November 2002 - Test - lists.nanog.org

RIPE NCC to allocate from 82.0.0.0/8
by Leslie Nobile 25 Nov '02

25 Nov '02

Subject: RIPE NCC to allocate from 82.0.0.0/8 As of Nov 23, 2002, 82.0.0.0/8 has been allocated to RIPE NCC by the IANA. In the near future, the RIPE NCC will begin making allocations from this /8. A master list of IANA IPv4 allocations can be found at http://www.iana.org/assignments/ipv4-address-space. For informational purposes, a list of ARIN's currently administered blocks is listed below. Further information on ARIN's /8s and minimum allocation size can be found at http://www.arin.net/statistics ARIN CIDR BLOCKS CIDR Block Smallest Allocation 24.0.0.0/8 /20 63.0.0.0/8 /19 64.0.0.0/8 /20 65.0.0.0/8 /20 66.0.0.0/8 /20 67.0.0.0/8 /20 68.0.0.0/8 /20 69.0.0.0/8 /20 196.0.0.0/8 /24 198.0.0.0/8 /24 199.0.0.0/8 /24 200.0.0.0/8 /24 204.0.0.0/8 /24 205.0.0.0/8 /24 206.0.0.0/8 /24 207.0.0.0/8 /24 208.0.0.0/8 /20 209.0.0.0/8 /20 216.0.0.0/8 /20 Regards, Leslie Nobile Director, Registration Services American Registry for Internet Numbers (ARIN)

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Re: Odd DDoS, anyone else seen this?
by variable＠ednet.co.uk 25 Nov '02

25 Nov '02

On Mon, 25 Nov 2002, Chris Roberts wrote: > Yer, some dial providers that I've seen do it to make use of these > addresses, as x.x.x.0/32 is a perfectly valid host address. I've seen this too. Dialup boxes that use dynamic pools prefer them to start on a subnet boundry so that they can announce a single aggregate route for the whole pool. However we ran into problems with using x.x.x.0 before (think it was a broken TCP/IP from some vendor or another) and so we moved the dynamic pools further up the subnet. Rich

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Re: Odd DDoS, anyone else seen this?
by Stephen J. Wilcox 25 Nov '02

25 Nov '02

> > Can anyone think of a reason why this sort of traffic should be routed at > > all? Does anyone actually drop hosts on to addresses ending in x.x.x.0? > > > > Yer, some dial providers that I've seen do it to make use of these > addresses, as x.x.x.0/32 is a perfectly valid host address. Interestingly we used to use /22s on our dial boxes and as a result of users with .0 or .255 addresses finding access problems to some areas of the Internet we stopped assigning them. Its curious just how many systems on the Internet are misconfigured or run software created by folks without proper understanding of the network protocols (M$). I wonder to what extent this poor engineering is detrimental to the ever changing Internet and if we'll hit a point where theres so many workarounds it becomes unmanageable.. (hmm, we might be pretty close from some of the things I've seen ;) </rant></troll> <meta content="dont bother replying, its too much like hard work">

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FTTx mailing lists
by Thomas Kernen 25 Nov '02

25 Nov '02

I'm trying to locate technical FTTx (Fibre to the home/business/curb) related mailing lists. Pointers appreciated. Thomas

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Re: PAIX
by Stephen Sprunk 24 Nov '02

24 Nov '02

Thus spake "Brad Knowles" <brad.knowles(a)skynet.be> > At 2:45 PM -0600 2002/11/24, Stephen Sprunk wrote: > > None of these applications have any requirement for peering every 100km2. > > I'd expect my refrigerator, oven, light switches, etc. to be behind my > > house's firewall and only talk using link-local addresses anyways. > > Using Rendezvous and multicast DNS? What happens when you bring > in the rogue appliance that decides to start spoofing answers from > other equipment, or maybe you contract a computer virus that does so? That's a potentially interesting discussion, but it has nothing to do with requiring peering in every 100km2. > I think the real risk is VoIP and mobile phones used as Internet > video phones with H.323 or other protocols that require high > bandwidth and low latency. Imagine doing this for tens of millions > of people in a large city. And the half-dozen carriers who operate those tens of millions of phones will have private peering in place if it makes technical sense -- just like they do for TDM phones. That doesn't mean those carriers will want to peer publicly in every city, nor does it necessarily mean that private peering in every city makes economic or technical sense. As I previously asserted, every point in the US is within 20ms RTT of a major exchange today, and 20ms latency is irrelevant in the VoIP arena. Try again. S

