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Vote Now: Color of N92 T-Shirt, Sneak Peek of Agenda + Video - Why NANOG?
by Nanog News 12 Sep '24

12 Sep '24

*Video — "Why NANOG?" Hear from a Woman in Tech **We asked Women in Tech Attendee DE-CIX's Kelly Sieben * A key part of NANOG’s evolution is the growing impact of women in tech, who are now playing a crucial role in shaping the future of Internet infrastructure and network operations. We asked an attendee of our last event Why NANOG? Here's what she had to say! Each meeting features a Women in Tech Mixer, offering important opportunities for networking, mentorship, and professional development. Our next WIT Mixer will be held on Sunday, 20, Oct. from 5-6:30. Please plan to arrive early before the conference. *WATCH NOW <https://nanog.org/stories/nanog-tv/why-nanog-women-in-tech/>* *Sneak Peek of Agenda for NANOG 92! * *Have you Registered Yet for Our Next Meeting in Toronto?* Coming to the NANOG 92 Stage in Toronto 21-23 October. More talks will be listed as the Program Committee accepts submissions. - IPv6 Familiarity Training - Create ROAs Today + Secure Your Resources with ARIN's RPKI Services - Routing Security: Fostering Continuous Improvement - The DNS Root Server System Messaging Challenge - BGP Flowspec Doesn't Suck. You're Just Doing it Wrong - + More *VIEW MORE <https://nanog.org/events/nanog-92/>* *Vote Now: What Color Would You Like Your NANOG 92 T-Shirt?* *Deadline for Voting is Monday — Don't Wait! * We need some fashion advice. Vote in our poll on your favorite color for our next meeting's T-Shirt TODAY. Deadline for print is Monday, 16, Sept. by 5 pm PST — so don't wait! ***Please Note. You must be a registered attendee + logged in to vote. *VOTE NOW <https://nanog.org/events/nanog-92/t-shirt-color-survey/>*

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OIX (formerly Open-IX) Document Development Mailing List (Invitation to Join)
by Chris Grundemann 12 Sep '24

12 Sep '24

Hello NANOG, This message is being sent in my capacity as the Chair of the Board of OIX. We (OIX) have some proposed updates to standards documents that affect this community. As such, we would like to invite anyone and everyone interested to subscribe to the OIX DDP mailing list. The sole purpose of this OIX DDP mailing list is to discuss changes to standards and/or BCOPs within the scope of OIX. To ensure that all documents are created and updated in an open, community-led, transparent, and bottom-up manner, we need as many eyes on the process as possible. Thanks in advance - mailing list details follow. -- The OIX Document Development Process (OIX DDP) is the process by which current Standards and best current operational practices (BCOPs) for the operation of the Internet, and connected networks, are documented by the Global Network Engineering Community (GNEC). These OIX documents are developed and published in an open, transparent, bottom-up, and ongoing manner designed to yield functional documentation that is accessible to all. To support this, OIX maintains an OIX DDP mailing list for public discussions of proposed documents and/or changes to published documents. The list address is: oix-ddp(a)mailman.swcp.com If you're familiar with mailman, the various associated addresses are all there too. Most notably: oix-ddp-subscribe(a)mailman.swcp.com oix-ddp-unsubscribe(a)mailman.swcp.com To make the list name easier to remember, I have set up an email alias: oix-ddp(a)oix.org -> oix-ddp(a)mailman.swcp.com The web page for users of the OIX DDP mailing list is: https://mailman.swcp.com/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/oix-ddp More information can be found in our GitHub repo: https://github.com/Open-IX/BCOP Most notably: https://github.com/Open-IX/BCOP/blob/main/OIX-DDP.md The DDP itself is due for an update, and the proposed changes will be sent out to the mailing list shortly.

