April 2018 - Test - lists.nanog.org

Fwd: [cooperation-wg] Massive IP blockings in Russia
by Sandra Murphy 19 Apr '18

19 Apr '18

Of possible interest to this group. Forwarding at Alexander’s suggestion, who says he has already shared info in the NANOG facebook group "(with updated prefixlist)". —Sandy > Begin forwarded message: > > From: Alexander Isavnin <isavnin(a)gmail.com> > Subject: [cooperation-wg] Massive IP blockings in Russia > Date: April 17, 2018 at 1:36:33 PM EDT > To: cooperation-wg(a)ripe.net > > Dear colleagues! > > I’m not pleased to inform you that RosComNadzor, a Russian Communication supervisory body, has started blocking huge ranges of IPs belonging to different cloud infrastructures, mostly Amazon and Google Cloud. > Those ranges include: 13.52.0.0/14, 13.56.0.0/14, 18.184.0.0/15, 18.194.0.0/15, 18.196.0.0/15, 34.192.0.0/10, 34.240.0.0/13, 34.248.0.0/13, 35.156.0.0/14, 35.160.0.0/13, 35.176.0.0/15, 52.0.0.0/11, 52.192.0.0/11, 52.208.0.0/13, 52.28.0.0/15, 52.58.0.0/15, 54.144.0.0/12, 54.160.0.0/12, 54.228.0.0/15, 54.72.0.0/15, 54.88.0.0/16. > > Russian ISPs MUST fully block all traffic to such networks. The list is frequently updated and gets automatically propagated to ISP every once in a while, failure to block any address may result in 1500eur fine. > The infrastructure listed above is being added to the blocklist under “counter-terrorist and counter-extremist” order of the General Prosecutor Office, #27-31-2015/Id4082-15, issued in 2015 and often used for blocking an arbitrary unwanted content. > The real reason for such blocking is an attempt to cut access to Telegram messenger, which refused to provide end-to-end encryption keys to the Federal Security Service (previously known as KGB). This is a case similar to San-Bernardino shooter’s, where the FBI was denied access to the shooter’s iPhone, but courts in Russia have made completely opposite decision. > Telegram’s infrastructure is being blocked by a different decision by RosKomNadzor, #2-1779/2018. > Cloud infrastructures are being blocked for massive proxy and VPN hosting used to dodge messenger blocking. > > It is said, that more Apple and Google networks may be blocked soon for apps updates and push notifications delivery for Telegram. > > We hope to still have the global IP connectivity to keep you informed about how the situation develops. > Do not be surprised if some of your services placed in cloud infrastructures will miss Russian customers. > > You can monitor the number of IP addresses, domains and URLs to be blocked in Russia at the https://2018.schors.spb.ru/ page (run by the famous ENOG community member Phil Kulin). > Detailed information (also via API) is available at the https://reestr.rublacklist.net run by RosKomSvoboda civil society group. > > Kind regards, > Alexander Isavnin > > Sent via RIPE Forum -- https://www.ripe.net/participate/mail/forum

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RCN and IPv6
by Bryan Holloway 19 Apr '18

19 Apr '18

Curious if any RCN network guys or gals are on the list and can provide any idea as to when RCN plans on deploying IPv6? I make inquiries every six months or so, but I get the usual canned response that it's in the works, but no ETA.

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Juniper Config Commit causes Cisco Etherchannels to go into err-disable state
by Joseph Jenkins 18 Apr '18

