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Pacific Bell NAP Upgrade
by Warren K. Williams 19 Dec '95

19 Dec '95

Folks, As you all know, from the past two NANOG meetings, Pacific Bell has been working on identifying and evaluating a new ATM switch architecture for the NAP. After looking at several alternatives, I am pleased to announce that we have decided to deploy Stratacom BPX switches. We are very confident that this decision will greatly increase the throughput perfomance of traffic over our ATM environment for the NAP. The performance issues that we have presented have fallen into two categories: buffering capacity and backplane speed. The BPX's buffering is amongst the largest available with a 64,000 cell buffering capacity per port. It also has a 9.6 Gigabit per second backplane. Our engineering group has worked extremely hard in testing the performance of the switch in a TCP/IP environment, with several rigorous test plans. The Stratacom's performance was very impressive. At our next customer meeting and at the next NANOG, we will present a detailed analysis of the results of our testing and of the capabilities of the new switches. This new switch architecture will also allow us to offer a solid OC3 access to the NAP. Along with the new switch announcement, I would also like to inform you of our plans to add an additional exchange point in Southern California. This effort is targetted to those providers who foresee their traffic needs exceeding DS3 access and would be available to both OC3 and DS3 customers. The exact location and timing has yet to be determined. More to follow, most likely at the next NANOG. Warren ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ Warren K. Williams, Director - Network Access Point Pacific Bell Business Communications Services Email: wkwilli(a)pacbell.com Phone: 510.867.9065 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------

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Re: Are the Route Servers Viable Solutions That Are Being Held Hostage?
by Sean Doran 18 Dec '95

18 Dec '95

Sorry, Alan, I don't follow you. Besides, I personally don't think of Suits Are In Charge or its new subsidiary Network Dissolutions to be bad guys at all. In fact, looking back, the whole InterNIC idea is much more of a success on the RS front than on the IS or DS fronts, and that is largely because NSI is staffed and controlled by clueful people. Sean.

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CERT Vendor-Initiated Bulletin VB-95:10 - Vulnerability in elm 2.4
by CERT Bulletin 18 Dec '95

