November 2004 - Test - lists.nanog.org

Re: BGP question
by Robert Scott 11 Nov '04

11 Nov '04

Neighbor V AS MsgRcvd MsgSent TblVer InQ OutQ Up/Down State/PfxRcd 10.69.68.231 4 7939 2462962 2213063 7460478 3 0 10w1d 148815 68.216.192.17 4 6380 3045064 102934 7460454 0 0 1d15h 147463 131.247.47.238 4 5661 336539 102895 7460478 0 0 4w2d 8964 AppleBees says "No Anheuser" Robert Scott says "NO APPLEBEES!" Join The Boycott! Robert D. Scott Associate Director Computer Services and Telecommunications Network Operations University of Central Florida Robert(a)mail.ucf.edu CSB-310 407-823-0662 Voice 407-823-5476 FAX 345-0662 Sun-Com 877-549-5390 Pager >>> Henning Brauer <hb-nanog(a)bsws.de> 11/11/2004 6:11:31 AM >>> * adrian kok <adriankok2000(a)yahoo.com.hk> [2004-11-10 21:32]: > 2/ I saw article. "a full BGP feed is about 110,000 > routes." we're at 140..150k these days. > Do you have experience that AMD64 with 3G memory in > Unix Box can handle it? I've done it on a soekris box, that is, a 266MHz Geode CPU with 128MB RAM, using OpenBSD and OpenBGPD... -- Henning Brauer, BS Web Services, http://bsws.de hb(a)bsws.de - henning(a)openbsd.org Unix is very simple, but it takes a genius to understand the simplicity. (Dennis Ritchie)

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Cisco 6509 DC Power Supplies...
by Brian W. Gemberling 11 Nov '04

11 Nov '04

I have 2 6500 DC Power Supplies I don't need anymore. They are FREE to a good home! I'd prefer someone to just pick them up locally to me, they are in the Ashburn Equinix facility. If anyone is interested, drop me a line. They are pretty much brand new and work fine, they are not for shooting or blowing up (although I have a old switch if you are looking for something to destroy). Thank You, Brian W. Gemberling

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Telcordia to sell for $1.3B: newspaper
by Fergie (Paul Ferguson) 11 Nov '04

11 Nov '04

"NEW YORK (CNN/Money) - Two investment firms are about to close a deal to acquire telecommunications software company Telcordia Technologies Inc. for about $1.3 billion, a newspaper reported Thursday." http://money.cnn.com/2004/11/11/news/midcaps/telcordia/index.htm - ferg -- "Fergie", a.k.a. Paul Ferguson Engineering Architecture for the Internet fergdawg(a)netzero.net or fergdawg(a)sbcglobal.net

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Re: How to Blocking VoIP ( H.323)
by J. Oquendo 11 Nov '04

11 Nov '04

> 1) Your problem is a wonky broken H.323 that dies when it > gets a connection from outside. > > 2) Your problem is "corporate insider uses VoIP to call a > competitor and leak trade secrets". > > 3) Your problem is "VoIP users bypassing billing for telephone calls". > > All three will require different solutions, and there's probably > other scenarios as well..... Definitely sounds like there is little one can do to combat against VoIP. Anyway, along with Mr. Kletnieks' views on halting someone from using VoIP (or VoIP like services a-la Skype), looking at it from an "Internal Corp." level where as an admin you would want to block someone from using Skype or so, you can probably do some form of packet filtering based on port, but, what can you do if the user decided to use proxy settings. You would likely want to do some quick network packet analysis find some common criteria for whatever it is you want to block, and then block it right at the firewall or content filter level. E.g.: Taking the common (perhaps) header strings, and or some payload information and creating some form of rule to deny this. An analysis would probably do little though if the user has some VoIP tunneling going on though, or some form of method to manipulate outbound packet information since the data would be different (if encrypted) most of the time. =+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+ J. Oquendo GPG Key ID 0x51F9D78D Fingerprint 2A48 BA18 1851 4C99 CA22 0619 DB63 F2F7 51F9 D78D http://pgp.mit.edu:11371/pks/lookup?op=get&search=0x51F9D78D sil @ politrix . org http://www.politrix.org sil @ infiltrated . net http://www.infiltrated.net "How can we account for our present situation unless we believe that men high in this government are concerting to deliver us to disaster?" Joseph McCarthy "America's Retreat from Victory"

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BGP question
by adrian kok 11 Nov '04

