December 2004 - Test - lists.nanog.org

Topology of current network
by Joe Shen 15 Dec '04

15 Dec '04

Hi, I'm looking for information on backbone/PoP topology . To my memory there is a web has a lot of topology graphs but I can't call it. Could anybody do some help? thanks Joe __________________________________________________ Do You Yahoo!? Log on to Messenger with your mobile phone! http://sg.messenger.yahoo.com

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New IANA IPv6 allocation for RIPE NCC (2001:4C00::/23)
by Doug Barton 15 Dec '04

15 Dec '04

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 Greetings, This is to inform you that the IANA has allocated the following one (1) IPv6 /23 block to the RIPE NCC: 2001:4C00::/23 RIPE NCC For a full list of IANA IPv6 allocations please see: <http://www.iana.org/assignments/ipv6-tla-assignments> - -- Doug Barton General Manager, The Internet Assigned Numbers Authority -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.2.6 (FreeBSD) iD8DBQFBwNAhyIakK9Wy8PsRAtXyAJ4t1M6cQC/137a8+e5Zhv3juJUTOwCg5Mq0 6tyjLHMDph1d+vRKSgBtJio= =miYo -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Cisco Security Advisory: Default Administrative Password in Cisco Guard and Traffic Anomaly Detector
by Cisco Systems Product Security Incident Response Team 15 Dec '04