18 Dec '95

CERT Vendor-Initiated Bulletin VB-95:10 December 18, 1995 Topic: Vulnerability in elm 2.4 PL 24 Source: Bill Pemberton, University of Virginia To aid in the wide distribution of essential security information, the CERT Coordination Center is forwarding the following information from Bill Pemberton, who is the coordinator of the group that maintains elm. Mr. Pemberton urges you to act on this information as soon as possible. His contact information is included in the forwarded text below; please contact him if you have any questions or need further information. ========================FORWARDED TEXT STARTS HERE============================ I. Description Elm will follow symlinks in /tmp when opening temp files. All systems that support symlinks are vulnerable. II. Impact Users on the system can create files in the directories of other elm users. You can determine what version of elm you are running with the -v command line option (run "elm -v"). III. Solution Upgrade to elm 2.4 PL 25. The patch to upgrade from elm 2.4 PL 24 to PL 25 is available at: ftp://ftp.myxa.com/pub/elm/elm2.4.p25 MD5 (elm2.4.p25) = 5ec93595c7573be4d0cb4ce7097b6e83 The full distribution of elm 2.4 PL 25 is available at: ftp://ftp.myxa.com/pub/elm/elm2.4.tar.Z MD5 (elm2.4.tar.Z) = e5bdc4492a4931402c57ac9a8cf111b2 IV. Contact information Bill Pemberton wfp5p(a)virginia.edu ITC/Unix Systems flash(a)virginia.edu University of Virginia uunet!virginia!wfp5p =========================FORWARDED TEXT ENDS HERE============================= CERT publications, information about FIRST representatives, and other information related to computer security are available for anonymous FTP from info.cert.org. CERT advisories and bulletins are also posted on the USENET newsgroup comp.security.announce. If you would like to have future advisories and bulletins mailed to you or to a mail exploder at your site, please send mail to cert-advisory-request(a)cert.org. If you wish to send sensitive incident or vulnerability information to CERT staff by electronic mail, we strongly advise that the e-mail be encrypted. The CERT Coordination Center can support a shared DES key, PGP (public key available via anonymous FTP on info.cert.org) or PEM (contact CERT staff for details). Internet email: cert(a)cert.org Telephone: +1 412-268-7090 (24-hour hotline) CERT personnel answer 8:30 a.m.-5:00 p.m. EST(GMT-5)/EDT(GMT-4), and are on call for emergencies during other hours. Fax: +1 412-268-6989 CERT Coordination Center Software Engineering Institute Carnegie Mellon University Pittsburgh, PA 15213-3890 USA CERT is a service mark of Carnegie Mellon University. CERT Vendor-Initiated Bulletin VB-95:10 December 18, 1995 Topic: Vulnerability in elm 2.4 PL 24 Source: Bill Pemberton, University of Virginia To aid in the wide distribution of essential security information, the CERT Coordination Center is forwarding the following information from Bill Pemberton, who is the coordinator of the group that maintains elm. Mr. Pemberton urges you to act on this information as soon as possible. His contact information is included in the forwarded text below; please contact him if you have any questions or need further information. ========================FORWARDED TEXT STARTS HERE============================ I. Description Elm will follow symlinks in /tmp when opening temp files. All systems that support symlinks are vulnerable. II. Impact Users on the system can create files in the directories of other elm users. You can determine what version of elm you are running with the -v command line option (run "elm -v"). III. Solution Upgrade to elm 2.4 PL 25. The patch to upgrade from elm 2.4 PL 24 to PL 25 is available at: ftp://ftp.myxa.com/pub/elm/elm2.4.p25 MD5 (elm2.4.p25) = 5ec93595c7573be4d0cb4ce7097b6e83 The full distribution of elm 2.4 PL 25 is available at: ftp://ftp.myxa.com/pub/elm/elm2.4.tar.Z MD5 (elm2.4.tar.Z) = e5bdc4492a4931402c57ac9a8cf111b2 IV. Contact information Bill Pemberton wfp5p(a)virginia.edu ITC/Unix Systems flash(a)virginia.edu University of Virginia uunet!virginia!wfp5p =========================FORWARDED TEXT ENDS HERE============================= CERT publications, information about FIRST representatives, and other information related to computer security are available for anonymous FTP from info.cert.org. CERT advisories and bulletins are also posted on the USENET newsgroup comp.security.announce. If you would like to have future advisories and bulletins mailed to you or to a mail exploder at your site, please send mail to cert-advisory-request(a)cert.org. If you wish to send sensitive incident or vulnerability information to CERT staff by electronic mail, we strongly advise that the e-mail be encrypted. The CERT Coordination Center can support a shared DES key, PGP (public key available via anonymous FTP on info.cert.org) or PEM (contact CERT staff for details). Internet email: cert(a)cert.org Telephone: +1 412-268-7090 (24-hour hotline) CERT personnel answer 8:30 a.m.-5:00 p.m. EST(GMT-5)/EDT(GMT-4), and are on call for emergencies during other hours. Fax: +1 412-268-6989 CERT Coordination Center Software Engineering Institute Carnegie Mellon University Pittsburgh, PA 15213-3890 USA CERT is a service mark of Carnegie Mellon University.

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Re: Are the Route Servers Viable Solutions That Are Being Held Hostage?
by Sean Doran 18 Dec '95

18 Dec '95

| I asked Bud, "Bud, will your I/R to RF transcievers send data at | greater than 2.4kps?". "Yes", replied Bud, "but it will take some work, and cost $X". | "And will your I/R to RF transcievers send data bidirectionally?" | I asked Bud. "Yes", replied Bud, "but it will take some work, and cost $X". So you paid him $X and he set about his business. Some months later, you are wondering why you haven't had a fully-working, delivered, useful, marketable product. "What happened?", you ask Bud. Bud explains that the problem was that there were some other organizations who didn't put in the (unpaid-for by Bud) effort needed to get Bud the information Bud needed to make things work as planned, even though those organizations might get some benefit from the work Bud was doing. "But given $X or even $X times N, could you have accumulated all the information yourself, in principle, in this time?", you ask Bud. "And could you not have foreseen this problem, or even explained to me earlier than now that it was a difficulty that could be overcome by more resources for you to gather up this information more independently?" Hm, I wonder what the answers are. Sean.

