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RE: VeriSign's antitrust suit against ICANN dismissed
by Hosman, Ross 27 Aug '04

27 Aug '04

One stupid lawsuit from Verisign down...one more stupid lawsuit from SCO to go -----Original Message----- From: owner-nanog(a)merit.edu [mailto:owner-nanog@merit.edu]On Behalf Of Henry Linneweh Sent: Friday, August 27, 2004 9:29 AM To: nanog(a)merit.edu Subject: VeriSign's antitrust suit against ICANN dismissed http://news.com.com/VeriSign%27s+antitrust+suit+against+ICANN+dismissed/2100 -1030_3-5326136.html?tag=nefd.top

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time to bury nethead versus bellhead polemics
by Gordon Cook 27 Aug '04

27 Aug '04

Hope that more than a few here will be interested in some of my recent conclusions - from the November issue that I just published. Why a Layered Model is the Only Reasonable Way to Evaluate Telecom Lines of Business Have Blurred - Making the Regulatory Concept of Vertical Silos Archaic Time Has Come to Bury All "Bellhead versus Nethead" Polemics Introduction Since the bubble burst in late 2000 sending the Internet and the rest of telecom into a tailspin, it has been rather obvious that former stability and predictability of the economics of telecommunications has been shattered. The last several issues of The COOK Report have explored the fallout of those shattered economics in great detail. In this introduction The COOK Report notes that telecom economics is likely to stay broken, first, due to oversupply, and second due to lack of differentiation on anything other than price across too many competitors in services and service providers. Third: because of very loosely bonded brand loyalty. A final and very serious additional problem is regulatory instability as the FCC struggles with historical precedent in its interpretation of legislation. It finds itself whip-sawed between its "vertical silo" model derived from the technology it regulates, and the increasingly advocated "horizontal network layer view" of the IP enabled services, including but not limited to VoIP, Video over IP, and so on. As long-term, and, perhaps, not so long term, readers of The COOK Report are aware, this publication has not only long trumpeted the "bellhead vs. nethead" divide, but taken a partisan position where anything seen to be "bell-headed" was regarded as bad while "netheaded" was seen as the 'nirvana' to which the Internet would guide telecommunications. = = == For the remainder of my Bury "Bellhead versus Nethead" Polemics article please see http://cookreport.com/13.08.shtml -- ============================================================= The COOK Report on Internet Protocol, 431 Greenway Ave, Ewing, NJ 08618 USA 609 882-2572 (PSTN) 415 651-4147 (Lingo) Subscription info & prices at http://cookreport.com/subscriptions.shtml Why Bellhead vs Nethead polemics don't help at: http://cookreport.com/13.08.shtml E-mail cook(a)cookreport.com =============================================================

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Fastmail.fm contact
by George Barnett 27 Aug '04

27 Aug '04

Hi All, I'm looking for an admin bod @fastmail.fm - anybody have a contact to lend me off-list? Many thanks, George -- George Barnett Reality Engineer & Explorer e: george(a)alink.co.za m: +44 778 884 7205 Things must be as they may - William Shakespear, Henry V

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VeriSign's antitrust suit against ICANN dismissed
by Henry Linneweh 27 Aug '04

27 Aug '04

http://news.com.com/VeriSign%27s+antitrust+suit+against+ICANN+dismissed/210…

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DNS
by Paul Gilbert 27 Aug '04

27 Aug '04

I have a friend whom has a problem with we believe DNS. In this case the ISP is NTL. He has a stateful firewall and is running NAT you can see from the tcp dump below that he sends the query to one DNS server but another responds thus breaking the firewall state and therefore it never resolves. Should the provider have the forwarding option on there servers or does he need to punch another hole in his firewall. cheers 09:23:01.216136 80.2.189.69.53 > 194.168.8.100.53: 54051+ [1au][|domain] (DF) 09:23:01.534353 194.168.4.100.53 > 80.2.189.69.53: 54051[|domain] (DF) 09:23:01.534618 80.2.189.69 > 194.168.4.100: icmp: 80.2.189.69 udp port 53 unreachable [tos 0xc0] 09:23:11.238123 80.2.189.69.53 > 194.168.8.100.53: 12113+ [1au][|domain] (DF) 09:23:11.414372 194.168.4.100.53 > 80.2.189.69.53: 12113[|domain] (DF) 09:23:11.414606 80.2.189.69 > 194.168.4.100: icmp: 80.2.189.69 udp port 53 unreachable [tos 0xc0] 09:23:19.634810 80.2.189.69.53 > 194.168.8.100.53: 9737+ [1au][|domain] (DF) 09:23:19.643883 194.168.4.100.53 > 80.2.189.69.53: 9737[|domain] (DF) 09:23:19.644127 80.2.189.69 > 194.168.4.100: icmp: 80.2.189.69 udp port 53 unreachable [tos 0xc0] Paul Gilbert Router Management Solutions, Inc. www.routermanagement.com work: 5167666068 mobile: 5164564983

