September 2005 - Test - lists.nanog.org

OT - Vint Cerf joins Google
by Suresh Ramasubramanian 08 Sep '05

08 Sep '05

For once, I'll do a Fergie http://www.google.com/press/pressrel/vintcerf.html MOUNTAIN VIEW, Calif. – September 8, 2005 – Google Inc. (NASDAQ: GOOG) today announced that it hired Vinton (Vint) Cerf, the longtime technologist who is widely known as a "founding father" of the Internet, as Chief Internet Evangelist. [...] -- Suresh Ramasubramanian (ops.lists(a)gmail.com)

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Opinions wanted re blog-style NANOG list content
by Joe Abley 08 Sep '05

08 Sep '05

[bcc'd to nanog(a)nanog.org] Call for Community Participation The NANOG Steering Committee is interested in hearing feedback from the community about the following topic. Private comments may be sent to steering(a)nanog.org. Public discussion is encouraged, and should take place on the nanog-futures mailing list. For information about subscription to the nanog-futures mailing list, see <http://www.nanog.org/email.html>. Commentary on Current Events on the NANOG List Many threads on NANOG begin with a bare reference to some article published elsewhere (e.g. a blog, or a news organisation web site). While some of these threads have undoubted relevance to network operations, others are certainly off-topic. Some participants of the NANOG list have expressed frustration at the perceived off-topic chatter on the list resulting from these threads. Other participants have commented that they welcome the content. There is no clear majority opinion known to the NANOG Steering Committee. A common medium for distribution of information such as those contained in these NANOG threads is the weblog. Blogs have established mechanisms for facilitating follow-up commentary from readers, and are also readily syndicated through RSS or e-mail. Two notable such blogs already exist: Fergie's Tech Blog <http://fergdawg.blogspot.com/>, an individual initiative of long-time NANOG contributor Paul Fergusson Merit's SlashNOG <http://slashnog.merit.edu/>, a proof-of-concept discussion forum styled after Slashdot The NANOG Steering Committee is interested in hearing the opinions of the community on this topic. For example: 1. Should current events/news bulletin-style threads be declared universally off-topic for the NANOG mailing list? 2. Should NANOG encourage, facilitate, or otherwise support a blog or similar forum for this content? Please follow-up to the nanog-futures mailing list <http:// www.nanog.org/email.html> or send private commentary to the NANOG Steering Committee at <steering(a)nanog.org>. Joe Abley (for the NANOG SC)

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WISPA Wireless Crisis Center
by W.D.McKinney 08 Sep '05

08 Sep '05

Katria network help about the Wireless side is at http://www.wispa.org/ and more pointedly at http://katrina.cnt.org/wordpress/ Hope this helps, -Dee

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3 men die in weekend crashes
by fergdawg＠netzero.net 07 Sep '05

07 Sep '05

This story was sent to you by: Fergie (Paul Ferguson) -------------------- 3 men die in weekend crashes -------------------- Separate accidents kill motorcyclist going to celebrate birthday, one riding with friend, and 'sweet, loving' son BY CHRISTINE ARMARIO STAFF WRITER September 5, 2005 Donald Schober would have been celebrating his 24th birthday yesterday, but he was being mourned by friends and family instead. The Medford man was one of three men to die in motorcycle or car accidents in Nassau and Suffolk during the Labor Day weekend. Schober was just a few minutes from home after visiting friends Friday evening when his 2001 Suzuki motorcycle, traveling westbound on Barton Avenue, collided with a 1990 Honda sedan trying to turn left onto Tremont Avenue. He was pronounced dead at the scene shortly after 6 p.m. Police said the speed of Schober's motorcycle may have been a factor in the accident and that the driver of the Honda, Michael Laskaris, of Selden, said he did not see Schober's bike as he turned. Schober, a broker at ABG Services Inc. in Holbrook, was going to spend his birthday celebrating with a night out with friends, who instead gathered yesterday at his wake. His godmother, Maria Ball, said some of them had painted the words "We ride together, we die together" on the back windows of their cars and trucks. "He's going to be fully surrounded by the biggest birthday he ever had," Ball said tearfully over the phone. She said Schober had been riding motorcycles since he was 17 and had just bought the Suzuki bike two months ago after a year of saving. A second motorcyclist was killed yesterday in Wantagh. Michael Benedetto, 37, of Lindenhurst, was riding a motorcycle with a friend on Sunrise Highway when he lost control of his vehicle near Wantagh Avenue and hit a parked car by the Lighthouse Diner at 2:40 a.m., police said. "I kept on riding about half a mile, realized he wasn't behind me, made a U-turn, and saw a bunch of people around a parked vehicle," said Peter Scifo, the friend. "I thought he was unconscious with a broken arm." Benedetto was transported to Nassau University Medical Center, where he died at 3:32 a.m., police said. Scifo said Benedetto was a former Marine who had served in Desert Storm and was employed as a mechanic at a Copiague fence company. He is survived by three sisters, a brother and his mother, Scifo said. "He was just a great guy," Scifo said. "Loved his family, loved his friends, always smiling and happy." Earlier yesterday, Adam Fraier, a 27-year-old Cedarhurst man, was killed when his 2002 Nissan hit a telephone pole on Edwards Avenue in Calverton and flipped over on its roof, police said. Fraier was transported to Central Suffolk Hospital where he was pronounced dead at 1:12 a.m. His father, Mark Fraier, said his son was returning from the house of a work colleague when he lost control of the car. His son was a University of Albany graduate who worked as a mortgage broker for Premium Capital Funding in Jericho, he said. "Sweet, loving," he said, describing his son. "He was a loving son and grandson that will be sorely missed." Copyright (c) 2005, Newsday, Inc. -------------------- This article originally appeared at: http://www.newsday.com/mynews/ny-lifata054412687sep05,0,6885648.story Visit Newsday online at http://www.newsday.com

