November 2014 - Test - lists.nanog.org

Phasing out of copper
by Jean-Francois Mezei 03 Dec '14

03 Dec '14

Currently in the midst of a CRTC policy hearing in Canada on future of competition in ISPs. Incumbents claim they have no plans to retire their copper plant after deploying FTTP/FTTH. (strategically to convince regulator that keeping ISPs on copper is fine and no need to let them access FTTP). For my reply I am trying to get more authoritative info to show that incumbents do have plans to retire the copper plant once enough customers have migrated to FTTP ( I heard that 80% migration is the tip-ver where they convert the rest of customers to FTTP to be able to shutddown the copper). Anyone have pointers to documents or experiences that would help me convince the regulator that incumbents deploy FTTP with eventual goal to be able to shutdown their old copper instead of perpetually maintaining both systems ? Also being discussed is removing regulations for access to ULL (unbundled local loops). In areas being upgraded to FTTP, are there services that really need copper ULLs and do not have an FTTP equivalent ? (home alarm systems ?). When an incumbent states for the record that "retiring copper is not in their current plans", I know that it means that it isn't in their short term plans. But I need some evidence of what other telcos do to help show the incumbent is "spinning". Any help appreciated.

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Buying IP Bandwidth Across a Peering Exchange
by Colton Conor 02 Dec '14

02 Dec '14

I know typically peering exchanges are made for peering traffic between providers, but can you buy IP transit from a provider on an exchange? An example, buy a 10G port on an exchange, peer 5Gbps of traffic with multiple providers on the exchange, and buy 5Gbps of IP transit from others on the exchange? Some might ask why not get a cross connect to the provider. It is cheaper to buy an port on the exchange (which includes the cross connect to the exchange) than buy multiple cross connects. Plus we are planning on getting a wave to the exchange, and not having any physical routers or switches at the datacenter where the exchange/wave terminates at. Is this possible?

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[NANOG-announce] NANOG 63 - San Antonio - Call for Presentations is Open!
by Tony Tauber 02 Dec '14

02 Dec '14

Greetings NANOG Folks, It was great to see so many of you (~700) at NANOG 62 in Baltimore. NANOG will hold its 63rd meeting in San Antonio, TX on February 2-4, 2015, hosted by CyrusOne. The NANOG Program Committee is now seeking proposals for presentations, panels, tutorials, tracks sessions, and keynote materials for the NANOG 63 program. We invite presentations highlighting issues relating to technology already deployed or soon-to-be deployed in the Internet, . Vendors are encouraged to work with operators to present real-world deployment experiences with the vendor's products and interoperability. Key dates to track if you wish to submit a presentation: Date Event/Deadline Oct. 27, 2014 CFP Opens for NANOG 63 Dec. 05, 2014 CFP Deadline #1: Presentation Abstracts Due Dec. 12, 2014 CFP Topic List Posted Jan. 02, 2015 CFP Deadline #2: Presentation Slides Due Jan. 09, 2015 Meeting Agenda Published Jan. 30, 2015 Speaker FINAL presentations to PCTool or speaker-support Feb. 02, 2015 Lightning Talk Submissions Open (Abstracts Only) NANOG 63 submissions are welcome on the Program Committee Site <https://pc.nanog.org/> or email me if you have questions. See the detailed NANOG63 Call for Presentations <https://www.nanog.org/meetings/nanog63/callforpresentations> for more information. Let's see each other in San Antonio where, apparently, the typical high temps in February are 65F/18C. Thanks, Tony Tauber Chair, Program Committee North American Network Operator Group (NANOG) _______________________________________________ NANOG-announce mailing list NANOG-announce(a)mailman.nanog.org http://mailman.nanog.org/mailman/listinfo/nanog-announce

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Equinix Virginia - Ethernet OOB suggestions
by Ruairi Carroll 01 Dec '14

01 Dec '14

Dear List, I've got an upcoming deployment in Equinix (DC10) and I'm struggling to find a provider who can give me a 100Mbit port (With a commit of about 5-10Mbit) with a /23 or /24 of public space , for OOB purposes. We had hoped to use Equinixs services, however they're limiting us to a single public IP. I'm also open to other solutions - xDSL or similar, but emphasis is on cheap and on-net. Cheers /Ruairi

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Multi-homing with multiple ASNs
by Curtis L. Parish 30 Nov '14

30 Nov '14

Greetings, We have recently added a second ISP (third if you count I2). Our first "ISP" is actually a private state network that peers with two Tier 1 providers. We own an AS number and our IP space but at the last minute learned our state network is advertising our network using two different ASNs (neither ours) so they can load balance their connections. If you hit the right looking glass server you can see our network advertised by three different ASNs. We were told by the new ISP that this is a problem but the state network says it is not. Looking for opinions and words of wisdom on this split advertising issue. Thanks curtis Curtis Parish Senior Network Engineer Middle Tennessee State University