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The Cidr Report
by cidr-report＠potaroo.net 27 Aug '04

27 Aug '04

This report has been generated at Fri Aug 27 21:42:49 2004 AEST. The report analyses the BGP Routing Table of an AS4637 (Reach) router and generates a report on aggregation potential within the table. Check http://www.cidr-report.org/as4637 for a current version of this report. Recent Table History Date Prefixes CIDR Agg 20-08-04 140707 96788 21-08-04 140804 96668 22-08-04 140728 96674 23-08-04 140727 96681 24-08-04 140829 96703 25-08-04 140971 96790 26-08-04 140909 96844 27-08-04 141076 96827 AS Summary 17798 Number of ASes in routing system 7272 Number of ASes announcing only one prefix 1373 Largest number of prefixes announced by an AS AS7018 : ATTW AT&T WorldNet Services 85962240 Largest address span announced by an AS (/32s) AS721 : DNIC DoD Network Information Center Aggregation Summary The algorithm used in this report proposes aggregation only when there is a precise match using the AS path, so as to preserve traffic transit policies. Aggregation is also proposed across non-advertised address space ('holes'). --- 27Aug04 --- ASnum NetsNow NetsAggr NetGain % Gain Description Table 141093 96831 44262 31.4% All ASes AS18566 741 7 734 99.1% CVAD Covad Communications AS4134 782 172 610 78.0% CHINANET-BACKBONE No.31,Jin-rong Street AS4323 775 219 556 71.7% TWTC Time Warner Telecom AS6347 659 122 537 81.5% SAVV SAVVIS Communications Corporation AS7018 1373 944 429 31.2% ATTW AT&T WorldNet Services AS7843 488 103 385 78.9% ADELPH-13 Adelphia Corp. AS22773 379 20 359 94.7% CXAB Cox Communications Inc. Atlanta AS6467 387 31 356 92.0% ACSI e.spire Communications, Inc. AS9583 528 178 350 66.3% SATYAMNET-AS Satyam Infoway Ltd., AS701 1252 904 348 27.8% UU UUNET Technologies, Inc. AS6197 717 395 322 44.9% BNS-14 BellSouth Network Solutions, Inc AS9929 353 34 319 90.4% CNCNET-CN China Netcom Corp. AS22909 361 44 317 87.8% CMCS Comcast Cable Communications, Inc. AS27364 351 37 314 89.5% ARMC Armstrong Cable Services AS1239 940 630 310 33.0% SPRN Sprint AS11172 354 52 302 85.3% Alestra AS17676 345 43 302 87.5% JPNIC-JP-ASN-BLOCK Japan Network Information Center AS4355 380 99 281 73.9% ERSD EARTHLINK, INC AS6478 345 64 281 81.4% ATTW AT&T WorldNet Services AS4766 543 266 277 51.0% KIXS-AS-KR Korea Telecom AS9443 359 109 250 69.6% INTERNETPRIMUS-AS-AP Primus Telecommunications AS6140 369 123 246 66.7% IMPSA ImpSat AS14654 254 10 244 96.1% WAYPOR-3 Wayport AS6198 456 220 236 51.8% BNS-14 BellSouth Network Solutions, Inc AS25844 244 15 229 93.9% SASMFL-2 Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP AS3561 466 253 213 45.7% CWU Cable & Wireless USA AS6327 226 29 197 87.2% SHAWC-2 Shaw Communications Inc. AS5668 388 196 192 49.5% CIH-12 CenturyTel Internet Holdings, Inc. AS22291 260 68 192 73.8% CC04 Charter Communications AS721 605 427 178 29.4% DNIC DoD Network Information Center Total 15680 5814 9866 62.9% Top 30 total Possible Bogus Routes 24.138.80.0/20 AS11260 AHSICHCL Andara High Speed Internet c/o Halifax Cable Ltd. 24.246.0.0/17 AS7018 ATTW AT&T WorldNet Services 24.246.38.0/24 AS25994 NPGCAB NPG Cable, INC 24.246.128.0/18 AS7018 ATTW AT&T WorldNet Services 64.46.4.0/22 AS11711 TULARO TULAROSA COMMUNICATIONS 64.46.12.0/24 AS7850 IHIGHW iHighway.net, Inc. 64.46.27.0/24 AS8674 NETNOD-IX Netnod Internet Exchange Sverige AB 64.46.34.0/24 AS3408 64.46.63.0/24 AS7850 IHIGHW iHighway.net, Inc. 64.83.96.0/19 AS22934 EBNI E Broadband Now Inc. 66.54.112.0/24 AS32108 EZSPY EZ-Spyder 66.54.113.0/24 AS32108 EZSPY EZ-Spyder 66.54.114.0/24 AS32108 EZSPY EZ-Spyder 66.54.115.0/24 AS32108 EZSPY EZ-Spyder 66.114.0.0/19 AS16526 BIRCHT Birch Telecom, Inc. 69.26.32.0/19 AS17307 VIRTEL-15 