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SWIP and Rwhois in the Real World
by Crist Clark 07 Sep '05

07 Sep '05

As best I can tell from ARIN documents, ISP still are supposed to SWIP or use Rwhois for subassignments of /29 and greater. However, is this still widely practiced these days? Especially among smaller ISPs? I know the privacy pros and cons, so I don't seek to start those threads again. I'm interested in what smaller ISPs are actually doing these days. Thanks. -- Crist J. Clark crist.clark(a)globalstar.com Globalstar Communications (408) 933-4387

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Yahoo! -- A "Phisher-friendly" hosting domain?
by Fergie (Paul Ferguson) 07 Sep '05

07 Sep '05

This would probably be better posted to NSP-SEC, but since I'm not subscribed (and have tried at least once), I'll share it here. For what it's worth, I'm involved in several security and anti-malware, anti-botnet, etc. group efforts, and I personally think that this particlar situation has gained enough "badness" status as to warrant wider public disclosure. A colleague alerted me to this earlier today (with permission to reprint): [snip] My attention was drawn earlier today to yet another phishing site on Yahoo! - we're already finding extreme porn and other disreputable sites moving there now that their "abuse dept" has been dismantled and reassembled in Oregon, apparently with all staff-under-training. But it caught my eye that SOMEBODY at Yahoo! ought to be reviewing domain names like "bankofthewestupdate.com" when they are set up on their servers, if only for reasons of due diligence ... otherwise Bank of the West might possibly have grounds for a lawsuit against Yahoo! ? Have any banks ever threatened to litigate against ISPs? If ever there was an incident calling out to be made a test case ... [snip] Details can be found here: http://www.spamhaus.org/sbl/sbl.lasso?query=SBL31214 Also: [snip] The fact that very many phishers, 419s, and spamming pornographers are flocking to Yahoo is the result of changes that Yahoo have made to their abuse processing. Also, as they run ClamAV on all mail to their "new" abuse desk in Oregon, any reports to them that contain evidence of phishing incidents are automatically rejected by the ClamAV filtering - so it is difficult to know exactly HOW Yahoo! could have been expected to take action on these cases. (Yahoo! have been told about the situation by several respected individuals but from the reactions it seems that they do not care.) [snip] A more interesting link can be found here: http://www.spamhaus.org/sbl/listings.lasso?isp=yahoo.com This is somewhat disturbing. - ferg -- "Fergie", a.k.a. Paul Ferguson Engineering Architecture for the Internet fergdawg(a)netzero.net or fergdawg(a)sbcglobal.net ferg's tech blog: http://fergdawg.blogspot.com/

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Cisco Security Advisory: Cisco IOS Firewall Authentication Proxy for FTP and Telnet Sessions Buffer Overflow
by Cisco Systems Product Security Incident Response Team 07 Sep '05

