March 2003 - Test - lists.nanog.org

RE: State Super-DMCA Too True
by Kuhtz, Christian 31 Mar '03

31 Mar '03

[..] > AT&T/Comcast doesn't sell business accounts > (at least not here) but they will now sell you a more expensive package, > 3.5Mbit/384kbit, for $95/mo, including 'model rental fee', it includes > 5 IP addresses "VPN Capability"(?) as well. ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ Perhaps that is advertised as such because of issues around VPN clients behind NAT/PAT devices. Some work better than others. Having a non-NAT address stops most of those issues. Or, that's me trying to figure out what a marketeer might've been thinking. Ugh. Ouch. Stop. That hurts. Quit it. Ouch. Ouch. Thanks, Christian ***** "The information transmitted is intended only for the person or entity to which it is addressed and may contain confidential, proprietary, and/or privileged material. Any review, retransmission, dissemination or other use of, or taking of any action in reliance upon, this information by persons or entities other than the intended recipient is prohibited. If you received this in error, please contact the sender and delete the material from all computers."

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RE: State Super-DMCA Too True
by Kris Foster 31 Mar '03

31 Mar '03

Regarding common carriers, Geoff Huston wrote a good article for IPJ http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/759/ipj_5-3/ipj_5-3_uncommon_carrier.html Kris (top posting because below this line is a complete mess) > -----Original Message----- > From: Stephen Sprunk [mailto:stephen@sprunk.org] > Sent: Monday, March 31, 2003 6:30 PM > To: todd glassey > Cc: North American Noise and Off-topic Gripes; Michael > Loftis; Robert A. > Hayden > Subject: Re: State Super-DMCA Too True > > > > As reading your message both hurts my eyes and would take > excessive effort > to reformat for a reply, I won't do so. > > However, I do question the credibility of anyone who cites > Cheech and Chong > to back up his position. > > S > > Stephen Sprunk "God does not play dice." --Albert Einstein > CCIE #3723 "God is an inveterate gambler, and He throws the > K5SSS dice at every possible opportunity." --Stephen Hawking > ----- Original Message ----- > From: "todd glassey" <todd.glassey(a)worldnet.att.net> > To: "Stephen Sprunk" <stephen(a)sprunk.org>; "Michael Loftis" > <mloftis(a)wgops.com>; "Robert A. Hayden" <rhayden(a)geek.net> > Cc: "North American Noise and Off-topic Gripes" <nanog(a)merit.edu> > Sent: Monday, 31 March, 2003 17:07 > Subject: RE: State Super-DMCA Too True > > > > Stephen - my responses in caps - > > > > > > > > -----Original Message----- > > From: owner-nanog(a)merit.edu [mailto:owner-nanog@merit.edu]On > > Behalf Of > > Stephen Sprunk > > Sent: Monday, March 31, 2003 2:32 PM > > To: todd glassey; Michael Loftis; Robert A. Hayden > > Cc: North American Noise and Off-topic Gripes > > Subject: Re: State Super-DMCA Too True > > > > > > > > Thus spake "todd glassey" <todd.glassey(a)worldnet.att.net> > > > Yes but this is specific to the argument on whether an ISP > > > should be accountable for what people do with its > > bandwidth > > > and what I think is ultimately going to happen is that > > these > > > laws are going to be