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RE: Stan's work
by sob＠academ.com 06 Mar '95

06 Mar '95

I used a variety of tools and some hand crafted html. For the powerpoint presentations, I read them into Powerpoint on my Mac and saved them as a scapebook file. Then I used GraphicConverter to make GIFs directly from the PICTs in the scrapebook file. For the Frame Maker presentations, I converted them to MIF and use fm2html to convert the mostly text slides. I produced postscript from the pages that were graphics and converted them as I did all postscript. See below for the details on that. I used Photoshop and an HP ScanJet for the drawings that were made at the meeting. I used ghostscript for the postscript. I converted them to ppm files and then used xv to make GIFs. -- Stan | Academ Consulting Services |internet: sob(a)academ.com Olan | For more info on academ, see this |uucp: bcm!academ!sob Barber | URL- http://www.academ.com/academ |Opinions expressed are only mine.

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URGENT: ns.internic.net blown
by Per Gregers Bilse 05 Mar '95

05 Mar '95

Can somebody get in touch with the right people? ns.internic.net has blown 194.in-addr.arpa . Can't get anybody on the telephone. --- Forwarded mail from Stef Van Dessel <stef(a)INnet.net> From: Stef Van Dessel <stef(a)INnet.net> Subject: NS records for 194.in-addr.arpa To: ripe-op(a)ripe.net Date: Sun, 5 Mar 1995 14:31:12 +0100 (MET) hello, I'm thinking someone screwed up, somewhere.: NS records for 194.in-addr.arpa are $&"%. ; <<>> DiG 2.0 <<>> @ns.internic.net -x ns ;; ->>HEADER<<- opcode: QUERY , status: NOERROR, id: 10 ;; flags: qr rd ; Ques: 1, Ans: 2, Auth: 2, Addit: 2 ;; QUESTIONS: ;; 194.in-addr.arpa, type = NS, class = IN ;; ANSWERS: 194.in-addr.arpa. 518400 NS DNS1.KEMA.NL. 194.in-addr.arpa. 518400 NS NS1.SURFNET.NL. ;; AUTHORITY RECORDS: 194.in-addr.arpa. 518400 NS DNS1.KEMA.NL. 194.in-addr.arpa. 518400 NS NS1.SURFNET.NL. ;; ADDITIONAL RECORDS: DNS1.KEMA.NL. 68866 A 194.53.253.50 NS1.SURFNET.NL. 518400 A 192.87.106.101 ;; Sent 1 pkts, answer found in time: 739 msec ;; FROM: news.INbe.net to SERVER: ns.internic.net 198.41.0.4 ;; WHEN: Sun Mar 5 14:24:23 1995 ;; MSG SIZE sent: 34 rcvd: 146 - -- Stef Van Dessel stef(a)INbe.net INnet support Posthoflei 3, B-2600 Berchem, Belgium Office: +32-3-2814983 Fax: +32-3-2814985 - -- Stef Van Dessel stef(a)INbe.net INnet support Posthoflei 3, B-2600 Berchem, Belgium Office: +32-3-2814983 Fax: +32-3-2814985 --- End of forwarded message from Stef Van Dessel <stef(a)INnet.net> The correct list of nameservers is: ;; ANSWERS: 194.in-addr.arpa. 518400 NS ns.uu.net. 194.in-addr.arpa. 518400 NS layon.inria.fr. 194.in-addr.arpa. 518400 NS sunic.sunet.se. 194.in-addr.arpa. 518400 NS munnari.oz.au. 194.in-addr.arpa. 518400 NS sparky.arl.mil. 194.in-addr.arpa. 518400 NS ns.ripe.net. 194.in-addr.arpa. 518400 NS ns.eu.net. This is causing bad problems for everybody in 194.* . Hummm ... as a side-issue, is it too much to ask that widely publicized 24hour emergency telephone numbers exist for root nameserver operations? -- bilse, EUnet NOC +31 20 592 5110; 24hr +31 20 592 5165 (emergencies only) EUnet Comm. Svcs. +31 20 623 3803; fax +31 20 622 4657 http://www.EU.net

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Re: URGENT: ns.internic.net blown
by len＠barrnet.net 05 Mar '95