07 Sep '05

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 Cisco Security Advisory: ======================== Cisco IOS Firewall Authentication Proxy for FTP and Telnet Sessions Buffer Overflow =================================================================================== Revision 1.0 For Public Release 2005 September 7 1600 UTC (GMT) - ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Contents ======== Summary Affected Products Details Impact Software Versions and Fixes Obtaining Fixed Software Workarounds Exploitation and Public Announcements Status of This Notice: FINAL Distribution Revision History Cisco Security Procedures - ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Summary ======= The Cisco IOS Firewall Authentication Proxy for FTP and/or Telnet Sessions feature in specific versions of Cisco IOS software is vulnerable to a remotely-exploitable buffer overflow condition. Devices that do not support, or are not configured for Firewall Authentication Proxy for FTP and/or Telnet Services are not affected. Devices configured with only Authentication Proxy for HTTP and/or HTTPS are not affected. Only devices running certain versions of Cisco IOS are affected. Cisco has made free software available to address this vulnerability. There are workarounds available to mitigate the effects of the vulnerability. This advisory is available at http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20050907-auth_proxy.shtml. Affected Products ================= Vulnerable Products +------------------ Devices that are running the following release trains of Cisco IOS are affected if Firewall Authentication Proxy for FTP and/or Telnet Sessions is configured and applied to an active interface. * 12.2ZH and 12.2ZL based trains * 12.3 based trains * 12.3T based trains * 12.4 based trains * 12.4T based trains To determine the software running on a Cisco product, log in to the device and issue the show version command to display the system banner. Cisco IOS software will identify itself as "Internetwork Operating System Software" or simply "IOS." On the next line of output, the image name will be displayed between parentheses, followed by "Version" and the Cisco IOS release name. Other Cisco devices will not have the show version command, or will give different output. The following example identifies a Cisco 7200 router running Cisco IOS release 12.3(10a) with an installed image name of C7200-JK8O3S-M. Router#show version Cisco Internetwork Operating System Software IOS (tm) 7200 Software (C7200-JK8O3S-M), Version 12.3(10a), RELEASE SOFTWARE (fc2) Copyright (c) 1986-2004 by cisco Systems, Inc. Additional information about Cisco IOS release naming can be found at http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/620/1.html. Refer to the Details section for more information about affected and unaffected configurations. Products Confirmed Not Vulnerable +-------------------------------- * Products that are not running Cisco IOS are not affected * Products that are running Cisco IOS versions 12.2 and earlier (including 12.0S) are not affected. (excluding 12.2ZH and 12.2ZL) * Products that are running Cisco IOS are not affected unless they are configured for Firewall Authentication Proxy for FTP and/or Telnet Sessions. * Products that are running Cisco IOS XR are not affected. No other Cisco products are currently known to be affected by this vulnerability. Details ======= The Cisco IOS Firewall Authentication Proxy feature allows network administrators to apply specific security policies on a per-user basis. With the Firewall Authentication Proxy for FTP and/or Telnet Sessions feature, users can log into the network services via FTP and/or Telnet, and their specific access profiles are automatically retrieved and applied from a Remote Authentication Dial In User Service (RADIUS), or Terminal Access Controller Access Control System Plus (TACACS+) authentication server. Cisco IOS Software is vulnerable to a Denial of Service (DoS) and potentially an arbitrary code execution attack when processing the user authentication credentials from an Authentication Proxy Telnet/FTP session. To exploit this vulnerability an attacker must first complete a TCP connection to the IOS device running affected software and receive an auth-proxy authentication prompt. This vulnerability is documented in the Cisco Bug Toolkit as Bug ID CSCsa54608 (registered customers only) To determine if your device is running Firewall Authentication Proxy for FTP and/or Telnet Sessions feature, log into the device and issue the show ip auth-proxy configuration command to display the configuration of Firewall Authentication Proxy services. The following example identifies Firewall Authentication Proxy services running for Telnet and FTP under the proxy rule name proxy_example. Router#show ip auth-proxy configuration Authentication global cache time is 60 minutes Authentication global absolute time is 0 minutes Authentication Proxy Watch-list is disabled Authentication Proxy Rule Configuration Auth-proxy name proxy_example ftp list not specified auth-cache-time 60 minutes telnet list not specified auth-cache-time 60 minutes The following will be seen if Firewall Authentication Proxy services are not enabled but supported in