October 2014 - Test - lists.nanog.org

Level3 contact
by Valeriu Vraciu 06 Oct '14

06 Oct '14

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 Hello, If someone from Level3 (Europe) with core access is here and willing to assist, please can you contact me off-list for routing issues related to AS2614 (RoEduNet) BGP in Bucharest, RO ? Thanks. - -- Valeriu Vraciu RoEduNet (AS2614) -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG/MacGPG2 v2.0.22 (Darwin) Comment: GPGTools - http://gpgtools.org iEYEARECAAYFAlQydaoACgkQncI+CatY949o0QCaAxLGeRzBcOMrxlQaSy8oBKeS swAAn3lkwk+Z66lRnzz4Q8U9zdGoe98V =/mSr -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Shellshock vulnerability research leads to WHAT?!
by Jonathan Hall 06 Oct '14

06 Oct '14

While a little off-topic for the NANOG list, I figured some of you may want to know about this. I started researching and testing this vulnerability the day it was released, and once I started researching its usage/exploitation in the wild, I identified that a few major sites were actually compromised using the vulnerability - Yahoo! being one in particular. Tripod/Lycos and WinZip.com were also compromised. Yahoo! reached out and gave me a response, albeit a very weak one, only after the FBI, media and CEO Marissa Mayers was contacted... WinZip patched their boxes and didn't bother responding or notifying me that they got it done. Please do excuse the scattered nature of the email sent to Marissa Mayers @ Yahoo! - there were other correspondences that are currently being kept private, and at the time that I wrote that one, I had been awake for roughly 48 hours and was fueled on caffeine and nicotine. The chances are highly likely that Yahoo! is going to do their best at keeping this quiet and not release any information or details on this, and I figured that some of at are undoubtedly just as at risk from this as anyone else. Please see the rest of everything related to this at http://www.futuresouth.us/yahoo_hacked.html And http://www.futuresouth.us/yahoo_response.jpg for their initial response. Non-authoritative answer: Name: dip4.gq1.yahoo.com Address: 63.250.204.25 Non-authoritative answer: Name: api118.sports.gq1.yahoo.com Address: 10.212.240.43 These are the two servers that were 100% positively identified thus far as being compromised by both me and Yahoo!, with dip4.gq1.yahoo.com being the initial point of entry via Shellshock. Jonathan D. Hall Future South Technologies www.futuresouth.us (504) 470-3748 - [main] (504) 232-3306 - [cell] Life is a dream for the wise, a game for the fool, a comedy for the rich and a tragedy for the poor.

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FCC delays Comcast / TWC merger 180 days
by Patrick W. Gilmore 05 Oct '14

05 Oct '14

<http://www.forbes.com/sites/amadoudiallo/2014/10/04/comcast-merger-review-p…> Seems to be both on-topic, and timely, given the start of NANOG62 is tomorrow (or today for some). As I mentioned elsewhere, if the FCC asked both companies to provide info and both companies did not provide the info, delaying the merger 180 days is actually a pretty minor penalty. When I don't give the gov't what they want, I usually get a far harsher punishment than "no problem, we'll give you more time". -- TTFN, patrick

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Equinix Sales
by Daniel Corbe 05 Oct '14

05 Oct '14

Equinix Sales seem impossible to reach. Should I just give up and go through a sales agent or can someone from Equinix sales contact me off-list?

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Re: Marriott wifi blocking
by Larry Sheldon 05 Oct '14