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CW?
by Alex Rubenstein 24 Nov '02

24 Nov '02

http://biz.yahoo.com/djus/021113/0217000178_2.html -- Alex Rubenstein, AR97, K2AHR, alex(a)nac.net, latency, Al Reuben -- -- Net Access Corporation, 800-NET-ME-36, http://www.nac.net --

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82/8 allocated to RIPE
by Rob Thomas 23 Nov '02

23 Nov '02

Hi, NANOGers. 82/8, formerly IANA - Reserved, has been allocated to RIPE as of 23 NOV 2002. Please take the time to adjust your filters accordingly. I have updated my documents and monitoring for the new allocation. Master list of IANA IPv4 allocations http://www.iana.org/assignments/ipv4-address-space Bogon List http://www.cymru.com/Documents/bogon-list.html Bogon Monitoring http://www.cymru.com/BGP/robbgp-bogon.html Secure IOS Template (ported to Juniper by Steve Gill) http://www.cymru.com/Documents/secure-ios-template.html http://www.qorbit.net/documents/junos-template.pdf Secure BGP Template (ported to Juniper by Steve Gill) http://www.cymru.com/Documents/secure-bgp-template.html http://www.qorbit.net/documents/junos-bgp-template.pdf Secure BIND Template http://www.cymru.com/Documents/secure-bind-template.html Thanks! Rob. -- Rob Thomas http://www.cymru.com ASSERT(coffee != empty);

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Re: PAIX
by Paul Vixie 23 Nov '02

23 Nov '02

> | What application will require this dense peering? > > To power the IPv6 networks of refridgerators, ovens, and light switches, > as well as your 3G video conferencing phone i think we're going to need peering this dense to carry all of the nanog traffic between and among people who say we don't need it. if i ever needed clear evidence that the people who operate networks don't necessarily know who uses them or for what, or clear evidence that the most powerful force on the internet is a single voice claiming that something cannot be done, then the last week of this thread would be it.

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Re: Cyberattack FUD
by Vadim Antonov 22 Nov '02