18 Apr '18

I have cases open with both Cisco and Juniper on this, but wanted to see if anyone else had seen an issue like this because support has no idea. I have a Juniper QFX 5100 Core running in Virtual Chassis mode with 4 switches. I have 4 separate stacks of Cisco 3750 switches with 2x1GB uplinks bound into 4 different LACP trunks. I have had it happen twice now where I apply a trunk port config(not an LACP trunk) to a port that isn't a part of any of the LACP trunks and it causes all 4 of the Etherchannels on the Cisco stacked switches to go into an err-disable state with these messages: Mar 14 07:11:33: %PM-4-ERR_DISABLE: channel-misconfig (STP) error detected on Gi1/0/48, putting Gi1/0/48 in err-disable state Mar 14 07:11:33: %PM-4-ERR_DISABLE: channel-misconfig (STP) error detected on Po17, putting Gi1/0/48 in err-disable state Mar 14 07:11:33: %PM-4-ERR_DISABLE: channel-misconfig (STP) error detected on Po17, putting Po17 in err-disable state Mar 14 07:11:34: %LINEPROTO-5-UPDOWN: Line protocol on Interface GigabitEthernet1/0/48, changed state to down Mar 14 07:11:33: %PM-4-ERR_DISABLE: channel-misconfig (STP) error detected on Gi2/0/48, putting Gi2/0/48 in err-disable state (CA-TOR-1-7-2) Mar 14 07:11:34: %LINEPROTO-5-UPDOWN: Line protocol on Interface GigabitEthernet2/0/48, changed state to down Mar 14 07:11:34: %LINEPROTO-5-UPDOWN: Line protocol on Interface Port-channel17, changed state to down Here is the config I am applying to the port that has caused this issue to happen twice now: set interfaces ge-0/0/67 description "Firewall Port" set interfaces ge-0/0/67 unit 0 family ethernet-switching interface-mode trunk set interfaces ge-0/0/67 unit 0 family ethernet-switching vlan members 9-10 set interfaces ge-0/0/67 unit 0 family ethernet-switching vlan members 29 set interfaces ge-0/0/67 unit 0 family ethernet-switching vlan members 31-32 set interfaces ge-0/0/67 unit 0 family ethernet-switching vlan members 43 set interfaces ge-0/0/67 unit 0 family ethernet-switching vlan members 50-51 set interfaces ge-0/0/67 unit 0 family ethernet-switching vlan members 56 set interfaces ge-0/0/67 unit 0 family ethernet-switching vlan members 58 set interfaces ge-0/0/67 unit 0 family ethernet-switching vlan members 66 set interfaces ge-0/0/67 unit 0 family ethernet-switching vlan members 68 set interfaces ge-0/0/67 unit 0 family ethernet-switching vlan members 90 set interfaces ge-0/0/67 unit 0 family ethernet-switching vlan members 143 set interfaces ge-0/0/67 unit 0 family ethernet-switching vlan members 170 The issue happens within a couple of minutes of committing the config on the Juniper side, there are no cables plugged into port 0/0/67 so technically there shouldn't be any BPDU's sent out since there isn't a port change. Juniper Support wants me to turn on trace option and then run though a bunch of scenarios, the issue is that testing this takes down my network. Just wanted to put it out there to see if anyone else had run into a situation similar to this. TIA Joe

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ANRW 2018
by Jared Mauch 18 Apr '18

18 Apr '18

I’m forwarding this on behalf of the ANRW Chairs. Some of this research has been quite interesting, and is on-topic to what NANOG folks are interested in. Here’s some more details about it: https://irtf.org/anrp You can find their slides and presentation videos online as well, with the most recent one here: https://youtu.be/6v1TU4zsp5E?t=54m30s If you’re an operator and going to be at IETF in Montreal this summer, let me know. — snip — In recent years, the focus of many of top academic networking conferences has shifted away from the wide-area Internet. At the same time, the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) remains a top place to do practice-facing research on wide-area networking and security protocols. So, we thought its time to bring academics to the IETF, and develop an exciting academic venue that refocuses the community on wide-area networking and security research! To that end, we are rebooting the Applied Networking Research Workshop (ARNW’18) that we be held during IETF’102 on July 16 2018. The goal is to create a top academic venue for wide-area networking and security research and a path to transition research back into IETF standards, while inspiring academics to work on topics and open problems addressed at the IETF. We have several high-quality invited talks lined up (see below!), and are now soliciting submitted talks and papers. Submitted talks can be not-for-publication *re-submissions* of works that have been published elsewhere during the last 12 months; for these, we simply require a 2 page abstract. We are also seeking 6-page short papers for publication. Paper submission deadline is April 20, 2018. If you think your work can have an impact on the design and operation of the Internet, please consider submitting to ANRW'18! Call for papers: https://irtf.org/anrw/2018/cfp.html Invited talks: Why (and How) Networks Should Run Themselves Speaker: Nick Feamster (Princeton University) ARTEMIS: Neutralizing BGP Hijacking within a Minute Speaker: Alberto Dainotti (CAIDA) Run, Walk, Crawl: Towards Dynamic Link Capacities Speaker: Monia Ghobadi (Microsoft Research) TCP Congestion Signatures Speaker: Srikanth Sundaresan (UC Berkeley) or Amogh Dhamdhere (CAIDA) Measuring Adoption of Security Additions to the HTTPS Ecosystem Speaker: Quirin Scheitle (Technical University of Munich) Hope to see you in Montreal! Sharon Goldberg & David Choffnes ANRW'18 Program Committee Chairs

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Attacks on BGP Routing Ranges
by Ryan Hamel 18 Apr '18

18 Apr '18

Hello, I wanted to poll everyones thoughts on how to deal with attacks directly on BGP peering ranges (/30's, /127's). I know that sending an RTBH for our side of the upstream routing range does not resolve the issue, and it would actually make things worse by blackholing all inbound traffic on the carrier I send the null to. What are my options for carriers that are not willing to help investigate the situation or write up a firewall rule to mitigate it on the circuit? I am not a fan of naming and shaming because it has unintended consequences. Thanks in advance for everyone's suggestions. Ryan Hamel