Virtela Communications 132.0.0.0/10 AS721 DNIC DoD Network Information Center 137.0.0.0/13 AS721 DNIC DoD Network Information Center 138.136.0.0/13 AS721 DNIC DoD Network Information Center 158.0.0.0/13 AS721 DNIC DoD Network Information Center 192.30.93.0/24 AS17757 HPAUS-AP HP Australia 192.30.94.0/24 AS17757 HPAUS-AP HP Australia 192.30.127.0/24 AS719 LANLINK Elisa Oyj 192.40.105.0/24 AS5515 SONERA-GLOBAL-IP Sonera Solution Autonomous System 192.43.230.0/24 AS4738 SAARDNET-AS South Australian Academic Research and Development Network 192.44.0.0/19 AS702 AS702 MCI EMEA - Commercial IP service provider in Europe 192.80.64.0/19 AS1 LVLT Level 3 Communications, Inc. 192.81.182.0/24 AS719 LANLINK Elisa Oyj 192.81.183.0/24 AS719 LANLINK Elisa Oyj 192.81.184.0/24 AS719 LANLINK Elisa Oyj 192.119.135.0/24 AS270 NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration 192.124.252.0/22 AS680 DFN-IP service G-WiN 192.133.6.0/24 AS4004 GLOBALONE-EQUANT-UK Equant UK & Greece Autonomous System 192.135.50.0/24 AS7018 ATTW AT&T WorldNet Services 192.136.71.0/24 AS719 LANLINK Elisa Oyj 192.136.79.0/24 AS719 LANLINK Elisa Oyj 192.138.208.0/20 AS1 LVLT Level 3 Communications, Inc. 192.153.144.0/21 AS721 DNIC DoD Network Information Center 192.172.0.0/19 AS721 DNIC DoD Network Information Center 192.188.208.0/20 AS721 DNIC DoD Network Information Center 192.190.16.0/21 AS1 LVLT Level 3 Communications, Inc. 192.243.32.0/23 AS2044 PALINA Palin Aquisitions Inc. 198.23.26.0/24 AS4390 BELLAT-7 Bell Atlantic, Inc. 198.97.72.0/21 AS721 DNIC DoD Network Information Center 198.97.80.0/20 AS721 DNIC DoD Network Information Center 198.97.88.0/24 AS89 NUSC-1 Naval Underwater Systems Center 198.97.240.0/20 AS721 DNIC DoD Network Information Center 198.97.247.0/24 AS3475 DEPART-52 Department of the Navy 198.101.4.0/22 AS721 DNIC DoD Network Information Center 198.136.32.0/20 AS19329 MCBCC Martin County Board of County Commissioners 198.144.32.0/19 AS3998 CITY CityNet, Inc. 198.161.87.0/24 AS6539 GTGR GT Group Telecom Services Corp. 198.161.165.0/24 AS852 AGTA Telus Advanced Communications 198.163.155.0/24 AS684 MRN Manitoba Regional Network 198.167.0.0/16 AS7456 INS-51 Interhop Network SERVICES Inc. 198.167.163.0/24 AS15290 ACCA-2 Allstream Corp. Corporation Allstream 198.168.0.0/16 AS701 UU UUNET Technologies, Inc. 198.169.0.0/16 AS803 SASK SaskTel 198.232.133.0/24 AS23075 SKOTOS Skotos Tech, Inc 199.10.0.0/16 AS721 DNIC DoD Network Information Center 199.60.0.0/20 AS271 UBC-3 University of British Columbia 199.96.44.0/23 AS19092 360NE-1 360Networks (USA) Inc. 199.96.46.0/24 AS19092 360NE-1 360Networks (USA) Inc. 199.114.0.0/18 AS568 DISOUN DISO-UNRRA 199.114.0.0/21 AS721 DNIC DoD Network Information Center 199.114.128.0/18 AS721 DNIC DoD Network Information Center 199.114.130.0/24 AS721 DNIC DoD Network Information Center 199.114.132.0/24 AS721 DNIC DoD Network Information Center 199.114.134.0/24 AS1913 DLA-8 Defense Logistics Agency 199.114.136.0/24 AS1913 DLA-8 Defense Logistics Agency 199.114.138.0/24 AS721 DNIC DoD Network Information Center 199.114.140.0/24 AS3544 DISAUN DISA/UNRRA 199.114.142.0/24 AS721 DNIC DoD Network Information Center 199.114.144.0/24 AS721 DNIC DoD Network Information Center 199.114.148.0/24 AS721 DNIC DoD Network Information Center 199.114.150.0/24 AS721 DNIC DoD Network Information Center 199.114.152.0/24 AS1913 DLA-8 Defense Logistics Agency 199.114.156.0/24 AS1913 DLA-8 Defense Logistics Agency 199.114.160.0/24 AS1733 ADP-41 AF DDN PMO 199.120.32.0/19 AS16582 NXLI NEXTLEVEL INTERNET, INC. 199.121.0.0/16 AS721 DNIC DoD Network Information Center 199.123.0.0/18 AS721 DNIC DoD Network Information Center 199.123.16.0/20 AS721 DNIC DoD Network Information Center 199.123.80.0/21 AS721 DNIC DoD