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RPKI TAs
by Randy Bush 12 Aug '20

12 Aug '20

so i was trying to ensure i had a current set of TALs and was directed to https://www.ripe.net/manage-ips-and-asns/resource-management/certification/… the supposed TAL at the bottom of the page is pretty creative. anyone know what to do there? i kinda hacked with emacs and get rsync://rpki.ripe.net/ta/ripe-ncc-ta.cerpublic.key.info MIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEA0URYSGqUz2myBsOzeW1jQ6NsxNvlLMyhWknvnl8NiBCs/T/S2XuNKQNZ+wBZxIgPPV2pFBFeQAvoH/WK83HwA26V2siwm/MY2nKZ+Olw+wlpzlZ1p3Ipj2eNcKrmit8BwBC8xImzuCGaV0jkRB0GZ0hoH6Ml03umLprRsn6v0xOP0+l6Qc1ZHMFVFb385IQ7FQQTcVIxrdeMsoyJq9eMkE6DoclHhF/NlSllXubASQ9KUWqJ0+Ot3QCXr4LXECMfkpkVR2TZT+v5v658bHVs6ZxRD1b6Uk1uQKAyHUbn/tXvP8lrjAibGzVsXDT2L0x4Edx+QdixPgOji3gBMyL2VwIDAQAB but kinda expected an rrdp uri too and, to add insult to injury, the APNIC web page with their TAL https://www.apnic.net/community/security/resource-certification/ requires javascript! not to mention the ARIN stupidity as if we needed another exercise in bureaucrats making operations painful. most operations of any size have internal departments perfectly capable of doing that. randy

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cloudflare 1.1.1.2 filtered DNS
by William Herrin 12 Aug '20

12 Aug '20

Howdy, Is there an RBL lookup that provides information on why Cloudflare has elected to block a name lookup via the "1.1.1.1 for Families" service or is it a black box where you can only complain via https://report.teams.cloudflare.com/ and maybe they'll do something about it? Thanks, Bill Herrin -- William Herrin bill(a)herrin.us https://bill.herrin.us/

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Netflix people?
by Max Tulyev 11 Aug '20

11 Aug '20

Hi All, is there anyone from Netflix? We have a strange problem: our customers also customers of Netflix when connecting to Netfilx sees 404 error. If they change IP to another ISP - everything works fine. The support can't solve it.

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Compromized modems in Thai IP Space
by Alexander Maassen 11 Aug '20

11 Aug '20

Hello folks, Before you shoot me with 'wrong mailing list' replies, believe me, I tried, THNOG is dead, APNIC ain't responding either and the ISP's over there don't seem to care much. And I've been looking at this situation for over 2 years now since first incident. I simply hope that with the contacts you folks have due to your professions to be able to help. So, I came across this botnet which decided to pick my IRC network as control center, and I have been digging into them. It turns out that in Thailand, people can easily get cloned modems in order to internet for 'free', it simply boils down to mac cloning, so let me spare you the details. The problem is that these modems also carry a digital STD in the form of additional botnet code, allowing the controllers to do, well, botnet stuff. I disabled their ability to control by glining everything on join to the control channel, and since I am maintainer of DroneBL, add them to the blacklist. Doing that for 2+ years now. The amount of removal requests because people no longer are able to play on cncnet is amazing. My question here kinda is, how to permanently get rid of this evil in an effective way, and who to contact? (yes, I tried to get through to NOC's of the affected providers), or could perhaps someone be so nice to use one of their contacts in Thailand to speed things up? Kind regards, Alexander Maassen Maintainer DroneBL

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Corero
by JASON BOTHE 11 Aug '20

11 Aug '20

Folks Anyone on using Corero? Thoughts around it? Thanks J~

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Cisco EOL Support
by Ian Couch 11 Aug '20

11 Aug '20

Hey everyone, I was just wondering what types of support besides hardware support that anyone may have been able to acquire for EOL cisco gear, specifically 7600 gear. We can get NBD support for hardware failure pretty easily, I was just wondering if anyone has had any experience with any further support. Not IOS upgrades obviously, but potentially troubleshooting support. With the EOL dates coming up in 2021 we've been tasked to "see what's out there". Thanks, Ian. -- Ian Couch | Network Planner Tbaytel | 751 Tungsten St. | Thunder Bay, Ontario | P7B 6T1 Tel. (807) 625-2018 | Cell. (807) 624-6355 | Fax. (807) 623-2237 www.tbaytel.net respect. connects here. -- This email and any files transmitted with it are confidential and intended solely for the use of the individual or entity to whom they are addressed. If you have received this email in error please notify the system manager. This message contains confidential information and is intended only for the individual named. If you are not the named addressee you should not disseminate, distribute or copy this email. Please notify the sender immediately by e-mail if you have received this email by mistake and delete this e-mail from your system. If you are not the intended recipient you are notified that disclosing, copying, distributing or taking any action in reliance on the contents of this information is strictly prohibited.