11 Nov '04

Dear all Something I don't understand and would like you to help. 1/ for the url: http://www.oreillynet.com/pub/a/network/2002/08/12/multihoming.html I don't understand those 2 steps: - Register your routing policy in a Routing Registry. - Use looking glasses to see if your announcements are visible elsewhere on the Internet. How can I register the policy? and how can I use the looking glasses to check? 2/ I saw article. "a full BGP feed is about 110,000 routes." Do you have experience that AMD64 with 3G memory in Unix Box can handle it? Thank you very much and appreciate much for your help

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Re: Important IPv6 Policy Issue -- Your Input Requested
by Randy Bush 11 Nov '04

11 Nov '04

> To the end user of address space it is absolutely irrelevant how large > the total space is or what the size of the routing table is. What > matters is how much cost/effort you need to expend to get your address > space, and what you need to use it for. A guarantee of global > uniqueness has an unavoidable (and, in fact, quite significant) cost; > some uses of address space don't require global uniqueness; therefore > there will be a market demand for non-unique space. then let them make up addresses. oh, you mean they don't want to collide with global addresses? so they want nat? i though a major goal of v6 was no nat. again, you want you cake or want to eat it?

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RE: How to Blocking VoIP ( H.323) ?
by Fergie (Paul Ferguson) 11 Nov '04

11 Nov '04

One might also suggest that explicit "denials", as opposed to explicit "permits", as an access-control policy is fundamentally flawed security approach in the first place.... My $.02, - ferg -- "Scott Morris" <swm(a)emanon.com> wrote: Tcp/1719 is part of the H323 Gatekeeper default ports (which can be changed) Tcp/1720 is the H.225 call setup port, and I haven't heard of this being a configurable port. -----Original Message----- From: owner-nanog(a)merit.edu [mailto:owner-nanog@merit.edu] On Behalf Of Joe Shen Sent: Thursday, November 11, 2004 6:40 AM To: NANGO Subject: How to Blocking VoIP ( H.323) ? Hi, How could it be done to block VoIP at access router? I've thought about using ACL to block UDP port 1719,but this could be overcome by modifying protocol port number. regards Joe -- "Fergie", a.k.a. Paul Ferguson Engineering Architecture for the Internet fergdawg(a)netzero.net or fergdawg(a)sbcglobal.net

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RE: Important IPv6 Policy Issue -- Your Input Requested
by Network.Security 10 Nov '04

10 Nov '04

"Depending on putting devices on 1918 for security is dangerous. " - Simon J. Lyall. Agreed. RFC 1918 is a good idea, it's not the law, and with that ISP's are not required to do anything about 1918 addr's if they choose not to. We receive a disturbingly large amount of traffic sourced from the 1918 space destined for our network coming from one of our normally respectable Tier 1 ISP's (three letter acronym, starts with 'M', ends with 'CI'). This is particularly irritating since we pay for burstable service; nice that we are paying for illegitimate traffic to come down our pipes. Their answer to this issue was: our routers can't handle the additional load that filtering 1918 traffic would cause. That's odd, I didn't think routing to Null0 (or equivalent) was all that taxing, I don't want an ACL, I want it gone in the cheapest, fastest way possible. With that it our (the global collective, not just my company) responsibility to prevent RFC 1918 traffic from entering our exiting our border; makes for an interesting definition of "private address space."

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RE: Status of FCAPS model? Useful? Obsolete?
by Hannigan, Martin 10 Nov '04

10 Nov '04

> -----Original Message----- > From: owner-nanog(a)merit.edu [mailto:owner-nanog@merit.edu] > Sent: Monday, November 08, 2004 8:52 PM > To: nanog(a)merit.edu > Subject: Status of FCAPS model? Useful? Obsolete? > > > > Someone at Forrester research wrote an article in 2003 that > said FCAPS was > an obsolete model because > it was conceived during a time when mainframes were in use. > I haven't > read the article but the > premise of it seemed a bit overboard to me. > > Does the FCAPS model still hold currency among network > managers/engineers > today? What's FCAPS? -M<

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Cisco Security Advisory: Cisco IOS DHCP Blocked Interface Denial-of-Service
by Cisco Systems Product Security Incident Response Team 10 Nov '04