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Re: Low-numbered ASes being hijacked? [Re: BGP Update Report]
by Scott Weeks 30 Nov '14

30 Nov '14

> ----- Original Message ----- >>> Do these people never check what exactly they end up originating >>> outbound due to a config change, if that's really the case? >> >> Of course not because their neighbors are allowing it to >> pass; so as with all hijacks, deaggregation, and other >> unfiltered noise, the only care is traffic going in and >> out. QA (let alone automated sanity checks) are alien >> concepts to many, and "well it works" is the answer from >> some when contacted. > > That's sort of the BGP equivalent to BCP38 filtering, isn't it? --- jason(a)rice.edu wrote: From: Jason Bothe <jason(a)rice.edu> I’m not new here but the thread caught my eye, as I am one of the lower ASs being mentioned. I guess there isn’t really anything one can do to prevent these things other than listening to route servers, etc. I guess it’s all on what the upstream decides to allow-in and re-advertise. ---------------------------------------------------------------- First, obviously, set BGP filters to allow only what you expect to send upstream. Then, look at what your routers are advertising to your upstreams using 'sho bgp advertised routes' type commands to make sure it's exactly what you're expecting to send. Last, look on route servers at various places around the internet to make sure everything is advertised to expectations . You can find a lot here: http://www.traceroute.org/#Route%20Servers Also, of course, all of this can be done on a regular basis using programs instead of being done manually. scott

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BGP Update Report
by cidr-report＠potaroo.net 30 Nov '14

