Table: 4245 Prefixes from 32-bit ASNs in the Routing Table: 13223 Number of bogon 32-bit ASNs visible in the Routing Table: 1 Special use prefixes present in the Routing Table: 1 Prefixes being announced from unallocated address space: 1331 Number of addresses announced to Internet: 2657192828 Equivalent to 158 /8s, 97 /16s and 139 /24s Percentage of available address space announced: 71.8 Percentage of allocated address space announced: 71.8 Percentage of available address space allocated: 100.0 Percentage of address space in use by end-sites: 95.3 Total number of prefixes smaller than registry allocations: 165389 APNIC Region Analysis Summary ----------------------------- Prefixes being announced by APNIC Region ASes: 112564 Total APNIC prefixes after maximum aggregation: 34192 APNIC Deaggregation factor: 3.29 Prefixes being announced from the APNIC address blocks: 114799 Unique aggregates announced from the APNIC address blocks: 47947 APNIC Region origin ASes present in the Internet Routing Table: 4875 APNIC Prefixes per ASN: 23.55 APNIC Region origin ASes announcing only one prefix: 1210 APNIC Region transit ASes present in the Internet Routing Table: 835 Average APNIC Region AS path length visible: 4.6 Max APNIC Region AS path length visible: 28 Number of APNIC region 32-bit ASNs visible in the Routing Table: 775 Number of APNIC addresses announced to Internet: 728720576 Equivalent to 43 /8s, 111 /16s and 100 /24s Percentage of available APNIC address space announced: 85.2 APNIC AS Blocks 4608-4864, 7467-7722, 9216-10239, 17408-18431 (pre-ERX allocations) 23552-24575, 37888-38911, 45056-46079, 55296-56319, 58368-59391, 63488-63999, 131072-133631 APNIC Address Blocks 1/8, 14/8, 27/8, 36/8, 39/8, 42/8, 43/8, 49/8, 58/8, 59/8, 60/8, 61/8, 101/8, 103/8, 106/8, 110/8, 111/8, 112/8, 113/8, 114/8, 115/8, 116/8, 117/8, 118/8, 119/8, 120/8, 121/8, 122/8, 123/8, 124/8, 125/8, 126/8, 133/8, 150/8, 153/8, 163/8, 171/8, 175/8, 180/8, 182/8, 183/8, 202/8, 203/8, 210/8, 211/8, 218/8, 219/8, 220/8, 221/8, 222/8, 223/8, ARIN Region Analysis Summary ---------------------------- Prefixes being announced by ARIN Region ASes: 163081 Total ARIN prefixes after maximum aggregation: 81731 ARIN Deaggregation factor: 2.00 Prefixes being announced from the ARIN address blocks: 163820 Unique aggregates announced from the ARIN address blocks: 75763 ARIN Region origin ASes present in the Internet Routing Table: 15926 ARIN Prefixes per ASN: 10.29 ARIN Region origin ASes announcing only one prefix: 6000 ARIN Region transit ASes present in the Internet Routing Table: 1666 Average ARIN Region AS path length visible: 4.1 Max ARIN Region AS path length visible: 24 Number of ARIN region 32-bit ASNs visible in the Routing Table: 41 Number of ARIN addresses announced to Internet: 1073321856 Equivalent to 63 /8s, 249 /16s and 151 /24s Percentage of available ARIN address space announced: 56.8 ARIN AS Blocks 1-1876, 1902-2042, 2044-2046, 2048-2106 (pre-ERX allocations) 2138-2584, 2615-2772, 2823-2829, 2880-3153 3354-4607, 4865-5119, 5632-6655, 6912-7466 7723-8191, 10240-12287, 13312-15359, 16384-17407 18432-20479, 21504-23551, 25600-26591, 26624-27647, 29696-30719, 31744-33791 35840-36863, 