10 Nov '04

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 Cisco Security Advisory: Cisco IOS DHCP Blocked Interface Denial-of-Service =============================================================================== Revision 1.0 For Public Release 2004 November 10 1700 UTC (GMT) - ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Contents Summary Affected Products Details Impact Software Versions and Fixes Obtaining Fixed Software Workarounds Exploitation and Public Announcements Status of This Notice: FINAL Distribution Revision History Cisco Security Procedures - ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Summary ======= Cisco IOS devices running branches of Cisco IOS version 12.2S that have Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP) server or relay agent enabled, even if not configured, are vulnerable to a denial of service where the input queue becomes blocked when receiving specifically crafted DHCP packets. Cisco is providing free fixed software to address this issue. There are also workarounds to mitigate this vulnerability. This issue was introduced by the fix included in CSCdx46180 and is being tracked by Cisco Bug ID CSCee50294 ( registered customers only) . This advisory is available at http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20041110-dhcp.shtml. Affected Products ================= This vulnerability was introduced by the fix for CSCdx46180, and was integrated in Cisco IOS 12.2(14)SZ and 12.2(18)S. The following Cisco products running Cisco IOS version 12.2(14)SZ, or a variant of Cisco IOS 12.2(18)S (as listed in the following section) and higher are affected by this vulnerability. * Cisco 7200, 7300, 7500 platforms * Cisco 2650, 2651, 2650XM, 2651XM Multiservice platform * Cisco ONS15530, ONS15540 * Cisco Catalyst 4000, Sup2plus, Sup3, Sup4 and Sup5 modules * Cisco Catalyst 4500, Sup2Plus TS * Cisco Catalyst 4948, 2970, 3560, and 3750 * Cisco Catalyst 6000, Sup2/MSFC2 and Sup720/MSFC3 * Cisco 7600 Sup2/MSFC2 and Sup720/MSFC3 Vulnerable Products - ------------------- This issue affects only Cisco devices running affected Cisco IOS versions 12.2 (18)EW, 12.2(18)EWA, 12.2(14)SZ, 12.2(18)S, 12.2(18)SE, 12.2(18)SV, 12.2(18)SW and higher that do not have the configuration command no service dhcp. It is not necessary for DHCP server or relay agent to be configured in order for this vulnerability to be present and exploited; "service dhcp" is enabled by default in IOS and is the only setting necessary (in addition to interface addresses) for exploitation of this vulnerability. This includes routers as well as switches and line cards which run Cisco IOS software. Cisco devices which do not run Cisco IOS software are not affected. Cisco devices running affected Cisco IOS software with the command no service dhcp enabled are not affected. To determine the software running on a Cisco product, log in to the device and issue the show version command to display the system banner. Cisco IOS software will identify itself as "Internetwork Operating System Software" or simply "IOS." On the next line of output, the image name will be displayed between parentheses, followed by "Version" and the IOS release name. Other Cisco devices will not have the show version command or will give different output. The following example identifies a Cisco product running IOS release 12.0(3) with an installed image name of C2500-IS-L: Cisco Internetwork Operating System Software IOS (TM) 2500 Software (C2500-IS-L), Version 12.0(3), RELEASE SOFTWARE The release train label is "12.0." The next example shows a product running Cisco IOS release 12.0(2a)T1 with an image name of C2600-JS-MZ: Cisco Internetwork Operating System Software IOS (tm) C2600 Software (C2600-JS-MZ), Version 12.0(2a)T1, RELEASE SOFTWARE (fc1) Additional information about Cisco IOS release naming can be found at http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/620/1.html. Products Confirmed Not Vulnerable - --------------------------------- Cisco devices running affected Cisco IOS software with the command no service dhcp enabled are not affected. Cisco products that run any versions of IOS not listed in the Software Versions and Fixes table below, are not affected. Cisco products that do not run Cisco IOS software and are not affected by this vulnerability include, but are not limited to: * 700 series dialup routers (750, 760, and 770 series) are not affected. * WAN switching products such as the IGX, BPX and MGX lines are not affected. * No host-based software is affected. * The Cisco PIX Firewall is not affected * The Cisco LocalDirector is not affected. * The Cisco Content Engine and ACNS is not affected. * The Catalyst 2901/2902, 2948G, 2980G, 4000, 5000, and 6000 switches running CatOS. * Cisco Network Registrar is not affected. * Cisco VPN 3000 series is not affected * Cisco IOS-XR platform is not affected. * Cisco MDS 9000 family is not affected. Details ======= DHCP services allow devices to request and receive basic host configuration information from the DHCP server via the network. Cisco routers can be configured to both provide dynamic host configuration information (termed DHCP server function), and forward DHCP