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CERT Advisory CA-95:18 - Widespread Attacks
by CERT Advisory 18 Dec '95

18 Dec '95

============================================================================= CA-95:18 CERT Advisory December 18, 1995 Widespread Attacks on Internet Sites ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- Over the last several weeks, the CERT Coordination Center has been working on a set of incidents in which the intruders have launched widespread attacks against Internet sites. Hundreds of sites have been attacked, and many of the attacks have been successful, resulting in root compromises at the targeted sites. We continue to receive reports, and we believe that more attacks are going undetected. ********************************************************************** All the vulnerabilities exploited in these attacks are known, and are addressed by CERT advisories (see Section III). ********************************************************************** We urge everyone to obtain these advisories and take action to ensure that systems are protected against these attacks. Also, please feel free to redistribute this message. As we receive additional information relating to this advisory, we will place it in ftp://info.cert.org/pub/cert_advisories/CA-95:18.README We encourage you to check our README files regularly for updates on advisories that relate to your site. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- I. Description Intruders are doing the following: - using automated tools to scan sites for NFS and NIS vulnerabilities - exploiting the rpc.ypupdated vulnerability to gain root access - exploiting the loadmodule vulnerability to gain root access - installing Trojan horse programs and packet sniffers - launching IP spoofing attacks II. Impact Successful exploitation of the vulnerabilities can result in unauthorized root access. III. Solution The CERT staff urges you to immediately take the steps described in the advisories and README files listed below. Note that it is important to check README files as they contain updated information we received after the advisory was published. a. Using automated tools to scan sites for NFS and NIS vulnerabilities * CA-94:15.NFS.Vulnerabilities * CA-94:15.README * CA-92:13.SunOS.NIS.vulnerability b. Exploiting the rpc.ypupdated vulnerability to gain root access * CA-95:17.rpc.ypupdated.vul * CA-95:17.README c. Exploiting the loadmodule vulnerability to gain root access * CA-93:18.SunOS.Solbourne.loadmodule.modload.vulnerability * CA-95:12.sun.loadmodule.vul * CA-95:12.README d. Installing Trojan horse programs and packet sniffers * CA-94:01.ongoing.network.monitoring.attacks * CA-94:01.README e. Launching IP spoofing attacks * CA-95:01.IP.spoofing * CA-95:01.README The CERT advisories and README files are available from ftp://info.cert.org/pub/cert_advisories If you find a compromise, please complete the Incident Reporting Form that we have provided in the appendix of this advisory, and return the form to cert(a)cert.org. This completed form will help us better assist you. Note: Because of our workload, we must ask you not to send log files of activity, but we would be happy to work with you as needed on how to interpret data that you may collect. Also, the CERT staff can provide guidance and advice, if needed, on how to handle incidents and work with law enforcement. If you see activity that indicates an attack is in progress, we encourage you to contact other sites involved and the service providers, as well as the CERT Coordination Center. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Contacting the CERT Coordination Center For sensitive information, please use encrypted email. The CERT public PGP key is available from ftp://info.cert.org/pub/CERT_PGP.key If you prefer to use DES, please call the CERT hotline +1 412 268 7090 to exchange a DES key over the phone. Other CERT contact information: Internet email: cert(a)cert.org Telephone: +1 412-268-7090 (24-hour hotline) CERT personnel answer 8:30 a.m.