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bgp tools for route optmization based on(performance, cost and reliability
by MageMojo 21 Jul '11

21 Jul '11

Hi all, Looking for tools to optimize bgp routes based on performance, cost and reliability. Paid, open source, doesn't matter. Even presentations or research papers on performing tasks are welcome. But not configuration guides on multihoming :) Specifically in the context of a hosting provider who's multihomed to several tier 1's. What tools do you use for such optimization and just every day maintenance? Eric

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Re: CISCO IOS 12.x Virtual Switch
by Daniel Espejel 21 Jul '11

21 Jul '11

Thank you very much, now I'll try to perform some deployments over a C3600 w/NS module. Best regards. -- Daniel Espejel Perez

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real ARP / CAM limits on Huawei CX600?
by Rogelio 20 Jul '11

20 Jul '11

Anyone have any good info on how many ARP entries one of the Huawei CX600 routers can take? http://www.huawei.com/en/products/data-communication/metro-services-platfor… I will be passing about 1000 L2TP tunnels to a router before it, and the subscriber network that will be hitting the interface is about 30K people at any given time. I'm hoping that it's cool ARP-wise and that the bridging that's done internally doesn't break (i.e. Huawei's equivalent to a CAM table) -- Also on LinkedIn? Feel free to connect if you too are an open networker: scubacuda(a)gmail.com

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CISCO IOS 12.x Virtual Switch
by Daniel Espejel 20 Jul '11

20 Jul '11

Hello list!. I want to virtualize a CISCO Switch with CISCO IOS 12.x to perform some test on its RA-Guard implementation. By searching over Internet I've found that its possible to virtualize some devices such as routers using GSN3 and a CISCO IOS image. Is it possible to do something like this but for a switch instead of a router?. Or does anyone have any suggestions in order to test CISCO's RA-Guard (or another implementation)?? Best regards. -- Daniel Espejel Perez

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Cisco Security Advisory: Cisco ASR 9000 Series Routers Line Card IP Version 4 Denial of Service Vulnerability
by Cisco Systems Product Security Incident Response Team 20 Jul '11