put in place and as part of enforcing > > > these there will be some arrests. > > > > If you ship pot via FedEx, does the delivery guy go to jail > > too? > > > > THIS IS A REALLY BAD EXAMPLE - IF YOU WANT I WILL GIVE YOU > > THE ADDRESSES OF HALF A DOZEN MEDICAL MARIJUANA DISTRIBUTORS > > IN SAN FRANCISCO AND OAKLAND, AND THEY CAN ANSWER THAT ONE - > > I THINK HERE IN CALIFORNIA, IF YOU ARE IN A CITY THAT DOES > > NOT PROSECUTE THE MEDICINAL USE OF MARIJUANA - THEN NO ONE > > GOES TO JAIL FOR SHIPPING IT. > > > > No. > > If you make obscene phone calls, does the operator go to > > jail too? > > > > DEPENDS ON WHETHER THEY DIALED THE PHONE FOR YOU. > > > > No. > > > > BUT IF YOUR AGENT OPENS THE PACKAGE TO INSURE THAT IT HAD A > > CORRECT ADDRESS ON IT AND FINDS IT CONTAINS CONTRABAND - > > THEN ARE THEY RESPONSIBLE? - BETTER YET - IF THEY OPENED THE > > PACKAGE TO INSPECT THE DELIVERY ADDRESS AND THEN REFUSED TO > > APPLY ANY DILIGENCE ON THE PACKAGES PAYLOAD OR OTHER ADDRESS > > DATA BEYOND THAT OF A LOCAL DELIVERY ADDRESS, MY TAKE IS > > THAT THIS IS WHY THERE WILL BE SO MANY ADMIN'S IN JAIL IN > > THE COMING YEAR OR TWO - WITH THEIR ATTITUDES, THEY MAY > > OUT-NUMBER THE DRUNK DRIVERS IN CALIFORNIA PRISONS SOON. > > > > ANYWAY - THE OPENING OF THE MAIL TO DO ANYTHING INCLUDING > > DELIVER IT OBLIGATES YOU TO MAKE SURE THAT ANY AND ALL THE > > DATA REPRESENTED IN THE HEADER IS REAL AS WELL. IF YOU PARSE > > THE RFC822 DATA TO PROCESS IT THEM PROCESS IT. THAT'S THE > > POINT AND THAT THIS IS NOT AN OPTION UNDER THESE LAWS - ITS > > JUST THAT TO DATE THE TIER-2/3 ISP'S HAVE NEVER BEFORE BEEN > > THREATENED WITH JAIL FOR NOT GOING THE WHOLE ROUTE... > > > > Common carrier status exists for this very reason. > > > > I WOULD ARGUE THAT THE ISP'S ARE BY DEFINITION NOT COMMON > > CARRIERS. ONLY THE TIER-1 PROVIDERS WOULD BE CLASSIFIED AS > > CC'S UNDER INTERNET DEFINITIONS, AND ANYONE THAT OPERATES > > MORE THAN ONE TIER-1 SERVICE, AS IN A TIER-2 OR TIER-3 > > OPERATION TOO, HAS A LARGER ISSUE THAT ALL OF THEIR > > INFRASTRUCTURE LIKELY HAS TO COMPLY - > > > > Unfortunately, it > > probably means we'll have to stop filtering things like spam > > and DoS, since > > filtering on content inherently violates common carrier > > protection -- > > > > NO - QUITE THE OPPOSITE - ACTUALLY WHAT IT MEANS IS THAT FOR > > ANY SERVICE FOR WHICH YOU ARE THE ORIGINATING OR TERMINATION > > ENTITY, THAT "THE DATA REPRESENTED IN ANYTHING YOU PROCESS > > MUST BE RELIABLE AND TRUE". THAT MEANS IF YOU ACCEPT EMAIL > > FROM SOMEWHERE AND PROFFER IT ONWARD TO YOUR CLIENT'S, AND > > YOU DON'T BOTHER TO FILTER AND PROOF IT - THAT YOU STAND A > > GOOD CHANCE TO "GET YOUR PEE-PEE WHACKED BY THE BAILIFF" - > > TO QUOTE FROM CHEECH AND CHONG. > > > > see > > the smut suit against AOL a few years ago. > > > > I KNOW - I WAS AN EXPERT WITNESS IN ONE OF THEM. I ALSO AM > > THE INDUSTRY LIAISON TO THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION'S > > INFORMATION SECURITY COMMITTEE, BUT I AM NOT AN ATTORNEY SO > > IGNORE THIS IF YOU WANT. > > > > S > > > > Stephen Sprunk "God does not play dice." --Albert > > Einstein > > CCIE #3723 "God is an inveterate gambler, and He > > throws the > > K5SSS dice at every possible opportunity." --Stephen > > Hawking > > > > >

