November 2000 - Test - lists.nanog.org

DoS issue, conclusion
by Ariel Biener 07 Nov '00

07 Nov '00

Hi, My impression from this thread is the following: 1). Alot of folks feel the same way I do. 2). Some others don't care. 3). Major Tier1 providers are either not represented on this list, or don't care. 4). After a rather interesting discussion, no one is willing to do a darn thing about the problem except talk. So, after this grim summary, I suggest to all of you that do want to make a difference sometime, and also to Tier1 representatives that are interested in cooperation, better service and a better Internet to reply to me, in private even, if sending to the list makes you feel ackward. My aim is to compile a list of people that are willing to write and help educated others in the proper ways to configure a network, with a global perspective in mind. thanks, --Ariel P.S. About AADS, I find their whole dealing with their downtime a disgrace. Nothing in the press, nothing to mailing lists, nothing on their WEB site. Moreover, we got some incredibly *rude* answers from Genuity today, answers unbecoming of network professionals, and although I can understand the kind of pressures they've been under, whomever answered us (no names) should take some courtesy lessons, since he makes their whole ISP customer service center look pretty bad. -- Ariel Biener e-mail: ariel(a)post.tau.ac.il Work phone: 03-6406086 fingerprint = 07 D1 E5 3E EF 6D E5 82 0B E9 21 D4 3C 7D 8B BC

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RE: DoS issue, conclusion
by Mathew Butler 07 Nov '00

07 Nov '00

Actually, this brings up an interesting point... what can one reasonably expect from an upstream provider to be put in the original service contract? Who has to pay for the time to resolve issues? What kinds of issues are normally part of the contract, and what kinds aren't? -Mat Butler -----Original Message----- From: Christian Nielsen [mailto:cnielsen@nielsen.net] Sent: Tuesday, November 07, 2000 3:18 PM To: Ariel Biener Cc: nanog(a)merit.edu Subject: Re: DoS issue, conclusion On Tue, 7 Nov 2000, Ariel Biener wrote: > 3). Major Tier1 providers are either not represented on this list, or > don't care. not that... it is just that most ISPs dont have large staff to deal with these types of issues. And maybe, if you were being DoSed, and you offered to pay for their time, they might answer differently. Christian

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History - is the web getting faster or slower?
by Sean Donelan 07 Nov '00

07 Nov '00

Is the web (not the Internet) getting worse or better? I looked at the Keynote web site indexes and noticed in the last couple of months the trend lines for consumer sites and business sites went in different directions. The Keynote business index continues to show a gradual improvement in web site response times. But since August, their measurements of consumer sites shows a dramatic worsening of consumer site response times. I don't know why the divergence since August, but it dramatically shows how different samples of the web can have very different behavior. http://www.keynote.com/company/overview/public_services/services.html

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Election 1996 - 2000 has the Internet changed?
by Sean Donelan 07 Nov '00

07 Nov '00

I was doing some web searches on the Internet's performance during the last US presidential election in 1996. Things haven't changed very much. Randy Bush was still asking why people are asking about network outages on NANOG instead of calling the providers NOCs. AGIS and BBN were having routing problems. The rat in the power plant at Stanford was autopsied. People were SYN flooding IRC sites. And web operators woefully underestimated the crowd effects on their servers. But I found this quote about how we could improve the Internet's performance amusing. The Internet needs a faster backbone using Asynchronous Transfer Mode technologies, and companies should locate their servers on server farms, Jenkins said. "There needs to be some sharing of bandwidths and consolidation of resources into a high-speed backbone," he said. (Computerworld) PS, the e-mail address does not imply representation, my normal non-work domain is under-the-weather.

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AADS NAP still down
by Jeff Bartig 06 Nov '00

06 Nov '00

Hello, I'm kind of surprised no one has commented on this yet. AADS/SBC had scheduled an outage window from 12am-6am CST on 11/5 to upgrade the switch software for the AADS NAP in Chicago. They are still down as of now, 11/6 1:30am CST. It was up for a while between 10am-2pm. The only update I was able to get from the AADS NOC as of a 1/2 hour ago is that the outage is related to the update and that AADS staff are on a conference call with Lucent working on the problem. No ETA on a solution. Jeff -- Jeff Bartig | University of Wisconsin - Madison 1210 W Dayton, Rm B263 | Division of Information Technology Work Phone: (608) 262-8336 | Network Engineering Technology E-Mail: jeffb(a)doit.wisc.edu |

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Re: Fire protection in ISPs and collocation facilities
by Mauro Lollo 06 Nov '00