39936-40959, 46080-47103 53248-55295, 62464-63487, 393216-394239 ARIN Address Blocks 3/8, 4/8, 6/8, 7/8, 8/8, 9/8, 11/8, 12/8, 13/8, 15/8, 16/8, 17/8, 18/8, 19/8, 20/8, 21/8, 22/8, 23/8, 24/8, 26/8, 28/8, 29/8, 30/8, 32/8, 33/8, 34/8, 35/8, 38/8, 40/8, 44/8, 45/8, 47/8, 48/8, 50/8, 52/8, 53/8, 54/8, 55/8, 56/8, 57/8, 63/8, 64/8, 65/8, 66/8, 67/8, 68/8, 69/8, 70/8, 71/8, 72/8, 73/8, 74/8, 75/8, 76/8, 96/8, 97/8, 98/8, 99/8, 100/8, 104/8, 107/8, 108/8, 128/8, 129/8, 130/8, 131/8, 132/8, 134/8, 135/8, 136/8, 137/8, 138/8, 139/8, 140/8, 142/8, 143/8, 144/8, 146/8, 147/8, 148/8, 149/8, 152/8, 155/8, 156/8, 157/8, 158/8, 159/8, 160/8, 161/8, 162/8, 164/8, 165/8, 166/8, 167/8, 168/8, 169/8, 170/8, 172/8, 173/8, 174/8, 184/8, 192/8, 198/8, 199/8, 204/8, 205/8, 206/8, 207/8, 208/8, 209/8, 214/8, 215/8, 216/8, RIPE Region Analysis Summary ---------------------------- Prefixes being announced by RIPE Region ASes: 119610 Total RIPE prefixes after maximum aggregation: 61148 RIPE Deaggregation factor: 1.96 Prefixes being announced from the RIPE address blocks: 123359 Unique aggregates announced from the RIPE address blocks: 78944 RIPE Region origin ASes present in the Internet Routing Table: 17538 RIPE Prefixes per ASN: 7.03 RIPE Region origin ASes announcing only one prefix: 8285 RIPE Region transit ASes present in the Internet Routing Table: 2830 Average RIPE Region AS path length visible: 5.1 Max RIPE Region AS path length visible: 103 Number of RIPE region 32-bit ASNs visible in the Routing Table: 2506 Number of RIPE addresses announced to Internet: 656022500 Equivalent to 39 /8s, 26 /16s and 27 /24s Percentage of available RIPE address space announced: 95.4 RIPE AS Blocks 1877-1901, 2043, 2047, 2107-2136, 2585-2614 (pre-ERX allocations) 2773-2822, 2830-2879, 3154-3353, 5377-5631 6656-6911, 8192-9215, 12288-13311, 15360-16383 20480-21503, 24576-25599, 28672-29695 30720-31743, 33792-35839, 38912-39935 40960-45055, 47104-52223, 56320-58367 59392-61439, 61952-62463, 196608-200191 RIPE Address Blocks 2/8, 5/8, 25/8, 31/8, 37/8, 46/8, 51/8, 62/8, 77/8, 78/8, 79/8, 80/8, 81/8, 82/8, 83/8, 84/8, 85/8, 86/8, 87/8, 88/8, 89/8, 90/8, 91/8, 92/8, 93/8, 94/8, 95/8, 109/8, 141/8, 145/8, 151/8, 176/8, 178/8, 185/8, 188/8, 193/8, 194/8, 195/8, 212/8, 213/8, 217/8, LACNIC Region Analysis Summary ------------------------------ Prefixes being announced by LACNIC Region ASes: 53068 Total LACNIC prefixes after maximum aggregation: 10006 LACNIC Deaggregation factor: 5.30 Prefixes being announced from the LACNIC address blocks: 58322 Unique aggregates announced from the LACNIC address blocks: 27386 LACNIC Region origin ASes present in the Internet Routing Table: 2046 LACNIC Prefixes per ASN: 28.51 LACNIC Region origin ASes announcing only one prefix: 553 LACNIC Region transit ASes present in the Internet Routing Table: 393 Average LACNIC Region AS path length visible: 4.8 Max LACNIC Region AS path length visible: 35 Number of LACNIC region 32-bit ASNs visible in the Routing Table: 915 Number of LACNIC addresses announced to Internet: 146170648 Equivalent to 8 /8s, 182 /16s and 99 /24s Percentage of available LACNIC address space announced: 87.1 LACNIC AS Blocks 26592-26623, 