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Invitation to join Friendster from Jeff Wheeler
by Jeff Wheeler 31 Mar '03

31 Mar '03

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Re: is this true or... ?
by Lars Erik Gullerud 31 Mar '03

31 Mar '03

On Sat, 2003-03-29 at 02:24, David Schwartz wrote: > The laws require an "intent to" "conceal" the "origin or > destination". NAT would not count, as the intent is to share a scarce > resource, not to conceal the origin or destination -- the origin is > only concealed to the extent necessary to accomplish the sharing. I disagree - I could point you to a bunch of companies who are running NAT _precisely_ to "conceal origin or destination". Not because they are short of address space (since a lot of them even do 1:1 NAT), but because they feel it adds to their security measures to obscure and conceal their internal addressing and topology. Don't forget all the self-appointed "security experts" out there with very varying degrees of clue. I would imagine that type of setup would be very hard to argue falls outside the text of this bill. /leg

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CFP: The Workshop on Rapid Malcode (WORM)
by vern＠ee.lbl.gov 31 Mar '03

31 Mar '03

[forwarded in consideration that some NANOGers might have some interesting perspectives on worms that would otherwised be missed] The Workshop on Rapid Malcode (WORM) Workshop held in association with the 10th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security, October 27th, 2003 Washington D.C. Call for Papers In the last several years, Internet-wide infectious epidemics have emerged as one of the leading threats to information security and service availability. The vehicle for these outbreaks, malicious codes called "worms", leverage the combination of software monocultures and the uncontrolled Internet communication model to quickly compromise large numbers of hosts. Current operational practices have not been able to manage these threats effectively and the research community is only now beginning to address this area. The goal of this workshop is to bring together ideas, understanding and experience bearing on the worm problem from a wide range of communities including academia, industry and the government. We are soliciting papers from researchers and practitioners on subjects including, but not limited to: Modeling and analysis of propagation dynamics Automatic detection, characterization, and prediction Analysis of worm construction, current & future Propagation strategies (fast & obvious vs slow and stealthy) Reactive countermeasures Proactive defenses Threat assessment Forensic methods of attribution Significant operational experiences Important Dates Paper submissions due: July 1st, 2003 Acceptance notification: August 14th Camera ready copy for accepted papers: August 29th Workshop: October 27th Submissions Submitted papers must not substantially overlap papers that have been published or that are simultaneously submitted to a journal or conference with proceedings. Papers should be at most 10 conference-style pages (double column) using a numbered citation style, 11 point font, and reasonable margins on letter-sized paper. The first page of each paper should include the title, abstract, authors and contact information. Further submission instructions will be posted at http://pisa.ucsd.edu/worm03/ in a timely matter. Conference Organization General Chair: Stuart Staniford, Silicon Defense Publicity Chair: Robert Cunningham, MIT Lincoln Lab Program Committee Chair: Stefan Savage, UC San Diego Program Committee Members: Robert Cunningham, MIT Lincoln Lab Anup Ghosh, DARPA David Moore, CAIDA/UC San Diego Carey Nachenberg, Symantec Vern Paxson, ICIR/LBL Phil Porras, SRI Jeff Rowe, UC Davis Mike Skroch, Sandia Stuart Staniford, Silicon Defense Don Towsley, UMass Amherst

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RE: NANOG Splinter List (Was: State Super-DMCA Too True)
by todd glassey 31 Mar '03