Network Information Center 199.189.32.0/19 AS7332 IQUEST IQuest Internet 199.197.8.0/22 AS21814 PARSON-18 Parsons Corp. 199.202.0.0/16 AS701 UU UUNET Technologies, Inc. 202.47.1.0/24 AS7491 PI-PH-AS-AP PI-PHILIPINES 202.70.28.0/24 AS4515 ERX-STAR Star Internet Services Ltd. 202.73.128.0/22 AS4058 LINKAGENET-AP CPCNet Hong Kong Ltd. 202.81.96.0/19 AS10113 DATAFAST-AP DATAFAST TELECOMMUNICATIONS LTD 202.81.109.0/24 AS7657 TIG-US-PAS-AP The Internet Group Limited 202.81.121.0/24 AS10113 DATAFAST-AP DATAFAST TELECOMMUNICATIONS LTD 202.93.0.0/20 AS4134 CHINANET-BACKBONE No.31,Jin-rong Street 202.133.3.0/24 AS9335 CIP-JAPAN-AS-AP ATT IPlus 202.164.224.0/19 AS7599 IPXC-AS-AP IP Exchange 203.32.4.0/23 AS7617 203.62.0.0/17 AS7572 AARNET-ACT-RNO Australian Academic and Reasearch Network (AARNet) 203.84.192.0/19 AS17433 PHILWEB-AP PhilWeb.Com, Inc. 203.84.192.0/20 AS17433 PHILWEB-AP PhilWeb.Com, Inc. 203.84.208.0/20 AS17433 PHILWEB-AP PhilWeb.Com, Inc. 203.210.69.0/24 AS17536 PRODIGY-AS-AP Prodidgy Telecommunications 204.154.125.0/24 AS3952 TELLAB-1 TELLABS Operations, Inc. 204.154.126.0/24 AS3952 TELLAB-1 TELLABS Operations, Inc. 204.154.127.0/24 AS3952 TELLAB-1 TELLABS Operations, Inc. 204.194.110.0/23 AS30653 EXOBI Exobit Networks Inc. 204.196.0.0/14 AS1 LVLT Level 3 Communications, Inc. 205.150.0.0/15 AS701 UU UUNET Technologies, Inc. 205.159.72.0/24 AS1660 ANSCOM-5 ANS Communications 206.167.57.0/24 AS376 RISQR-3 Reseau Interordinateurs Scientique Quebecois (RISQ) 206.191.64.0/18 AS15290 ACCA-2 Allstream Corp. Corporation Allstream 206.251.69.0/24 AS27429 TIL-33 Telesat International Ltd. 206.253.190.0/23 AS8123 POLYBA Polybase 207.231.96.0/19 AS11194 NUNETI NuNet Inc 208.81.187.0/24 AS19194 SNL-8 Sentris Network LLC 209.172.0.0/18 AS7770 TRTI Triton Technologies, Inc. 209.205.69.0/24 AS21578 Universidad autonoma de Bucaramanga 209.205.70.0/24 AS21578 Universidad autonoma de Bucaramanga 209.205.81.0/24 AS15066 SkyNet de Colombia S.A. 209.205.82.0/24 AS15066 SkyNet de Colombia S.A. 209.205.84.0/24 AS15066 SkyNet de Colombia S.A. 209.213.32.0/19 AS10629 INS-52 Inter-Pacific Network Services 209.213.50.0/24 AS10629 INS-52 Inter-Pacific Network Services 209.213.51.0/24 AS10629 INS-52 Inter-Pacific Network Services 209.213.55.0/24 AS10629 INS-52 Inter-Pacific Network Services 209.213.56.0/24 AS10629 INS-52 Inter-Pacific Network Services 209.251.0.0/19 AS11036 SISCOM-1 SISCOM, Inc 216.37.110.0/23 AS4264 CERFN California Education and Research Federation Network 216.96.128.0/18 AS7018 ATTW AT&T WorldNet Services 216.145.130.0/24 AS11937 TRXI TRX Inc. 216.145.132.0/24 AS11937 TRXI TRX Inc. 216.145.133.0/24 AS11937 TRXI TRX Inc. 216.145.134.0/24 AS11937 TRXI TRX Inc. 216.145.135.0/24 AS11937 TRXI TRX Inc. 216.145.156.0/24 AS20304 JIS-32 JVLNET Internet Services 216.145.158.0/24 AS20304 JIS-32 JVLNET Internet Services 216.145.176.0/21 AS20304 JIS-32 JVLNET Internet Services 216.145.177.0/24 AS20304 JIS-32 JVLNET Internet Services 216.145.178.0/24 AS20304 JIS-32 JVLNET Internet Services 216.145.184.0/21 AS10758 INWAVE INWave Internet, Inc 216.145.200.0/21 AS20304 JIS-32 JVLNET Internet Services 216.186.151.0/24 AS3356 LEVEL3 Level 3 Communications 216.186.152.0/21 AS3356 LEVEL3 Level 3 Communications 216.186.160.0/23 AS3356 LEVEL3 Level 3 Communications 216.186.164.0/22 AS3356 LEVEL3 Level 3 Communications 216.186.192.0/22 AS3356 LEVEL3 Level 3 Communications 216.186.198.0/23 AS3356 LEVEL3 Level 3 Communications 216.186.248.0/23 AS3356 LEVEL3 Level 3 Communications Please see http://www.cidr-report.org for the full report ------------------------------------ Copies of this report are mailed to: nanog(a)merit.edu eof-list(a)ripe.net apops(a)apops.net routing-wg(a)ripe.net afnog(a)afnog.org swinog(a)swinog.ch