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US-CERT: Alert (TA18-106A) Russian State-Sponsored Cyber Actors Targeting Network Infrastructure Devices
by Jay Farrell 17 Apr '18

17 Apr '18

https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-106A

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FEMA’s plan underestimated Puerto Rican hurricane
by Sean Donelan 15 Apr '18

15 Apr '18

In the U.S. disaster response system, the primary responsbility for disaster response falls on state (territory) and local governments. In theory, the federal government response is supposed to be secondary. https://www.politico.com/story/2018/04/15/puerto-rico-hurricane-fema-disast… [...] The plan also expected private sector companies to quickly restore telecommunications on the island. “There are minimal expectations that federal assistance would be required to restore the infrastructure during the response and recovery of a storm,” it said. If communication systems were not fixed quickly, the document said, first responders could use satellite phones instead or rely on mobile communication trucks delivered to the island. But during Maria, Puerto Rico’s communication system was wiped out, leaving telecommunications companies scrambling to slowly repair the infrastructure as state and local officials struggled to communicate with FEMA and other first responders. Local officials described limited communications as one of the biggest challenges in the first week after the storm. [...] To many in the disaster community, the problems with FEMA’s plan were representative of broader disaster management challenges across the entire agency. FEMA, individual communities and the country prepare for disasters that fit within their current capabilities, they said, but don’t plan for disasters that could cause even more damage, requiring greater planning or resources in such a dire scenario. “If you go back and look at almost any federal disaster plan, it suffers from planning to your current capabilities versus planning to what actually could happen,” said a former FEMA official, adding “I wouldn’t say this is a special case, but it is a problem endemic to the federal government.” [...]

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IPv4 and IPv6 hijacking by AS 6
by Matt Harris 14 Apr '18

14 Apr '18

AS 6 is now announcing several IPv4 and IPv6 blocks of mine, and it looks like I'm not alone. Does anyone have any contacts there, or know what might be going on? The number of prefixes they're currently advertising is tremendous. The phone numbers associated with AS6's RIR whois data are non-functional. I've sent emails to their contacts listed in RIR whois (Mike Abbott and John Luke Mills), but with phone numbers being dead, I'm not optimistic. If anyone is there who has any control over AS 6 or knows whom I can reach out to, please let me know. Thanks, Matt

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Weekly Routing Table Report
by cscora＠apnic.net 13 Apr '18