and BootP packets across separate broadcast domains (termed DHCP relay agent function). Cisco routers are configured to process and accept DHCP packets by default, therefore the command "service dhcp" does not appear in the running configuration display, and only the command for the disabled feature, no service dhcp, will appear in the running configuration display when the feature is disabled. The vulnerability is present, regardless if the DHCP server or relay agent configurations are present on an affected product. The only required configuration for this vulnerability in affected versions is the lack of the no service dhcp command. Certain crafted DHCP packets may be undeliverable, but will remain in the queue instead of being dropped. If a number of packets are sent that equal the size of the input queue, no more traffic will be accepted on that interface. On a blocked Ethernet interface, Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) times out after a default time of four hours, and no inbound or outbound traffic can be processed, including both IP and non-IP traffic such as IPX. The device must be rebooted to clear the input queue on the interface, and will not reload without user intervention. The attack may be repeated on all interfaces, causing the router to be remotely inaccessible, excluding the console port where DHCP packets are not processed by default and which can be used for out-of-band management and configured for remote access. Workarounds are available, and are documented in the Workarounds section below. Other types of interfaces, including but not limited to ATM, Serial and POS interfaces, are affected, but ARP is not a factor. To identify a blocked input interface, use the show interfaces command and look for the Input Queue line. The size of the input queue may keep increasing. If the current size (in this case, 76) is larger than the maximum size (75), the input queue is blocked. Router#show interface ethernet 0/0 Ethernet0/0 is up, line protocol is up Hardware is AmdP2, address is 0050.500e.f1e0 (bia 0050.500e.f1e0) Internet address is 172.16.1.9/24 MTU 1500 bytes, BW 10000 Kbit, DLY 1000 usec, rely 255/255, load 1/255 Encapsulation ARPA, loopback not set, keepalive set (10 sec) ARP type: ARPA, ARP Timeout 04:00:00 Last input 00:00:41, output 00:00:07, output hang never Last clearing of "show interface" counters 00:07:18 Input queue: 76/75/1091/0 (size/max/drops/flushes); Total output drops: 0 !--- The 76/75 shows that this is blocked Impact ====== A device receiving these specifically crafted DHCP packets will force the inbound interface to stop processing traffic. The device may stop processing packets destined to the router, including routing protocol packets and ARP packets. No alarms will be triggered, nor will the router reload to correct itself. This vulnerability may be exercised repeatedly resulting in loss of availability until a workaround has been applied or the device has been upgraded to a fixed version of code. The effects of this vulnerability can be monitored by the same methods outlined in the white paper entitled Uses of Network Management for Monitoring the "IP Packet Blocks Input Queue" PSIRT Advisory which details methods to identify impacted devices via SNMP, RMON, and Network Management products. Software Versions and Fixes =========================== Each row of the Cisco IOS software table below describes a release train and the platforms or products for which it is intended. If a given release train is vulnerable, then the earliest possible releases that contain the fix (the "First Fixed Release") and the anticipated date of availability for each are listed in the "Rebuild" and "Maintenance" columns. A device running a release in the given train that is earlier than the release in a specific column (less than the First Fixed Release) is known to be vulnerable. The release should be upgraded at least to the indicated release or a later version (greater than or equal to the First Fixed Release label). When selecting a release, keep in mind the following definitions: * Maintenance: Most heavily tested, stable, and highly recommended release of a release train in any given row of the table. * Rebuild: Constructed from the previous maintenance or major release in the same train, it contains the fix for a specific defect. Although it receives less testing, it contains only the minimal changes necessary to repair the vulnerability. In all cases, customers should exercise caution to confirm that the devices to be upgraded contain sufficient memory and that current hardware and software configurations will continue to be supported properly by the new software release. If the information is not clear, contact the Cisco TAC for assistance as shown in the Obtaining Fixed Software section below. More information on Cisco IOS software release names and abbreviations is available at http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/620/1.html. The fixes will be available at the Software Center located at http://www.cisco.com/tacpage/sw-center/. For software installation and upgrade procedures, see http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/130/upgrade_index.shtml. For