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Cisco Security Advisory: Cisco Telnet Denial of Service Vulnerability
by Cisco Systems Product Security Incident Response Team 27 Aug '04

27 Aug '04

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 Cisco Security Advisory: Cisco Telnet Denial of Service Vulnerability Revision 1.0 For Public Release 2004 August 27 1000 UTC - ------------------------------------------------------------------------- Contents Summary Affected Products Details Impact Software Versions and Fixes Obtaining Fixed Software Workarounds Exploitation and Public Announcements Status of This Notice: INTERIM Distribution Revision History Cisco Security Procedures - ------------------------------------------------------------------------- Summary ======= A specifically crafted Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) connection to a telnet or reverse telnet port of a Cisco device running Internetwork Operating System (IOS) may block further telnet, reverse telnet, Remote Shell (RSH), Secure Shell (SSH), and in some cases Hypertext Transport Protocol (HTTP) access to the Cisco device. Telnet, reverse telnet, RSH and SSH sessions established prior to exploitation are not affected. All other device services will operate normally. Services such as packet forwarding, routing protocols and all other communication to and through the device are not affected. Cisco will make free software available to address this vulnerability. Workarounds, identified below, are available that protect against this vulnerability. This vulnerability is documented in Cisco bug ID CSCef46191 ( registered customers only) . This Advisory is available at http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20040827-telnet.shtml. Affected Products ================= Vulnerable Products - ------------------- This vulnerability affects all Cisco devices that permit access via telnet or reverse telnet and are running an unfixed version of IOS. Products Confirmed Not Vulnerable - --------------------------------- Cisco products that do not run IOS are not affected. Details ======= Telnet, RSH and SSH are used for remote management of Cisco IOS devices. The SSH protocol is also used for Secure Copy (SCP), which allows an encryption-protected transfer of files to and from Cisco devices. HTTP is also used for management of certain Cisco devices. IOS versions prior to12.2(15)T include HTTP server version 1.0, which, if configured, will be unresponsive on a device that is under exploitation. IOS versions after and including 12.2(15)T include HTTP server version 1.1, which is unaffected. Reverse telnet is a feature that allows you to telnet to a Cisco device and then connect to a third device through an asynchronous serial connection. For more information on reverse telnet, consult the following documents: http://cisco.com/en/US/products/sw/iosswrel/ps1828/products_configuration_g… http://cisco.com/en/US/products/sw/iosswrel/ps1826/products_configuration_g… Cisco devices that are operating as a reverse telnet server may have ports open in the ranges of: * 2001 to 2999 * 3001 to 3099 * 6001 to 6999 * 7001 to 7099 After a specially crafted TCP connection to an IOS device on TCP port 23 or the reverse telnet ports listed above, all subsequent telnet, reverse telnet, RSH (TCP port 514), SSH, SCP (SSH and SCP use TCP port 22), and in some cases HTTP (TCP port 80) connections to the device experiencing exploitation will be unsuccessful. Any telnet, reverse telnet, RSH, SSH, SCP and HTTP sessions that are already established with the device will continue to function properly. In Cisco IOS, telnet, reverse telnet, RSH, SSH, SCP and some HTTP sessions are handled by a virtual terminal (VTY). Each telnet, reverse telnet, RSH, SSH and SCP session consumes a VTY. After successful exploitation, the Cisco device can no longer accept any subsequent VTY connections. Though it is not possible to establish new telnet, reverse telnet, RSH, SSH, SCP or HTTP connections to the device after a successful exploitation, the device is only vulnerable on TCP port 23 and the reverse telnet ports listed above. A successful exploitation of this vulnerability requires a complete 3-way TCP handshake, which makes it very difficult to spoof the source IP address. Only remote access services that use VTYs are affected. This includes telnet, reverse telnet, RSH, SSH, SCP and version 1.0 of the HTTP server. Other device services including, but not limited to, routing protocols, TACACS/RADIUS, Voice over IP (VoIP) and packet forwarding are not affected. This vulnerability is addressed by Cisco bug ID: * CSCef46191 ( registered customers only) To determine the software running on a Cisco product, log in to the device and issue the show version command to display the system banner. Cisco IOS software will identify itself as "Internetwork Operating System Software" or simply "IOS �". On the next line of output, the image name will be displayed between parentheses, followed by "Version" and the IOS release name. Other Cisco devices will not have the show version command or will give different output. The following example identifies a Cisco product running IOS release 12.0(3) with an installed image name of C2500-IS-L: Cisco Internetwork Operating System Software IOS (TM) 2500 Software (C2500-IS-L), Version 12.0(3), RELEASE SOFTWARE The release train label is "12.0". The next example shows a product running IOS release 12.0(2a)T1 with an image name of C2600-JS-MZ: Cisco Internetwork Operating System Software IOS (tm) C2600 Software (C2600-JS-MZ), Version 12.0(2a)T1, RELEASE SOFTWARE (fc1) Additional information about Cisco IOS Banners is available at http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/sw/iosswrel/ios_abcs_ios_networking_the…. Impact ====== Exploitation of this vulnerability may result in the denial of new telnet, reverse telnet, RSH, SSH, SCP and HTTP connections to a device running IOS. Other access to the device via the console or SNMP is not affected. The device will remain in this state until the problematic TCP connection is cleared, or the device is reloaded (which will clear the problematic session). If no other access methods are available, exploitation of this vulnerability could deny remote access to the device. Depending on your network architecture, workarounds may be available to mitigate this vulnerability. Software will be available to repair this vulnerability. Software Versions and Fixes =========================== Cisco is working to release fixes for this vulnerability in all currently maintained IOS releases. No software upgrade is required in order to mitigate this vulnerability. See the information below regarding the available configuration workarounds. The software fixes will appear in regularly scheduled maintenance releases of IOS software. As fixed software becomes available for public release, Cisco will update this section of the advisory. Obtaining Fixed Software ======================== Customers with Service Contracts - -------------------------------- As fixed software becomes available, customers with contracts should obtain the fixed software through their regular update channels. For most customers, this means that such software should be obtained through the Software Center on Cisco's worldwide website at http://www.cisco.com. Customers using Third-party Support Organizations - ------------------------------------------------- Customers whose Cisco products are provided or maintained through prior or existing agreement with third-party support organizations such as Cisco Partners, authorized resellers, or service providers should contact that support organization for assistance with the upgrade or fixed software, which should be free of charge. Customers without Service Contracts - ----------------------------------- Customers who purchase direct from Cisco but who do not hold a Cisco service contract and customers who purchase through third-party vendors but are unsuccessful at obtaining fixed software through their point of sale should get their fixed software by contacting the Cisco Technical Assistance Center (TAC). TAC contacts are as follows. * +1 800 553 2447 (toll free from within North America) * +1 408 526 7209 (toll call from anywhere in the world) * e-mail: tac(a)cisco.com Please have your product serial number available and give the URL of this notice as evidence of your entitlement to a free upgrade. Free upgrades for non-contract customers must be requested through the TAC. Please do not contact either "psirt(a)cisco.com" or "security-alert(a)cisco.com" for software upgrades. See http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/687/Directory/DirTAC.shtml for additional TAC contact information, including special localized telephone numbers and instructions and e-mail addresses for use in various languages. Customers may only install and expect support for the feature sets they have purchased. By installing, downloading, accessing or otherwise using such software upgrades, customers agree to be bound by the terms of Cisco's software license terms found at http://www.cisco.com/public/sw-license-agreement.html, or as otherwise set forth at Cisco.com Downloads at http://www.cisco.com/public/sw-center/sw-usingswc.shtml. Workarounds =========== The effectiveness of any workaround is dependent on specific customer situations such as product mix, network topology, traffic behavior, and organizational mission. Customers should consult with their service provider or support organization to ensure any applied workaround is the most appropriate for use in the intended network before it is deployed. Mitigation Strategies - --------------------- Not all of the mitigation strategies listed will work for all customers. Some of the workarounds listed are dependent on which versions and feature-sets of IOS you have in your network. Enabling SSH and disabling telnet - --------------------------------- Note: SSH support is only available in certain IOS feature sets and platforms Cisco devices that support SSH can enable it by following the steps listed here: http://cisco.com/en/US/products/sw/iosswrel/ps1835/products_configuration_g… To disable telnet access to the device, configure the following on all your VTY lines: Router(config)# line vty 0 4 Router(config-line)# transport input ssh Note: Even if SSH is enabled, the IOS device is not protected until telnet access is disabled. Configuring a VTY Access Class - ------------------------------ It is possible to limit the exposure of the Cisco device by applying a VTY access class to permit only known, trusted devices to connect to the device via telnet, reverse telnet, RSH, SSH or SCP. For more information on restricting traffic to VTYs, please consult: http://cisco.com/en/US/products/sw/iosswrel/ps1835/products_command_referen… Configuring Interface Access Lists (ACLs) - ----------------------------------------- In addition to configuring a VTY Access Class, it