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Earthlink people? -> 207.69.195.103
by S. Ryan 24 Oct '06

24 Oct '06

Any Earthlink mail admins around? This server -> 207.69.195.103 -> has been on SORBS for some time now and I can't get any response from normal channels at Earthlink. A lot of your customers end up using that outgoing mail server and anyone that uses SORBS obviously may be blocking them.. and your customers are frustrated as well as mine that can't receive mail due to your SORBS listing. Thank you, SR

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Need help explaining in-addr.arpa to Limelight
by Tuc at T-B-O-H.NET 24 Oct '06

24 Oct '06

Hi, I seem to be having a problem. Limelight has SWIP'd 69.28.185.0/24 to me, and I asked for IN-ADDR.ARPA control. I recently went to check and it seemed not to be working right. I sent them an email around 11p Eastern Sunday nite asking it to be fixed. I even included a reference to a web page on how to delegate in-addr.arpa. I received the following back : "This is done, but you will need to rename the zone on your end to: tboh.185.28.69.in-addr.arpa." Is there someone out there that might be able to help me explain this to the techs there. That you can't "subdomain" an in-addr.arpa like you do a domain name? Thanks, Tuc/TBOH

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Firefox ASNumber extension updated for FF2.0
by Andre Oppermann 24 Oct '06

24 Oct '06

We've updated the Firefox ASNumber extension for FF2.0, fixed some bugs and added a couple of features (no IPv6 lookups yet though): http://asnumber.networx.ch/ Enjoy. About: The ASNumber extension displays the Prefix, AS Number and a couple of interesting statistics about them in the Firefox statusbar panel. Feedback, comments, feature requests welcome. -- Andre

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New IPv6 allocation from IANA to LACNIC
by Ricardo Patara 24 Oct '06

24 Oct '06

Hello, We would like to inform the community that LACNIC received the IPv6 address block 2800::/12 from IANA in October 2006 for further distribution to organizations in the Latin America and Caribbean region. The previous IPv6 address block being used by LACNIC (2800:0000::/23), is included in this new allocation from IANA. And the minimum prefix allocation in this block will be /32 Complete information about IP address block under LACNIC responsibility can be found at: http://lacnic.net/en/registro/index.html Regards Ricardo Patara Registration Service Manager LACNIC - Latin American and Caribbean IP Address Registry --

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RE: Collocation Access
by Frank Coluccio 24 Oct '06

24 Oct '06

Most list members here will probably find difficulty fathoming this, but during the Cold War years of the Nineteen Sixties, many telco employees, depending on the type of work they were engaged in, were actually issued government "Civil Defense" ID's for the purpose of gaining access to their workplaces and for transit to contingency assignments during natural disasters and acts of war. Long Lines staff and local operating company switching and transmission staff were given high priority in those days. I'm not sure exactly when, but I think the practice was suspended around 1968-9, or so. Do you suppose that telecoms and Internet is critical enough to the nation's infrastructure today that it should carry this level of regard by government? Say, qualified personnel working in critical sectors be issued "Homeland Security" ID's? Would such ID's issued by Homeland Security satisfy the clearance requirements for gaining access to collocation centers? On Tue Oct 24 8:51 , "David Schwartz" sent: > > >> In recent memory, I can think of two large collocation >> centers that retain your ID. One is in Miami and one in New York (I don't >> think I need to name names, most of you know to which I refer). >> All others >> (including AT&T) have never asked to retain my ID. > >Then you broke the law, assuming you had a Florida license and you presented >it to the Miami facility. > >Florida law, Title 13 section 322.32(2), "Unlawful use of license" says >"[i]t is a misdemeanor of the second degree ... for any person ... [t]o lend >his or her driver's license to any other person or knowingly permit the use >thereof by another." > >DS > >

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RE: Collocation Access
by Alex Rubenstein 24 Oct '06