05 Mar '95

It just recently happened to two of our networks as well (last week). I don't remember being warned about this, yet it has happened to several providers so far. Len On Mar 5, 10:03am, David Bergum wrote: > Subject: URGENT: ns.internic.net blown > Per, > > have you recently reassigned 194.0.0.0 via swip? There was a swip bug that > blew away the total registration record for a CIDR block when the zero net > was reassigned. I have suffered the consequence of this with two of my > cidr blocks. With one it took over 3 weeks for them to fix. Not good.... > > > Dave. > > -- > A Minnesota Regional Network > -----/|\-----------------------------------------------+ > - / | \ Dave Bergum <bergum(a)MR.Net> | > - /__|__\ 511 11th Av S, Box 212 Gab: (612)342-2895 | > - j---'---/ Minneapolis, MN Fax: (612)344-1716 | > -~~~~~~~~~~ 55415-1536 Beep: (612)637-6791 | > -------------------------------------------------------+ >-- End of excerpt from David Bergum -- BBN/BARRNET ..The PREMIER West Coast Network Provider.. info(a)barrnet.net Work: len(a)barrnet.net http://www.barrnet.net 415-528-7111 (sales/info) Personal: len(a)netsys.com http://www.netsys.com 415-528-7205 (office)

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Re: URGENT: ns.internic.net blown
by scottw＠thomtech.com 05 Mar '95

05 Mar '95

I don't work there anymore but I still have contacts. I'll give them a call. Scott At 08:09 AM 3/5/95 -0800, Paul A Vixie wrote: >I'll escalate this through the Internic folks, who don't all read NANOG. > >It isn't just ns.internic.net -- my root server (ns.isc.org) has it also, >though I can't quite find the smoking gun in the in-addr zone file. > > -------------------------------------------------------------------------- Thomson Technology Services Group Voice: 301-548-5547 1375 Piccard Dr, Suite 250 FAX: 301-548-5595 Rockville, MD 20850 Email: scottw(a)thomtech.com

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Re: 60 Day Termination Notice (fwd)
by sob＠jareth.sesqui.net 05 Mar '95

05 Mar '95

I have made pictures of the ENSS139 here.

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NOTES COMPLETED
by sob＠academ.com 04 Mar '95

04 Mar '95

All of the notes I have are completed. There are two notable omissions: 1. Jack Waters slides are not here. I don't have them. 2. Sean Doran's Transition slides are not here. They appeared to be cropped along one side. I have asked Sean to take a look, but I have not heard more. On Monday, I will package it all up for Merit to download for its permanent home up there. Until Merit does install them, they will remain avaialble at http://www.academ.com/nanog Thanks for all the kind words from many of you. Even more thanks to the presenters who made there slides available to me in machine readable format. Monumental thanks to those presenters that translated their slides into HTML before sending them to me. Those made the best looking pages of all. If any of you notice any problems with the notes, please continue to let me know and I will do my best to fix them. I don't know if I will make the ISOC meeting. If I do, I will take notes there as well unless otherwise instructed. -- Stan | Academ Consulting Services |internet: sob(a)academ.com Olan | For more info on academ, see this |uucp: bcm!academ!sob Barber | URL- http://www.academ.com/academ |Opinions expressed are only mine.

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CERT Advisory - CA-95:03a REVISED Telnet Encryption Vulnerability
by CERT Advisory 03 Mar '95