13 Apr '18

This is an automated weekly mailing describing the state of the Internet Routing Table as seen from APNIC's router in Japan. The posting is sent to APOPS, NANOG, AfNOG, SANOG, PacNOG, SAFNOG TZNOG, MENOG, BJNOG, SDNOG, CMNOG, LACNOG, IRNOG and the RIPE Routing WG. Daily listings are sent to bgp-stats(a)lists.apnic.net For historical data, please see http://thyme.rand.apnic.net. If you have any comments please contact Philip Smith <pfsinoz(a)gmail.com>. Routing Table Report 04:00 +10GMT Sat 14 Apr, 2018 Report Website: http://thyme.rand.apnic.net Detailed Analysis: http://thyme.rand.apnic.net/current/ Analysis Summary ---------------- BGP routing table entries examined: 694221 Prefixes after maximum aggregation (per Origin AS): 268062 Deaggregation factor: 2.59 Unique aggregates announced (without unneeded subnets): 333993 Total ASes present in the Internet Routing Table: 60376 Prefixes per ASN: 11.50 Origin-only ASes present in the Internet Routing Table: 52151 Origin ASes announcing only one prefix: 22835 Transit ASes present in the Internet Routing Table: 8225 Transit-only ASes present in the Internet Routing Table: 268 Average AS path length visible in the Internet Routing Table: 4.0 Max AS path length visible: 34 Max AS path prepend of ASN ( 30873) 32 Prefixes from unregistered ASNs in the Routing Table: 46 Number of instances of unregistered ASNs: 46 Number of 32-bit ASNs allocated by the RIRs: 22190 Number of 32-bit ASNs visible in the Routing Table: 17842 Prefixes from 32-bit ASNs in the Routing Table: 74177 Number of bogon 32-bit ASNs visible in the Routing Table: 16 Special use prefixes present in the Routing Table: 3 Prefixes being announced from unallocated address space: 367 Number of addresses announced to Internet: 2862806274 Equivalent to 170 /8s, 162 /16s and 245 /24s Percentage of available address space announced: 77.3 Percentage of allocated address space announced: 77.3 Percentage of available address space allocated: 100.0 Percentage of address space in use by end-sites: 98.9 Total number of prefixes smaller than registry allocations: 231118 APNIC Region Analysis Summary ----------------------------- Prefixes being announced by APNIC Region ASes: 190229 Total APNIC prefixes after maximum aggregation: 53961 APNIC Deaggregation factor: 3.53 Prefixes being announced from the APNIC address blocks: 189163 Unique aggregates announced from the APNIC address blocks: 77142 APNIC Region origin ASes present in the Internet Routing Table: 8713 APNIC Prefixes per ASN: 21.71 APNIC Region origin ASes announcing only one prefix: 2428 APNIC Region transit ASes present in the Internet Routing Table: 1303 Average APNIC Region AS path length visible: 4.0 Max APNIC Region AS path length visible: 29 Number of APNIC region 32-bit ASNs visible in the Routing Table: 3675 Number of APNIC addresses announced to Internet: 767084034 Equivalent to 45 /8s, 184 /16s and 198 /24s APNIC AS Blocks 4608-4864, 7467-7722, 9216-10239, 17408-18431 (pre-ERX allocations) 23552-24575, 37888-38911, 45056-46079, 55296-56319, 58368-59391, 63488-64098, 64297-64395, 131072-137529 APNIC Address Blocks 1/8, 14/8, 27/8, 36/8, 39/8, 42/8, 43/8, 49/8, 58/8, 59/8, 60/8, 61/8, 101/8, 103/8, 106/8, 110/8, 111/8, 112/8, 113/8, 114/8, 115/8, 116/8, 117/8, 118/8, 119/8, 120/8, 121/8, 122/8, 123/8, 124/8, 125/8, 126/8, 133/8, 150/8, 153/8, 163/8, 171/8, 175/8, 180/8, 182/8, 183/8, 202/8, 203/8, 210/8, 211/8, 218/8, 219/8, 220/8, 221/8, 222/8, 223/8, ARIN Region Analysis Summary ---------------------------- Prefixes being announced by ARIN Region ASes: 206423 Total ARIN prefixes after maximum aggregation: 98887 ARIN Deaggregation factor: 2.09 Prefixes being announced from the ARIN address blocks: 206893 Unique aggregates announced from the ARIN address blocks: 97703 ARIN Region origin ASes present in the Internet Routing Table: 18135 ARIN Prefixes per ASN: 11.41 ARIN Region origin ASes announcing only one prefix: 6704 ARIN Region transit ASes present in the Internet Routing Table: 1794 Average ARIN Region AS path length visible: 3.6 Max ARIN Region AS path length visible: 20 Number of ARIN region 32-bit ASNs visible in the Routing Table: 2335 Number of ARIN addresses announced to Internet: 1109026464 Equivalent to 66 /8s, 26 /16s and 102 /24s ARIN AS Blocks 1-1876, 1902-2042, 2044-2046, 2048-2106 (pre-ERX allocations) 2138-2584, 2615-2772, 2823-2829, 2880-3153 3354-4607, 4865-5119, 5632-6655, 6912-7466 7723-8191, 10240-12287, 13312-15359, 16384-17407 18432-20479, 