15 Dec '04

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 Cisco Security Advisory: Default Administrative Password in Cisco Guard and Traffic Anomaly Detector Revision 1.0 For Public Release 2004 December 15 1900 UTC (GMT) - ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Contents ======== Summary Affected Products Details Impact Software Versions and Fixes Obtaining Fixed Software Workarounds Exploitation and Public Announcements Status of This Notice: FINAL Distribution Revision History Cisco Security Procedures - ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Summary ======= The Cisco Guard and Cisco Traffic Anomaly Detector software contains a default password for an administrative account. This password is set, without any user's intervention, during installation of the software used by the Cisco Guard and Traffic Anomaly Detector Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) mitigation appliances, and is the same in all installations of the product. Software version 3.0 and earlier of the Cisco Guard and Traffic Anomaly Detector are affected by this vulnerability. Customers running version 3.1 or higher of the software are not affected. There are workarounds available including one that does not require a reboot of the device. Cisco has made free software available to address this problem. The vulnerabilities are documented as the following Cisco bug IDs: CSCeg12167 and CSCeg12188. This advisory is available at http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20041215-guard.shtml. Affected Products ================= Vulnerable Products - ------------------- All versions of the software for the Cisco Guard and Cisco Traffic Anomaly Detector prior to version 3.1 are affected by this vulnerability. There are three ways to determine the software version that your Cisco Guard and Cisco Traffic Anomaly Detector DDoS mitigation appliances are running: * Virtual terminal or local serial console connection * Remote Secure Shell (SSH) connection * Remote secure web session What follows is an example of each method; you should choose the method that applies to your particular environment and network setup. 1. To determine the software version number through the local serial console use a serial cable and a terminal emulation program to connect to the appliance. Once you are connected press the Enter key of your terminal and the Guard and Traffic Anomaly Detector will present, without even logging in, the version of the software running on the devices: Cisco Guard Version 3.1(0.12) GUARD login: In this example the Cisco Guard is running software version 3.1. For a virtual terminal the procedure is the same except that no serial cable or terminal emulation program is needed (a standard keyboard and monitor are directly connected to the appliance.) 2. To obtain the software version number through a SSH session use a SSH client to log into the Cisco Guard or Cisco Traffic Anomaly Detector and issue the show version command-line interface (CLI) command. The following example shows an interaction with a Cisco Traffic Anomaly Detector: prompt$ ssh admin(a)detector.example.com admin(a)detector.example.com's password: Last login: Wed Nov 24 22:45:53 on ttyS0 admin@DETECTOR#show version Copyright (c) 2000-2004 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved. Software License Agreement [...] Cisco Anomaly Detector Release: 3.1(0.12) Date: 2004/10/27 19:58:14 DETECTOR uptime is 3 weeks, 3 days, 17 hours, 53 minutes System Serial Number: XXXXXXX Contact Information: Cisco Systems Inc. riverhead-support(a)cisco.com admin@DETECTOR# In this example the Cisco Traffic Anomaly Detector is running software version 3.1. 3. To obtain the software version that Cisco Guard and Cisco Traffic Anomaly Detector are running through a secure web interface, open the URL https://<IP address of your Guard or Detector>/ in a web browser, log in, and then click on the About link located on the top right section of the browser window. Products Confirmed Not Vulnerable - --------------------------------- No other Cisco products are currently known to create these specific default account/passwords. Details ======= The Cisco Guard and Cisco Traffic Anomaly Detectors are Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack mitigation appliances that detect the presence of a potential DDoS attack and divert attack traffic destined for the network being monitored without affecting the flow of legitimate traffic. Both the Cisco Guard and the Cisco Anomaly Traffic Detector appliances can be managed via a virtual terminal (standard keyboard and monitor attached directly to the appliance), a local serial console, remote SSH connections, and/or remote secure web sessions. Most management and troubleshooting tasks are performed through a CLI interface that is similar to that of most Cisco products, but a special administrative account is provided so certain management and troubleshooting tasks that are not covered by the standard CLI can be performed. The administrative account username is root, like the superuser in the Unix operating system. This account has a default password that is the same in all installations of the Cisco Guard and Cisco Traffic Anomaly Detector in all versions prior to 3.1. This default password is made up of a combination of letters, numbers, and punctuation per best security practices for passwords, but Cisco recommends that this password be changed for extra security. The vulnerability described here is documented in the Cisco Bug ID CSCeg12167 for the Cisco Guard and in the Cisco Bug ID CSCeg12188 for the Cisco Traffic Anomaly Detector. Impact ====== Someone that is able to log into a Cisco Guard or Cisco Traffic Anomaly Detector DDoS mitigation appliance using the root administrative account has full control of the device, which includes the ability to change configurations, divert traffic, and install software. Software Versions and Fixes =========================== While workarounds that do not require a software upgrade exist, Cisco has made available free software that addresses the vulnerability described in this document. Version 3.1 or later of the Cisco Guard and Cisco Traffic Anomaly Detector software does not leave a default password for the administrative root account after a fresh installation or after an upgrade from previous versions. This is because in version 3.1 and later the installation/upgrade procedure requires the user to choose a password for the administrative account. Note: the procedure to upgrade to version 3.1 can only be done through the out-of-band interfaces. When considering software upgrades, please also consult http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/products_security_advisories_listing.ht… and any subsequent