your IOS version: Router#show ip auth-proxy configuration Authentication global cache time is 60 minutes Authentication global absolute time is 0 minutes Authentication Proxy Watch-list is disabled Router# The following will be seen if running a version of IOS that does not support Firewall Authentication Proxy services: Router#show ip auth-proxy configuration ^ % Invalid input detected at '^' marker. Router# A router that has Firewall Authentication Proxy services assigned to an interface will have ip auth-proxy <list name> command under an interface in the show running-config output. The following example identifies Firewall Authentication Proxy services running under the proxy rule name "proxy_example" applied to the interface Ethernet 2/1: Router#show ip auth-proxy configuration Authentication global cache time is 60 minutes Authentication global absolute time is 0 minutes Authentication Proxy Watch-list is disabled Authentication Proxy Rule Configuration Auth-proxy name proxy_example ftp list not specified auth-cache-time 60 minutes telnet list not specified auth-cache-time 60 minutes Router#show running-config ! ! ! interface Ethernet2/1 ip address 10.1.1.1 255.255.255.0 ip auth-proxy proxy_example ! ! ! Additional information about Cisco IOS Firewall Authentication Proxy services refer to: http://www.cisco.com/univercd/cc/td/doc/product/software/ios120/120newft/12…. Additional information about Cisco IOS Firewall Authentication Proxy for FTP and/or Telnet Sessions refer to: http://www.cisco.com/univercd/cc/td/doc/product/software/ios123/123newft/12… Impact ====== Successful exploitation of the vulnerability on Cisco IOS may result in a reload of the device or execution of arbitrary code. Repeated exploitation could result in a sustained DoS attack or execution of arbitrary code on Cisco IOS devices. Software Versions and Fixes =========================== When considering software upgrades, please also consult http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/products_security_advisories_listing.ht… and any subsequent advisories to determine exposure and a complete upgrade solution. In all cases, customers should exercise caution to be certain the devices to be upgraded contain sufficient memory and that current hardware and software configurations will continue to be supported properly by the new release. If the information is not clear, contact the Cisco Technical Assistance Center ("TAC") for assistance. Each row of the Cisco IOS software table (below) describes a release train and the platforms or products for which it is intended. If a given release train is vulnerable, then the earliest possible releases that contain the fix (the "First Fixed Release") and the anticipated date of availability for each are listed in the "Rebuild" and "Maintenance" columns. A device running a release in the given train that is earlier than the release in a specific column (less than the First Fixed Release) is known to be vulnerable. The release should be upgraded at least to the indicated release or a later version (greater than or equal to the First Fixed Release label). For further information on the terms "Rebuild" and "Maintenance", please consult the following URL: http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/620/1.html +----------------------------------------+ | Major | Availability of Repaired | | Release | Releases | |------------+---------------------------| | Affected | | | | 12.2-Based | Rebuild | Maintenance | | Release | | | |------------+-------------+-------------| |12.2ZH | Vulnerable; contact TAC | |------------|-------------+-------------| | | Vulnerable; migrate to | | | 12.3(4)XK4 or later for | | | Cisco 17xx; | |12.2ZL | Migrate to 12.4(1) or | | | later for Cisco 3200; | | | Migrate to 12.3(7)XR4 or | | | later for ICS7750 | |------------|-------------+-------------| | Affected | | | | 12.3-Based | Rebuild | Maintenance | | Release | | | |------------+-------------+-------------| | | 12.3(3h) | | | |-------------+-------------| | | 12.3(5e) | | |12.3 |-------------+-------------| | | 12.3(6e) | | | |-------------+-------------| | | 12.3(9d) | | | |-------------+-------------| | | 12.3(10d) | | | |-------------+-------------| | | 12.3(12b) | | | |-------------+-------------| | | 12.3(13a) | 12.3(15) | |------------|-------------+-------------| |12.3B | Vulnerable; migrate to | | | 12.3(14)T2 or later | |------------|-------------+-------------| |12.3BC | 12.3(9a)BC7; available | | | 19-Sept-05 | |------------|-------------+-------------| |12.3BW | Vulnerable; migrate to | | | 12.3(14)T2 or later | |------------|-------------+-------------| |12.3JA | | 12.3(7)JA | |------------|-------------+-------------| |12.3JK | | 12.3(2)JK | |----------------------------------------| | | 12.3(7)T10 | | | |---------------------------| | | 12.3(8)T9 | | |12.3T |-------------|-------------| | | 12.3(11)T6 | | | |---------------------------| | | 12.3(14)T2 | | |----------------------------------------| |12.3XA | 12.3(2)XA5; available TBD | |------------|-------------+-------------| |12.3XB | Vulnerable; migrate to | | | 12.3(14)T2 or later | |------------|-------------+-------------| |12.3XC | 12.3(2)XC3 | | |------------|-------------+-------------| |12.3XD | Vulnerable; migrate to | | | 12.3(14)T2 or later | |------------|-------------+-------------| |12.3XE | 12.3(2)XE4; available TBD | |------------|-------------+-------------| |12.3XF | Vulnerable; migrate to | | | 12.3(14)T2 or later | |------------|-------------+-------------| |12.3XG | 12.3(4)XG5; available TBD | |------------|-------------+-------------| |12.3XH | Vulnerable; migrate to | | | 12.3(14)T2 or later | |------------|-------------+-------------| |12.3XI | 12.3(7)XI4 | | |--------------------------+-------------| |12.3XJ | Vulnerable; migrate to | | | 12.3(11)YF2 or later | |----------------------------------------| |12.3XK | 12.3(4)XK4; available TBD | |------------|---------------------------| |12.3XL | 12.3(11)XL3 | | |------------|---------------------------| |12.3XM | Vulnerable; migrate to | | | 12.3(14)T2 or later | |------------|---------------------------| |12.3XQ | Vulnerable; migrate to | | | 12.4(1) or later | |------------|-------------+-------------| |12.3XR | 12.3(7)XR4 | | |----------------------------------------| |12.3XS | Vulnerable; migrate to | | | 12.4(1) or later | |------------|---------------------------| |12.3XU | Vulnerable; contact TAC | |------------|---------------------------| |12.3XW | Vulnerable; migrate to | | | 12.3(11)YF2 or later | |----------------------------------------| |12.3XY | Vulnerable; contact TAC | |------------|---------------------------| | | Vulnerable; migrate to | | | 12.4(1) or later for Cisco| |12.3YA | 828; migrate to 12.3(8)YG2| | | or later for SOHO 9x and | | | Cisco 83x | |------------|---------------------------| |12.3YD | Vulnerable; migrate to | | | 12.3(14)T2 or later | |----------------------------------------| |12.3YF | 12.3(11)YF2 | | |----------------------------------------| |12.3YG | 12.3(8)YG2 | | |----------------------------------------| |12.3YI | 12.3(8)YI1 | | |----------------------------------------| |12.3YJ | Vulnerable; contact TAC | |----------------------------------------| |12.3YK | 12.3(11)YK1 | | |----------------------------------------| |12.3YQ | | 12.3(14)YQ | |----------------------------------------| |12.3YS | | 12.3(11)YS | |----------------------------------------| |12.3YT | | 12.3(14)YT | |----------------------------------------| |12.3YU | | 12.3(14)YU | |----------------------------------------| |12.3YW | | 12.3(11)YW | |----------------------------------------| | Affected | | | | 12.4-Based | Rebuild | Maintenance | | Release | | | |------------+-------------+-------------| |12.4 | | 12.4(1) | |----------------------------------------| |12.4MR | | 12.4(2)MR | |----------------------------------------| |12.4T | | 12.4(2)T | +----------------------------------------+ Obtaining Fixed Software ======================== Customers with Service Contracts +------------------------------- Customers with contracts should obtain upgraded software through their regular update channels. For most customers, this means that upgrades should be obtained through the Software Center on Cisco's worldwide website at http://www.cisco.com. Customers using Third-party Support Organizations +------------------------------------------------ Customers whose Cisco products are provided or maintained through prior or existing agreement with third-party support organizations such as Cisco Partners, authorized resellers, or service providers should contact that support organization for assistance with the upgrade, which should be free of charge. Customers without Service Contracts +---------------------------------- Customers who purchase direct from Cisco but who do not hold a Cisco service contract and customers who purchase through third-party vendors but are unsuccessful at obtaining fixed software through their point of sale should get their upgrades by contacting the Cisco Technical Assistance Center (TAC). TAC contacts are as follows. * +1 800 553 2447 (toll free from within North America) * +1 408 526 7209 (toll call from anywhere in the world) * e-mail: tac(a)cisco.com Please have your product serial number available and give the URL of this notice as evidence of your entitlement to a free upgrade. Free upgrades for non-contract customers must be requested through the TAC. Please do not contact either "psirt(a)cisco.com" or "security-alert(a)cisco.com" for software upgrades. See http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/687/Directory/DirTAC.shtml for additional TAC contact information, including special localized telephone numbers and instructions and e-mail addresses for use in various languages. Customers may only install and expect support for the feature sets they have purchased. By installing, downloading, accessing or otherwise using such software upgrades, customers agree to be bound by the terms of Cisco's software license terms found at http://www.cisco.com/public/sw-license-agreement.html, or as otherwise set forth at Cisco.com Downloads at http://www.cisco.com/public/sw-center/sw-usingswc.shtml. Workarounds =========== The effectiveness of any workaround is dependent on specific customer situations such as product mix, network topology, traffic behavior, and organizational mission. Due to the variety of affected products and releases, customers should consult with their service provider or support organization to