21504-23551, 25600-26591, 26624-27647, 29696-30719, 31744-33791 35840-36863, 39936-40959, 46080-47103 53248-55295, 62464-63487, 64198-64296, 393216-397212 ARIN Address Blocks 3/8, 4/8, 6/8, 7/8, 8/8, 9/8, 11/8, 12/8, 13/8, 15/8, 16/8, 17/8, 18/8, 19/8, 20/8, 21/8, 22/8, 23/8, 24/8, 26/8, 28/8, 29/8, 30/8, 32/8, 33/8, 34/8, 35/8, 38/8, 40/8, 44/8, 45/8, 47/8, 48/8, 50/8, 52/8, 53/8, 54/8, 55/8, 56/8, 57/8, 63/8, 64/8, 65/8, 66/8, 67/8, 68/8, 69/8, 70/8, 71/8, 72/8, 73/8, 74/8, 75/8, 76/8, 96/8, 97/8, 98/8, 99/8, 100/8, 104/8, 107/8, 108/8, 128/8, 129/8, 130/8, 131/8, 132/8, 134/8, 135/8, 136/8, 137/8, 138/8, 139/8, 140/8, 142/8, 143/8, 144/8, 146/8, 147/8, 148/8, 149/8, 152/8, 155/8, 156/8, 157/8, 158/8, 159/8, 160/8, 161/8, 162/8, 164/8, 165/8, 166/8, 167/8, 168/8, 169/8, 170/8, 172/8, 173/8, 174/8, 184/8, 192/8, 198/8, 199/8, 204/8, 205/8, 206/8, 207/8, 208/8, 209/8, 214/8, 215/8, 216/8, RIPE Region Analysis Summary ---------------------------- Prefixes being announced by RIPE Region ASes: 189340 Total RIPE prefixes after maximum aggregation: 91435 RIPE Deaggregation factor: 2.07 Prefixes being announced from the RIPE address blocks: 185690 Unique aggregates announced from the RIPE address blocks: 110508 RIPE Region origin ASes present in the Internet Routing Table: 25094 RIPE Prefixes per ASN: 7.40 RIPE Region origin ASes announcing only one prefix: 11401 RIPE Region transit ASes present in the Internet Routing Table: 3486 Average RIPE Region AS path length visible: 4.1 Max RIPE Region AS path length visible: 34 Number of RIPE region 32-bit ASNs visible in the Routing Table: 6884 Number of RIPE addresses announced to Internet: 716174976 Equivalent to 42 /8s, 175 /16s and 246 /24s RIPE AS Blocks 1877-1901, 2043, 2047, 2107-2136, 2585-2614 (pre-ERX allocations) 2773-2822, 2830-2879, 3154-3353, 5377-5631 6656-6911, 8192-9215, 12288-13311, 15360-16383 20480-21503, 24576-25599, 28672-29695 30720-31743, 33792-35839, 38912-39935 40960-45055, 47104-52223, 56320-58367 59392-61439, 61952-62463, 64396-64495 196608-207259 RIPE Address Blocks 2/8, 5/8, 25/8, 31/8, 37/8, 46/8, 51/8, 62/8, 77/8, 78/8, 79/8, 80/8, 81/8, 82/8, 83/8, 84/8, 85/8, 86/8, 87/8, 88/8, 89/8, 90/8, 91/8, 92/8, 93/8, 94/8, 95/8, 109/8, 141/8, 145/8, 151/8, 176/8, 178/8, 185/8, 188/8, 193/8, 194/8, 195/8, 212/8, 213/8, 217/8, LACNIC Region Analysis Summary ------------------------------ Prefixes being announced by LACNIC Region ASes: 89451 Total LACNIC prefixes after maximum aggregation: 19714 LACNIC Deaggregation factor: 4.54 Prefixes being announced from the LACNIC address blocks: 90842 Unique aggregates announced from the LACNIC address blocks: 40741 LACNIC Region origin ASes present in the Internet Routing Table: 7008 LACNIC Prefixes per ASN: 12.96 LACNIC Region origin ASes announcing only one prefix: 1926 LACNIC Region transit ASes present in the Internet Routing Table: 1311 Average LACNIC Region AS path length visible: 4.7 Max LACNIC Region AS path length visible: 32 Number of LACNIC region 32-bit ASNs visible in the Routing Table: 4541 Number of LACNIC addresses announced to Internet: 172652768 Equivalent to 10 /8s, 74 /16s and 120 /24s LACNIC AS Blocks 26592-26623, 27648-28671, 52224-53247, 61440-61951, 64099-64197, 262144-268700 + ERX transfers LACNIC Address Blocks 177/8, 179/8, 181/8, 186/8, 187/8, 189/8, 190/8, 191/8, 200/8, 201/8, AfriNIC Region Analysis Summary ------------------------------- Prefixes being announced by AfriNIC Region ASes: 18730 Total AfriNIC prefixes after maximum aggregation: 4023 AfriNIC Deaggregation factor: 4.66 Prefixes being announced from the AfriNIC address blocks: 21266 Unique aggregates announced from the AfriNIC address blocks: 7607 AfriNIC Region origin ASes present in the Internet Routing Table: 1132 AfriNIC Prefixes per ASN: 18.79 AfriNIC Region origin ASes announcing only one prefix: 375 AfriNIC Region transit ASes present in the Internet Routing Table: 227 Average AfriNIC Region AS path length visible: 4.4 Max AfriNIC Region AS path length visible: 21 Number of AfriNIC region 32-bit ASNs visible in the Routing Table: 407 Number of AfriNIC addresses announced to Internet: 97447936 Equivalent to 5 /8s, 206 /16s and 240 /24s AfriNIC AS Blocks 36864-37887, 327680-328703 & ERX transfers AfriNIC Address Blocks 41/8, 102/8, 105/8, 154/8, 196/8, 197/8, APNIC Region per AS prefix count summary ---------------------------------------- ASN No of nets /20 equiv MaxAgg Description 4538 5407 4192 74 ERX-CERNET-BKB China Education and Rese 7545 4378 415 