-5:00 p.m. EST(GMT-5)/EDT(GMT-4), and are on call for emergencies during other hours. Fax: +1 412-268-6989 Postal address: CERT Coordination Center Software Engineering Institute Carnegie Mellon University Pittsburgh, PA 15213-3890 USA CERT advisories and bulletins are posted on the USENET newsgroup comp.security.announce. If you would like to have future advisories and bulletins mailed to you or to a mail exploder at your site, please send mail to cert-advisory-request(a)cert.org. Past CERT publications, information about FIRST representatives, and other information related to computer security are available from ftp://info.cert.org/pub/ Copyright 1995 Carnegie Mellon University This material may be reproduced and distributed without permission provided it is used for noncommercial purposes and the copyright statement is included. CERT is a service mark of Carnegie Mellon University. .............................................................................. Appendix: Incident Reporting Form (also available from ftp://info.cert.org/pub/incident.reporting.form) CERT(sm) Coordination Center Incident Reporting Form CERT has developed the following form in an effort to facilitate our interaction with members of the Internet community. We would appreciate your completing the form included below in as much detail as possible. The information is optional, but the more information you can provide, the better we will be able to assist you. Note that our policy is to keep confidential any information you provide unless we receive your permission to release that information. (See questions 8 and 11 below.) Please feel free to duplicate any section as required. Please return this form to cert(a)cert.org. If you are unable to e-mail this form, please send it via FAX. Our FAX telephone number is +1 412-268-6989. Thank you for your cooperation and help. 1) Incident number (assigned by CERT): CERT# 2) Reporting site information Organizational Name (e.g. CERT Coordination Center): Domain Name (e.g. cert.org) 3) Your contact information Name: E-mail address: Telephone number: FAX number (optional): Pager number (optional): Home telephone number (for CERT internal use only): 4) Additional contact information (if available) Name: E-mail address: Telephone number: FAX number (optional): Pager number (optional): Home telephone number (for CERT internal use only): 5) Compromised host(s) at your site (one entry per host please) Hostname: IP address: Vendor: Hardware: OS: Version: Security patches applied: 6) Please list the other sites compromised that you have notified, and the contact information for each site (one entry per site please) Hostname: IP address: Contact information: Name: E-mail address: Telephone number: FAX number (optional): Pager number (optional): Home telephone number (optional, for CERT internal use only): 7) Please list the other sites compromised that you have not yet notified (one entry per site please) Hostname: IP address: Contact information (if available): Name: E-mail address: Telephone number: FAX number (optional): Pager number (optional): Home telephone number (optional, CERT internal use only): 8) Would you be willing to contact these sites if CERT provided you the relevant contact information (Yes/No): Or, can CERT give your contact information to these sites when we contact them (Yes/No): 9) Incident category (Yes/No) Probe: Prank: Mail Spoofing: Break-in: Installed Trojan Horse: Intruder gained root access: NIS (yellow pages) attack: NFS attack: TFTP attack: FTP attack: Telnet attack: Rlogin or rsh attack: Product vulnerability: Worm: Virus: Other (please specify): 10) Are you currently using (Yes/No/Periodically) COPS (The Computer Oracle and Password System): TCP access control using packet filtering: Host access control via modified daemons or wrappers: Crack: Tripwire: Proactive password checkers (e.g. npasswd, passwd+): Shadow passwords: Other (please specify): 11) Miscellaneous Please specify any other incident response team(s) you have contacted Team: Contact information Name: E-mail address: Telephone number: FAX number (optional): Pager number (optional): Home telephone number (optional, CERT internal use only): If you have not contacted another incident response team, could we give them your contact information (Yes/No): Please specify any law enforcement agency(ies) you have contacted Agency: Contact information Name: E-mail address: Telephone number: FAX number (optional): Pager number (optional): Home telephone number (optional, CERT internal use only): If you have not contacted any law enforcement agency, could we give them your contact information, if necessary (Yes/No): 12) Detailed description of incident (e.g. method of intrusion, etc) 13) What assistance would you like from CERT? Copyright 1995 Carnegie Mellon University This form may be reproduced and distributed without permission provided it is used for noncommercial purposes and the CERT Coordination Center is acknowledged. CERT is a service mark of Carnegie Mellon University.