05 Oct '14

On 10/4/2014 12:23, Jay Ashworth wrote: > ----- Original Message ----- >> From: "Majdi S. Abbas" <msa(a)latt.net> > >> I've seen this in a few places, but if anyone encounters similar >> behavior, I suggest the following: >> >> - Document the incident. >> - Identify the make and model of the access point, or >> controller, and be sure to pass along this information to >> the FCC's OET: http://transition.fcc.gov/oet/ >> >> Vendors really need to start losing their US device certification >> for devices that include advertised features that violate US law. It >> would put a stop to this sort of thing pretty quickly. > > Majdi makes an excellent point, but I want to clarify it, so no one misses > the important subtext: > > It is OK for an enterprise wifi system to make this sort of attack *on rogue > APs which are trying to pretend to be part of it (same ESSID). > > It is NOT OK for an enterprise wifi system to make this sort of attack > on APs which *are not trying to pretend to be part of it* (we'll call this > The Marriott Attack from now on, right?) > > Rogue AP prevention is a *useful* feature in enterprise wifi systems... > but *that isn't what Marriott was doing*. I can agree that prevention of foreign attachments to a net work is morally OK. -- The unique Characteristics of System Administrators: The fact that they are infallible; and, The fact that they learn from their mistakes. Quis custodiet ipsos custodes

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Re: Marriott wifi blocking
by Brandon Butterworth 04 Oct '14

04 Oct '14

> From: Jay Ashworth <jra(a)baylink.com> > Again: you've shifted topics here from "enterprise rogue protection" > (stay off *my* ESSID) to "Marriott Attack" (stay off all ESSIDs that > *aren't* mine); different thing entirely. Don't forget the 3rd "stay off this channel go use another" used at large scale events where for the masses to get a workable service a few have to give up the right to spray their wifi on whichever channel they wish. The Marriott may have not been fined had they been doing this rather than "stay off all channels because we wish to charge for them". I've not seen if they were stopping other SSID on all channels or just the ones they were using. brandon

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Re: Marriott wifi blocking
by Larry Sheldon 04 Oct '14

04 Oct '14

On 10/4/2014 01:37, Owen DeLong wrote: >> Most crimes not committed by government entities have to go through >> an indictment-trial-conviction sequence before punisihment is >> administered. >> >> Except in Chicago. > > Whereas most crimes committed by government entities go through the > same process and are then not punished. I wasn't going to go there--that gets me banned a lot. But I do think that an related AP at the curb outside is entitled to a trial before the death ray is unleashed against it. -- The unique Characteristics of System Administrators: The fact that they are infallible; and, The fact that they learn from their mistakes. Quis custodiet ipsos custodes

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Re: Marriott wifi blocking
by Larry Sheldon 04 Oct '14

04 Oct '14

On 10/3/2014 22:26, Hugo Slabbert wrote: > On Sat 2014-Oct-04 08:37:32 +0530, Suresh Ramasubramanian > <ops.lists(a)gmail.com> wrote: > >> Wifi offered by a carrier citywide, or free wifi signals from a nearby >> hotel / park / coffee shop.. > > Perfect example (thanks) of why cutting off network attachment points > would be fair game while effectively attacking other WLANs has > collateral damage. Most crimes not committed by government entities have to go through an indictment-trial-conviction sequence before punisihment is administered. Except in Chicago. -- The unique Characteristics of System Administrators: The fact that they are infallible; and, The fact that they learn from their mistakes. Quis custodiet ipsos custodes

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Re: Marriott wifi blocking
by Larry Sheldon 04 Oct '14

04 Oct '14

On 10/3/2014 23:31, Owen DeLong wrote: > The hotel is being fined for blocking/jamming users setting up wifi > via mobile technologies and such, not using the hotel's network. Hard > for me to imagine how the hotel gets to insert itself into any > applicable AUP in that scenario. +1 What happens if the AP happens to be stopped at a traffic light outside? -- The unique Characteristics of System Administrators: The fact that they are infallible; and, The fact that they learn from their mistakes. Quis custodiet ipsos custodes

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Re: Marriott wifi blocking
by Larry Sheldon 04 Oct '14

04 Oct '14

On 10/3/2014 22:09, Valdis.Kletnieks(a)vt.edu wrote: > On Fri, 03 Oct 2014 20:31:56 -0500, Larry Sheldon said: > >> What it is about red-colored APs that is offensive? I have never seen one. > > It's a color code that indicates it's an RFC3514-compliant device. %^) -- The unique Characteristics of System Administrators: The fact that they are infallible; and, The fact that they learn from their mistakes. Quis custodiet ipsos custodes

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