may be desirable to block all telnet traffic from entering the network. The example below demonstrates how to block TCP port 23 and the reverse telnet traffic while permitting all other IP traffic. Router(config)# access-list 100 deny tcp any any eq telnet Router(config)# access-list 100 deny tcp any any range 2001 2999 Router(config)# access-list 100 deny tcp any any range 3001 3099 Router(config)# access-list 100 deny tcp any any range 6001 6999 Router(config)# access-list 100 deny tcp any any range 7001 7099 Router(config)# access-list 100 permit ip any any The access list must then be configured to block inbound traffic on all public-facing interfaces: Router(config)# interface Ethernet 0/0 Router(config-if)# ip access-group 100 in Telnet should be blocked as part of a Transit ACL controlling all access to the trusted network. Transit ACLs are considered a network security best practice and should be considered as a long-term addition to good network security, as well as a workaround for this specific vulnerability. The white paper entitled "Transit Access Control Lists: Filtering at Your Edge" presents guidelines and recommended deployment techniques for transit ACLs: http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/tacl.html Configuring Infrastructure Access Lists (iACLs) - ----------------------------------------------- Although it is often difficult to block traffic transiting your network, it is possible to identify traffic which should never be allowed to target your infrastructure devices and block that traffic at the border of your network. Infrastructure ACLs are considered a network security best practice and should be considered as a long-term addition to good network security as well as a workaround for this specific vulnerability. The white paper entitled "Protecting Your Core: Infrastructure Protection Access Control Lists" presents guidelines and recommended deployment techniques for infrastructure protection ACLs: http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/iacl.html Configuring Receive Access Lists (rACLs) - ---------------------------------------- For distributed platforms, rACLs may be an option starting in Cisco IOS Software Versions 12.0(21)S2 for the 12000 series GSR and 12.0(24)S for the 7500 series. The receive access lists protect the device from harmful traffic before the traffic can impact the route processor. Receive path ACLs are considered a network security best practice, and should be considered as a long-term addition to good network security, as well as a workaround for this specific vulnerability. The CPU load is distributed to the line card processors and helps mitigate load on the main route processor. The white paper entitled "GSR: Receive Access Control Lists" will help identify and allow legitimate traffic to your device and deny all unwanted packets: http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/racl.html Exploitation and Public Announcements ===================================== The Cisco PSIRT is aware of exploitation of this vulnerability and is recommending customers take action to protect themselves. Status of This Notice: INTERIM ============================== THIS ADVISORY IS PROVIDED ON AN "AS IS" BASIS AND DOES NOT IMPLY ANY KIND OF GUARANTEE OR WARRANTY. YOUR USE OF THE INFORMATION ON THE ADVISORY OR MATERIALS LINKED FROM THE ADVISORY IS AT YOUR OWN RISK. CISCO RESERVES THE RIGHT TO CHANGE OR UPDATE THIS NOTICE AT ANY TIME. CISCO EXPECTS TO UPDATE THIS NOTICE WITHIN 48 to 72 hours FROM THE ORIGINAL DATE OF THIS NOTICE. Distribution ============ This advisory will be posted on Cisco's worldwide website at http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20040827-telnet.shtml. In addition to worldwide web posting, a text version of this notice is clear-signed with the Cisco PSIRT PGP key and is posted to the following e-mail and Usenet news recipients. * cust-security-announce(a)cisco.com * first-teams(a)first.org (includes CERT/CC) * bugtraq(a)securityfocus.com * vulnwatch(a)vulnwatch.org * cisco(a)spot.colorado.edu * cisco-nsp(a)puck.nether.net * full-disclosure(a)lists.netsys.com * comp.dcom.sys.cisco(a)newsgate.cisco.com Future updates of this advisory, if any, will be placed on Cisco's worldwide website, but may or may not be actively announced on mailing lists or newsgroups. Users concerned about this problem are encouraged to check the above URL for any updates. Revision History ================ +---------------------------------------------+ | Revision | 2004-August-27 | Initial public | | 1.0 | | release. | +---------------------------------------------+ Cisco Security Procedures ========================= Complete information on reporting security vulnerabilities in Cisco products, obtaining assistance with security incidents, and registering to receive security information from Cisco, is available on Cisco's worldwide website at http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/sec_incident_response.shtml. This includes instructions for press inquiries regarding Cisco security notices. All Cisco security advisories are available at http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.2.5 (GNU/Linux) iD8DBQFBLxMAezGozzK2tZARAj6eAJ0VX9vmrTBin4Vxt3FchPLIddKAlQCgvt20 dDYTV+/GnsCSHsRfmUz5eJw= =1fzl -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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On the back of other security posts (well some over a year ago now)....
by Matthew Sullivan 27 Aug '04