20 Jul '11

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA256 Cisco Security Advisory: Cisco ASR 9000 Series Routers Line Card IP Version 4 Denial of Service Vulnerability Advisory ID: cisco-sa-20110720-asr9k Revision 1.0 For Public Release 2011 July 20 1600 UTC (GMT) +--------------------------------------------------------------------- Summary ======= Cisco 9000 Series Aggregation Services Routers (ASR) running Cisco IOS XR Software version 4.1.0 contain a vulnerability that may cause a network processor in a line card to lock up while processing an IP version 4 (IPv4) packet. As a consequence of the network processor lockup, the line card that is processing the offending packet will automatically reload. Cisco has released a free software maintenance upgrade (SMU) to address this vulnerability. There are no workarounds for this vulnerability. This advisory is posted at: http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20110720-asr9k.shtml Affected Products ================= Vulnerable Products +------------------ This vulnerability affects the following Cisco ASR 9000 Series devices when they are running Cisco IOS XR Software version 4.1.0 without the SMU asr9k-p-4.1.0.CSCtr26695.tar installed: * Cisco ASR 9006 router * Cisco ASR 9010 router To determine the software running on a Cisco ASR 9000 Series device, log in to the device and issue the show version brief command to display the system banner. The system banner confirms that the device is running Cisco IOS XR Software by displaying text similar to Cisco IOS XR Software. The software version is displayed after the text Cisco IOS XR Software. The following example identifies a Cisco ASR 9010 that is running Cisco IOS XR Software Release 4.1.0: RP/0/0/CPU0:Router#show version brief Fri Jul 8 18:54:39.222 CEST Cisco IOS XR Software, Version 4.1.0[Default] Copyright (c) 2011 by Cisco Systems, Inc. ROM: System Bootstrap, Version 1.05(20101118:025914) [ASR9K ROMMON], Router uptime is 9 weeks, 1 day, 5 hours, 53 minutes System image file is "bootflash:disk0/asr9k-os-mbi-4.1.0/mbiasr9k-rp.vm" cisco ASR9K Series (MPC8641D) processor with 4194304K bytes of memory. MPC8641D processor at 1333MHz, Revision 2.2 ASR-9010-CHASSIS 4 Management Ethernet 8 WANPHY controller(s) 8 TenGigE 8 DWDM controller(s) 40 GigabitEthernet 4 SONET/SDH 2 Packet over SONET/SDH 1 MgmtMultilink 219k bytes of non-volatile configuration memory. 975M bytes of compact flash card. 33994M bytes of hard disk. 1605616k bytes of disk0: (Sector size 512 bytes). 1605616k bytes of disk1: (Sector size 512 bytes). To determine which SMUs are active on the device, issue the show install active summary command. This command will return a list of all SMUs installed, as shown in the following example: RP/0/0/CPU0:Router#show install active summary Fri Jul 8 19:02:15.887 CEST Active Packages: disk0:asr9k-doc-p-4.1.0 disk0:asr9k-mini-p-4.1.0 disk0:asr9k-k9sec-p-4.1.0 disk0:asr9k-video-p-4.1.0 Note: The preceding output shows a device without the SMU asr9k-p-4.1.0.CSCtr26695.tar installed. Also note that Cisco IOS XR Software can include multiple SMUs and the output may differ from the preceding example. Products Confirmed Not Vulnerable +-------------------------------- The following products are confirmed not vulnerable: * Cisco Carrier Routing System (CRS) running any version of Cisco IOS XR Software * Cisco XR 12000 Series Routers running any version of Cisco IOS XR Software * Cisco 12000 Series Routers running any version of Cisco IOS Software * Cisco IOS Software * Cisco IOS XE Software * Cisco NX-OS Software * Cisco ASR 1000 and 5000 Series routers running any version of software * Cisco ASR 9000 Series routers running any version of Cisco IOS XR Software other than 4.1.0 * Cisco ASR 9000 Series routers running Cisco IOS XR Software version 4.1.0 and with the SMU asr9k-p-4.1.0.CSCtr26695.tar installed To determine which SMUs are active on the device, issue the show install active summary command. This will return a list of all SMUs installed: RP/0/0/CPU0:Router#show install active summary Fri Jul 8 19:02:15.887 CEST Active Packages: disk0:asr9k-p-4.1.0.CSCtr26695-1.0.0 disk0:asr9k-p-4.1.0.CSCto96804-1.0.0 disk0:asr9k-p-4.1.0.CSCto95435-1.0.0 disk0:asr9k-doc-p-4.1.0 disk0:asr9k-mini-p-4.1.0 disk0:asr9k-k9sec-p-4.1.0 disk0:asr9k-video-p-4.1.0 Note: The preceding output shows a device with the SMU asr9k-p-4.1.0.CSCtr26695.tar installed (in bold). Also note that Cisco IOS XR Software can include multiple SMUs and the output may differ from the preceding example. Details ======= Cisco ASR 9000 Series routers are designed to provide carrier-class reliability using the Cisco IOS XR Software modular operating system, offering service and application-level intelligence focused on optimized video delivery and mobile aggregation in Carrier Ethernet Services networks. Cisco IOS XR Software is a distributed operating system designed for continuous system operation combined with service flexibility and high performance. Cisco ASR 9000 Series devices running Cisco IOS XR Software version 