August 2015 - Test - lists.nanog.org

LTE
by Nathan Anderson 26 Aug '15

26 Aug '15

Is there anybody here who is fluent in LTE/3GPP networks and the standards that govern them? I'm not sure where else to look. I have a very specific question about UEs, UICCs, and the security negotiation (integrity & ciphers) that occurs during attachment both on the AS and NAS layers, and so far I have not found our vendor to be very helpful. If there is somebody out there that knows something about this area, and is willing to chat with me about it, feel free to drop me a line off-list. Thanks much, -- Nathan Anderson First Step Internet, LLC nathana(a)fsr.com

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Peering + Transit Circuits
by Tim Durack 25 Aug '15

25 Aug '15

Question: What is the preferred practice for separating peering and transit circuits? 1. Terminate peering and transit on separate routers. 2. Terminate peering and transit circuits in separate VRFs. 3. QoS/QPPB ( https://www.nanog.org/meetings/nanog42/presentations/DavidSmith-PeeringPoli… ) 4. Don't worry about peers stealing transit. 5. What is peering? Your comments are appreciated. -- Tim:>

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Re: [c-nsp] Peering + Transit Circuits
by Mark Tinka 25 Aug '15

25 Aug '15

On 25/Aug/15 14:23, Brian Turnbow wrote: > Or use uRPF with an acl. > You can specify what to block and what not to block and use S/RTBH as well. Even though we're not receiving the full feed on dedicated peering routers, you're talking at least 35% of it. Sometimes more... Mark.

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Re: [c-nsp] Peering + Transit Circuits
by Mark Tinka 25 Aug '15

25 Aug '15

On 25/Aug/15 13:58, Scott Granados wrote: > If you’re not enabling URPF at the peering routers and edges how do you handle things like RTBH? D/RTBH still works fine. S/RTBH would be an issue, but one could enable uRPF temporarily for that. Mark.

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Re: [c-nsp] Peering + Transit Circuits
by Tim Durack 25 Aug '15

25 Aug '15

On Tue, Aug 18, 2015 at 11:25 AM, Scott Granados <scott(a)granados-llc.net> wrote: > So in our case we terminate peering and transit on different routers. > Peering routers have well flow enabled (the one that starts with a J that’s > inline). With NFSEN / NFDUMP we’re able to collect that flow data and look > for anomalous flows or other issues. We pretty much detect and then deal > with peering issues rather than prevent them with whitelists and so forth > but then again we’ve been lucky and not experienced to many issues other > than the occasional leakage of prefixes and such which maxprefix handles > nicely. > > Can I ask why you terminate peering and transit on different routers? (Not suggesting that is bad, just trying to understand the reason.) Tim:>

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Re: [c-nsp] Peering + Transit Circuits
by Tim Durack 25 Aug '15

25 Aug '15

On Tue, Aug 18, 2015 at 8:47 AM, Gert Doering <gert(a)greenie.muc.de> wrote: > Hi, > > On Tue, Aug 18, 2015 at 08:29:31AM -0400, Tim Durack wrote: > > 4. Don't worry about peers stealing transit. > > 5. What is peering? > > I'm afraid that the majority of answers will be 4./5., mixed with > "6. what? how can peers stell my transit?!" > > We're somewhat into the "we'll notice if there is surprisingly high > inbound traffic on peering, and then we'll find the peer, and apply > appropriate measures" camp... (since we're a hosting shop, we have mostly > outgoing traffic, so "significant" amounts of incomnig traffic stick > out). > > But yeah, something more strict might be in order. > Thanks for the response. This is what I was guessing. We currently do "2. Terminate peering and transit circuits in separate VRFs." which works well when everything is a VRF but comes at the cost of higher resource usage (RIB & FIB.) I was thinking a creative solution might be: "7. DSCP mark packets on peering ingress, police on transit egress." Not sure if I really want to get into using DSCP bits for basic IP service though. > (It would be cool if Cisco would understand that hardware forwarding > platforms need useful netflow with MAC-addresses in there... ASR9k at > least got working MAC-accounting, but more fine grained telemetry would > certainly be appreciated. Software IOS can do it, Sup720 cannot do it > due to hardware constraints, Sup2T exports MAC addresses taken from random > caches in the system but not the inbound packets, XR doesn't do it at all, > hrmph) > gert > > -- > USENET is *not* the non-clickable part of WWW! > // > www.muc.de/~gert/ > Gert Doering - Munich, Germany > gert(a)greenie.muc.de > fax: +49-89-35655025 > gert(a)net.informatik.tu-muenchen.de > -- Tim:>