30 Nov '14

BGP Update Report Interval: 20-Nov-14 -to- 27-Nov-14 (7 days) Observation Point: BGP Peering with AS131072 TOP 20 Unstable Origin AS Rank ASN Upds % Upds/Pfx AS-Name 1 - AS12897 1394574 20.6% 199224.9 -- HEAGMEDIANET HSE Medianet GmbH,DE 2 - AS23752 300478 4.4% 2659.1 -- NPTELECOM-NP-AS Nepal Telecommunications Corporation, Internet Services,NP 3 - AS9829 266609 3.9% 169.1 -- BSNL-NIB National Internet Backbone,IN 4 - AS53249 78168 1.2% 39084.0 -- LAWA-AS - Los Angeles World Airport,US 5 - AS28642 63900 0.9% 1879.4 -- Contato Internet Ltda EPP,BR 6 - AS14840 60699 0.9% 1785.3 -- COMMCORP COMUNICACOES LTDA,BR 7 - AS20940 49912 0.7% 102.9 -- AKAMAI-ASN1 Akamai International B.V.,US 8 - AS23688 44891 0.7% 760.9 -- LINK3-TECH-AS-BD-AP Link3 Technologies Ltd.,BD 9 - AS52828 44476 0.7% 1482.5 -- Netpal Internet Palmares Ltda.,BR 10 - AS8402 43028 0.6% 29.3 -- CORBINA-AS OJSC "Vimpelcom",RU 11 - AS5 38861 0.6% 7.0 -- SYMBOLICS - Symbolics, Inc.,US 12 - AS28573 37224 0.6% 27.0 -- NET Serviços de Comunicação S.A.,BR 13 - AS46573 36961 0.6% 82.1 -- GLOBAL-FRAG-SERVERS - Global Frag Networks,US 14 - AS7545 32539 0.5% 13.4 -- TPG-INTERNET-AP TPG Telecom Limited,AU 15 - AS35819 32391 0.5% 60.3 -- MOBILY-AS Etihad Etisalat Company (Mobily),SA 16 - AS45271 31119 0.5% 103.4 -- ICLNET-AS-AP Idea Cellular Limited,IN 17 - AS3 30043 0.4% 3185.0 -- MIT-GATEWAYS - Massachusetts Institute of Technology,US 18 - AS53175 30030 0.4% 968.7 -- Unetvale Servicos e Equipamentos LTDA,BR 19 - AS38197 28599 0.4% 27.4 -- SUNHK-DATA-AS-AP Sun Network (Hong Kong) Limited,HK 20 - AS39891 27349 0.4% 98.0 -- ALJAWWALSTC-AS Saudi Telecom Company JSC,SA TOP 20 Unstable Origin AS (Updates per announced prefix) Rank ASN Upds % Upds/Pfx AS-Name 1 - AS12897 1394574 20.6% 199224.9 -- HEAGMEDIANET HSE Medianet GmbH,DE 2 - AS53249 78168 1.2% 39084.0 -- LAWA-AS - Los Angeles World Airport,US 3 - AS23342 22191 0.3% 22191.0 -- UNITEDLAYER - Unitedlayer, Inc.,US 4 - AS3181 10938 0.2% 10938.0 -- ASN-MATRIXMOBILE CJSC "Matrix Mobile",RU 5 - AS18135 9065 0.1% 9065.0 -- BTV BTV Cable television,JP 6 - AS3 23868 0.3% 1306.0 -- MIT-GATEWAYS - Massachusetts Institute of Technology,US 7 - AS37425 15898 0.2% 7949.0 -- Somcable,SO 8 - AS60725 22790 0.3% 7596.7 -- O3B-AS O3b Limited,JE 9 - AS62174 4824 0.1% 4824.0 -- INTERPAN-AS INTERPAN LTD.,BG 10 - AS25003 19994 0.3% 3998.8 -- INTERNET_BINAT Internet Binat Ltd,IL 11 - AS16065 2702 0.0% 2702.0 -- AS16065 Redimi AS,NL 12 - AS23752 300478 4.4% 2659.1 -- NPTELECOM-NP-AS Nepal Telecommunications Corporation, Internet Services,NP 13 - AS5 38861 0.6% 7.0 -- SYMBOLICS - Symbolics, Inc.,US 14 - AS55657 2147 0.0% 2147.0 -- XNS-AS-ID Xtreme Network System, PT,ID 15 - AS4 21237 0.3% 871.0 -- ISI-AS - University of Southern California,US 16 - AS28642 63900 0.9% 1879.4 -- Contato Internet Ltda EPP,BR 17 - AS58599 5559 0.1% 1853.0 -- CYBERGATE-BD Cybergate Limited,BD 18 - AS14840 60699 0.9% 1785.3 -- COMMCORP COMUNICACOES LTDA,BR 19 - AS4 5345 0.1% 1437.0 -- ISI-AS - University of Southern California,US 20 - AS4 8784 0.1% 2303.0 -- ISI-AS - University of Southern California,US TOP 20 Unstable Prefixes Rank Prefix Upds % Origin AS -- AS Name 1 - 94.16.72.0/21 200960 2.9% AS12897 -- HEAGMEDIANET HSE Medianet GmbH,DE 2 - 94.16.64.0/21 200914 2.9% AS12897 -- HEAGMEDIANET HSE Medianet GmbH,DE 3 - 94.16.80.0/20 200901 2.9% AS12897 -- HEAGMEDIANET HSE Medianet GmbH,DE 4 - 194.99.108.0/23 199280 2.9% AS12897 -- HEAGMEDIANET HSE Medianet GmbH,DE 5 - 194.127.204.0/23 199121 2.9% AS12897 -- HEAGMEDIANET HSE Medianet GmbH,DE 6 - 194.45.104.0/23 197850 2.9% AS12897 -- HEAGMEDIANET HSE Medianet GmbH,DE 7 - 185.9.28.0/22 195548 2.8% AS12897 -- HEAGMEDIANET HSE Medianet GmbH,DE 8 - 202.70.88.0/21 150476 2.2% AS23752 -- NPTELECOM-NP-AS Nepal Telecommunications Corporation, Internet Services,NP 9 - 202.70.64.0/21 146967 2.1% AS23752 -- NPTELECOM-NP-AS Nepal Telecommunications Corporation, Internet Services,NP 10 - 198.140.114.0/24 39116 0.6% AS53249 -- LAWA-AS - Los Angeles World Airport,US 11 - 198.140.115.0/24 39052 0.6% AS53249 -- LAWA-AS - Los Angeles World Airport,US 12 - 196.43.157.0/24 38349 0.6% AS5 -- SYMBOLICS - Symbolics, Inc.,US 13 - 130.0.192.0/21 23862 0.3% AS3 -- MIT-GATEWAYS - Massachusetts Institute of Technology,US 14 - 64.29.130.0/24 22191 0.3% AS23342 -- UNITEDLAYER - Unitedlayer, Inc.,US 15 - 192.115.44.0/22 19986 0.3% AS25003 -- INTERNET_BINAT Internet Binat Ltd,IL 16 - 162.249.183.0/24 11921 0.2% AS60725 -- O3B-AS O3b Limited,JE 17 - 5.8.168.0/23 10938 0.2% AS3181 -- ASN-MATRIXMOBILE CJSC "Matrix Mobile",RU 18 - 185.26.155.0/24 10851 0.2% AS60725 -- O3B-AS O3b Limited,JE 19 - 14.0.59.0/24 10546 0.1% AS36408 -- CDNETWORKSUS-02 - CDNetworks Inc.,US 20 - 192.58.232.0/24 10407 0.1% AS6629 -- NOAA-AS - NOAA,US Details at http://bgpupdates.potaroo.net ------------------------------------ Copies of this report are mailed to: nanog(a)nanog.org eof-list(a)ripe.net apops(a)apops.net routing-wg(a)ripe.net afnog(a)afnog.org