a current view of all posted and repaired images for Cisco IOS, please check the listing available to registered Cisco.com users at: http://www.cisco.com/tacpage/sw-center/sw-ios.shtml. +---------------------------------------------+ | Major Release | Availability of Repaired | | | Releases | |----------------+----------------------------| | Affected | | | | 12.2-Based | Rebuild | Maintenance | | Release | | | |----------------+--------------+-------------| | 12.2(18)EW | 12.2(18)EW2 | | |----------------+--------------+-------------| | 12.2(18)EWA | | 12.2(20)EWA | |----------------+--------------+-------------| | | 12.2(18)S6 | | | |--------------+-------------| | | 12.2(20)S4 | | |12.2(18)S |--------------+-------------| | | 12.2(22)S2 | | | |--------------+-------------| | | | 12.2(25)S | |----------------+--------------+-------------| | 12.2(18)SE | 12.2(20)SE3 | | |----------------+--------------+-------------| | 12.2(18)SV | | 12.2(24)SV | |----------------+--------------+-------------| | 12.2(18)SW | | 12.2(25)SW | |----------------+----------------------------| | 12.2(18)SXD | Not impacted | |----------------+----------------------------| | 12.2(14)SZ | Migrates to | | | | 12.2(20)S4 | | +---------------------------------------------+ Obtaining Fixed Software ======================== Customers with Service Contracts - -------------------------------- Customers with contracts should obtain upgraded software through their regular update channels. For most customers, this means that upgrades should be obtained through the Software Center on Cisco's worldwide website at http:// www.cisco.com. Customers using Third-party Support Organizations - ------------------------------------------------- Customers whose Cisco products are provided or maintained through prior or existing agreement with third-party support organizations such as Cisco Partners, authorized resellers, or service providers should contact that support organization for assistance with the upgrade, which should be free of charge. Customers without Service Contracts - ----------------------------------- Customers who purchase direct from Cisco but who do not hold a Cisco service contract and customers who purchase through third-party vendors but are unsuccessful at obtaining fixed software through their point of sale should get their upgrades by contacting the Cisco Technical Assistance Center (TAC). TAC contacts are as follows. * +1 800 553 2447 (toll free from within North America) * +1 408 526 7209 (toll call from anywhere in the world) * e-mail: tac(a)cisco.com Please have your product serial number available and give the URL of this notice as evidence of your entitlement to a free upgrade. Free upgrades for non-contract customers must be requested through the TAC. Please do not contact either "psirt(a)cisco.com" or "security-alert(a)cisco.com" for software upgrades. See http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/687/Directory/DirTAC.shtml for additional TAC contact information, including special localized telephone numbers and instructions and e-mail addresses for use in various languages. Customers may only install and expect support for the feature sets they have purchased. By installing, downloading, accessing or otherwise using such software upgrades, customers agree to be bound by the terms of Cisco's software license terms found at http://www.cisco.com/public/sw-license-agreement.html, or as otherwise set forth at Cisco.com Downloads at http://www.cisco.com/public/sw-center/sw-usingswc.shtml. Workarounds =========== There are four possible workarounds for this vulnerability: * Disabling the dhcp service * Control Plane Policing * Two versions of Access Control Lists Disabling the DHCP Service - -------------------------- This vulnerability can be mitigated by utilizing the command: no service dhcp However, this workaround will disable all DHCP processing on the device, including the DHCP helper functionality that may be necessary in some network configurations. Control Plane Policing Feature - ------------------------------ The Control Plane Policy feature may be used to mitigate this vulnerability, as in the following example: access-list 140 deny udp host 192.168.13.1 any eq bootps access-list 140 deny udp any host 192.168.13.1 eq bootps access-list 140 deny udp any host 255.255.255.255 eq bootps access-list 140 permit udp any any eq bootps class-map match-all bootps-class match access-group 140 policy-map control-plane-policy class bootps-class police 8000 1500 1500 conform-action drop exceed-action drop control-plane service-policy input control-plane-policy For this example 192.168.13.1 is a legitimate DHCP server. Additional information on the configuration and use of the CPP feature can be found at this link: http://www.cisco.com/en/US/partner/products/sw/iosswrel/ps1838/ products_feature_guide09186a00801afad4.html. This workaround is only applicable to Cisco IOS 12.2S, as this feature is only available in Cisco IOS versions 12.2S and 12.3T. Cisco IOS 12.3T is not impacted by this advisory. Access Lists - Two Methods - -------------------------- Access lists can be applied to block DHCP/BootP traffic destined