22 Nov '02

On Thu, 21 Nov 2002, David Schwartz wrote: > Suppose, for example, we'd had closed cockpit doors. The 9/11 terrorists > would have threatened the lives of the passengers and crew to induce the > pilots to open the doors. The pilots would have opened the doors because the > reasoning until that time was that you did whatever the hostages told you to > do until you could get the plane on the ground. > > It was the rules of engagement that failed. Nothing more, nothing less. In the "regular" skyjacking the attackers want to get ransom, or divert an airplane to someplace. They'll get cooperation from pilots, too - without any need to be present in the cockpit. So if it is known that the policy is not to let anyone in, no matter what happens to passengers, the attackers wouldn't even try. In fact, they don't, on airlines which have this policy. Letting deranged people in cockpit, in fact, places _all_ passengers at risk of an unintended crash (imagine an attacker getting agitated and killing pilots, or simply pulling knobs - there were incidents when _little kids_ allowed to cockpit crashed the commercial planes). The rules of engagement were patently absurd > >and then by making life truly miserable for > >those who wish or have to travel, in a fit of post-disaster paranoia. > > The airline industry did that? Your mileage may wary, but I do not find pleasure in being stripped in public just because I've got long hair. As I result I'm avoiding all air travel, if I can. I'm sure a lot of other people do that too. > >It is not enemies who are savvy, it is managers who are stupid. Like, the > >"crash airplane into some high-value target" scenario was well-aired more > >than decade ago > > Not the "crash jetliner full of passengers into high-value target" > scenario. Heh. Our friends Chechens told than in a TV interview back in 1995 that they intend to do precisely that. They identified Kremlin as a target, though. And Israelis as a matter of fact assume that attackers are on a suicide mission. And the fact that US does not exactly inspire adoration in mid-Eastern parts of the world isn't any news, too. > If you were able to make the decision to shoot down or not shoot down the two > jetliners before either struck a building, knowing only that they were not > responding and probably hijaacked, what would you have done? I'd have doors in place, so as to avoid the whole situation. As I told, it is the standard procedure (keep cockpit doors closed) in much of the world outside US. > Again, it's the rules of engagement that failed. Rules are formulated by someone, they are not God-given. That someone is patently incompetent - in both failing to notice explicit early warnings, and failing to follow on the best practices of his peers. > So tell me what they should have done differently. Not allowed knives on the > plane? The terrorists would have used their bare hands. Strip searched every > passenger? Arm their pilots -- they weren't allowed to. I repeat: have doors closed, period. As for "they weren't allowed" part - don't be ridiculous. This is an oligopoly situation, and so they pretty much can get their terms from the government - just look at those multibillion handouts. > > I hope that US airlines > >go out of business and El Al moves in; isn't that what competition is > >supposed to be about? > > Except that there is no competition. Airlines don't get to make their own > security rules, they're largely preempted by the government ownership and > control of airports and the FARs. It takes two to tango. If those large businesses cannot get the reasonable rules from the government, their lobbying groups are incompetent (and so they deserve to go out of business). More likely, they didn't ask. Competition is not only about having seats filled - it is also about dealing with governments, courts, media, etc. > >The same holds for the Internet (with special thanks to the toothless > >antimonopoly enforcement which allowed operating systems to become a > >monoculture). > > This is a great bit of double-think. It has nothing to do with the fact that > people overwhelmingly prefer to have compatible operating systems, it's the > fact that nobody forced them to diversify against their will. Huh? MS was found guilty of monopolistic practices - repeatedly. They also are quite ruthless in going out and strangling competition (just watch their anti-Linux FUD campaign). If you think they are deterred, just take a look at the Palladium thingie - a sure-fire public domain OS killer. In fact, given the enormous positive network externalities associated with the operating systems, it would make a lot of sense to the government to level the playing field with affirmative action - for example, by differential taxation of dominant and sub-dominant vendors. The government procurement could've been more intent on having second supplier of compatible OS software, too - that'd force MS to publish detailed specs on all interfaces, and prevent them from playing proprietary lock-in games. Or give up government market altogether. People overwhelmingly do not care what's inside; they buy _applications_; and given the overwhelmingly monopolistic presense of OS vendor on the market the app vendors have little reason to develop for non-MS market. Of course, the position of MS as the monopoly vendor is supported by the fact that majority of other vendors only have Windows versions of their apps. To secure that unassailable position, MS excludes other parties from developing compatible platforms for running these applications by deliberately hiding, obscuring, and tweaking the APIs. I'm sorry to say, but the "free" market (not that there ever been one) does not always produce sustainable results; and the task of government regulators is to identify those situations and act to prevent them. In this case, the situation was easy to spot, but the reaction was quite botched by stupid (if not to say - incompetent) things, like overly talkative judge. --vadim

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Looking for a piece of gear to do...
by Alex Rubenstein 22 Nov '02

22 Nov '02

Hi. I am looking for a very simple piece of gear that will do the following: Fast-E ---- |thing|-------ATM OC3------|thing| ---- Fast-E I am not looking for a discussion on how this, me, or ATM is bad. It's just a solution I need. Anyway, I am looking for 'thing' to be a simple device. Perhaps it would have more than one FE port, and you'd map PVC's to ports, or whatever. The key is that this totally transparent, and able to pass 802.1q vlan tags. It'd be used in a point-to-point topology only. Any clues would be great. -- Alex Rubenstein, AR97, K2AHR, alex(a)nac.net, latency, Al Reuben -- -- Net Access Corporation, 800-NET-ME-36, http://www.nac.net --

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