June 2013 - Test - lists.nanog.org

Big day for IPv6 - 1% native penetration
by Tomas Podermanski 05 Jan '16

05 Jan '16

Hi, It seems that today is a "big day" for IPv6. It is the very first time when native IPv6 on google statistics (http://www.google.com/intl/en/ipv6/statistics.html) reached 1%. Some might say it is tremendous success after 16 years of deploying IPv6 :-) T.

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How are you doing DHCPv6 ?
by Randy Carpenter 02 Apr '15

02 Apr '15

I am wondering how people out there are using DHCPv6 to handle assigning prefixes to end users. We have a requirement for it to be a redundant server that is centrally located. DHCPv6 will be relayed from each customer access segment. We have been looking at using ISC dhcpd, as that is what we use for v4. However, it currently does not support any redundancy. It also does not do very much useful logging for DHCPv6 requests. Certainly not enough to keep track of users and devices. So, my questions are: How are you doing DHCPv6 with Prefix Delegation? What software are you using? When DHCPv6 with Prefix Delegation seems to be about the only way to deploy IPv6 to end users in a generic device-agnostic fashion, I am wondering why it is so difficult to find a working solution. thanks, -Randy -- | Randy Carpenter | Vice President - IT Services | Red Hat Certified Engineer | First Network Group, Inc. | (800)578-6381, Opt. 1 ----

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Generating IPv6 list with filtergen.level3.net
by Smith, Courtney 28 Mar '15

28 Mar '15

Anyone out there know how to generate a IPv6 list Level3's filtergen? I tried Google but didn't find anything. () ascii ribbon campaign - against html e-mail /\ www.asciiribbon.org - against proprietary attachments

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Blocking private AS
by Thomas Magill 27 Nov '13

27 Nov '13

I am thinking about implementing a filter to block all traffic with private AS numbers in the path. I see quite a few in my table though so I am concerned I might block some legitimate traffic. In some cases, these are just prefixes with the private appended to the end but a few have the private as a transit. Is this a good idea or would I likely be blocking too much legitimate traffic? The filter I am using currently shows the following: BGP table version is 5462394, local router ID is 209.112.253.4 Status codes: s suppressed, d damped, h history, * valid, > best, i - internal, r RIB-failure, S Stale Origin codes: i - IGP, e - EGP, ? - incomplete Network Next Hop Metric LocPrf Weight Path * i58.68.109.0/24 x.x.x.x 0 100 0 6130 9498 10201 65534 i *> y.y.y.y 0 6130 9498 10201 65534 i * i68.115.224.0/24 x.x.x.x 0 100 0 6130 19151 20115 65011 i *> y.y.y.y 0 6130 19151 20115 65011 i * 85.112.22.0/24 y.y.y.y 0 6130 6939 23148 64532 64532 64532 64532 64532 64532 64532 64532 64532 i *> 93.189.194.0/24 y.y.y.y 0 6130 3549 39386 39386 39386 25233 65000 47146 i * i x.x.x.x 0 100 0 6130 3549 39386 39386 39386 25233 65000 47146 i *> 96.60.243.0/24 y.y.y.y 0 6130 2828 4181 65528 i * i x.x.x.x 0 100 0 6130 2828 4181 65528 i * i96.61.232.0/24 x.x.x.x 0 100 0 6130 2828 4181 65527 i *> y.y.y.y 0 6130 2828 4181 65527 i * i96.61.233.0/24 x.x.x.x 0 100 0 6130 2828 4181 65527 i *> y.y.y.y 0 6130 2828 4181 65527 i * i96.61.234.0/24 x.x.x.x 0 100 0 6130 2828 4181 65527 i *> y.y.y.y 0 6130 2828 4181 65527 i *> 148.207.2.0/24 y.y.y.y 0 6130 2828 3257 16531 13579 65090 i * i x.x.x.x 0 100 0 6130 2828 3257 16531 13579 65090 i *> 148.207.40.0/24 y.y.y.y 0 6130 2828 3257 16531 13579 65090 i * i x.x.x.x 0 100 0 6130 2828 3257 16531 13579 65090 i *> 148.207.97.0/24 y.y.y.y 0 6130 2828 3257 16531 13579 65090 i * i x.x.x.x 0 100 0 6130 2828 3257 16531 13579 65090 i * 170.34.100.0/24 y.y.y.y 0 6130 19151 20115 65011 ? * 170.34.104.0/24 y.y.y.y 0 6130 19151 20115 65011 ? * 170.34.113.0/24 y.y.y.y 0 6130 19151 20115 65011 ? * i174.35.1.0/24 x.x.x.x 0 100 0 6130 16467 64565 i * i174.47.199.0/24 x.x.x.x 0 100 0 6130 2828 4323 15065 65123 i *> y.y.y.y 0 6130 2828 4323 15065 65123 i * i192.109.61.0 x.x.x.x 0 100 0 6130 19151 20115 65011 i *> y.y.y.y 0 6130 19151 20115 65011 i *> 196.216.249.0 y.y.y.y 0 6130 2828 3257 8513 8513 8513 36881 65000 36896 37062 i * i x.x.x.x 0 100 0 6130 2828 3257 8513 8513 8513 36881 65000 36896 37062 i Network Next Hop Metric LocPrf Weight Path *> 209.172.69.128/30 y.y.y.y 0 6130 16467 64565 i * i x.x.x.x 0 100 0 6130 16467 64565 i *> 213.146.161.0 y.y.y.y 0 6130 2828 174 64679 48493 i * i x.x.x.x 0 100 0 6130 2828 174 64679 48493 i Thomas Magill Network Engineer Office: (858) 909-3777 Cell: (858) 869-9685 mailto:tmagill@providecommerce.com <mailto:tmagill@providecommerce.com> provide-commerce 4840 Eastgate Mall San Diego, CA 92121 ProFlowers <http://www.proflowers.com/> | redENVELOPE <http://www.redenvelope.com/> | Cherry Moon Farms <http://www.cherrymoonfarms.com/> | Shari's Berries <http://www.berries.com/>