431 TPG-INTERNET-AP TPG Telecom Limited, AU 4766 2854 11131 783 KIXS-AS-KR Korea Telecom, KR 9829 2815 1499 544 BSNL-NIB National Internet Backbone, IN 7552 2725 1155 69 VIETEL-AS-AP Viettel Group, VN 9394 2635 4923 29 CTTNET China TieTong Telecommunications 45899 2586 1574 161 VNPT-AS-VN VNPT Corp, VN 17974 2330 928 79 TELKOMNET-AS2-AP PT Telekomunikasi Indo 9808 2171 8699 32 CMNET-GD Guangdong Mobile Communication 4755 2091 417 215 TATACOMM-AS TATA Communications formerl Complete listing at http://thyme.rand.apnic.net/current/data-ASnet-APNIC ARIN Region per AS prefix count summary --------------------------------------- ASN No of nets /20 equiv MaxAgg Description 6327 3365 1323 85 SHAW - Shaw Communications Inc., CA 22773 3287 2988 150 ASN-CXA-ALL-CCI-22773-RDC - Cox Communi 18566 2168 405 109 MEGAPATH5-US - MegaPath Corporation, US 20115 2093 2490 448 CHARTER-NET-HKY-NC - Charter Communicat 16509 2054 4413 636 AMAZON-02 - Amazon.com, Inc., US 30036 1952 338 186 MEDIACOM-ENTERPRISE-BUSINESS - Mediacom 209 1922 5070 606 CENTURYLINK-US-LEGACY-QWEST - Qwest Com 11492 1800 227 546 CABLEONE - CABLE ONE, INC., US 16625 1750 856 1248 AKAMAI-AS - Akamai Technologies, Inc., 7018 1707 20205 1255 ATT-INTERNET4 - AT&T Services, Inc., US Complete listing at http://thyme.rand.apnic.net/current/data-ASnet-ARIN RIPE Region per AS prefix count summary --------------------------------------- ASN No of nets /20 equiv MaxAgg Description 12479 4036 1512 488 UNI2-AS, ES 39891 3778 203 20 ALJAWWALSTC-AS, SA 20940 2695 742 1980 AKAMAI-ASN1, US 8551 2126 378 43 BEZEQ-INTERNATIONAL-AS Bezeqint Interne 12389 2029 1859 706 ROSTELECOM-AS, RU 34984 1977 333 490 TELLCOM-AS, TR 9121 1968 1692 19 TTNET, TR 13188 1608 100 47 TRIOLAN, UA 6849 1241 355 21 UKRTELNET, UA 8402 1226 544 14 CORBINA-AS OJSC "Vimpelcom", RU Complete listing at http://thyme.rand.apnic.net/current/data-ASnet-RIPE LACNIC Region per AS prefix count summary ----------------------------------------- ASN No of nets /20 equiv MaxAgg Description 8151 4345 3387 574 Uninet S.A. de C.V., MX 10620 3570 539 270 Telmex Colombia S.A., CO 11830 2641 369 85 Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad 6503 1626 437 53 Axtel, S.A.B. de C.V., MX 7303 1510 1024 192 Telecom Argentina S.A., AR 28573 1037 2254 176 CLARO S.A., BR 3816 1005 504 121 COLOMBIA TELECOMUNICACIONES S.A. ESP, C 6147 996 377 31 Telefonica del Peru S.A.A., PE 11172 928 126 85 Alestra, S. de R.L. de C.V., MX 18881 908 1074 29 TELEFÔNICA BRASIL S.A, BR Complete listing at http://thyme.rand.apnic.net/current/data-ASnet-LACNIC AfriNIC Region per AS prefix count summary ------------------------------------------ ASN No of nets /20 equiv MaxAgg Description 24863 1144 396 44 LINKdotNET-AS, EG 37611 824 107 9 Afrihost, ZA 36903 741 372 137 MT-MPLS, MA 36992 701 1412 41 ETISALAT-MISR, EG 8452 643 1730 18 TE-AS TE-AS, EG 24835 638 850 15 RAYA-AS, EG 29571 472 68 12 ORANGE-COTE-IVOIRE, CI 37492 451 376 81 ORANGE-, TN 15399 362 35 7 WANANCHI-, KE 37342 361 32 1 MOVITEL, MZ Complete listing at http://thyme.rand.apnic.net/current/data-ASnet-AFRINIC Global Per AS prefix count summary ---------------------------------- ASN No of nets /20 equiv MaxAgg Description 4538 5407 4192 74 ERX-CERNET-BKB China Education and Rese 7545 4378 415 431 TPG-INTERNET-AP TPG Telecom Limited, AU 8151 4345 3387 574 Uninet S.A. de C.V., MX 12479 4036 1512 488 UNI2-AS, ES 39891 3778 203 20 ALJAWWALSTC-AS, SA 10620 3570 539 270 Telmex Colombia S.A., CO 6327 3365 1323 85 SHAW - Shaw Communications Inc., CA 22773 3287 2988 150 ASN-CXA-ALL-CCI-22773-RDC - Cox Communi 4766 2854 11131 783 KIXS-AS-KR Korea Telecom, KR 9829 2815 1499 544 BSNL-NIB National Internet Backbone, IN Complete listing at http://thyme.rand.apnic.net/current/data-ASnet Global Per AS Maximum Aggr summary ---------------------------------- ASN No of nets Net Savings Description 7545 4378 3947 TPG-INTERNET-AP TPG Telecom Limited, AU 8151 4345 3771 Uninet S.A. de C.V., MX 39891 3778 3758 ALJAWWALSTC-AS, SA 12479 4036 3548 UNI2-AS, ES 10620 3570 3300 Telmex Colombia S.A., CO 6327 3365 3280 SHAW - Shaw Communications Inc., CA 22773 3287 3137 ASN-CXA-ALL-CCI-22773-RDC - Cox Communications 7552 2725 2656 VIETEL-AS-AP Viettel Group, VN 9394 2635 2606 CTTNET China TieTong Telecommunications Corpora 11830 2641 2556 Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad y Telec Complete listing at http://thyme.rand.apnic.net/current/data-CIDRnet List of Unregistered Origin ASNs (Global) ----------------------------------------- Bad