advisories to determine exposure and a complete upgrade solution. In all cases, customers should exercise caution to be certain the devices to be upgraded contain sufficient memory and that current hardware and software configurations will continue to be supported properly by the new release. If the information is not clear, contact the Cisco Technical Assistance Center ("TAC") for assistance. If affected customers are not able to upgrade the software, the workarounds presented in the Workarounds section can be employed to completely eliminate this vulnerability. Obtaining Fixed Software ======================== As the fix for this vulnerability is a default configuration change, and a workaround is available, a software upgrade is not required to address this vulnerability. However, if you have a service contract, and wish to upgrade to unaffected code, you may obtain upgraded software through your regular update channels once that software is available. For most customers, this means that upgrades should be obtained through the Software Center on Cisco's Worldwide Web site at http://www.cisco.com. If you need assistance with the implementation of the workarounds, or have questions on the workarounds, please contact the Cisco Technical Assistance Center (TAC). * +1 800 553 2447 (toll free from within North America) * +1 408 526 7209 (toll call from anywhere in the world) * e-mail: tac(a)cisco.com See http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/687/Directory/DirTAC.shtml for additional TAC contact information, including special localized telephone numbers and instructions and e-mail addresses for use in various languages. Customers may only install and expect support for the feature sets they have purchased. By installing, downloading, accessing or otherwise using such software upgrades, customers agree to be bound by the terms of Cisco's software license terms found at http://www.cisco.com/public/sw-license-agreement.html, or as otherwise set forth at Cisco.com Downloads at http://www.cisco.com/public/sw-center/sw-usingswc.shtml. Workarounds =========== The vulnerability described in this document can be eliminated completely by logging into the affected Cisco Guard and Cisco Traffic Anomaly Detector DDoS mitigation appliances and changing the default password for the administrative root account to a strong password chosen by the user. To change the default password you need to run the passwd command once you have logged in as the root user. The following interaction shows and example of a change password dialog in a Cisco Traffic Anomaly Detector that is performed via SSH: prompt$ ssh root(a)detector.example.com root(a)detector.example.com's password: Last login: Tue Nov 23 15:48:13 on ttyS0 [root@DETECTOR root]# passwd Changing password for user root. New password: <new password typed in here> Retype new password: <new password typed in here> passwd: all authentication tokens updated successfully. In order to perform this procedure you will need the default password. To obtain this password customers must contact the Cisco TAC. Entitlement will be checked so please have your product serial number available and give the URL of this notice. After changing the default password, the Cisco Guard and Traffic Anomaly Detector will not accept root logins using the default password. A reboot is not required for the new password to take effect, so network operations will not be disrupted. If affected customers do not wish to contact Cisco to obtain the default password, it is possible to change the administrative account's password by performing the password recovery procedure. This procedure is documented at the following location: http://cisco.com/en/US/products/ps5887/products_password_recovery09186a0080… As a security best practice, it is recommended that customers make use of the access control feature that restricts connectivity to the SSH and web-based management services to certain IP networks configured by the administrator. Refer to the documentation for your Cisco Guard and Cisco Traffic Anomaly Detector, specifically the permit wbm and permit ssh commands, for details on how to enable this feature. Having these access control mechanisms in place may mitigate the vulnerability if it cannot be eliminated completely by changing the default password as described above. Exploitation and Public Announcements ===================================== The Cisco PSIRT is not aware of any public announcements or malicious use of the vulnerability described in this advisory. This vulnerability was uncovered during internal code audit. Status of This Notice: FINAL ============================ THIS ADVISORY IS PROVIDED ON AN "AS IS" BASIS AND DOES NOT IMPLY ANY KIND OF GUARANTEE OR WARRANTY. YOUR USE OF THE INFORMATION ON THE ADVISORY OR MATERIALS LINKED FROM THE ADVISORY IS AT YOUR OWN RISK. CISCO RESERVES THE RIGHT TO CHANGE OR UPDATE THIS NOTICE AT ANY TIME. Distribution ============ This advisory will be posted on Cisco's worldwide website at http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20041215-guard.shtml. In addition to worldwide web posting, a text version of this notice is clear-signed with the Cisco PSIRT PGP key and is posted to the following e-mail and Usenet news recipients: * cust-security-announce(a)cisco.com * first-teams(a)first.org (includes CERT/CC) * bugtraq(a)securityfocus.com * vulnwatch(a)vulnwatch.org * cisco(a)spot.colorado.edu * cisco-nsp(a)puck.nether.net * full-disclosure(a)lists.netsys.com * comp.dcom.sys.cisco(a)newsgate.cisco.com Future updates of this advisory, if any, will be placed on Cisco's worldwide website, but may or may not be actively announced on mailing lists or newsgroups. Users concerned about this problem are encouraged to check the above URL for any updates. Revision History ================ +---------------------------------------------+ | Revision | | Initial | | 1.0 | 2004-December-15 | public | | | | release. | +---------------------------------------------+ Cisco Security Procedures ========================= Complete information on reporting security vulnerabilities in Cisco products, obtaining assistance with security incidents, and registering to receive security information from Cisco, is available on Cisco's worldwide website at http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/products_security_vulnerability_policy.…. This includes instructions for press inquiries regarding Cisco security notices. All Cisco security advisories are available at http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.2.5 (GNU/Linux) iD8DBQFBwJadezGozzK2tZARAvqjAJ0VQ8rC3EpQQZVeICjfQbB5/WY3EgCg985B KdQz4NFAbwgoDaInXmWjs7c= =chLH -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Bell Canada/Bell Nexxia?
by Joshua Brady 14 Dec '04

