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Purpose of the Internet
by Alan Hannan 14 Mar '02

14 Mar '02

> Actually, NANOG does great. Especially during Sept 11, information > was disseminated, help was offered and accepted, and except for a > couple of idiotic flames, the SNR was high. ARPA designed the thing > to withstand nuclear blasts, and while this was not nuclear, it stood > up well. I read through nanog around september 11th a few days ago and I concur that painful as it was to re-read, it is apparent that nanog served well as a useful communications medium. With regards to the purpose of the internet, I recall reading in the Prologue to _Where Wizards Stay Up Late_, by Katie Hafner and Matthew Lyon, a true anecdote about Bob Taylor. The authors quote Mr. Taylor as refuting that the purpose of the arpanet was to provide communications in spite of a nuclear attack. Rather, it is asserted, the purpose of the arpanet was to interconnect computers at various research/education facilities so as to allow researchers to share resources. We all heard that story too, but popular media tended to focus on the sensationalist nuclear story. Useful info from history..... -alan ps -> thanks jeff for the book back in 1996 :-)

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FW: Purpose of the Internet
by Lixia Zhang 14 Mar '02

14 Mar '02

------ Forwarded Message From: Lixia Zhang <lixia(a)cs.ucla.edu> Date: Wed, 13 Mar 2002 21:55:25 -0800 To: Alan Hannan <alan(a)routingloop.com>, <nanog(a)merit.edu> Subject: Re: Purpose of the Internet On 3/13/02 9:14 PM, "Alan Hannan" <alan(a)routingloop.com> wrote: > ...... > With regards to the purpose of the internet, I recall reading > in the Prologue to _Where Wizards Stay Up Late_, by Katie Hafner > and Matthew Lyon, a true anecdote about Bob Taylor. The authors > quote Mr. Taylor as refuting that the purpose of the arpanet was > to provide communications in spite of a nuclear attack. > > Rather, it is asserted, the purpose of the arpanet was to > interconnect computers at various research/education facilities > so as to allow researchers to share resources. > > We all heard that story too, but popular media tended to focus > on the sensationalist nuclear story. There might be a mixup between what's the purpose of *packet switching* vs what was the originally intended use of ARPAnet. For those interested: here is a paper by Paul Baran, inventor of packet switching, "Some Perspectives on Networks-Past, Present and Future" back in 1977, recalling some of the history http://irl.cs.ucla.edu/papers/ifip.ps Lixia If you are really interested: another paper by Paul, "On Distributed Communications Networks", published in IEEE Trans on communications back in 1964, http://irl.cs.ucla.edu/papers/trans.ps (predated ARPANET) Dave Goldberg of PARC (my ex-office neighbor) helped scan in these historical papers. ------ End of Forwarded Message

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Re: vipul's razor
by Jeff Mcadams 14 Mar '02

14 Mar '02

Also sprach Petr M. Swedock >Is't possible to use this to 'poison' the catalogue: that is to say, >how easy is it to create a denial-of-service for legitimate mail? I'm not an expert on how Vipul's Razor does its cataloguing, but I suspect its quite easy to do so, yes. The man page (perldoc) for razor-report shows you how to set up a "trolling" address that auto-submits every received email via razor-report. Simply subscribe an address set up that way to BUGTRAQ or other mailing lists and every BUGTRAQ post (or whatever list its subscribed to) would be auto-submitted to razor as spam. Then for the other people on the list that are using razor-check...whether the post would get flagged as spam would be a race condition...do you get your copy before the trolling address gets its copy and gets it submitted to the catalogue? I think the idea of the razor is good...but needs some refinement...maybe ability to set a threshold on the number of reports needed to flag something as spam? -- Jeff McAdams Email: jeffm(a)iglou.com Head Network Administrator Voice: (502) 966-3848 IgLou Internet Services (800) 436-4456

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Anyone here at Sprint?
by Christopher K. Neitzert 14 Mar '02

14 Mar '02

Looking for a Nevada Sprint NOC worker. please email me off list. thanks christopher Christopher K. Neitzert / 0xC10D222F / chris(a)neitzert.com

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[Fwd: 10 years and no ubiquitous security]
by William Allen Simpson 14 Mar '02