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Network topology
by Colin Alston 15 Nov '13

15 Nov '13

Hi all I'm considering trying to come up with some means to automatically detect a networks topology and draw pretty pictures. This is somewhat boring though if a network isn't well arranged with VLANs and q-tag trunk routers and so on (It will just look like a big cloud of junk connected off an assumed switch). Is there any kind of cunning trick to detect standard layer2 switches along a path without stuff like STP?

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NFSen plugin - ddd
by Andrew Jones 29 Oct '13

29 Oct '13

Hi All, Does anyone have a copy of the DDoS detection plugin for NFSen called ddd that they could send to me? According to a blog article [1] I read, it used to be available at [2]. It's not there, and I haven't had any luck trying to track it down the usual ways. If anyone is able to provide a copy, I'd appreciate it. Thanks, Jonesy [1] http://www.ccieflyer.com/2010-01-JasonRowley.php [2] http://www.synacknetworks.com/ddd/ddd.zip

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NANOG 59 - Important Schedule Notice & Call For Presentations. Please read!
by David Temkin 24 Aug '13

24 Aug '13

NANOG Community, I hope everyone enjoyed New Orleans as much as I did! It's truly one of my favorite cities in the world. Fresh off a great meeting, we're already starting to get ready for NANOG 59 in Phoenix. If you have a topic you'd like to speak about, the program committee would love to consider it. Please watch http://www.nanog.org/meetings/nanog59/callforpresentations for more information. After considering feedback from members, speakers, ARIN, and sponsors we have decided to make a small tweak to the program timing at NANOG 59. We will continue with the Monday-Wednesday format, however we will move the ARIN Track and Tutorials to Tuesday morning, highlighting their importance to the program. The program will begin on Monday morning at 10:00AM followed by our popular Newcomers Lunch. The exact schedule layout can be found at http://www.nanog.org/meetings/nanog59/preagenda and is also attached in JPG format to this email. If you wish to submit a presentation, please keep these important dates in mind: Presentation Abstracts and Draft Slides Due: 16-Aug-2013 Slides Due: 30-Aug-2013 Topic List Posted: 06-Sep-2013 Final Agenda Published: 27-Sep-2013 Please submit your materials to http://pc.nanog.org Looking forward to seeing everyone in Phoenix! -Dave Temkin (Chair, NANOG Program Committee)

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Re: Open Resolver Problems
by Jay Ashworth 13 Jul '13

13 Jul '13

----- Original Message ----- > From: "Roland Dobbins" <rdobbins(a)arbor.net> > On Apr 1, 2013, at 11:18 PM, Patrick W. Gilmore wrote: > > Of course, since users shouldn't be using off-net name servers > > anyway, this isn't really a problem! :) > > ;> > > It's easy enough to construct ACLs to restrict the broadband consumer > access networks from doing so. Additional egress filtering would catch > any reflected attacks, per your previous comments. So, how would Patrick's caveat affect me, whose recursive resolver *is on my Linux laptop*? Would not that recursor be making queries he advocates blocking? Or don't I remember DNS well enough? Cheers, -- jra -- Jay R. Ashworth Baylink jra(a)baylink.com Designer The Things I Think RFC 2100 Ashworth & Associates http://baylink.pitas.com 2000 Land Rover DII St Petersburg FL USA #natog +1 727 647 1274

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gTLDs opened up
by Randy Bush 12 Jul '13

12 Jul '13

AfriNIC put these wonderful people on stage at the African Internet Summit. In parallel, I should offer /16s from an alternet IP space for USD1,000, buy one and get one free. </sarcasm> randy

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Google's QUIC
by Michael Thomas 09 Jul '13

09 Jul '13

http://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2013/06/google-making-the-web… Sorry if this is a little more on the dev side, and less on the ops side but since it's Google, it will almost certainly affect the ops side eventually. My first reaction to this was why not SCTP, but apparently they think that middle boxen/firewalls make it problematic. That may be, but UDP based port filtering is probably not far behind on the flaky front. The second justification was TLS layering inefficiencies. That definitely has my sympathies as TLS (especially cert exchange) is bloated and the way that it was grafted onto TCP wasn't exactly the most elegant. Interestingly enough, their main justification wasn't a security concern so much as "helpful" middle boxen getting their filthy mitts on the traffic and screwing it up. The last thing that occurs to me reading their FAQ is that they are seemingly trying to send data with 0 round trips. That is, SYN, data, data, data... That really makes me wonder about security/dos considerations. As in, it sounds too good to be true. But maybe that's just the security cruft? But what about SYN cookies/dos? Hmmm. Other comments or clue? Mike

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