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Re: Routing registry was Re: Sprint BGP filters in 207.x.x.x?
by jbarrows＠digex.net 18 Dec '95

18 Dec '95

At 10:30 PM 12/13/95, cook(a)cookreport.com wrote: ... >So if they were supposed to use the services of the routing arbiter and >appear to have renigged on this, what can anyone do?? Are they determined >to make it painfully obvious for all to see that there are no enforcement >teeth left at the NSF? I think you are assuming too much at this point. [About contractually having to play with the RA.] You should address that question to Sprint, rather than the mailing list. I believe SprintLink has voiced their willingness to work with any tool that will help the Internet scale better, so long as it does not have adverse effects on their network. The last time I checked, the _biggest_ argument against using the RA was that alot of the data is incorrect. I have also heard a lot about work that has been done to clean up the RA. Is this still the biggest factor? -Jeff [mssg. from the nanog archive...] ================================================================================== | Knowing Sean for who he is, I'm fairly sure that no RADB or RS will ever be | suitable to him. In particular... On the contrary; I believe Peter Lothberg's proposals for an RS scheme are quite reasonable. I think his criticisms of the current RADB and RS models are pretty well known, and valid. I would point out one more thing though, and that's that at the Stockholm IETF I had a genial chat with a number of folks from MERIT and the RA Team in general, and suggested several ways that the RADB could be made incrementally useful. I hope that some good comes out of that conversation. I'll use any tool that will make my job easier, and help our operation and the Internet scale better. At the moment, though, the RADB does the opposite, and the RS has no value whatsoever. Sean. =================================================================================== >Of course sprint is running a nap too. i understand that their position >is that the NAP is full. They have a BUNCH of people trying to get into >the NAP who are complaining to me that they get no answqers from sprint >as to when that will be possible. > >******************************************************************** >Gordon Cook, Editor & Publisher Subscriptions: Individ-ascii $85 >The COOK Report on Internet Individ. hard copy $150 >431 Greenway Ave, Ewing, NJ 08618 Small Corp & Gov't $200 >(609) 882-2572 Corporate $350 >Internet: cook(a)cookreport.com Corporate Site Lic. $650 >Web: http://pobox.com/cook/ Newly expanded COOK Report Web Pages >******************************************************************** > > >On Wed, 13 Dec 1995 Jeff.Ogden(a)um.cc.umich.edu wrote: > >> The large scale provider MichNet uses is MCI and they are required >> to cooperate with the RA and others. This is in their contract. I suspect >> that something similar might be in some of the other contracts of providers >> that provide service to networks that received funding from NSF for >> Interregional Connectivity. People might want to go read the fine >> print in their contracts. >> -Jeff Ogden >> Merit/MichNet >> > > >

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URGENT CERT message -- CERT#7023
by CERT Coordination Center 18 Dec '95