03 Mar '95

============================================================================= CA-95:03a CERT Advisory March 3, 1995 REVISED Telnet Encryption Vulnerability ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- *** THIS IS A REVISED CERT ADVISORY *** *** A portion of the patch was accidentally omitted from Appendix B in the original release of CA-95:03. This revision contains a new, complete Appendix B.*** The CERT Coordination Center has received reports of a serious security problem in the Berkeley Telnet clients that provide support for the experimental Telnet encryption option using the Kerberos V4 authentication. All known released versions of the BSD Telnet that support Kerberos V4 authentication and encryption are affected. We recommend that all sites that use encrypted telnet in conjunction with Kerberos V4 obtain a patch or upgraded version of Telnet according to the instructions in Section III below. As we receive additional information relating to this advisory, we will place it, along with any clarifications, in a CA-95:03a.README file. CERT advisories and their associated README files are available by anonymous FTP from info.cert.org. We encourage you to check the README files regularly for updates on advisories that relate to your site. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- I. Description There is a vulnerability in Berkeley Telnet clients that support encryption and Kerberos V4 authentications. This vulnerability substantially reduces the effectiveness of the encryption. II. Impact Anyone who can access and read packets that make up the encrypted Telnet session can easily decrypt the session. This is possible, for example, when an intruder uses a packet sniffer on the network to intercept the Telnet sessions. III. Solution Obtain and install the appropriate patch according to the instructions included with the patch. In Appendix A is a summary of the vendors who have reported to us and the status they provided, including how to obtain patches. This information is reproduced in the README file associated with this advisory. We will update the README file as we receive more information from vendors. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The CERT Coordination Center wishes to thank Theodore Ts'o of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology for identifying and developing a solution to this problem. We also thank Douglas Engert of Argonne National Laboratory for pointing out the omission in our original Appendix B. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- If you believe that your system has been compromised, contact the CERT Coordination Center or your representative in Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams (FIRST). If you wish to send sensitive incident or vulnerability information to CERT staff by electronic mail, we strongly advise that the e-mail be encrypted. The CERT Coordination Center can support a shared DES key, PGP (public key available via anonymous FTP on info.cert.org) or PEM (contact CERT staff for details). Internet E-mail: cert(a)cert.org Telephone: +1 412-268-7090 (24-hour hotline) CERT personnel answer 8:30 a.m.-5:00 p.m. EST(GMT-5)/EDT(GMT-4), and are on call for emergencies during other hours. Fax: +1 412-268-6989 CERT Coordination Center Software Engineering Institute Carnegie Mellon University Pittsburgh, PA 15213-3890 USA Past advisories, CERT bulletins, information about FIRST representatives, and other information related to computer security are available for anonymous FTP from info.cert.org. CERT is a service mark of Carnegie Mellon University. ............................................................................. Appendix A: Vendor Information CA-95:03a.README Issue date: March 3, 1995 This file is a supplement to CERT advisory CA-95:03a, "Telnet Encryption Vulnerability" and will be updated as additional information becomes available. This README supersedes CA-95:03.README. As of March 3, 1995, information from Digital Equipment Corporation and Sequent Computer Systems has been added to the original text. Below is information we have received from vendors who have patches available or upcoming, along with names of vendors who have reported that their products do not have the problem. If you have an encrypting Telnet from a vendor who is not listed, please contact that vendor for information regarding how to get a fixed version. Vendor or Source Status ---------------- ------------ Berkeley SW Distribution (BSD) source-code patch available from Berkeley; also in Appendix B of this advisory Data General Corporation not affected by the vulnerability Digital Equipment Corporation not affected by the vulnerability FTP Software, Inc. patch available Harris NightHawk System not affected by the vulnerability Hewlett-Packard Company not affected by the vulnerability Nat'l. Center for Supercomputer Applications (NCSA) upgrade available Open Software Foundation not affected by the vulnerability The Santa Cruz Operation, Inc.