to any router interface addresses, as in the following example: In this example, the IP address 192.168.13.1 represents a legitimate DHCP server, the addresses 10.89.236.147 and 192.168.13.2 represent router interface addresses, and 192.168.61.1 represents a loopback interface on the router. In this example, any bootp/dhcp packets destined to the router interface addresses are blocked. access-list 100 remark permit bootps from the DHCP server access-list 100 permit udp host 192.168.13.1 any eq bootps access-list 100 remark deny bootps from any to router f1/0 access-list 100 deny udp any host 10.89.236.147 eq bootps access-list 100 remark deny bootps from any to router f0/0 access-list 100 deny udp any host 192.168.13.2 eq bootps access-list 100 remark deny bootps from any to router loopback1 access-list 100 deny udp any host 192.168.61.1 eq bootps access-list 100 remark permit all other traffic access-list 100 permit ip any any access-list 100 is applied to f0/0 and f1/0 physical interfaces. interface FastEthernet0/0 ip address 192.168.13.2 255.255.255.0 ip access-group 100 in interface FastEthernet1/0 ip address 10.89.236.147 255.255.255.240 ip access-group 100 in ip helper-address 192.168.13.1 An alternate configuration for the interface access-list workaround. This example would also need to be applied to all physical interfaces, but deny statements for all of the IP addresses configured on the router are not necessary in this approach. In this example, the address 192.168.13.1 represents a legitimate DHCP server. access-list 100 permit udp host 192.168.13.1 any eq bootps access-list 100 permit udp any host 192.168.13.1 eq bootps access-list 100 permit udp any host 255.255.255.255 eq bootps access-list 100 deny udp any any eq bootps interface FastEthernet0/0 ip address 192.168.13.2 255.255.255.0 ip access-group 100 in interface FastEthernet1/0 ip address 10.89.236.147 255.255.255.240 ip access-group 100 in ip helper-address 192.168.13.1 Note: These workarounds will not prevent spoofed IP packets with the source IP address set to that of the DHCP server For more information on anti-spoofing refer to http://www.cisco.com/en/US/tech/ tk648/tk361/technologies_tech_note09186a0080120f 48.shtml#sec_ip and http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2827.txt. The Unicast Reverse Path Forwarding (Unicast RPF) feature helps to mitigate problems that are caused by spoofed IP source addresses. For further details, please refer to http://www.cisco.com/univercd/cc/td/doc/product/software/ios122 /122cgcr/fsecur_c/fothersf/scfrpf.htm. Exploitation and Public Announcements ===================================== The Cisco PSIRT is not aware of any public announcements or malicious use of the vulnerability described in this advisory. This vulnerability was reported to Cisco by a customer. Status of This Notice: FINAL ============================ THIS ADVISORY IS PROVIDED ON AN "AS IS" BASIS AND DOES NOT IMPLY ANY KIND OF GUARANTEE OR WARRANTY. YOUR USE OF THE INFORMATION ON THE ADVISORY OR MATERIALS LINKED FROM THE ADVISORY IS AT YOUR OWN RISK. CISCO RESERVES THE RIGHT TO CHANGE OR UPDATE THIS NOTICE AT ANY TIME. Distribution This advisory will be posted on Cisco's worldwide website at http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20041110-dhcp.shtml. In addition to worldwide web posting, a text version of this notice is clear-signed with the Cisco PSIRT PGP key and is posted to the following e-mail and Usenet news recipients. * cust-security-announce(a)cisco.com * first-teams(a)first.org (includes CERT/CC) * bugtraq(a)securityfocus.com * vulnwatch(a)vulnwatch.org * cisco(a)spot.colorado.edu * cisco-nsp(a)puck.nether.net * full-disclosure(a)lists.netsys.com * comp.dcom.sys.cisco(a)newsgate.cisco.com Future updates of this advisory, if any, will be placed on Cisco's worldwide website, but may or may not be actively announced on mailing lists or newsgroups. Users concerned about this problem are encouraged to check the above URL for any updates. Revision History +---------------------------------------------+ | Revision | | Initial | | 1.0 | 2004-November-10 | public | | | | release. | +---------------------------------------------+ Cisco Security Procedures Complete information on reporting security vulnerabilities in Cisco products, obtaining assistance with security incidents, and registering to receive security information from Cisco, is available on Cisco's worldwide website at http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/products_security_vulnerability_policy.…. This includes instructions for press inquiries regarding Cisco security notices. All Cisco security advisories are available at http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt. - ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- All contents are Copyright © 1992-2004 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved. Important Notices and Privacy Statement. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: PGP 7.0 iQA/AwUBQZJN63sxqM8ytrWQEQIT9gCg1F3Il3xJrvye98FMPwMAP8/WlfkAoOx3 +61bikQKb5rc/PFvzelpZfuP =XQ2O -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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