27648-28671, 52224-53247, 61440-61951, 262144-263679 plus ERX transfers LACNIC Address Blocks 177/8, 179/8, 181/8, 186/8, 187/8, 189/8, 190/8, 191/8, 200/8, 201/8, AfriNIC Region Analysis Summary ------------------------------- Prefixes being announced by AfriNIC Region ASes: 11711 Total AfriNIC prefixes after maximum aggregation: 2612 AfriNIC Deaggregation factor: 4.48 Prefixes being announced from the AfriNIC address blocks: 12358 Unique aggregates announced from the AfriNIC address blocks: 4091 AfriNIC Region origin ASes present in the Internet Routing Table: 694 AfriNIC Prefixes per ASN: 17.81 AfriNIC Region origin ASes announcing only one prefix: 213 AfriNIC Region transit ASes present in the Internet Routing Table: 144 Average AfriNIC Region AS path length visible: 4.7 Max AfriNIC Region AS path length visible: 24 Number of AfriNIC region 32-bit ASNs visible in the Routing Table: 8 Number of AfriNIC addresses announced to Internet: 48528448 Equivalent to 2 /8s, 228 /16s and 124 /24s Percentage of available AfriNIC address space announced: 48.2 AfriNIC AS Blocks 36864-37887, 327680-328703 & ERX transfers AfriNIC Address Blocks 41/8, 102/8, 105/8, 154/8, 196/8, 197/8, APNIC Region per AS prefix count summary ---------------------------------------- ASN No of nets /20 equiv MaxAgg Description 4766 2955 11559 952 Korea Telecom (KIX) 17974 2721 902 88 PT TELEKOMUNIKASI INDONESIA 7545 2112 319 110 TPG Internet Pty Ltd 4755 1794 392 190 TATA Communications formerly 9829 1538 1244 47 BSNL National Internet Backbo 9583 1321 102 543 Sify Limited 9498 1218 309 72 BHARTI Airtel Ltd. 7552 1169 1080 13 Vietel Corporation 4808 1143 2119 337 CNCGROUP IP network: China169 24560 1098 382 166 Bharti Airtel Ltd., Telemedia Complete listing at http://thyme.rand.apnic.net/current/data-ASnet-APNIC ARIN Region per AS prefix count summary --------------------------------------- ASN No of nets /20 equiv MaxAgg Description 6389 3038 3688 53 BellSouth.net Inc. 22773 2296 2939 137 Cox Communications, Inc. 18566 2052 379 178 MegaPath Corporation 1785 2048 686 131 PaeTec Communications, Inc. 20115 1684 1657 600 Charter Communications 4323 1638 1098 418 Time Warner Telecom 701 1511 11144 782 MCI Communications Services, 30036 1381 311 581 Mediacom Communications Corp 7018 1326 17779 865 AT&T WorldNet Services 6983 1292 755 578 ITC^Deltacom Complete listing at http://thyme.rand.apnic.net/current/data-ASnet-ARIN RIPE Region per AS prefix count summary --------------------------------------- ASN No of nets /20 equiv MaxAgg Description 8402 1926 544 16 OJSC "Vimpelcom" 34984 1368 244 224 TELLCOM ILETISIM HIZMETLERI A 20940 1189 450 893 Akamai Technologies European 31148 1010 45 20 FreeNet ISP 13188 897 99 42 TOV "Bank-Inform" 6849 855 363 39 JSC UKRTELECOM, 8551 786 370 41 Bezeq International 6830 755 2326 409 UPC Distribution Services 12479 679 798 53 Uni2 Autonomous System 35228 549 246 16 Avatar Broadband Limited Complete listing at http://thyme.rand.apnic.net/current/data-ASnet-RIPE LACNIC Region per AS prefix count summary ----------------------------------------- ASN No of nets /20 equiv MaxAgg Description 28573 3422 1829 94 NET Servicos de Comunicao S.A 10620 2687 435 198 