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Whoops. .mobi whois impersonation
by Jay R. Ashworth 11 Sep '24

11 Sep '24

[ Via PRIVACY ] https://arstechnica.com/security/2024/09/rogue-whois-server-gives-researche… -- Jay R. Ashworth Baylink jra(a)baylink.com Designer The Things I Think RFC 2100 Ashworth & Associates http://www.bcp38.info 2000 Land Rover DII St Petersburg FL USA BCP38: Ask For It By Name! +1 727 647 1274

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Cloudfront Blocking IP ranges
by Brad Bendy 11 Sep '24

11 Sep '24

Does anyone know the best way to get a hold of Amazon and get out off the naughty list on Cloudfront? I've got some ranges that appear to be blocked totally by Cloudfront. Thanks in advance

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Re: Re: Survey on barriers for RPKI adoption
by Lancheng 10 Sep '24

10 Sep '24

Hi Sofia, I am currently an Assistant Researcher in Zhongguancun Lab, Beijing, China. Although I am not a network operator, I am very interested in this topic. Last year, I also did a survey asking network operators about the barriers to adopting ROA and ROV. That work has been accepted by NDSS 2024 [1]. I hope this paper could be helpful. [1] https://www.ndss-symposium.org/ndss-paper/understanding-route-origin-valida… Best, Lancheng >(Apologies for duplicates) >Hello everyone, >Following up on my message below, I wanted to let everyone know that we have extended the due date for the survey on barriers to RPKI adoption until Sep 19th. >If you are a network operator who manages IP space through multiple RIRs and you haven’t already participated in the survey, please take a moment to do so as we would really appreciate having your valuable input. It will only take a few minutes: >https://www.surveymonkey.com/r/CHLHLML >At this stage, we would like to particularly encourage those of you who have not created ROAs yet to understand what barriers or challenges you have experienced, as we don’t have enough representation from this group yet. >Thanks so much in advance for your input! >Warm regards, >Sofía >-- >I am sending this email at a time that suits me and the time zone I work in. Please feel free to read, and act on or respond, at a time that suits you.

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ATT contact
by Doug Barrett 10 Sep '24

10 Sep '24

We’re seeing 30-50% packet loss on a hop around what we believe is Chicago area. Please reach out off-list if you can help.xxxx -> voiptest.sea.telecomsvc.com(64.282024-09-10T11:02:57-0500 Packets PingsHost Loss% Snt Last Avg Best Wrst StDev1. xxxxxxxx.xxxxxx.net(172.27.xxx.x) 0.0% 53 0.5 0.4 0.2 0.8 0.12. 10.1.xxx.xxx (10.1.xxx.xxx) 0.0% 53 2.6 4.5 1.7 29.1 4.23. 69.217.x.xx (69.217.x.xx) 0.0% 53 3.7 4.7 1.9 15.0 2.84. 12.91.81.197 (12.91.81.197) 0.0% 53 10.5 12.3 8.9 21.5 3.05. 12.122.162.186 (12.122.162.186) 0.0% 53 19.4 20.1 16.0 46.0 4.86. cgcil22crs.ip.att.net(12.122.1.129) 0.0% 53 25.7 20.5 13.3 38.9 4.57. 32.130.17.76 (32.130.17.76) 36.5% 52 14.6 16.9 12.6 34.4 5.48. 32.130.24.205 (32.130.24.205) 0.0% 52 24.0 18.9 14.6 35.1 4.89. 12.116.153.210 (12.116.153.210) 0.0% 52 17.3 31.8 15.5 133.0 26.310. 141.101.73.202 (141.101.73.202) 0.0% 52 26.0 30.8 14.0 131.5 25.011. 172.70.125.88 (172.70.125.88) 0.0% 52 16.1 17.4 13.2 23.9 2.4 172.70.125.46 (172.70.125.46) 172.70.125.213 (172.70.125.213) 172.70.125.165 (172.70.125.165) 172.70.125.214 (172.70.125.214) 172.70.125.87 (172.70.125.87) 172.70.125.207 (172.70.125.207) 172.70.125.199 (172.70.125.199) 172.70.125.161 (172.70.125.161)12. 172.70.125.157 (172.70.125.157) 0.0% 52 17.7 18.8 13.7 36.3 4.7 172.70.125.206 (172.70.125.206) 172.70.125.170 (172.70.125.170) 172.70.125.181 (172.70.125.181) 172.70.125.18 (172.70.125.18) 172.70.125.98 (172.70.125.98) 172.70.125.120 (172.70.125.120) 172.70.125.176 (172.70.125.176) 172.70.125.161 (172.70.125.161)13. 172.70.125.89 (172.70.125.89) 0.0% 52 28.6 19.3 13.8 36.1 5.6 172.70.125.199 (172.70.125.199) 172.70.125.115 (172.70.125.115) 172.70.125.19 (172.70.125.19) 172.70.125.25 (172.70.125.25) 172.70.125.108 (172.70.125.108) 172.70.125.102 (172.70.125.102) 172.70.125.137 (172.70.125.137) 172.70.125.165 (172.70.125.165)14. (waiting for reply)15. 64.28.116.197 (64.28.116.197) 0.0% 52 61.1 65.0 59.2 95.6 7.4 64.28.116.195 (64.28.116.195)16. voiptest.sea.telecomsvc.com(64.28.122. 0.0% 52 61.0 65.2 59.3 85.8 6.7