4.1.0 contain a vulnerability that may cause a network processor in a line card to lock up while processing an IPv4 packet. As a consequence of the network processor lockup, the line card that is processing the offending packet will automatically reload. This vulnerability can be triggered only by IPv4 packets. If only IP version 6 (IPv6) is in use, the device is not vulnerable. Both transit IPv4 packets and IPv4 packets directed to the device itself may trigger this vulnerability. One or both the following messages may appear in the system log: * PLATFORM-DIAGS-3-PUNT_FABRIC_DATA_PATH_FAILED * PLATFORM-DIAGS-0-LC_NP_LOOPBACK_FAILED This vulnerability is documented as CSCtr26695and has been assigned Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) ID CVE-2011-2549 Vulnerability Scoring Details +---------------------------- Cisco has provided scores for the vulnerability in this advisory based on the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS). The CVSS scoring in this Security Advisory is done in accordance with CVSS version 2.0. CVSS is a standards-based scoring method that conveys vulnerability severity and helps determine urgency and priority of response. Cisco has provided a base and temporal score. Customers can then compute environmental scores to assist in determining the impact of the vulnerability in individual networks. Cisco has provided an FAQ to answer additional questions regarding CVSS at: http://www.cisco.com/web/about/security/intelligence/cvss-qandas.html Cisco has also provided a CVSS calculator to help compute the environmental impact for individual networks at: http://intellishield.cisco.com/security/alertmanager/cvss * CSCtr26695 - ASR9k:Line Card Issue with NP lockup CVSS Base Score - 7.8 Access Vector - Network Access Complexity - Low Authentication - None Confidentiality Impact - None Integrity Impact - None Availability Impact - Complete CVSS Temporal Score - 6.8 Exploitability - Functional Remediation Level - Official-Fix Report Confidence - Confirmed Impact ====== Successful exploitation of the vulnerability described in this advisory may cause the affected line card to reload. Repeated exploitation could result in a sustained denial of service (DoS) condition. Software Versions and Fixes =========================== When considering software upgrades, also consult http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt and any subsequent advisories to determine exposure and a complete upgrade solution. In all cases, customers should exercise caution to be certain the devices to be upgraded contain sufficient memory and that current hardware and software configurations will continue to be supported properly by the new release. If the information is not clear, contact the Cisco Technical Assistance Center (TAC) or your contracted maintenance provider for assistance. Each row of the Cisco IOS XR Software table (below) names a Cisco IOS XR Software release train. If a given release train is vulnerable, then the earliest possible releases that contain the fix, if available at the time of Advisory, are listed in the "First Fixed Release" column of the table. +--------------------------------------------------------------------+ | Major | Availability of Repaired Releases | | Release | | |-------------+------------------------------------------------------| | | SMU ID | SMU Name | First Fixed | | | | | Release | |-------------+------------------------------------------------------| | 3.2.X | | | through | Not affected | | 4.0.X | | |-------------+------------------------------------------------------| | 4.1.0 | AA05118 | asr9k-p-4.1.0.CSCtr26695.tar | 4.1.1 | +--------------------------------------------------------------------+ Note: At the time of this advisory, Release 4.1.1 is expected to be available on July 29, 2011. Workarounds =========== There are no workarounds for this vulnerability. Obtaining Fixed Software ======================== Cisco has released free software updates that address these vulnerabilities. Prior to deploying software, customers should consult their maintenance provider or check the software for feature set compatibility and known issues specific to their environment. Customers may only install and expect support for the feature sets they have purchased. By installing, downloading, accessing or otherwise using such software upgrades, customers agree to be bound by the terms of Cisco's software license terms found at: http://www.cisco.com/en/US/docs/general/warranty/English/EU1KEN_.html Or as otherwise set forth at Cisco.com Downloads at: http://www.cisco.com/public/sw-center/sw-usingswc.shtml Do not contact psirt(a)cisco.com or security-alert(a)cisco.com for software upgrades. Customers with Service Contracts +------------------------------- Customers with contracts should obtain upgraded software through their regular update channels. For most customers, this means that upgrades should be obtained through the Software Center on Cisco's worldwide website at http://www.cisco.com. Customers using Third Party Support Organizations +------------------------------------------------ Customers whose Cisco products are provided or maintained through prior or existing agreements with third-party support organizations, such as Cisco Partners, authorized resellers, or service providers should contact that support organization for guidance and assistance with the appropriate course of action in regards to this advisory. The effectiveness of any workaround or fix is dependent on specific customer situations, such as product mix, network topology, traffic behavior, and organizational mission. Due to the variety of affected products and releases, customers should consult with their service provider or support organization to ensure any applied workaround or fix is the most appropriate for use in the intended network before it is deployed. Customers without Service Contracts +---------------------------------- Customers who purchase direct from Cisco but do not hold a Cisco service contract, and customers who purchase through third-party vendors but are unsuccessful in obtaining fixed software through their point of sale should acquire upgrades by contacting the Cisco Technical Assistance Center (TAC). TAC contacts are as follows. * +1 800 553 2447 (toll free from within North America) * +1 408 526 7209 (toll call from anywhere in the world) * e-mail: tac(a)cisco.com Customers should have their product serial number available and be prepared to give the URL of this notice as evidence of entitlement to a free upgrade. Free upgrades for non-contract customers must be requested through the TAC. Refer to: http://www.cisco.com/en/US/support/tsd_cisco_worldwide_contacts.html For additional TAC contact information, including localized telephone numbers, and instructions and e-mail addresses for use in various languages. Exploitation and Public Announcements ===================================== The Cisco PSIRT is not aware of any public announcements or malicious use of the vulnerability described in this advisory. This vulnerability was found during the resolution of multiple customer service requests. We would like to thank the Internet Measurement Group from the University of Washington for their help and support on troubleshooting this issue. Status of this Notice: FINAL ============================ THIS DOCUMENT IS PROVIDED ON AN "AS IS" BASIS AND DOES NOT IMPLY ANY KIND OF GUARANTEE OR WARRANTY, INCLUDING THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR USE. YOUR USE OF THE INFORMATION ON THE DOCUMENT OR MATERIALS LINKED FROM THE DOCUMENT IS AT YOUR OWN RISK. CISCO RESERVES THE RIGHT TO CHANGE OR UPDATE THIS DOCUMENT AT ANY TIME. A stand-alone copy or Paraphrase of the text of this document that omits the distribution URL in the following section is an uncontrolled copy, and may lack important information or contain factual errors. Distribution ============ This advisory is posted on Cisco's worldwide website at : http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20110720-asr9k.shtml In addition to worldwide web posting, a text version of this notice is clear-signed with the Cisco PSIRT PGP key and is posted to the following e-mail and Usenet news recipients. * cust-security-announce(a)cisco.com * first-bulletins(a)lists.first.org * bugtraq(a)securityfocus.com * vulnwatch(a)vulnwatch.org * cisco(a)spot.colorado.edu * cisco-nsp(a)puck.nether.net * full-disclosure(a)lists.grok.org.uk * comp.dcom.sys.cisco(a)newsgate.cisco.com Future updates of this advisory, if any, will be placed on Cisco's worldwide website, but may or may not be actively announced on mailing lists or newsgroups. Users concerned about this problem are encouraged to check the above URL for any updates. Revision History ================ +--------------------------------------------------------------------+ | Revision 1.0 | 2011-July-20 | Initial public release | +--------------------------------------------------------------------+ Cisco Security Procedures ========================= Complete information on reporting security vulnerabilities in Cisco products, obtaining assistance with security incidents, and registering to receive security information from Cisco, is available on Cisco's worldwide website at: http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/products_security_vulnerability_policy.… This includes instructions for press inquiries regarding Cisco security notices. All Cisco security advisories are available at: http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt +-------------------------------------------------------------------- Copyright 2010-2011 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved. +-------------------------------------------------------------------- -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.9 (Darwin) iF4EAREIAAYFAk4m/30ACgkQQXnnBKKRMND3gAD/QU7mozUjiGpbzBoEtIYGi8uj Bhe/TfxZjzFA4tNYZAYA/RUP7WMFrhK9q8jWUrniWTwcbp1PAc90pyPZ2QwTkwFK =vnj1 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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problems with dnswl.org
by Randy Bush 20 Jul '11