14 Dec '04

Does anyone from Bell Canada/Nexxia monitor the lists? If so, could you kindly shoot me an email offlist. Best Regards, Joshua Brady

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networking related vulnerabilities - floodish december?
by Gadi Evron 14 Dec '04

14 Dec '04

It appears like many of us will be very busy this month, on the network front. The linux kernel has two published vulnerabilities (one for IGMP - http://isec.pl/vulnerabilities/isec-0018-igmp.txt) MS released one for DHCP (http://go.microsoft.com/fwlink/?LinkId=36664) and last but not least - with a wordpad vuln out, we already expect an RTF worm. Any takers on a bet as to when? There is also one for WINS released early this month, and just patched, but it is less relevant for NANOG in my personal opinion. This is a busy month for network admins, not just system people who have to run and patch things. Just an FYI for those who don't often follow these things anymore due to lack of relevance. Gadi.

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fwd: contact for the world etc (nanog)
by Eric Brunner-Williams in Portland Maine 14 Dec '04

14 Dec '04

Oki all, FYI Eric ------- Forwarded Message Return-Path: bzs(a)world.std.com Delivery-Date: Tue Dec 14 15:07:09 2004 Return-Path: <bzs(a)world.std.com> Received: from TheWorld.com (pcls3.std.com [192.74.137.143]) by nic-naa.net (8.13.1/8.13.1) with ESMTP id iBEF78Cm009901 for <brunner(a)nic-naa.net>; Tue, 14 Dec 2004 15:07:08 GMT (envelope-from bzs(a)world.std.com) Received: from world.std.com (root(a)world-e.std.com [69.38.147.5]) by TheWorld.com (8.12.8p1/8.12.8) with ESMTP id iBEJ4rW5012319; Tue, 14 Dec 2004 14:04:53 -0500 Received: (from bzs@localhost) by world.std.com (8.12.8p1/8.12.8) id iBEJ4qV1016516; Tue, 14 Dec 2004 14:04:52 -0500 (EST) Date: Tue, 14 Dec 2004 14:04:52 -0500 (EST) Message-Id: <200412141904.iBEJ4qV1016516(a)world.std.com> From: Barry Shein <bzs(a)world.std.com> To: hannigan(a)theworld.com, brunner(a)nic-naa.net Subject: contact for the world etc (nanog) As far as I can tell I'm permanently blocked from nanog for no reason I understand or care much about. Oh well, if someone there wants info I have I guess they can pay my consulting rates. The text the guy cites isn't from our staff, we don't even have an auto-ack system. Maybe it's from some customer or maybe entirely forged, he doesn't include any headers and seems to just want to vent. Anyhow, that's all the time I plan to spend on this one, too bad nanog has become so useless. Feel free to forward. - -- -Barry Shein Software Tool & Die | bzs(a)TheWorld.com | http://www.TheWorld.com Purveyors to the Trade | Voice: 617-739-0202 | Login: 617-739-WRLD The World | Public Access Internet | Since 1989 *oo* ------- End of Forwarded Message

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Server Room Environment
by Erik Sundberg 14 Dec '04

14 Dec '04

I have a couple of quick questions about environmental settings for server rooms. What is the ideal temperature and humidity for a server room? What is too cold for a server room? What should the humidity range be? Thanks Erik

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Contact for "The World"
by David A. Ulevitch 14 Dec '04

14 Dec '04

Does anyone have a contact @ The World? They are not listed in Jared's NOC list nor do postmaster@ or mailer-daemon@ seem to have a human behind the wheel. As an aside, they send one of the most annoying spam-receipt-auto-ack's I've ever seen and the fact that you can't even reply to it is even more annoying. (sent from mailer-daemon) ISPs like them make the necessary evil of running an active abuse-desk all the more frustrating. Thanks, davidu ---------------------------------------------------- David A. Ulevitch - Founder, EveryDNS.Net http://david.ulevitch.com -- http://everydns.net ----------------------------------------------------

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RE: CBX-500 question, FRF.8
by Richmond, Jeff (ELI) 14 Dec '04

14 Dec '04

CBX-500 should do what you want. We have a number of Interworking VCs using the same cards as you listed, and it works fine. For the Translation type in the PVC setup, your options are: 1483 <=> 1490 None Hth, -Jeff -----Original Message----- From: james [mailto:hackerwacker@tarpit.cybermesa.com] Sent: Monday, December 13, 2004 10:36 PM To: Nanog@Merit. Edu Subject: CBX-500 question, FRF.8 I am working on a solution that will require my CBX-500 to do transparent mode and not translation mode. I've grepped the docs I have and looked on the web and can't find reference to which mode the CBX uses. This cross connect would be between the FR 3/1 card to the ATM DS3 card. Does anyone know which mode the CBX uses ? -- James H. Edwards Routing and Security Administrator At the Santa Fe Office: Internet at Cyber Mesa jamesh(a)cybermesa.com noc(a)cybermesa.com (505) 795-7101

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[Fwd: zone transfers, a spammer's dream?]
by Gadi Evron 14 Dec '04

14 Dec '04

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