14 Mar '02

In remembrance: -------- Original Message -------- Subject: 10 years and no ubiquitous security Date: Wed, 13 Mar 2002 18:49:35 -0500 From: William Allen Simpson <wsimpson(a)greendragon.com> Organization: DayDreamer To: ietf(a)ietf.org CC: ipsec(a)lists.tislabs.com 10 years ago this week, we had an IETF meeting in San Diego. 10 years ago on Tuesday, Phil Karn sprawled out across my hotel room bed and drew the packet header that became ESP. (Remember when we were small enough to have hotel room BOFs?) 10 years today, at a lunch meeting, Phil Karn gathered a group of us, and we agreed to pursue IP Security, as "the most important thing missing from the Internet". (Most real work was still done in lunch and dinner BOFs last time I attended IETF, and presumably that tradition continues now.) 10 years ago tomorrow, Brian Lloyd and I had a "rubber hose" lunch meeting with Steve Kent, who as a member of the IAB had refused to allow the PPP WG to publish CHAP in our RFC as an official authentication protocol. (He had previously mandated that we remove all security protocol negotiation.) He backed down, but we had to change the name from "cryptographic" to "challenge". Steve Kent refused to charter the IPSec WG. We had to reform the structure of the IAB (removing Steve Kent) -- which was good for many other reasons, although its efficacy was short-lived. After all these years, ESP itself is remarkably unchanged. (The sequence field is 32 bits instead of 16 bits, but we did that in 1993.) Remember, by 1995 we had multiple interoperable implementations. Roughly 5 years ago, IPSec was supposed to be disbanded, because its work was complete. Instead, somebody named Steve Kent secretly took over the WG editorship (with no consensus, or even WG discussion), and his "appointment" was enforced upon the new "reform" WG Chairs. For 5 more years, IPSec WG has slowly turned out unworkable documents, generating endless and fruitless discussion. Today, IPSec has insignificant deployment, and the WG goeth on forever. ... Should I remind folks that at that same San Diego IETF, JI and Phil and Steve Deering and others of us had a lunch BOF on Mobile-IP? -- William Allen Simpson Key fingerprint = 17 40 5E 67 15 6F 31 26 DD 0D B9 9B 6A 15 2C 32

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Need Verio Contact
by measl＠mfn.org 13 Mar '02

13 Mar '02

Does anyone have current contact info for VERIO NOC or Engineering? "puck" data is completely out of date, as is my internal lists. Thanks! -- Yours, J.A. Terranson sysadmin(a)mfn.org

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The view from the other side of the fence
by Sean Donelan 13 Mar '02

13 Mar '02

IV. SS7 SECURITY ISSUES Dave Henderson (SEVIS Systems) gave a presentation entitled, "Public Switched Network is Now Really Public (Attachment 4)." Dave noted he has spent a number of years working in information warfare and protection. He noted that his work addresses issues on network security and open network connection. Points Noted 10. Dave noted there are concerns with reliability of equipment. He noted that while the PSTN was formerly relatively closed, it is now wide open. 11. Dave noted in the past, the internet was relatively safe; however recent events have opened security issues while teaching vulnerability lessons. He noted that with an increase in network users, there is also an increase in vulnerabilities identified by users and decreased ability to control the network. 12. Dave reviewed the emerging threats to the PSTN. He noted the cost resulting from fraud is presently $12 billion and growing. With the rapid development of technology, there is less time for adequate testing. He noted that the quality of intruder tools is improving and they are becoming more available. He further noted hacker magazines are writing SS7 articles. 13. Dave reviewed some of the major threats to individual networks. Among these he noted theft of SS7 service (calling card numbers, wireless fraud and rerouting of call traffic) and denial of service. 14. Dave noted the solutions that are presently available for addressing security issues are inadequate. He noted the present gateway screening capabilities are unreliable, there is no standard security guideline for interconnection, there is a progressive skills gap, and there is currently no mechanisms to control or authenticate traffic on the network. 15. Dave noted the networks are very fragile with a tremendous number of vulnerabilities. 16. Dan noted if the network was compromised by a problem caused by a new piece of equipment, this could be devastating to a company's reputation. 17. Dave noted in order for convergence to take place interoperation with different transport and signaling technologies is imperative. 18. Dave noted the industry needs to be more proactive in addressing the security issues in order to avoid having the government impose mandates and to ensure the US is protected from information warfare attacks that could result in the draining of bank reserves and the cutting off of power sources. 19. Dan noted that like interoperability testing, security testing discoveries provide insurance against issues that arise. Unfortunately, until problems arise, people are not quick to act.