ensure any applied workaround is the most appropriate for use in the intended network before it is deployed. Disable Cisco IOS Firewall Authentication Proxy feature for Telnet/FTP sessions +------------------------------------------------------------------------------ In networks where Cisco IOS Firewall Authentication Proxy feature for Telnet/FTP sessions is not required but enabled, disabling the feature on an IOS device will eliminate exposure to this vulnerability. On a router which is configured for Cisco IOS Firewall Authentication Proxy feature for Telnet/FTP sessions, this must be done by issuing the command: "no ip auth-proxy name 'auth-proxy-name' {ftp | telnet}" Deploy Cisco IOS Firewall Authentication Proxy feature for HTTP/HTTPS sessions +----------------------------------------------------------------------------- Configure the device with Cisco IOS Firewall Authentication Proxy feature for HTTP and/or HTTPS sessions and allow the Telnet and FTP services within the per-user TACACS+/RADIUS profile. Disable Authentication proxy for Telnet/FTP sessions to eliminate exposure. An example of the configuration statements for HTTP session Auth-proxy is: ! Configure auth-proxy for http session authentication ip auth-proxy name http-proxy http ! Configure the router's web server to service auth-proxy authentication attempts ip http server ! Set the HTTP server authentication method to AAA ip http authentication aaa Additional auth-proxy and web server configuration settings are available. For details see: http://www.cisco.com/univercd/cc/td/doc/product/software/ios120/120newft/12… After successful authentication via HTTP/HTTPS, the user can initiate required FTP or Telnet sessions. The example shown below for Cisco Secure Windows (TACACS+) server profile Group setting allows FTP and Telnet as part of access-list entry proxyacl#2=permit tcp any any priv-lvl=15 proxyacl#1=permit icmp any any proxyacl#2=permit tcp any any proxyacl#3=permit udp any any Mitigations =========== Not all of the mitigation strategies listed will work for all customers. Some of the workarounds listed are dependent on which versions and feature-sets of IOS you have in your network. These mitigation strategies, may help reduce exposure to this vulnerability. To eliminate exposure to this vulnerability, customers should apply one of the workarounds listed above, or upgrade to a fixed release of Cisco IOS. Access Control Lists (ACLs) +-------------------------- Deploying IP access-lists can mitigate the effects of this vulnerability by allowing Firewall Authentication Proxy access only from trusted subnets. This feature must be used in conjunction with interface access-lists to ensure that IP traffic from un-trusted subnets is dropped by the router and not forwarded around the auth-proxy feature. Once the IP access-list is created, it is applied to the Authentication proxy by adding the keyword "list" followed by the IP access-list name or number. In the example below the trusted network is 169.160.160.0/24 and the auth-proxy router interface is 10.66.65.47. Example: ! Permit trusted network 169.160.160.0/24 to access auth-proxy access-list 105 permit tcp 169.160.160.0 0.0.0.255 any eq telnet ! ! Deny all IP traffic that is not authenticated by auth-proxy ! Note: Management and Control traffic to the router itself would ! need to be allowed in this access-list access-list 106 deny ip any any ! ! Modify the telnet auth-proxy config to use access-list 105 ip auth-proxy name tel-proxy telnet inactivity-time 60 list 105 ! ! Apply interface access-list 106 and auth-proxy test interface FastEthernet1/0 ip address 10.66.65.47 255.255.255.0 ip access-group 106 in ip auth-proxy tel-proxy For further information on creating IP access lists see Protecting Your Core: Infrastructure Protection Access Control Lists http://www.cisco.com/en/US/tech/tk648/tk361/technologies_white_paper09186a0… and Transit Access Control Lists: Filtering at Your Edge http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/tacl.html Control Plane Policing +--------------------- The Control Plane Policy (CoPP) feature can be used to mitigate the effects of this vulnerability by only allowing trusted hosts to attempt connections through the auth-proxy router. Care must be taken to ensure that legitimate management connections to the auth-proxy router itself are not dropped by the CoPP policy. In the following example trusted management host 169.160.160.1 is allowed to establish Telnet connections to the auth-proxy router itself. Trusted network 169.160.160.0/24 is allowed to attempt FTP and Telnet auth-proxy connections to IP networks and addresses other than the auth-proxy router itself. All other inbound FTP and Telnet connections attempts are denied. The auth-proxy router's IP addresses are 172.16.1.1 (Internet Side), 1.1.1.1/24 and 10.66.65.47 (Internal). Telnet/FTP server is 172.168.1.1. ! Do not police Telnet from trusted management host 169.160.160.1 to the auth-proxy ! router access-list 105 remark ** Do not police telnet from Trusted Hosts to Auth-Proxy Router ** access-list 105 deny tcp host 169.160.160.1 host 172.16.1.1 eq telnet access-list 105 deny tcp host 172.168.1.1 host 1.1.1.1 eq telnet access-list 105 deny tcp host 172.168.1.1 host 10.66.65.47 