(SCO) not affected by the vulnerability Sequent Computer Systems not affected by the vulnerability Sun Microsystems, Inc. not affected by the vulnerability PATCH INFORMATION ------------- Berkeley Software Distribution (BSD) A source-code patch, along with the domestic version of the most recently released Telnet sources from Berkeley, are available by anonymous FTP from net-dist.mit.edu:/pub/telnet/telnet.patch MD5 65d56befe3d0f1699d38de5509552578 There is also a PGP ASCII signature file for the patch in net-dist.mit.edu:/pub/telnet/telnet.patch.sig This patch can also be found in CERT Advisory CA-95:03a, Appendix B. (Note: Do not calculate a checksum for Appendix B alone. It will not match the checksum of the FTP version of the patch because the tabs in the FTP copy have been replaced with blank spaces in the CA-95:03a Appendix B copy.) ------------- FTP Software, Inc. Customers of FTP Software with an encrypting telnet (provided in the PC/TCP or OnNet packages) should call the FTP technical support line at 1-800-282-4387 and ask for the "tn encrypt patch". ------------- National Center for Supercomputer Applications (NCSA) Users of NCSA Telnet should upgrade to the NCSA Telnet 2.6.1d7, AND install the appropriate Kerberos plug-in which are available by anonymous FTP from ftp.ncsa.uiuc.edu Upgrade /Mac/Telnet/Telnet2.6/prerelease/d7/Telnet2.6.1d7(68K).sit.hqx MD5 b34b9fda59421b3b83f8df08a83f83b5 /Mac/Telnet/Telnet2.6/prerelease/d7/Telnet2.6.1d7(fat).sit.hqx MD5 877add7c3d298111889fc3f2f272ce6f Kerberos plug-ins /Mac/Telnet/Telnet2.6/prerelease/AuthMan.plugin.1.0b1.hqx MD5 df727eae184b22125f90ef1a31513fd4 /Mac/Telnet/Telnet2.6/prerelease/Kerberos_Telnet_plugin.sit.hqx MD5 dbda691efe9038648f234397895c734d Questions regarding NCSA Telnet should be directed to mactel(a)ncsa.uiuc.edu ............................................................................. Appendix B: Patch for Vulnerability in Telnet Encryption Option Omission error corrected March 3, 1995 See CA-95:03a.README for updated information. Index: auth.c =================================================================== RCS file: /mit/krb5/.cvsroot/src/appl/telnet/libtelnet/auth.c,v retrieving revision 5.5 retrieving revision 5.7 diff -u -r5.5 -r5.7 --- auth.c 1994/08/18 21:06:45 5.5 +++ auth.c 1994/11/08 04:39:02 5.7 @@ -244,7 +244,7 @@ { register int x; - if (strcasecmp(type, AUTHTYPE_NAME(0))) { + if (!strcasecmp(type, AUTHTYPE_NAME(0))) { *maskp = -1; return(1); } @@ -260,14 +260,14 @@ int auth_enable(type) - int type; + char * type; { return(auth_onoff(type, 1)); } int auth_disable(type) - int type; + char * type; { return(auth_onoff(type, 0)); } @@ -277,15 +277,20 @@ char *type; int on; { - int mask = -1; + int i, mask = -1; Authenticator *ap; if (!strcasecmp(type, "?") || !strcasecmp(type, "help")) { printf("auth %s 'type'\n", on ? "enable" : "disable"); printf("Where 'type' is one of:\n"); printf("\t%s\n", AUTHTYPE_NAME(0)); - for (ap = authenticators; ap->type; ap++) + mask = 0; + for (ap = authenticators; ap->type; ap++) { + if ((mask & (i = typemask(ap->type))) != 0) + continue; + mask |= i; printf("\t%s\n", AUTHTYPE_NAME(ap->type)); + } return(0); } @@ -293,7 +298,6 @@ printf("%s: invalid authentication type\n", type); return(0); } - mask = getauthmask(type, &mask); if (on) i_wont_support &= ~mask; else @@ -317,16 +321,22 @@ auth_status() { Authenticator *ap; + int i, mask; if (i_wont_support == -1) printf("Authentication disabled\n"); else printf("Authentication enabled\n"); - for (ap = authenticators; ap->type; ap++) + mask = 0; + for (ap = authenticators; ap->type; ap++) { + if ((mask & (i = typemask(ap->type))) != 0) + continue; + mask |= i; printf("%s: %s\n", AUTHTYPE_NAME(ap->type), (i_wont_support & typemask(ap->type)) ? "disabled" : "enabled"); + } return(1); } Index: kerberos.c =================================================================== RCS file: /mit/krb5/.cvsroot/src/appl/telnet/libtelnet/kerberos.c,v retrieving revision 5.5 retrieving revision 5.8 diff -u -r5.5 -r5.8 --- kerberos.c 1994/08/18 21:07:02 5.5 +++ kerberos.c 1994/11/14 21:33:58 5.8 @@ -225,9 +225,10 @@ register int i; des_key_sched(cred.session, sched); - des_set_random_generator_seed(cred.session); - des_new_random_key(challenge); - des_ecb_encrypt(challenge, session_key, sched, 1); + des_init_random_number_generator(cred.session); + des_new_random_key(session_key); + des_ecb_encrypt(session_key, session_key, sched, 0); + des_ecb_encrypt(session_key, challenge, sched, 0); /* * Increment the challenge by 1, and encrypt it for * later comparison. @@ -320,6 +321,11 @@ break; } + /* + * Initialize the random number generator since it's + * used later on by the encryption routine. + */ + des_init_random_number_generator(session_key); des_key_sched(session_key, sched); memcpy((void *)datablock, (void *)data, sizeof(Block)); /* @@ -337,7 +343,7 @@ * increment by one, re-encrypt it and send it back. */ des_ecb_encrypt(datablock, challenge, sched, 0); - for (r = 7; r >= 0; r++) { + for (r = 7; r >= 0; r--) { register int t; t = (unsigned int)challenge[r] + 1; challenge[r] = t; /* ignore overflow */ Index: commands.c =================================================================== RCS file: /mit/krb5/.cvsroot/src/appl/telnet/telnet/commands.c,v retrieving revision 5.14 retrieving revision 5.16 diff -u -r5.14 -r5.16 --- commands.c 1994/08/18 21:07:37 5.14 +++ commands.c 1994/11/08 06:42:49 5.16 @@ -1919,8 +1919,8 @@ }; extern int - auth_enable P((int)), - auth_disable P((int)), + auth_enable P((char *)), + auth_disable P((char *)), auth_status P((void)); static int auth_help P((void)); @@ -1959,6 +1959,12 @@ { struct authlist *c; + if (argc < 2) { + fprintf(stderr, + "Need an argument to 'auth' command. 'auth ?' for help.\n"); + return 0; + } + c = (struct authlist *) genget(argv[1], (char **) AuthList, sizeof(struct authlist)); if (c == 0) { @@ -2015,7 +2021,7 @@ EncryptEnable, 1, 1, 2 }, { "disable", "Disable encryption. ('encrypt enable ?' for more)", EncryptDisable, 0, 1, 2 }, - { "type", "Set encryptiong type. ('encrypt type ?' for more)", + { "type", "Set encryption type. ('encrypt type ?' for more)", EncryptType, 0, 1, 1 }, { "start", "Start encryption. ('encrypt start ?' for more)", EncryptStart, 1, 0, 1 }, @@ -2058,6 +2064,12 @@ char *argv[]; { struct encryptlist *c; + + if (argc < 2) { + fprintf(stderr, + "Need an argument to 'encrypt' command. 'encrypt ?' for help.\n"); + return 0; + } c = (struct encryptlist *) genget(argv[1], (char **) EncryptList, sizeof(struct encryptlist));