24 Oct '06

> (They let me in eventually with a passport. But if they're going to > trust a foreign-issued passport as photo id, it's not really that > obvious to me why they wouldn't trust a foreign-issued driving > licence. It's not like they can really tell whether either of them > are forged.) What I've never understood is, that, how a gov't issue ID (for the purposes of allowing entry) is of any use whatsoever. It's not as if someone is doing a instand background check to know if the person is a criminal, or wanted, or whatever. It's trivial to forge a gov't ID. -- Alex Rubenstein, AR97, K2AHR, alex(a)nac.net, latency, Al Reuben Net Access Corporation, 800-NET-ME-36, http://www.nac.net

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Any issues with AS 19548 and their links to Level 3 or TWTC?
by David Hubbard 23 Oct '06

23 Oct '06

Having some connectivity issues with multiple customers on that network from our AS and a few others I've found on traceroute.org; is anyone aware of anything there? Traces in, but which are more likely failing on the return side, often stop at ae-1-0.c1.dfw91.twc-core.net and paix-atl.adelphiacom.net. I've been unsuccessful trying to make them prefer a different inbound route to us. Thanks, David

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RE: Collocation Access
by Nick Thompson 23 Oct '06

23 Oct '06

Surprisingly on a recent visit to a large co-location facility I was required to leave my ID with the security staff at the front desk in exchange for a visitor's pass, for the entire time I was in the facility. Normally I would not have an issue with this, but any outside visitors are shadowed by an employee of the facility the entire time they are in the facility as well. It seems as though at this point there is little need for security to maintain control of the ID, again which could possibly leave it open to various activities already mentioned by some others. Nick Thompson -----Original Message----- From: owner-nanog(a)merit.edu [mailto:owner-nanog@merit.edu] On Behalf Of Roland Perry Sent: Monday, October 23, 2006 3:41 PM To: nanog(a)merit.edu Subject: Re: Collocation Access In article <20061023103731.W56322(a)iama.hypergeek.net>, John A. Kilpatrick <john(a)hypergeek.net> writes >> In fact he did have an AT&T badge which he was not allowed to hand over >> either. The fellow I chatted with at AT&T said they are not allowed to >> hand over their badge because it would compromise their security. > >My tech said the same thing. That keycard could grant central office >access so he couldn't surrender it. I have to admit (now I've been sent some information off-list) that I didn't realise the co-lo security were holding onto the "badge" (or access card or whatever) the whole time the tech was on the premises. Yes, that would give more opportunities for bad things to happen. In many years of gaining access to secured buildings I've only ever had that happen once (passport exchanged for a visitor's pass, and back again at the end of the day). -- Roland Perry

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Collocation Access
by Craig Holland 23 Oct '06

23 Oct '06

I just ran into something for the first time, and apparently it isn't that uncommon. AT&T was asked to install a circuit into a collocation facility where, like any I've been into, required them to show a government ID. They refused claiming it was against policy. After making some calls, I found out there are union regulations which restrict AT&T from asking their union employees to hand over personal property, ID's included. Is this some new trend or have I just gotten lucky in the past? Wouldn't someone like AT&T be better served by giving their employees some company issued ID that they can submit to secure facilities? I know it wouldn't be government issued, but would at least be a step in the right direction. Or, they ask the unions to amend their policies considering it is a requirement of the job to do these kinds of installs to present a government ID. craig

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RE: Collocation Access
by Brandon Butterworth 23 Oct '06

23 Oct '06

> What I've never understood is, that, how a gov't issue ID (for the > purposes of allowing entry) is of any use whatsoever. > > It's not as if someone is doing a instand background check to know if > the person is a criminal, or wanted, or whatever. It's trivial to forge > a gov't ID. Welcome to token security. There's lots of silly procedures around now that add nothing to security but someone in an office dreamt them up as they have to be seen to be doing something. If you point out how dumb they are you're a terrorist too. So we al waste time following them (they can't reduce them as if something did happen they'd be blamed, who wants less security?) Colos full of rent-a-cops are just as bad, my passport says who I'm allowed to surrender it to and that doesn't include colo guards yet some want to retain it whilst you're on site. Company ID isn't acceptable to some of them either. I'd rather not trust them with either though I don't mind them looking. brandon

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