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MS Network issue ?
by Scott Q. 10 Sep '24

10 Sep '24

Anyone else noticing issues accessing MS's network from Canada ? Started about 1h30 ago, huge latency/packet loss 2. AS??? mtl-bvh-dis-1 (216.187.113.108) 0.0% 100 0.7 1.7 0.3 33.6 4.9 3. AS??? ae3.tor-fr709-cor-1.peer1.net (216.187.88.88) 0.0% 100 7.1 7.4 6.9 26.1 2.1 4. AS??? microsoft.ip4.torontointernetxchange.net (206.108.34.160) 0.0% 100 16.4 16.8 16.3 22.0 1.0 5. AS8075 ae22-0.icr01.yto20.ntwk.msn.net (104.44.237.151) 0.0% 100 18.4 18.5 16.2 49.5 4.9 6. AS8075 be-120-0.ibr02.yto20.ntwk.msn.net (104.44.20.165) 42.0% 100 227.6 228.1 227.5 246.7 2.5 7. AS8075 be-7-0.ibr02.cle02.ntwk.msn.net (104.44.29.105) 22.0% 100 227.9 228.3 227.8 246.3 2.1 8. AS8075 be-3-0.ibr02.ch2.ntwk.msn.net (104.44.29.253) 0.0% 100 236.6 238.5 236.2 329.0 12.9 9. AS8075 be-6-0.ibr02.dsm05.ntwk.msn.net (104.44.18.217) 72.0% 100 427.9 437.3 424.1 537.0 27.7 10. AS8075 be-8-0.ibr02.cys04.ntwk.msn.net (104.44.18.150) 64.0% 100 429.2 430.4 419.8 498.8 12.7 11. AS8075 be-7-0.ibr02.mwh01.ntwk.msn.net (104.44.18.225) 0.0% 100 236.4 239.6 236.0 323.4 12.9 12. AS8075 be-2-0.ibr03.mwh01.ntwk.msn.net (104.44.16.80) 82.0% 100 542.4 437.7 424.5 542.4 28.6 13. AS8075 be-6-0.ibr01.pdx30.ntwk.msn.net (104.44.30.74) 0.0% 100 235.0 248.7 234.9 388.4 31.3 14. AS8075 be-7-0.ibr01.tyo79.ntwk.msn.net (104.44.18.166) 0.0% 100 227.9 238.0 227.8 350.5 26.6 15. AS8075 be-9-0.ibr01.sg2.ntwk.msn.net (104.44.18.213) 88.0% 100 423.4 428.4 422.5 467.7 12.5 16. AS8075 ae100-0.icr01.sg2.ntwk.msn.net (104.44.11.188) 74.0% 100 429.2 427.0 419.4 443.1 5.3

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CenturyLink Denver - failing hardware
by Elliott Sims 09 Sep '24

09 Sep '24

I'm attempting to get ahold of someone at CenturyLink/Quantum/Lumen about an unusual hardware failure that's causing issues for a lot of customers in southwest Denver. It appears that a buffer in one link in a LAG or ECMP group is flipping a bit around 10MB in to a zero. They have a bunch of tech visits scheduled to various people, and I assume after enough of those fail to fix the issue it'll eventually filter up to the NOC or neteng in a couple of weeks, but I'm hoping to short-circuit that a bit. Symptoms/troubleshooting: No change on home router replacement No difference across devices ICMP ping works fine, even padded to 1460 with 00 or FF SSH/SCP work (generally limited to 2MB or 4MB buffers/window depending on the version) HTTPS fails frequently Downloading a 10MB 0-filled file via HTTP succeeds consistently. Downloading a 10MB 1-filled file fails frequently Specifically, any 1-filled file with 10482846 or more bytes sees frequent failures For a consistent 5-tuple and large 1-filled file, failures are consistent.