eq telnet ! ! Police all other telnet and ftp connections to the auth-proxy router access-list 105 remark ** Police all other telnet/ftp attempts to Auth-Proxy Router ** access-list 105 permit tcp any host 172.16.1.1 eq telnet access-list 105 permit tcp any host 1.1.1.1 eq telnet access-list 105 permit tcp any host 10.66.65.47 eq telnet access-list 105 permit tcp any host 172.16.1.1 eq ftp access-list 105 permit tcp any host 1.1.1.1 eq ftp access-list 105 permit tcp any host 10.66.65.47 eq ftp ! ! Allow telnet and ftp auth-proxy for trusted network 169.160.160.0/24 access-list 105 remark ** Allow Auth-Proxy sessions from trusted networks ** access-list 105 deny tcp 169.160.160.0 0.0.0.255 any eq telnet access-list 105 deny tcp 169.160.160.0 0.0.0.255 any eq ftp ! ! Allow telnet and ftp auth-proxy for trusted network back to 169.160.160.0/24 access-list 105 remark ** Allow Auth-Proxy sessions to trusted networks ** access-list 105 deny tcp host 172.168.1.1 169.160.160.0 0.0.0.255 ! ! Allow TACACS+ from ACS server 10.66.79.229 access-list 105 remark ** Ensure we can still communicate with TACACS+ Server ** access-list 105 deny tcp host 10.66.79.229 gt 1023 host 10.66.65.47 eq 49 access-list 105 deny tcp host 10.66.79.229 eq 49 host 10.66.65.47 gt 1023 ! ! Police all TCP based management traffic from un-trusted hosts ! Note: If BGP is configured it would need to be allowed before this access-list entry access-list 105 remark ** Drop any other TCP connections ** access-list 105 permit tcp any any ! ! Do not police any other type of traffic going to the router access-list 105 remark ** Rest do not police ** access-list 105 deny ip any any ! class-map match-all only-allow-trusted-hosts match access-group 105 ! policy-map control-plane-policy ! Drop all traffic that matches the class "only-allow-trusted-hosts" class only-allow-trusted-hosts drop ! control-plane service-policy input control-plane-policy Note: CoPP is available only in IOS release trains 12.0S, 12.2S and 12.3T. Additional information on the configuration and use of the CoPP feature can be found at the following URL: http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/sw/iosswrel/ps1838/products_white_paper… Transit Access Control Lists +--------------------------- Additional mitigation can be added by Transit Access Control Lists that filter transit and edge traffic at network ingress points should be configured so that IP traffic is only allowed from legitimate, trusted IP addresses. For more information on tACLs, refer to: http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/tacl.html Exploitation and Public Announcements ===================================== The Cisco PSIRT is not aware of any public announcements or malicious use of the vulnerability described in this advisory. Status of This Notice: FINAL ====================== THIS ADVISORY IS PROVIDED ON AN "AS IS" BASIS AND DOES NOT IMPLY ANY KIND OF GUARANTEE OR WARRANTY, INCLUDING THE WARRANTY OF MERCHANTABILITY. YOUR USE OF THE INFORMATION ON THE ADVISORY OR MATERIALS LINKED FROM THE ADVISORY IS AT YOUR OWN RISK. CISCO RESERVES THE RIGHT TO CHANGE OR UPDATE THIS NOTICE AT ANY TIME. A stand-alone copy or paraphrase of the text of this security advisory that omits the distribution URL in the following section is an uncontrolled copy, and may lack important information or contain factual errors. Distribution ============ This advisory will be posted on Cisco's worldwide website at: http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20050907-auth_proxy.shtml. In addition to worldwide web posting, a text version of this notice is clear-signed with the Cisco PSIRT PGP key and is posted to the following e-mail and Usenet news recipients. * cust-security-announce(a)cisco.com * first-teams(a)first.org (includes CERT/CC) * bugtraq(a)securityfocus.com * vulnwatch(a)vulnwatch.org * cisco(a)spot.colorado.edu * cisco-nsp(a)puck.nether.net * full-disclosure(a)lists.grok.org.uk * comp.dcom.sys.cisco(a)newsgate.cisco.com Future updates of this advisory, if any, will be placed on Cisco's worldwide website, but may or may not be actively announced on mailing lists or newsgroups. Users concerned about this problem are encouraged to check the above URL for any updates. Revision History ================ +-----------------------------------------------------------+ | Revision 1.0 | 2005-September-07 | Initial Public Release | +-----------------------------------------------------------+ Cisco Security Procedures ========================= Complete information on reporting security vulnerabilities in Cisco products, obtaining assistance with security incidents, and registering to receive security information from Cisco, is available on Cisco's worldwide website at http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/products_security_vulnerability_policy.…. This includes instructions for press inquiries regarding Cisco security notices. All Cisco security advisories are available at http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.1 (GNU/Linux) iD8DBQFDIF/dezGozzK2tZARAtUgAKD9260CQGUcsbzUj1wpgxObhRCYhgCg0XLF jNbXinrFA/4XXCgZZbvTntU= =39rq -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Very funny: While Bush fiddles, New Orleans dies
by Fergie (Paul Ferguson) 07 Sep '05