20 Jul '11

% /usr/local/bin/rsync \ --times \ -v \ rsync2.dnswl.org::dnswl/bind-dnswl.zone \ /var/dns/primary/org.dnswl opening tcp connection to rsync2.dnswl.org port 873 rsync: failed to connect to rsync2.dnswl.org (85.25.63.16): Operation timed out (60) rsync error: error in socket IO (code 10) at clientserver.c(122) [Receiver=3.0.8] any other paying users seeing this or know anything? no response to email to admins, though it has been only six hours or so. randy

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Google DNS just disappeared
by Cody Rose 18 Jul '11

18 Jul '11

Is anyone else seeing that Googles DNS records just disappeared? I just lost all connectivity to Google services including google.com, plus.google.com, Public dns, etc. Regards, Cody Rose NOC & Sys Admin Website: www.killsudo.info email: cody(a)killsudo.info ------------------------------- $ dig A google.com ; <<>> DiG 9.8.0-P4-RedHat-9.8.0-7.P4.fc15 <<>> A google.com ;; global options: +cmd ;; Got answer: ;; ->>HEADER<<- opcode: QUERY, status: SERVFAIL, id: 14667 ;; flags: qr rd ra; QUERY: 1, ANSWER: 0, AUTHORITY: 0, ADDITIONAL: 0 ;; QUESTION SECTION: ;google.com. IN A ;; Query time: 4951 msec ;; SERVER: 10.168.88.7#53(10.168.88.7) ;; WHEN: Fri Jul 15 00:24:49 2011 ;; MSG SIZE rcvd: 28 ------------------------------- $ dig AAAA killsudo.info @8.8.8.8 ; <<>> DiG 9.8.0-P4-RedHat-9.8.0-7.P4.fc15 <<>> AAAA killsudo.info @8.8.8.8 ;; global options: +cmd ;; connection timed out; no servers could be reached $ dig AAAA killsudo.info @208.67.222.222 ------------------------------- ; <<>> DiG 9.8.0-P4-RedHat-9.8.0-7.P4.fc15 <<>> AAAA killsudo.info @208.67.222.222 ;; global options: +cmd ;; Got answer: ;; ->>HEADER<<- opcode: QUERY, status: NOERROR, id: 29448 ;; flags: qr rd ra; QUERY: 1, ANSWER: 1, AUTHORITY: 0, ADDITIONAL: 0 ;; QUESTION SECTION: ;killsudo.info. IN AAAA ;; ANSWER SECTION: killsudo.info. 600 IN AAAA 2001:470:1f10:aa4::2 ;; Query time: 63 msec ;; SERVER: 208.67.222.222#53(208.67.222.222) ;; WHEN: Fri Jul 15 00:29:55 2011 ;; MSG SIZE rcvd: 59

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Re: [lisp] Anybody can participate in the IETF (Was: Why is IPv6 broken?)
by Jeff Wheeler 18 Jul '11