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Survey on barriers for RPKI adoption
by Sofia Silva Berenguer 08 Sep '24

08 Sep '24

(Apologies for duplicates) Hello everyone, As part of the NRO RPKI Program<https://www.nro.net/technical-coordination/security/certification/#rpki_pro…> we would like to know more about the community’s expectations with regard to consistency in RPKI implementations across the Regional Internet Registries (RIRs). Our end goal is to define what a single, global RPKI system would look like. We want to know more about the experience of managing resources through multiple RIRs in order to understand whether the differences in the RIRs' RPKI implementations are hindering RPKI adoption, more specifically Route Origin Authorization (ROA) creation, and if so, which differences are the most painful. This will allow us to focus on making those aspects of the RPKI system more consistent. Are you a network operator with permissions to create ROAs for IP space allocated by multiple RIRs? If so, we would greatly appreciate your participation in our survey before September 12: https://www.surveymonkey.com/r/CHLHLML We want to hear from those who have already created ROAs as well as those who may be considering creating ROAs but have not yet done so. If this is not you, please consider forwarding this email to anyone else you know who could participate in the survey. Note that survey participants can enter a drawing for the equivalent to USD 35 e-gift voucher (If e-gift vouchers cannot be used in the winner's economy, an alternative gift will be provided). We really appreciate your participation! Warm regards, Sofía -- I am sending this email at a time that suits me and the time zone I work in. Please feel free to read, and act on or respond, at a time that suits you. ____________________________________________________________________ Sofía Silva Berenguer RPKI Program Manager, NRO / Process and Productivity Engineer, APNIC e: sofia(a)apnic.net<mailto:sofia@apnic.net> ____________________________________________________________________

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Spoofer Report for NANOG for Aug 2024
by CAIDA Spoofer Project 08 Sep '24

08 Sep '24

In response to feedback from operational security communities, CAIDA's source address validation measurement project (https://spoofer.caida.org) is automatically generating monthly reports of ASes originating prefixes in BGP for systems from which we received packets with a spoofed source address. We are publishing these reports to network and security operations lists in order to ensure this information reaches operational contacts in these ASes. This report summarises tests conducted within usa, can. Inferred improvements during Aug 2024: ASN Name Fixed-By 55 UPENN 2024-08-06 394195 CLEARNETWORX 2024-08-12 25853 ELJY30540 2024-08-29 Further information for the inferred remediation is available at: https://spoofer.caida.org/remedy.php Source Address Validation issues inferred during Aug 2024: ASN Name First-Spoofed Last-Spoofed 40676 AS40676 2016-08-29 2024-08-31 27364 ACS-INTERNET 2016-09-27 2024-08-29 1403 EBOX 2016-11-12 2024-08-27 2152 CSUNET-NW 2017-11-08 2024-08-28 33363 BHN-33363 2018-11-29 2024-08-30 21804 ACCESS-SK 2019-06-09 2024-08-25 36352 AS-COLOCROSSING 2020-10-08 2024-08-23 4922 SHENTEL 2021-12-28 2024-08-22 12183 TALKIE-COMMUNICATIONS 2022-12-10 2024-08-31 3701 NERONET 2023-04-18 2024-08-31 400282 2023-04-27 2024-08-30 393577 SCCNET 2023-05-03 2024-08-31 202400 2023-05-08 2024-08-26 61461 Airtek Solutions C.A. 2023-05-13 2024-08-16 394684 WISPERNET 2024-01-17 2024-08-30 214961 2024-05-14 2024-08-30 393530 TLU 2024-05-22 2024-08-28 19935 CRRS 2024-05-29 2024-08-24 398182 BLN 2024-06-17 2024-08-15 216211 2024-06-22 2024-08-23 13371 DUKE-INTERCHANGE 2024-07-03 2024-08-14 57308 Rossvyazinform 2024-08-10 2024-08-24 Further information for these tests where we received spoofed packets is available at: https://spoofer.caida.org/recent_tests.php?country_include=usa,can&no_block… Please send any feedback or suggestions to spoofer-info(a)caida.org

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