07 Sep '05

If anyone hasn't figured it out yet, I didn't send this crap to the list... - ferg -- "Fergie", a.k.a. Paul Ferguson Engineering Architecture for the Internet fergdawg(a)netzero.net or fergdawg(a)sbcglobal.net ferg's tech blog: http://fergdawg.blogspot.com/

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RE: Very funny: While Bush fiddles, New Orleans dies
by Church, Chuck 07 Sep '05

07 Sep '05

So how did this newspaper server end up with NANOG posting rights anyway??? Chuck Church -----Original Message----- From: owner-nanog(a)merit.edu [mailto:owner-nanog@merit.edu] On Behalf Of Andrew - Supernews Sent: Wednesday, September 07, 2005 9:51 AM To: nanog(a)merit.edu Subject: Re: Very funny: While Bush fiddles, New Orleans dies >>>>> "Patrick" == Patrick W Gilmore <patrick(a)ianai.net> writes: Patrick> Perhaps someone "in authority" can track and kill, er, ban Patrick> this luser? Which luser? The one who first thought it would be a good idea for newspaper sites to have a "mail this article to someone" feature that forges the sender address with no attempt to verify that the person making the request has the right to use that address? -- Andrew, Supernews http://www.supernews.com

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Re: While Bush fiddles, New Orleans dies
by Fergie (Paul Ferguson) 07 Sep '05

07 Sep '05

I absolutely am _not_ responsible in any way, shape, or form, for those messages. While some of my posts skirt the ever-changing topicality of the list, you have to admit -- I always send directly from my webmail account (wouldn't dream of sending from my corporate account :-) - ferg -- Robert E.Seastrom <rs(a)seastrom.com> wrote: "Stephen J. Wilcox" <steve(a)telecomplete.co.uk> writes: > wheres the ops in this? > > dont get me wrong, i'm sympathetic with new orleans and also > definitely not a bush supporter but this is verging on incitement > and i dont see the point of the post to here My guess: someone who doesn't like Paul (and there are plenty of people who have groused privately about his prolific posting of current news stories) is trying to make him look bad (or doing a savage parody, depending on how you look at it) by abusing the http://www.tribuneinteractive.com/ "mail someone this story" feature. Look at the headers... it was obviously sent by tribuneinteractive, and it's pretty unlike Paul to do something like this. So that's my hypothesis anyway. We'll wait till Paul is awake to be able to confirm or deny it. ---Rob -- "Fergie", a.k.a. Paul Ferguson Engineering Architecture for the Internet fergdawg(a)netzero.net or fergdawg(a)sbcglobal.net ferg's tech blog: http://fergdawg.blogspot.com/

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