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AfPIF 2015 Livestream
by Joly MacFie 25 Aug '15

25 Aug '15

Just about to start https://livestream.com/internetsociety/afpif2015/ -- --------------------------------------------------------------- Joly MacFie 218 565 9365 Skype:punkcast WWWhatsup NYC - http://wwwhatsup.com http://pinstand.com - http://punkcast.com VP (Admin) - ISOC-NY - http://isoc-ny.org -------------------------------------------------------------- -

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Data Center operations mail list?
by Chris Boyd 24 Aug '15

24 Aug '15

Is there a mail list that’s analogous to NANOG, but focused on the data center infrastructure and operations? The shorty.com hosted list is defunct. Thanks, and apologies for the tangential topic. —Chris

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Google Apps for ISPs -- Lingering fallout
by Shawn L 24 Aug '15

24 Aug '15

I know there are others on this list who used Google Apps for ISPs and recently migrated off (as the service was discontinued). We have had several cases where the user had a YouTube channel or Picasa photo albums, etc. that they created with their Google Apps for ISPs credentials. Now that the service is gone, those channels and albums still exist but the users are unable to login to them or manage them in any way because it tells them that their account has been disabled. Of course, Google had been un-responsive to all of our (and the customer's) inquiries about how to fix this. Has anyone else run into this and found a way around it? thanks Shawn

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BGP Update Report
by cidr-report＠potaroo.net 21 Aug '15