AS Designation Network Transit AS Description 230105 UNALLOCATED 38.110.79.0/24 23015 CMC180-TOR-AS - Cambridge Merc 65001 PRIVATE 46.237.40.0/21 13118 ASN-YARTELECOM PJSC Rostelecom 64513 PRIVATE 62.150.101.0/24 9155 QNET Kuwait, KW 65537 DOCUMENT 62.162.120.0/24 6821 MT-AS-OWN bul. Orce Nikolov bb 65024 PRIVATE 87.103.234.0/24 39407 CHITATELECOM-AS, RU 65024 PRIVATE 95.189.78.0/24 39407 CHITATELECOM-AS, RU 65024 PRIVATE 95.189.80.0/22 39407 CHITATELECOM-AS, RU 64111 UNALLOCATED 98.159.5.0/24 19555 KMI-NETWORK - Kinder Morgan, I 64111 UNALLOCATED 98.159.7.0/24 19555 KMI-NETWORK - Kinder Morgan, I 64121 UNALLOCATED 98.159.9.0/24 19555 KMI-NETWORK - Kinder Morgan, I Complete listing at http://thyme.rand.apnic.net/current/data-badAS Prefixes from private and non-routed address space (Global) ----------------------------------------------------------- Prefix Origin AS Description 100.66.224.0/19 209 CENTURYLINK-US-LEGACY-QWEST - Qwest Communicati 100.127.16.0/23 28885 OMANTEL-NAP-AS OmanTel NAP, OM 100.127.18.0/23 28885 OMANTEL-NAP-AS OmanTel NAP, OM Complete listing at http://thyme.rand.apnic.net/current/data-dsua Advertised Unallocated Addresses -------------------------------- Network Origin AS Description 14.128.14.0/23 10247 NETLINE, ZA 14.192.48.0/24 327815 XNET, NA 14.192.50.0/23 10247 NETLINE, ZA 14.192.58.0/23 10247 NETLINE, ZA 27.100.7.0/24 56096 UNKNOWN 36.255.250.0/23 10247 NETLINE, ZA 41.76.136.0/22 37500 -Reserved AS-, ZZ 41.76.136.0/24 37500 -Reserved AS-, ZZ 41.76.138.0/24 37500 -Reserved AS-, ZZ 41.76.139.0/24 37500 -Reserved AS-, ZZ Complete listing at http://thyme.rand.apnic.net/current/data-add-IANA Number of prefixes announced per prefix length (Global) ------------------------------------------------------- /1:0 /2:0 /3:0 /4:0 /5:0 /6:0 /7:0 /8:15 /9:12 /10:37 /11:100 /12:288 /13:564 /14:1097 /15:1902 /16:13397 /17:7836 /18:13669 /19:25227 /20:39361 /21:45193 /22:86301 /23:70047 /24:386928 /25:849 /26:607 /27:662 /28:35 /29:20 /30:17 /31:4 /32:53 Advertised prefixes smaller than registry allocations ----------------------------------------------------- ASN No of nets Total ann. Description 6327 3153 3365 SHAW - Shaw Communications Inc., CA 39891 2946 3778 ALJAWWALSTC-AS, SA 12479 2772 4036 UNI2-AS, ES 22773 2540 3287 ASN-CXA-ALL-CCI-22773-RDC - Cox Communications 18566 2061 2168 MEGAPATH5-US - MegaPath Corporation, US 11830 1989 2641 Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad y Telec 30036 1703 1952 MEDIACOM-ENTERPRISE-BUSINESS - Mediacom Communi 10620 1599 3570 Telmex Colombia S.A., CO 8551 1589 2126 BEZEQ-INTERNATIONAL-AS Bezeqint Internet Backbo 11492 1558 1800 CABLEONE - CABLE ONE, INC., US Complete listing at http://thyme.rand.apnic.net/current/data-sXXas-nos Number of /24s announced per /8 block (Global) ---------------------------------------------- 1:1592 2:825 4:19 5:2869 6:59 7:1 8:1122 12:1876 13:183 14:1746 15:30 16:3 17:200 18:68 20:47 21:4 23:2549 24:2153 25:2 27:2269 31:1971 32:87 35:27 36:505 37:2757 38:1449 39:253 40:118 41:3104 42:606 43:1938 44:104 45:4100 46:3070 47:204 49:1297 50:1048 51:304 52:993 54:372 55:5 56:12 57:42 58:1532 59:1011 60:430 61:2139 62:1815 63:1803 64:4758 65:2221 66:4587 67:2351 68:1146 69:3192 70:1149 71:560 72:2093 74:2718 75:411 76:429 77:1549 78:1699 79:1929 80:1478 81:1429 82:1080 83:770 84:1040 85:2050 86:580 87:1318 88:933 89:2309 90:208 91:6310 92:1171 93:2390 94:2370 95:2781 96:659 97:357 98:943 99:133 100:81 101:1259 102:40 103:17406 104:3250 105:228 106:654 107:1763 108:711 109:2699 110:1597 111:1780 112:1267 113:1337 114:1121 115:1637 116:1641 117:1705 118:2158 119:1664 120:965 121:1057 122:2451 123:1810 124:1450 125:1891 128:979 129:638 130:449 131:1574 132:677 133:196 134:1015 135:226 136:455 137:498 138:1908 139:593 140:424 141:688 142:782 143:975 144:810 145:459 146:1178 147:766 148:1560 149:701 150:720 151:1048 152:762 153:312 154:1029 155:754 156:870 157:784 158:629 159:1667 160:923 161:747 162:2579 163:531 164:1057 165:1412 166:425 167:1403 168:3051 169:806 170:3687 171:428 172:1040 173:1946 174:887 175:750 176:1851 177:3975 178:2418 179:1218 180:2247 181:2218 182:2386 183:1138 184:919 185:13255 186:3581 187:2381 188:2764 189:2026 190:8121 191:1438 192:9829 193:5888 194:4795 195:3952 196:2505 197:1424 198:5538 199:5864 200:7392 201:5013 202:10371 203:10177 204:4520 205:2878 206:3075 207:3199 208:3979 209:3937 210:4035 211:2111 212:3017 213:2725 214:950 215:60 216:5841 217:2130 218:908 219:619 220:1748 221:995 222:1039 223:1244 End of report