18 Dec '95

============================================================================= Alert to Network Service Providers - Widespread attacks on Internet sites CERT Coordination Center December 18, 1995 ============================================================================= Over the last several weeks, the CERT Coordination Center has been working on related incidents where the intruders have launched widespread attacks against Internet sites. Due to the scope of this incident, we ask that you alert your customers/constituency as soon as possible, and urge them to take action to ensure that systems are protected against these attacks. Please feel free to redistribute this message. Hundreds of sites have been attacked, and many of the attacks have been successful, resulting in root compromises at the targeted sites. We are working directly with the root-compromised sites. We continue to receive reports, and we believe that more attacks are going undetected. ************************************************************************** NOTE -- all of the vulnerabilities exploited in this attack are known, and are addressed by CERT advisories. ************************************************************************** The MO of the attacks and advisories that address these vulnerabilities are listed below. We cannot emphasize enough the importance of taking the actions suggested in these advisories and README files. - using automated tools to scan sites for NFS and NIS vulnerabilities * CA-94:15.NFS.Vulnerabilities and CA-94:15.README * CA-92:13.SunOS.NIS.vulnerability - exploiting the rpc.ypupdated vulnerability to gain root access * CA-95:17.rpc.ypupdated.vul and CA-95:17.README - exploiting the loadmodule vulnerability to gain root access * CA-93:18.SunOS.Solbourne.loadmodule.modload.vulnerability, CA-95:12.sun.loadmodule.vul and CA-95:12.README - installing Trojan horse programs and packet sniffers * CA-94:01.ongoing.network.monitoring.attacks and CA-94:01.README - launching IP spoofing attacks * CA-95:01.IP.spoofing and CA-95:01.README The CERT advisories and README files are available from: ftp://info.cert.org:/pub/cert_advisories Please feel free to forward this alert to other providers of Internet services, in addition to notifying your customers/constituents of this attack. We will also be launching CERT advisory CA-95:18.widespread.attacks this morning. I have appended a copy of this advisory below. Communicating with us - ---------------------- Warning: For sensitive information, use encrypted email. You will find the CERT public PGP key at the end of this document. If you would prefer to use DES, please call the CERT hotline: +1 412 268 7090 to exchange a DES key over the phone. If you or one of your customers find a compromise, please complete and return the Incident Reporting Form (IRF) appended below. This completed form will help us better assist you. Because of our workload, we must ask you not to send log files of activity, but we would be happy to work with you as needed on how to interpret data that you may collect. If you see activity that indicates an attack is in progress, we encourage you to contact your customer, or other sites involved or their service provider. We will also be happy to provide guidance and advice, if needed, on how to handle incidents and work with law enforcement. CERT Public Key - ---------------------- - -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Version: 2.6 mQCNAi2a4WoAAAEEAN0IPkqCmoGRud0Kts3g4ZGgZ4zyqY8C5VTOgUcqU+D2U1so 21K6dxj/lewKFduXtNpqDeg6C0wR6GIMJ2jWLU4GUEq0xHohioWGGg5O3QTvCpN3 rnLIKO9urv4Wjgkp1n1ys7xcOYl5jb7kuhdlXs3kNgKi4zBB5XVP+x0t4w7BAAUR tChDRVJUIENvb3JkaW5hdGlvbiBDZW50ZXIgPGNlcnRAY2VydC5vcmc+iQCVAgUQ LZrkOXVP+x0t4w7BAQEI3QP/d9gl7GD52Pd8KbsBMb0hiploigL8kZW1Q1fVsIm1 cO9xumU89CLf2jrN+IdrIMpVWAO3DyJjZooZTaJBg/9jjv3HltHTq/XFD5c+WYlM G+fQZVuR8qu8+D8P8pPbNVm94wxj9fyKO39/dnub1UfjDedJBtt+zgMJmstADkOv QBM= =N6E5 - -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Incident Reporting Form - ---------------------- Please complete this form if you are reporting a compromise. CERT(sm) Coordination Center Incident Reporting Form CERT has developed the following form in an effort to facilitate our interaction with members of the Internet community. We would appreciate your completing the form included below in as much detail as possible. The information is optional, but the more information you can provide, the better we will be able to assist you. Note that our policy is to keep confidential any information you provide unless we receive your permission to release that information. (See questions 8 and 11 below.) Please feel free to duplicate any section as required. Please return this form to cert(a)cert.org. If you are unable to e-mail this form, please send it via FAX. Our FAX telephone number is +1 412-268-6989. Thank you for your cooperation and help. 1) Incident number (after assigned by CERT): 2) Reporting site information Organizational Name (e.g. CERT Coordination Center): Domain Name (e.g. cert.org) 3) Your contact information Name: E-mail address: Telephone number: FAX number (optional): Pager number (optional): Home telephone number (for CERT internal use only): 4) Additional contact information (if available) Name: E-mail address: Telephone number: FAX number (optional): Pager number (optional): Home telephone number (for CERT internal use only): 5) Compromised host(s) at your site (one entry per host please) Hostname: IP address: Vendor: Hardware: OS: Version: Security patches applied: 6) Please list the other sites compromised that you have notified, and the contact information for each site (one entry per site please) Hostname: IP address: Contact information: Name: E-mail address: Telephone number: FAX number (optional): Pager number (optional): Home telephone number (optional, for CERT internal use only): 7) Please list the other sites compromised that you have not yet notified (one entry per site please) Hostname: IP address: Contact information (if available): Name: E-mail address: Telephone number: FAX number (optional): Pager number (optional): Home telephone number (optional, CERT internal use only): 8) Would you be willing to contact these sites if CERT provided you the relevant contact information (Yes/No): Or, can CERT give your contact information to these sites when we contact them (Yes/No): 9) Incident category (Yes/No) Probe: Prank: Mail Spoofing: Break-in: Installed Trojan Horse: Intruder gained root access: NIS (yellow pages) attack: NFS attack: TFTP attack: FTP attack: Telnet attack: Rlogin or rsh attack: Product vulnerability: Worm: Virus: Other (please specify): 10) Are you currently using (Yes/No/Periodically) COPS (The Computer Oracle and Password System): TCP access control using packet filtering: Host access control via modified daemons or wrappers: Crack: Tripwire: Proactive password checkers (e.g. npasswd, passwd+): Shadow passwords: Other (please specify): 11) Miscellaneous Please specify any other incident response team(s) you have contacted Team: Contact information Name: E-mail address: Telephone number: FAX number (optional): Pager number (optional): Home telephone number (optional, CERT internal use only): If you have not contacted another incident response team, could we give them your contact information (Yes/No): Please specify any law enforcement agency(ies) you have contacted Agency: Contact information Name: E-mail address: Telephone number: FAX number (optional): Pager number (optional): Home telephone number (optional, CERT internal use only): If you have not contacted any law enforcement agency, could we give them your contact information, if necessary (Yes/No): 12) Detailed description of incident (e.g. method of intrusion, etc) 13) What assistance would you like from CERT? Copyright 1995 Carnegie Mellon University This form may be reproduced and distributed without permission provided it is used for noncommercial purposes and the CERT Coordination Center is acknowledged. CERT is a service mark of Carnegie Mellon University. ============================================================================= CA-95:18 CERT Advisory December 18, 1995 Widespread Attacks on Internet Sites ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- Over the last several weeks, the CERT Coordination Center has been working on a set of incidents in which the intruders have launched widespread attacks against Internet sites. Hundreds of sites have been attacked, and many of the attacks have been successful, resulting in root compromises at the targeted sites. We continue to receive reports, and we believe that more attacks are going undetected. ********************************************************************** All the vulnerabilities exploited in these attacks are known, and are addressed by CERT advisories (see Section III). ********************************************************************** We urge everyone to obtain these advisories and take action to ensure that systems are protected against these attacks. Also, please feel free to redistribute this message. As we receive additional information relating to this advisory, we will place it in ftp://info.cert.org/pub/cert_advisories/CA-95:18.README We encourage you to check our README files regularly for updates on advisories that relate to your site. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- I. Description Intruders are doing the following: - using automated tools to scan sites for NFS and NIS vulnerabilities - exploiting the rpc.ypupdated vulnerability to gain root access - exploiting the loadmodule vulnerability to gain root access - installing Trojan horse programs and packet sniffers - launching IP spoofing attacks II. Impact Successful exploitation of the vulnerabilities can result in unauthorized root access. III. Solution The CERT staff urges you to immediately take the steps described in the advisories and README files listed below. Note that it is important to check README files as they contain updated information we received after the advisory was published. a. Using automated tools to scan sites for NFS and NIS vulnerabilities * CA-94:15.NFS.Vulnerabilities * CA-94:15.README * CA-92:13.SunOS.NIS.vulnerability b. Exploiting the rpc.ypupdated vulnerability to gain root access * CA-95:17.rpc.ypupdated.vul * CA-95:17.README c. Exploiting the loadmodule vulnerability to gain root access * CA-93:18.SunOS.Solbourne.loadmodule.modload.vulnerability * CA-95:12.sun.loadmodule.vul * CA-95:12.README d. Installing Trojan horse programs and packet sniffers * CA-94:01.ongoing.network.monitoring.attacks * CA-94:01.README e. Launching IP spoofing attacks * CA-95:01.IP.spoofing * CA-95:01.README The CERT advisories and README files are available from ftp://info.cert.org/pub/cert_advisories If you find a compromise, please complete the Incident Reporting Form that we have provided in the appendix of this advisory, and return the form to cert(a)cert.org. This completed form will help us better assist you. Note: Because of our workload, we must ask you not to send log files of activity, but we would be happy to work with you as needed on how to interpret data that you may collect. Also, the CERT staff can provide guidance and advice, if needed, on how to handle incidents and work with law enforcement. If you see activity that indicates an attack is in progress, we encourage you to contact other sites involved and the service providers, as well as the CERT Coordination Center. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Contacting the CERT Coordination Center For sensitive information, please use encrypted email. The CERT public PGP key is available from ftp://info.cert.org/pub/CERT_PGP.key If you prefer to use DES, please call the CERT hotline +1 412 268 7090 to exchange a DES key over the phone. Other CERT contact information: Internet email: cert(a)cert.org Telephone: +1 412-268-7090 (24-hour hotline) CERT personnel answer 8:30 a.m.