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Re: NACR question
by Dale S. Johnson 03 Mar '95

03 Mar '95

Bob, Please send questions like this to "nsfnet-admin(a)merit.edu", not to regional-techs (which is a very large list, mostly of people not at Merit). --Dale Johnson > From list-admin(a)merit.edu Fri Mar 3 14:24:51 1995 > Subject: NACR question > To: regional-techs(a)merit.edu > Date: Fri, 3 Mar 95 14:18:33 EST > > > I have a quick question on the NACR form that is unclear to me. > > Example: A customer of ours is a private individual with a .us domain. > > There is no vaild classification for the "orgtype" field to put him > in. This is not a business or a non-profit org, but just a single individual. > > What should I use for "orgtype"? > > -- > Bob Kupiec (N3MML) Phone: 1-609-897-7300 GES, Inc. (JvNCnet) > Systems Engineering -or- : 1-800-35-TIGER 3 Independence Way > Email: kupiec(a)jvnc.net Fax : 1-609-897-7310 Princeton, NJ 08540 >

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Re: 60 Day Termination Notice (fwd)
by Mills＠huey.udel.edu 03 Mar '95

03 Mar '95

HWB, Backroom.udel.edu and one of its relatives still splice the Ether here, most of the time with LEDs dark, but they spring briefly to life once in a while when somebody yells "fuzzball!" The one at SDSC has apparently been overcome by Etheritis due massive load on the wire. Same thing happened at SURA. Dave

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NACR question
by Bob Kupiec 03 Mar '95

03 Mar '95

I have a quick question on the NACR form that is unclear to me. Example: A customer of ours is a private individual with a .us domain. There is no vaild classification for the "orgtype" field to put him in. This is not a business or a non-profit org, but just a single individual. What should I use for "orgtype"? -- Bob Kupiec (N3MML) Phone: 1-609-897-7300 GES, Inc. (JvNCnet) Systems Engineering -or- : 1-800-35-TIGER 3 Independence Way Email: kupiec(a)jvnc.net Fax : 1-609-897-7310 Princeton, NJ 08540

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