31 Mar '03

JA - in answer to your commentary not only are you wrong but you are in fact mistaken about the laws underlying what is and is not restraint of trade and what would constitute Antitrust... And as to the Super DCMA laws... in your response to that no one would do these things - My friend then the US Department of Justice will implement these laws around you and you will wind up looking this on the wrong end of an arrest warrant potentially. I am not worried about this happening - its already in place. The legislation is already in place in six US states. All it takes is the first arrest warrants to be issued. Look, you seem to think that this evolution is something that you as a System's Or Network Admin get to, or possibly can control, and that arrogance is what is justifying putting these ideas in place. Now - you may not like these ideas personally, but they are not mine alone, in fact I am just one of many messengers all saying pretty much the same thing - and whether you personally like it or not it is very likely that these things are going to come to happen. This is evidenced by the legislation in question here. In response to your statement #2 - I believe this also to be rather inaccurate. In fact the operational protocols alliance is no different that any of the participants in MFN's peering agreements or in the micro groups like OpenPeering.ORG that are around. In fact its no different than MERIT's or IANA's operating models, really - so this commentary is not only wrong its abusive since it seeks to cast a tone of "illegality" around the commentary to discredit it. In answer to the only real question you asked (your comment #2), i.e. what would happen if your employer wanted to route a protocol that others did not want to route? Simple - that protocol would stay within MFN. By the way were you formally speaking for MFN as their representative when you coined the abusive term "fantasy group"... Todd Glassey -----Original Message----- From: J.A. Terranson [mailto:measl@mfn.org] Sent: Sunday, March 30, 2003 7:01 PM To: todd glassey Cc: Rafi Sadowsky; Jared Mauch; Jack Bates; nanog(a)merit.edu Subject: RE: NANOG Splinter List (Was: State Super-DMCA Too True) On Sun, 30 Mar 2003, todd glassey wrote: > And then it hit me - NANOG has the opportunity to create a > consortium of networking providers really do run the > Internet here in North America... and this would be done by > creating agreements on what is and is not routed between the > members of this little tribunal so to speak. The membership > would be limited to a representative to each carrier that > was a participant in this program. And all participants > would agree to limit their routed protocols to the approved > "list". These players would also get to approve those work > products developed in the Operations WG as operational > standards too. > > Think this through before you say no. No. (1) There is no carrier on this planet that is going to join your fantasy group when the group is in a position to make calls on their business model. (2) The US has federal [anti-trust] laws under which this may well be illegal anyway. (3) What do you do when carrier-x decides they have a need for a protocol the group does not wish to carry? Forget this idea: it is beyond stillborn. -- Yours, J.A. Terranson sysadmin(a)mfn.org

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Where fiber goes, backhoes soon follow: Camp Doha fiber link
by Sean Donelan 31 Mar '03

31 Mar '03

I wonder if Kuwait has a Call Before You Dig program which spray paints orange markers on the sand. http://www.fcw.com/fcw/articles/2003/middle_east/web-signal-03-31-03.asp "Within the next two weeks, a fiber link will be established to connect Camp Doha with the Theater Command Communications Center in Bahrain, which is run by Central Command, and finally back into "the large fiber connections in the European infrastructure," Detamore said. "This will give us a bigger, more reliable pipe for a lot more bandwidth that we don't have to push through satellites," he said, declining to provide specific details on the size of the "pipe."

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Current DF providers list?
by Deepak Jain 31 Mar '03

31 Mar '03

With all of the consolidation of dark fiber providers and other facilities based fiber providers, is there any resource out there that is a little more current than an annual map? I am trying to locate the providers available on a certain stretch of interstate and have been running into dead-ends with a 1 year old resource. Thanks in advance, Deepak Jain AiNET

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RE: NANOG Splinter List (Was: State Super-DMCA Too True)
by Kris Foster 31 Mar '03

31 Mar '03

> I think that we possibly may need three subgroups. But maybe > not all at once. why don't we just get it over with and break apart/dilute into the usual suspect: social, technological, legal, economic, political. [sarcasm] Kris

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Re: State Super-DMCA Too True
by neil＠DOMINO.ORG 31 Mar '03

31 Mar '03

> Er, isn't that the fundamental difference between IP and fixed-bandwidth > voice ? I have spent any number of years trying to 'educate' old guard telco > management and planners that one of the key economic benefits of the > Internet over old fashioned private networks is that the sharing of capacity > actully works 99.99% of the time... It only works because there is more bandwidth provisioned on most of the Internet than is needed. When this isn't the case things start to go downhill pretty rapidly. IP provides a mechanism for easier bandwidth management and resourcing but if you run out - you run out. Regards, Neil.

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