18 Jul '11

On Mon, Jul 18, 2011 at 12:15 PM, Noel Chiappa <jnc(a)mercury.lcs.mit.edu> wrote: > Let me make sure I understand your point here. You don't seem to be > disagreeing with the assertion that for most sites (even things like very > large universities, etc), their 'working set' (of nodes they communicate) > with will be much smaller than the network as a whole? Why would you assume this to be true if LISP also promises to make multi-homing end-sites cheaper and easier, and independent of the ISP's willingness to provide BGP without extra cost? You see, if every SOHO network and "power user" can suddenly become multi-homed without spending a great deal of money on a powerful router and ISP services which support BGP, many of these networks will do so. The working sets of a scaled-up, LISP future will make the BGP DFZ of today look small. > So only the very largest content providers (YouTube, etc) will have > 'working sets' which include a fairly large share of the entire Internet? No, any end-site of interest to a DoS attacker must be able to deal with a working set which includes the entire Internet. The reason for this is obvious: it will be the best way to attack a LISP infrastructure, and it will not be difficult for attackers to send packets where each packet's source address appears to be from a different mapping system entry. Some people have commented that LISP hopes to prevent source address spoofing through technical means that have not been fully explored. This is a good goal but it must require the ETR doing address validation to look-up state from the mapping system. It will have the same cache churn problem as an ITR subject to a reflection attack (or an outbound DoS flow meant to disable that ITR.) So there is no practical means of doing source address validation on ETRs (under DoS.) Even if you did that, the ITR must still be subject to the occasional large flow of outbound traffic from a compromised host (dorm machine, open wireless, hacked server, etc.) which is intended to disable the ITR. > I have previously commented that such sites have lots of specialized > infrastructure to handle their traffic loads - do you think it will be > infeasible for them to have specialized LISP infrastructure too? (Leaving > aside for a moment what that infrastruture would look like - it's not > necessarily separate hardware, it might be integrated into existing boxes > on the periphery of their site.) Again, every content shop will need to have that specialized infrastructure. Every site that someone might have a motive to launch a DoS attack against must be able to withstand at least trivial DoS. If you think only the super-huge sites will have a large working set, you are again ignoring DoS attacks. The same is true of ISP subscriber access platforms. If my ISP's BRAS effectively goes down regularly, I won't keep that ISP service very long, I'll change to a competitor. The more subscribers on one BRAS, the more likely it will receive frequent DoS attacks. So in reality, the common cache size needed to achieve a high hit rate really does not matter, unless you wish to ignore DoS (which you seem to want to do very badly.) -- Jeff S Wheeler <jsw(a)inconcepts.biz> Sr Network Operator / Innovative Network Concepts

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Fwd: [arin-announce] Abuse Contact to be Mandatory per Policy 2010-14
by John Curran 18 Jul '11

18 Jul '11

This is a significant change that all NANOG folks should be aware of... FYI, /John Begin forwarded message: From: ARIN <info(a)arin.net<mailto:info@arin.net>> Date: July 18, 2011 11:31:45 AM EDT To: <mailto:arin-announce@arin.net> arin-announce(a)arin.net<mailto:arin-announce@arin.net> Subject: [arin-announce] Abuse Contact to be Mandatory per Policy 2010-14 ARIN is preparing to implement Policy 2010-14: Standardize IP Reassignment Registration Requirements. Once this policy is implemented, all new Organization registration records (Org IDs) will need to include an Abuse POC (in addition to the already required Admin and Tech). ARIN Online, REST, and templates are all being modified to enforce this new policy requirement Existing Org IDs will also need to comply with this rule. If an existing Org ID does not have an Abuse POC already listed, the existing Tech POC (s) will also become the Abuse POC(s) by default. This policy will be implemented no later than 30 September 2011. We strongly urge all customers to review and update their organization information data, and to add an Abuse POC if one is not currently listed. Again, if a new Abuse POC is not added to the record, the existing Tech POC (s) will also become the Abuse POC(s) by default. If there are any questions, please contact the Registration Services department at hostmaster(a)arin.net<mailto:hostmaster@arin.net>. Regards, Leslie Nobile Director, Registration Services American Registry for Internet Numbers _______________________________________________ ARIN-Announce You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to the ARIN Announce Mailing List (ARIN-announce(a)arin.net<mailto:ARIN-announce@arin.net>). Unsubscribe or manage your mailing list subscription at: http://lists.arin.net/mailman/listinfo/arin-announce Please contact info(a)arin.net<mailto:info@arin.net> if you experience any issues.

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NetFlix Down
by Scott, Robert D. 17 Jul '11

17 Jul '11

There appears to be a login issue at Netflix. Calls to their 1-866-579-7113 number only yields a recording that they are experiencing a higher than normal call volume, try again later. Widespread? Robert D. Scott Robert(a)ufl.edu Senior Network Engineer 352-273-0113 Phone CNS - Network Services 352-392-2061 CNS Phone Tree University of Florida 352-273-0743 FAX Florida Lambda Rail 352-294-3571 FLR NOC Gainesville, FL 32611 321-663-0421 Cell 3216630421(a)messaging.sprintpcs.com

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