21 Aug '15

BGP Update Report Interval: 13-Aug-15 -to- 20-Aug-15 (7 days) Observation Point: BGP Peering with AS131072 TOP 20 Unstable Origin AS Rank ASN Upds % Upds/Pfx AS-Name 1 - AS38197 218503 3.7% 169.5 -- SUNHK-DATA-AS-AP Sun Network (Hong Kong) Limited,HK 2 - AS9829 186659 3.2% 100.0 -- BSNL-NIB National Internet Backbone,IN 3 - AS22059 129550 2.2% 18507.1 -- -Reserved AS-,ZZ 4 - AS36947 83141 1.4% 386.7 -- ALGTEL-AS,DZ 5 - AS3709 57957 1.0% 2146.6 -- NET-CITY-SA - City of San Antonio,US 6 - AS13188 44407 0.8% 41.6 -- BANKINFORM-AS CONTENT DELIVERY NETWORK LTD,UA 7 - AS39891 39019 0.7% 15.8 -- ALJAWWALSTC-AS Saudi Telecom Company JSC,SA 8 - AS38478 35395 0.6% 211.9 -- SUNNYVISION-AS-AP SunnyVision Limited,HK 9 - AS8402 35278 0.6% 31.8 -- CORBINA-AS OJSC "Vimpelcom",RU 10 - AS25563 33157 0.6% 8289.2 -- WEBLAND-AS Webland AG,CH 11 - AS28573 30880 0.5% 12.6 -- NET Serviços de Comunicação S.A.,BR 12 - AS30295 30458 0.5% 3807.2 -- 2ICSYSTEMSINC - 2iC Systems Inc.,CA 13 - AS2088 29944 0.5% 7486.0 -- FR-RENATER-MAYOTTE Reseau National de telecommunications pour la Technologie,EU 14 - AS56636 29237 0.5% 29237.0 -- ASVEDARU VEDA Ltd.,RU 15 - AS131090 29111 0.5% 76.8 -- CAT-IDC-4BYTENET-AS-AP CAT TELECOM Public Company Ltd,CAT ,TH 16 - AS197068 28243 0.5% 1882.9 -- QRATOR HLL LLC,RU 17 - AS10620 24676 0.4% 7.4 -- Telmex Colombia S.A.,CO 18 - AS25438 20172 0.3% 190.3 -- ASN-ICCNET International Computer Company, Ltd.,SA 19 - AS1505 19071 0.3% 1733.7 -- DNIC-AS-01505 - Headquarters, USAISC,US 20 - AS8151 16892 0.3% 9.5 -- Uninet S.A. de C.V.,MX TOP 20 Unstable Origin AS (Updates per announced prefix) Rank ASN Upds % Upds/Pfx AS-Name 1 - AS56636 29237 0.5% 29237.0 -- ASVEDARU VEDA Ltd.,RU 2 - AS22059 129550 2.2% 18507.1 -- -Reserved AS-,ZZ 3 - AS40493 10663 0.2% 10663.0 -- FACILITYSOURCEINC - FacilitySource,US 4 - AS393588 9571 0.2% 9571.0 -- MUBEA-FLO - Mubea,US 5 - AS37590 8853 0.1% 8853.0 -- BCA-ASN,AO 6 - AS25563 33157 0.6% 8289.2 -- WEBLAND-AS Webland AG,CH 7 - AS2088 29944 0.5% 7486.0 -- FR-RENATER-MAYOTTE Reseau National de telecommunications pour la Technologie,EU 8 - AS200671 4445 0.1% 4445.0 -- SKOK-JAWORZNO SKOK Jaworzno,PL 9 - AS25265 3815 0.1% 3815.0 -- VELTON-AS VELTON.TELECOM Ltd,UA 10 - AS30295 30458 0.5% 3807.2 -- 2ICSYSTEMSINC - 2iC Systems Inc.,CA 11 - AS31357 14877 0.2% 2975.4 -- TOMICA-AS Tomsk Information and Consulting Agency,RU 12 - AS197914 8421 0.1% 2807.0 -- STOCKHO-AS Stockho Hosting SARL,FR 13 - AS45606 12046 0.2% 2409.2 -- 14 - AS327739 2268 0.0% 2268.0 -- Kili-io,KE 15 - AS3709 57957 1.0% 2146.6 -- NET-CITY-SA - City of San Antonio,US 16 - AS59219 2033 0.0% 2033.0 -- MOIC-BT Ministry of Information & Communications,BT 17 - AS200562 1911 0.0% 1911.0 -- WELLTEL-IE WELLTEL (IRELAND) LTD,IE 18 - AS197068 28243 0.5% 1882.9 -- QRATOR HLL LLC,RU 19 - AS1505 19071 0.3% 1733.7 -- DNIC-AS-01505 - Headquarters, USAISC,US 20 - AS60572 1681 0.0% 1681.0 -- ZENEXITY-AS Zenexity SARL,FR TOP 20 Unstable Prefixes Rank Prefix Upds % Origin AS -- AS Name 1 - 105.96.0.0/22 80433 1.2% AS36947 -- ALGTEL-AS,DZ 2 - 64.34.125.0/24 64768 1.0% AS22059 -- -Reserved AS-,ZZ 3 - 76.191.107.0/24 64757 1.0% AS22059 -- -Reserved AS-,ZZ 4 - 195.128.159.0/24 29237 0.5% AS56636 -- ASVEDARU VEDA Ltd.,RU 5 - 185.65.148.0/24 28171 0.4% AS197068 -- QRATOR HLL LLC,RU 6 - 61.7.155.0/24 24683 0.4% AS131090 -- CAT-IDC-4BYTENET-AS-AP CAT TELECOM Public Company Ltd,CAT ,TH 7 - 78.140.0.0/18 14816 0.2% AS31357 -- TOMICA-AS Tomsk Information and Consulting Agency,RU 8 - 92.43.216.0/21 11332 0.2% AS25563 -- WEBLAND-AS Webland AG,CH 9 - 66.19.194.0/24 11257 0.2% AS6316 -- AS-PAETEC-NET - PaeTec Communications, Inc.,US 10 - 185.84.192.0/22 10991 0.2% AS25563 -- WEBLAND-AS Webland AG,CH 11 - 178.174.96.0/19 10829 0.2% AS25563 -- WEBLAND-AS Webland AG,CH 12 - 201.77.141.0/24 10726 0.2% AS28654 -- Axtelecom Telecomunicações Ltda,BR 13 - 8.17.26.0/24 10663 0.2% AS40493 -- FACILITYSOURCEINC - FacilitySource,US 14 - 199.60.236.0/24 10639 0.2% AS30295 -- 2ICSYSTEMSINC - 2iC Systems Inc.,CA 15 - 199.60.234.0/23 10419 0.2% AS30295 -- 2ICSYSTEMSINC - 2iC Systems Inc.,CA 16 - 192.58.137.0/24 9571 0.1% AS393588 -- MUBEA-FLO - Mubea,US 17 - 199.60.233.0/24 9376 0.1% AS30295 -- 2ICSYSTEMSINC - 2iC Systems Inc.,CA 18 - 196.6.255.0/24 8853 0.1% AS37590 -- BCA-ASN,AO 19 - 94.73.56.0/21 8582 0.1% AS42081 -- SPEEDY-NET-AS Speedy net AD,BG 20 - 130.0.192.0/21 8381 0.1% AS197914 -- STOCKHO-AS Stockho Hosting SARL,FR Details at http://bgpupdates.potaroo.net ------------------------------------ Copies of this report are mailed to: nanog(a)nanog.org eof-list(a)ripe.net apops(a)apops.net routing-wg(a)ripe.net afnog(a)afnog.org

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