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Re: Low-numbered ASes being hijacked? [Re: BGP Update Report]
by Harry Hoffman 30 Nov '14

30 Nov '14

I'm currently looking into AS3 in an attempt to figure out what's going on. Always interested to hear what others have found out. Cheers, Harry On Nov 30, 2014 8:57 AM, Simon Leinen <simon.leinen(a)switch.ch> wrote: > > cidr-report writes: > > BGP Update Report > > Interval: 20-Nov-14 -to- 27-Nov-14 (7 days) > > Observation Point: BGP Peering with AS131072 > > > TOP 20 Unstable Origin AS > > Rank ASN Upds % Upds/Pfx AS-Name > [...] > > 11 - AS5 38861 0.6% 7.0 -- SYMBOLICS - Symbolics, Inc.,US > > Disappointing to see Symbolics (AS5) on this list. I would expect these > Lisp Machines to have very stable BGP implementations, especially given > the leisurely release rhythm for Genera for the past few decades. Has > the size of the IPv4 unicast table started triggering global GCs? > > Seriously, all these low-numbered ASes in the report look fishy. I > would have liked this to be an artifact of the reporting software (maybe > an issue with 4-byte ASes?), but I do see some strange paths in the BGP > table that make it look like (accidental or malicious) hi-hacking of > these low-numbered ASes. > > Now the fact that these AS numbers are low makes me curious. If I > wanted to hijack other folks' ASes deliberately, I would probably avoid > such numbers because they stand out. Maybe these are just non-standard > "private-use" ASes that are leaked? > > Some suspicious paths I'm seeing right now: > > 133439 5 > 197945 4 > > Hm, maybe 32-bit ASes do have something to do with this... > > Any ideas? > -- > Simon. (Just curious) > > [...] > > 17 - AS3 30043 0.4% 3185.0 -- MIT-GATEWAYS - Massachusetts Institute of Technology,US > [...] > > > TOP 20 Unstable Origin AS (Updates per announced prefix) > > Rank ASN Upds % Upds/Pfx AS-Name > [...] > > 13 - AS5 38861 0.6% 7.0 -- SYMBOLICS - Symbolics, Inc.,US > [...] > > 15 - AS4 21237 0.3% 871.0 -- ISI-AS - University of Southern California,US > [...] > > 19 - AS4 5345 0.1% 1437.0 -- ISI-AS - University of Southern California,US > > 20 - AS4 8784 0.1% 2303.0 -- ISI-AS - University of Southern California,US

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TeliaSonera IC Contacts
by Ammar Zuberi 30 Nov '14

30 Nov '14

Hi all, Does anyone have a contact for an account manager at TeliaSonera IC? We’ve sent at least 3 requests for a quote through their website over a month or so and haven’t got a single reply except for the automated “we’ve received your query” email. We’re looking for IP transit in Amsterdam, NL. Best Regards, Ammar Zuberi FastReturn, Inc Email: ammar(a)fastreturn.net This email and any files transmitted with it are confidential and intended solely for the use of the individual or entity to whom they are addressed. If you have received it by mistake, please let us know by e-mail reply and delete it from your system; you may not copy this message or disclose its contents to anyone. Please note that any views or opinions presented in this email are solely those of the author and do not necessarily represent those of the company. Finally, the recipient should check this email and any attachments for the presence of viruses. The company accepts no liability for any damage caused by any virus transmitted by this email.

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Re: Transparent hijacking of SMTP submission...
by Larry Sheldon 29 Nov '14

29 Nov '14

On 11/29/2014 14:09, John Levine wrote: > In article <CAL9jLaY1q_RBkyB6kczKZUiFR5b1r3kuVz8WivWR0Rjj_oaGTg(a)mail.gmail.com> you write: >> backing up a bit in the conversation, perhaps this is just in some >> regions of comcastlandia? I don't see this in Northern Virginia... > > I don't see it in New Jersey, either. > > Is this a direct connection, or a coffee shop sharing a cable connection or > something like that? I am a little confused but have note yet had time and interest at the same time to back through the thread.... I thought when it started that the complaint was somebody using a public wiffy had been victimized by something I read about recently (and thought it was here that I had red it) where somebody sets up a fraudulent server on the wiffy that advertises a false-flag email "server" that strips out the security stuff and then sends the traffic to an accomplice-site that eventually gets the stripped traffic to its original destination. -- The unique Characteristics of System Administrators: The fact that they are infallible; and, The fact that they learn from their mistakes. Quis custodiet ipsos custodes

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