Telmex Colombia S.A. 7303 1735 1161 230 Telecom Argentina Stet-France 18881 1708 908 20 Global Village Telecom 8151 1367 2855 422 UniNet S.A. de C.V. 11830 868 364 15 Instituto Costarricense de El 27947 851 93 89 Telconet S.A 6147 793 373 27 Telefonica Del Peru 7738 780 1498 36 Telecomunicacoes da Bahia S.A 6503 776 434 60 AVANTEL, S.A. Complete listing at http://thyme.rand.apnic.net/current/data-ASnet-LACNIC AfriNIC Region per AS prefix count summary ------------------------------------------ ASN No of nets /20 equiv MaxAgg Description 36998 1854 112 5 Sudanese Mobile Telephone (ZA 24863 872 338 26 LINKdotNET AS number 6713 554 633 26 Itissalat Al-MAGHRIB 8452 414 956 9 TEDATA 24835 297 144 9 RAYA Telecom - Egypt 3741 247 921 209 The Internet Solution 29571 228 21 13 Ci Telecom Autonomous system 36992 222 501 29 Etisalat MISR 15706 219 32 6 Sudatel Internet Exchange Aut 29975 192 668 21 Vodacom Complete listing at http://thyme.rand.apnic.net/current/data-ASnet-AFRINIC Global Per AS prefix count summary ---------------------------------- ASN No of nets /20 equiv MaxAgg Description 28573 3422 1829 94 NET Servicos de Comunicao S.A 6389 3038 3688 53 BellSouth.net Inc. 4766 2955 11559 952 Korea Telecom (KIX) 17974 2721 902 88 PT TELEKOMUNIKASI INDONESIA 10620 2687 435 198 Telmex Colombia S.A. 22773 2296 2939 137 Cox Communications, Inc. 7545 2112 319 110 TPG Internet Pty Ltd 18566 2052 379 178 MegaPath Corporation 1785 2048 686 131 PaeTec Communications, Inc. 8402 1926 544 16 OJSC "Vimpelcom" Complete listing at http://thyme.rand.apnic.net/current/data-ASnet Global Per AS Maximum Aggr summary ---------------------------------- ASN No of nets Net Savings Description 6389 3038 2985 BellSouth.net Inc. 17974 2721 2633 PT TELEKOMUNIKASI INDONESIA 10620 2687 2489 Telmex Colombia S.A. 22773 2296 2159 Cox Communications, Inc. 4766 2955 2003 Korea Telecom (KIX) 7545 2112 2002 TPG Internet Pty Ltd 1785 2048 1917 PaeTec Communications, Inc. 8402 1926 1910 OJSC "Vimpelcom" 18566 2052 1874 MegaPath Corporation 36998 1854 1849 Sudanese Mobile Telephone (ZA Complete listing at http://thyme.rand.apnic.net/current/data-CIDRnet List of Unregistered Origin ASNs (Global) ----------------------------------------- Bad AS Designation Network Transit AS Description 62828 UNALLOCATED 8.21.130.0/24 4323 Time Warner Telecom 62850 UNALLOCATED 8.25.147.0/24 46887 Lightower Fiber Netw 62734 UNALLOCATED 8.31.128.0/24 6939 Hurricane Electric 62773 UNALLOCATED 8.35.180.0/22 3356 Level 3 Communicatio 15132 UNALLOCATED 12.9.150.0/24 7018 AT&T WorldNet Servic 62719 UNALLOCATED 12.27.130.0/24 4323 Time Warner Telecom 62861 UNALLOCATED 12.37.197.0/24 7018 AT&T WorldNet Servic 13317 UNALLOCATED 12.44.10.0/24 7018 AT&T WorldNet Servic 23502 UNALLOCATED 12.44.44.0/24 7018 AT&T WorldNet Servic 17300 UNALLOCATED 12.45.103.0/24 209 Qwest Communications Complete listing at http://thyme.rand.apnic.net/current/data-badAS Prefixes from private and non-routed address space (Global) ----------------------------------------------------------- Prefix Origin AS Description 100.100.0.0/24 4847 China Networks Inter-Exchange Complete listing at http://thyme.rand.apnic.net/current/data-dsua Advertised