-5:00 p.m. EST(GMT-5)/EDT(GMT-4), and are on call for emergencies during other hours. Fax: +1 412-268-6989 Postal address: CERT Coordination Center Software Engineering Institute Carnegie Mellon University Pittsburgh, PA 15213-3890 USA CERT advisories and bulletins are posted on the USENET newsgroup comp.security.announce. If you would like to have future advisories and bulletins mailed to you or to a mail exploder at your site, please send mail to cert-advisory-request(a)cert.org. Past CERT publications, information about FIRST representatives, and other information related to computer security are available from ftp://info.cert.org/pub/ Copyright 1995 Carnegie Mellon University This material may be reproduced and distributed without permission provided it is used for noncommercial purposes and the copyright statement is included. CERT is a service mark of Carnegie Mellon University. .............................................................................. Appendix: Incident Reporting Form (also available from ftp://info.cert.org/pub/incident.reporting.form) CERT(sm) Coordination Center Incident Reporting Form CERT has developed the following form in an effort to facilitate our interaction with members of the Internet community. We would appreciate your completing the form included below in as much detail as possible. The information is optional, but the more information you can provide, the better we will be able to assist you. Note that our policy is to keep confidential any information you provide unless we receive your permission to release that information. (See questions 8 and 11 below.) Please feel free to duplicate any section as required. Please return this form to cert(a)cert.org. If you are unable to e-mail this form, please send it via FAX. Our FAX telephone number is +1 412-268-6989. Thank you for your cooperation and help. 1) Incident number (assigned by CERT): CERT# 2) Reporting site information Organizational Name (e.g. CERT Coordination Center): Domain Name (e.g. cert.org) 3) Your contact information Name: E-mail address: Telephone number: FAX number (optional): Pager number (optional): Home telephone number (for CERT internal use only): 4) Additional contact information (if available) Name: E-mail address: Telephone number: FAX number (optional): Pager number (optional): Home telephone number (for CERT internal use only): 5) Compromised host(s) at your site (one entry per host please) Hostname: IP address: Vendor: Hardware: OS: Version: Security patches applied: 6) Please list the other sites compromised that you have notified, and the contact information for each site (one entry per site please) Hostname: IP address: Contact information: Name: E-mail address: Telephone number: FAX number (optional): Pager number (optional): Home telephone number (optional, for CERT internal use only): 7) Please list the other sites compromised that you have not yet notified (one entry per site please) Hostname: IP address: Contact information (if available): Name: E-mail address: Telephone number: FAX number (optional): Pager number (optional): Home telephone number (optional, CERT internal use only): 8) Would you be willing to contact these sites if CERT provided you the relevant contact information (Yes/No): Or, can CERT give your contact information to these sites when we contact them (Yes/No): 9) Incident category (Yes/No) Probe: Prank: Mail Spoofing: Break-in: Installed Trojan Horse: Intruder gained root access: NIS (yellow pages) attack: NFS attack: TFTP attack: FTP attack: Telnet attack: Rlogin or rsh attack: Product vulnerability: Worm: Virus: Other (please specify): 10) Are you currently using (Yes/No/Periodically) COPS (The Computer Oracle and Password System): TCP access control using packet filtering: Host access control via modified daemons or wrappers: Crack: Tripwire: Proactive password checkers (e.g. npasswd, passwd+): Shadow passwords: Other (please specify): 11) Miscellaneous Please specify any other incident response team(s) you have contacted Team: Contact information Name: E-mail address: Telephone number: FAX number (optional): Pager number (optional): Home telephone number (optional, CERT internal use only): If you have not contacted another incident response team, could we give them your contact information (Yes/No): Please specify any law enforcement agency(ies) you have contacted Agency: Contact information Name: E-mail address: Telephone number: FAX number (optional): Pager number (optional): Home telephone number (optional, CERT internal use only): If you have not contacted any law enforcement agency, could we give them your contact information, if necessary (Yes/No): 12) Detailed description of incident (e.g. method of intrusion, etc) 13) What assistance would you like from CERT? Copyright 1995 Carnegie Mellon University This form may be reproduced and distributed without permission provided it is used for noncommercial purposes and the CERT Coordination Center is acknowledged. CERT is a service mark of Carnegie Mellon University.

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unsubscribe
by Bob Castelli 18 Dec '95

18 Dec '95

unsubscribe castelli(a)hq.si.net

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Sprint BGP filters in 207.x.x.x?
by Avi Freedman 17 Dec '95

17 Dec '95

What's the smallest CIDR block Sprint will listen to from an external source in the 207.x.x.x-208.x.x.x range? Is it different than the filters on > /19s in 206.x.x.x-207.x.x.x range? Avi

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Re: Routing registry was Re: Sprint BGP filters in 207.x.x.x?
by Jeff.Ogden＠um.cc.umich.edu 17 Dec '95

17 Dec '95

The large scale provider MichNet uses is MCI and they are required to cooperate with the RA and others. This is in their contract. I suspect that something similar might be in some of the other contracts of providers that provide service to networks that received funding from NSF for Interregional Connectivity. People might want to go read the fine print in their contracts. -Jeff Ogden Merit/MichNet

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