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Fwd: [Help stop Georgia S.B. 315, a bad bill for cybersecurity]
by Rich Kulawiec 11 Apr '18

11 Apr '18

----- Forwarded message from Bennett Cyphers <bennett(a)eff.org> ----- > From: Bennett Cyphers <bennett(a)eff.org> > Date: Wed, 11 Apr 2018 11:41:40 -0700 > Subject: [ NNSquad ] Help stop Georgia S.B. 315, a bad bill for cybersecurity > Reply-To: "stop-sb315(a)eff.org" <stop-sb315(a)eff.org> > > Hello all, > > I'm Bennett Cyphers, staff technologist at EFF. For the last few months, > we have been working with local grassroots advocates and infosec experts > in Georgia to oppose S.B. 315, a bill that would expand the state's > existing hacking laws. We believe it's an unnecessary, harmful > overreach. Because of the vague definitions in the bill, we are > concerned that it will chill independent security research. Further, the > bill aims to legalize "hack back" measures which could harm innocent > users, especially victims of malware whose devices have been > appropriated by bad actors. > > We are collecting signatures from cybersecurity specialists, > technologists, computer scientists, academics, students, and others in > the industry to request Gov. Nathan Deal veto this bill. Our letter is > particularly designed for out-of-state individuals who wish to help the > effort. > > We're not ready to share the letter publicly yet, so if you are > interested in signing on, please email us (stop-sb315(a)eff.org) and we > will send you the full letter off-list. We are trying to finalize > signatures by end of business on Thursday, April 12, so please get back > to us ASAP. > > For more information about the bill: > https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2018/03/georgia-passes-anti-infosec-legislati… > > For the text of the bill: > http://www.legis.ga.gov/legislation/en-US/Display/20172018/SB/315 > > Thank you for your consideration, and please do not hesitate to email us > if you have further questions. > > Sincerely, > > Bennett ----- End forwarded message -----

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