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Re: Telco's write best practices for packet switching networks
by Kelly J. Cooper 13 Mar '02

13 Mar '02

Sean, On Mar 6, 7:56am, Sean Donelan wrote: > Subject: Telco's write best practices for packet switching networks * *After the SNMP excitement I asked if anyone had suggestions on how *to architect or design a backbone network to be less suspectible to *problems. It turns out the telephone industry has written a set of *best practices for the Internet. Uh huh... The report is 122 pages long and contains a review of how they took existing Best Practices, collected mostly from the previous NRIC, and refined them (based on criteria outlined on p.22). Then performed a SURVEY of what people thought about the 256 BP recommendations they had, covering Service Providers of multiple services and equipment suppliers, all somehow related to telecommunications. The BPs themselves range from: 5-501 "Network Operators should report problems discovered from their testing to the Equipment Supplier whose equipment was found to be the cause of problem." ...to... 5-758 "If 911 call completion is affected, test calls should be made by the Server Provider to the PSAP(s) to assess the impact. Once service is restored, the Service Provider should make multiple 911 test calls to ensure they complete properly." (See Appendix A) I don't think they were focusing on BPs for the Internet per se so much as believing that many BPs that work for PSTN should also work for the Internet. Whether or not they are correct is a (if not THE) challenging matter for debate. *Focus Group 2.A.2: Best Practices on Packet Switching. Karl Rauscher, *Lucent Technologies *http://www.nric.org/pubs/index.html * * Mr. Rauscher gave an example of the kind of information to be found * there. The best practice used in the example states that critical * packet network elements such as control elements, access in signaling * gateways and DNS servers, should have firewall protection such as * screening and filtering. One hundred percent of the respondents * indicated they were implementing this best practice. * *Cool, who has an OC-192 firewall on their control elements? What is *a control element, is that the same as a router or is that a signaling *gateway? Damned flat internet... can't tell if you're kidding or not. I'm guessing that you are, but just in case... Control elements are the router-like bits or computer-like bits that actually "control" management of the switch (i.e. you connect to that part in order to reconfigure, upgrade, etc. the element). Most ISPs have a comparable set-up wrt modems/terminal servers for managing their network elements - same dealy, but ISPs can choose between inband & OOB whereas the telcos can't. (Or couldn't, til recently, when Net/Bell convergence started urging the market toward big damn fiber switches with in-band mgmt tools.) So - in the world of telco, the control elements are JUST OOB. Since you literally can't reach them inband, the OOB element mgmt can be done through modems or a separate network which is firewalled off from the rest of the Internet. That's what they're talking about in your excerpt. What I find interesting is that I've heard a lot of cage rattling to take the Internet in this direction, i.e. stop managing it in-band where all the kiddies and the terrorists can get at it and start managing it OOB. Hide it, shut it away, don't route it, etc. nevermind what a pain it is to manage TWO networks... nevermind how much flexibility you lose. (Sorry, my bias is showing.) And I'm hearing this from BOTH NetHeads AND BellHeads. Kelly J. -- Kelly J. Cooper - Security Engineer, CISSP GENUITY - Main # - 800-632-7638 3 Van de Graaff Drive - Fax - 781-262-2744 Burlington, MA 01803 - http://www.genuity.net

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NYT 3/13/02 on Worldcom and the SEC : "From Obscurity to Inquiry"
by Fletcher E Kittredge 13 Mar '02

13 Mar '02

Well written, sobering. Free registration required. http://www.nytimes.com/2002/03/13/technology/13PHON.html regards, fletcher

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ILEC Map
by Irwin Lazar 12 Mar '02

12 Mar '02

Folks, Is there a web site out there that provides a map of the united states showing each ILEC and the states within their region (Bellsouth, SBC, Qwest, & Verizon)? Thanks in advance, Irwin

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