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bgp hijack
by Karl Morin 10 Aug '20

10 Aug '20

Hello NANOG, One of our customers' upstream provider (AS21548) has been hijacking a prefix for a long time now, making it impossible to use this prefix properly https://bgp.he.net/ip/23.154.208.0 We tried support tickets, contacting Aptum/Beanfield's NOC, an abuse request. No reply at all, the tickets just get ignored or closed. Any help would be appreciated Regards, [image: upload image] Karl Morin Data Center Specialist *Hive Data Center * M: (514) 409-6606 W: hivedatacenter.com <https://hivedatacenter.com> E: kmorin(a)hivedatacenter.com <kmorin(a)hivedatacenter.com> [image: facebook] <https://www.facebook.com/hivedatacenter/> [image: linkedin] <https://www.linkedin.com/in/hivedatacenter/> [image: instagram] <https://www.instagram.com/hivedatacenter/>

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Spoofer Report for NANOG for Jul 2020
by CAIDA Spoofer Project 08 Aug '20

08 Aug '20

In response to feedback from operational security communities, CAIDA's source address validation measurement project (https://spoofer.caida.org) is automatically generating monthly reports of ASes originating prefixes in BGP for systems from which we received packets with a spoofed source address. We are publishing these reports to network and security operations lists in order to ensure this information reaches operational contacts in these ASes. This report summarises tests conducted within usa, can. Inferred improvements during Jul 2020: ASN Name Fixed-By 174 COGENT-174 2020-07-10 7859 PAIR-NETWORKS 2020-07-11 3549 LVLT-3549 2020-07-15 Further information for the inferred remediation is available at: https://spoofer.caida.org/remedy.php Source Address Validation issues inferred during Jul 2020: ASN Name First-Spoofed Last-Spoofed 5650 FRONTIER-FRTR 2016-02-22 2020-07-19 209 CENTURYLINK-US-LEGACY-QWEST 2016-08-16 2020-07-30 6128 CABLE-NET-1 2016-09-03 2020-07-23 20412 CLARITY-TELECOM 2016-09-30 2020-07-27 6181 FUSE-NET 2016-10-10 2020-07-27 11427 TWC-11427-TEXAS 2016-10-21 2020-07-14 174 COGENT-174 2016-10-21 2020-07-07 32440 LONI 2016-11-03 2020-07-26 12083 WOW-INTERNET 2016-11-09 2020-07-29 30036 MEDIACOM-ENTERPRISE-BUSINESS 2016-11-16 2020-07-23 9009 M247 2017-01-10 2020-07-28 63296 AWBROADBAND 2017-09-01 2020-07-28 546 PARSONS-PGS-1 2017-11-20 2020-07-22 20448 VPNTRANET-LLC 2018-09-20 2020-07-28 63275 RADIOWIRE 2019-02-07 2020-07-15 8047 GCI 2019-04-11 2020-07-30 46300 HSC-WAP 2019-10-30 2020-07-24 239 UTORONTO 2020-01-28 2020-07-18 13614 ALLWEST 2020-03-16 2020-07-01 26335 MTSU 2020-03-20 2020-07-20 5078 ONENET-AS-1 2020-04-06 2020-07-09 11650 PLDI 2020-05-25 2020-07-08 6391 URBAN-15 2020-05-29 2020-07-16 5690 VIANET-NO 2020-06-12 2020-07-20 11525 HRTC 2020-06-27 2020-07-05 36086 TELX-LEGACY 2020-07-11 2020-07-11 20340 CALLTOWER 2020-07-15 2020-07-15 36222 WINDWAVE-COMMUNICATIONS 2020-07-21 2020-07-21 394752 AVATIVE-FIBER 2020-07-22 2020-07-22 Further information for these tests where we received spoofed packets is available at: https://spoofer.caida.org/recent_tests.php?country_include=usa,can&no_block… Please send any feedback or suggestions to spoofer-info(a)caida.org

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GTT contact for ipv6 issue
by Ben Cannon 08 Aug '20

08 Aug '20

We have a service affecting issue and conventional channels are stymied.. Could a compassionate network engineer reach out off-list re #5339907 please? Thanks! -Ben Ms. Benjamin PD Cannon, ASCE 6x7 Networks & 6x7 Telecom, LLC CEO ben(a)6by7.net <mailto:ben@6by7.net> "The only fully end-to-end encrypted global telecommunications company in the world.” FCC License KJ6FJJ

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BGP full feed for testing purposes
by Blažej Krajňák 07 Aug '20

07 Aug '20

Hello, I'm wondering, if there is any public service I can get full BGP feed from for testing purposes. I admin multi-homed AS50242 with two default routes for now (fail-over). I'm going to prepare new routing setup with extended validation so reall full BGP feed would be usefull. Yes, I can ask my upstream provider for it, but I don't want to change settings in production setup. Thanks Regards, Blažej Krajňák

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