Unallocated Addresses -------------------------------- Network Origin AS Description 23.90.128.0/18 27418 OUTOFWALL INC. 23.91.0.0/19 40676 Psychz Networks 23.91.4.0/24 40676 Psychz Networks 23.91.14.0/24 40676 Psychz Networks 23.91.32.0/19 36315 Servpac Inc. 23.91.80.0/20 21560 Capital Technology Services G 23.91.96.0/20 37958 ChinaCache Networks ASN 23.91.112.0/21 32475 MidPhase Inc. 23.91.120.0/21 36351 SoftLayer Technologies Inc. 23.91.160.0/19 36493 3757277 Canada Inc. (oa 295.c Complete listing at http://thyme.rand.apnic.net/current/data-add-IANA Number of prefixes announced per prefix length (Global) ------------------------------------------------------- /1:0 /2:0 /3:0 /4:0 /5:0 /6:0 /7:0 /8:16 /9:11 /10:31 /11:92 /12:253 /13:476 /14:932 /15:1635 /16:12838 /17:6785 /18:11330 /19:23161 /20:32947 /21:35652 /22:50197 /23:43974 /24:251235 /25:830 /26:986 /27:452 /28:49 /29:73 /30:20 /31:0 /32:14 Advertised prefixes smaller than registry allocations ----------------------------------------------------- ASN No of nets Total ann. Description 18566 2007 2052 MegaPath Corporation 36998 1819 1854 Sudanese Mobile Telephone (ZA 6389 1700 3038 BellSouth.net Inc. 8402 1632 1926 OJSC "Vimpelcom" 22773 1548 2296 Cox Communications, Inc. 30036 1221 1381 Mediacom Communications Corp 11492 1183 1224 Cable One 1785 1088 2048 PaeTec Communications, Inc. 6983 1034 1292 ITC^Deltacom 22561 964 1239 Digital Teleport, Inc Complete listing at http://thyme.rand.apnic.net/current/data-sXXas-nos Number of /24s announced per /8 block (Global) ---------------------------------------------- 1:923 2:869 3:3 4:16 5:812 6:21 8:613 12:1878 13:3 14:899 15:11 16:3 17:19 18:19 20:25 23:616 24:1755 27:1700 31:1521 32:45 33:2 34:5 36:96 37:1945 38:918 39:5 40:181 41:3220 42:231 44:14 46:2073 47:10 49:700 50:864 52:12 54:44 55:5 56:4 57:26 58:1147 59:584 60:367 61:1495 62:1249 63:1973 64:4399 65:2333 66:4145 67:2109 68:1096 69:3297 70:909 71:504 72:2018 74:2580 75:324 76:304 77:1216 78:1016 79:670 80:1277 81:1055 82:630 83:753 84:590 85:1253 86:380 87:1039 88:548 89:1564 90:154 91:5716 92:620 93:1612 94:2118 95:1510 96:515 97:349 98:1130 99:41 100:33 101:686 103:3782 105:530 106:143 107:229 108:538 109:2008 110:976 111:1123 112:594 113:804 114:752 115:1045 116:1009 117:831 118:1221 119:1296 120:338 121:763 122:1871 123:1267 124:1386 125:1439 128:636 129:233 130:355 131:663 132:350 133:158 134:307 135:72 136:275 137:269 138:352 139:171 140:198 141:343 142:549 143:406 144:501 145:90 146:553 147:417 148:773 149:367 150:153 151:485 152:415 153:207 154:45 155:516 156:306 157:419 158:285 159:783 160:361 161:457 162:901 163:225 164:628 165:582 166:276 167:637 168:1039 169:124 170:1125 171:185 172:11 173:1626 174:667 175:540 176:1320 177:2480 178:1867 179:315 180:1600 181:886 182:1406 183:479 184:621 185:1102 186:2641 187:1453 188:1958 189:1253 190:7298 192:7085 193:5425 194:4032 195:3358 196:1343 197:1057 198:4758 199:5511 200:6069 201:2525 202:8976 203:8894 204:4537 205:2647 206:2892 207:2793 208:3957 209:3662 210:3080 211:1629 212:2177 213:1983 214:887 215:84 216:5427 217:1711 218:637 219:318 220:1267 221:587 222:332 223:521 End of report

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