27 Aug '04

Need I say more...? http://www.securityfocus.com/news/9411 My thanks to those who listened and helped me. My thanks to those who helped Spamhaus, and my thanks to anyone else who got involved with the whole deal. / Mat

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MRV discounts (summary)
by Deepak Jain 27 Aug '04

27 Aug '04

All folks seemed to think 20% was no trouble. One guy suggested 40% was possible on some equipment. Some vendors seemed to choke on that suggestion. :) DJ

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Mega DOS tomorrow?
by Andy Dills 26 Aug '04

26 Aug '04

So, slashdot is linking to some news sites that are reporting that Aleksandr Gostev from Kapersky Labs in Russia has predicted that a large chunk of the net will be shut down tomorrow. I thought the ISC comment was pretty funny: http://isc.sans.org/diary.php -- e-Jihad Begins Thursday, Internet Predicted to Melt Down by Mid-day You should probably starting backing up that gig of gmail to local storage. According to a Russian news site, Kaspersky Labs states that terrorists will launch attacks which will paralyze the Internet this Thursday. This tragically coincides with two weeks of script kiddie attacks (which were scheduled to begin this past Sunday) aimed at disrupting the Republican national convention. In addition, many college students are back on campus this week, which provides the e-terrorists and i-subversives with a veritable candyland of insecure boxes on big pipes. Faced with this triple threat, our beloved Internet will surely fall. The ISC would like to go out on a limb and predict that the Internet will not vaporize into a cloud of nothingness this Thursday, but if it does, it's been our pleasure to help stave off its inevitable annihilation this long. -- Andy --- Andy Dills Xecunet, Inc. www.xecu.net 301-682-9972 ---

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