06 Nov '00

In my experience, I belive I'd agree with the USAF statement. In any fires that I've seen in or around data centre facilities, it has usually started outside of the actual equipment itself, with ancillary systems and other materials. (this has been mostly in enterprise settings, as opposed to ISP / Co-lo) I've just about completed a new facility with both FM200 gas (above & below floor) and pre-action (dry-pipe) water with misting heads as a secondary. My biggest fire hazard concern is the electrical system and electrical/communications cabling within the facility. We've probably all seen the bad practice of storing combustible materials within the environment itself (paper manuals, boxes, etc). I've also developed a great amount of respect for compressed gas extinguishing systems (FM200, etc.). About three years ago I saw the aftermath of a service person refilling a cylinder, when the neck of the valve broke. The 600lb cylinder went off like a torpedo (kind of like letting go of a ballon).....broke loose of its mounting an took off through the room, ramming several cabinets and blasting through floor tiles. The guy servicing it (the only person in the room at the time) actually survived, the cylinder brushed him as it took off and dislocated his arm. The data centre looked like a war zone when I walked into it....the force of the thing was incredible. M. >From: Sean Donelan <sean(a)donelan.com> >To: nanog(a)merit.edu >Subject: Fire protection in ISPs and collocation facilities >Date: 3 Nov 2000 01:39:18 -0800 > > >What has been the fire experience for ISPs and collocation facilities? >Other than the infamous Ascend incidents, I don't recall any ISP or >collocation fire incidents during the last five years. > >Why am I asking, because some code officials seem to feel the need >to develop a special code to cover collocation facilities popping >up all over the place. But I think most collocation facilities are >generally constructed to exceed the current codes anyway, and are >generally much lower risk than the "normal" occupancies around them. > >The US Air Force is revising its design guidance for fire protection >of computer-electronic equipment installations this year. In the most >recent draft, the USAF has ultra sensitive air sampling smoke detection, >wet-pipe automatic sprinklers and smoke exhaust systems in its design >guidance. > >Based on a five year study, the USAF found the most significant fire >and smoke threats have originated outside the computer-electronic >equipment room. Two-thirds of the fires originate outside the >computer-electronic room. > >One-third of the fires originated within the vicinity of the computer- >electronic equipment. Less than 25% of the fires originate within the >computer-electronic equipment. > >The single largest threat of fire to computer-electronic equipment is >the electrical distribution system. Two-thirds of the dollar losses >(1/3 of the fires) are caused by fixed wiring, transformers, power >switching gear, light fixtures and extension cords. > >In over 50% of the fires, the first material ignited is some type of >plastic, including electrical insulation. > > > _________________________________________________________________________ Get Your Private, Free E-mail from MSN Hotmail at http://www.hotmail.com. Share information about yourself, create your own public profile at http://profiles.msn.com.

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RE: Fire protection in ISPs and collocation facilities
by Sean Donelan 06 Nov '00

06 Nov '00

On Sun, 05 November 2000, Roeland Meyer wrote: > Simple rule, make sure that you're upstream and the down-stream end has more > bandwidth than the up-stream end. It's kind of the reverse of the internet. > In the event that the inflow exceeds the outflow, hit the SCRAM switch > before you fry something. This is the main reason I have it (SCRAM), but I'm > damned if I can justify it for that reason. It's a lot easier to talk about > fire. It should be left in the Fire codes. In 120 years of the Bell System (and post divesture experience) the telco's have not had a single death caused by a fire in a CO. The telephone companies have the concept of service continutity: its better to burn the switch to the ground before cutting power and service. This is a very different concept from NFPA 75 which has an assumption underlying the code, computer hardware is expensive and must be saved. In the communications world, the service is expensive and must be saved; not the hardware. One interesting tidbit is the NFPA doesn't have a single record instance of an EPO switch being used by any fire responder. However there are hundreds of reports of accidental and erronous EPO activations. Fuses, circuit breakers or overcurrent devices are satisfactory for cutting power in every other type of occupancy. What is so different, and dangerous about a computer room which requires a manually activated system? Almost all the other NEC safety devices are automatic, and activate when required instead of relying a human. There are APC UPSes stuffed under desks in offices all over the country, without EPOs. If you want an EPO, great; build one. I'm not proposing banning them. But don't force me to put one in. You use the example of the SCRAM button, however the code specifically exempts systems used for things such as a nuclear reactor SCRAM system from the EPO requirement. If I'm building a reactor, I don't need an EPO; but if I'm building a computer room I have to install an EPO. We want to build highly reliable, highly available systems; we need to look at single point of failures. EPO systems are designed to be a single point of failure. So far I have not seen any data which supports their use as a life-safety device, and justifies the real damage they do. > What are the four seasons in California? Earthquake, Drought, Fire, and > Flood. You've no doubt heard about the "Oakland Hills Fire" but no one has > ever talked about the mud-slides, in the Winter following the "Oakland Hills > Fire", caused by the ground-cover being burnt off. In fact, no one hears > much about California flooding. That's because it is a natural part of the > ecology here and not as sexy as earthquakes and brush fires. Every part of the country has its own set of hazards. Volcanoes in the northwest, heavy snow in the northeast, hurricanes in the south east, tornadoes across the mid-west, tsunomi in alaska and hawaii. Wasn't it a SPRINT CO which got enveloped by a mud slide a few years ago? And one of the few times I lost an AT&T circuit was due to mud slides in California.

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RE: Fire protection in ISPs and collocation facilities
by Roeland Meyer 06 Nov '00

06 Nov '00

Simple rule, make sure that you're upstream and the down-stream end has more bandwidth than the up-stream end. It's kind of the reverse of the internet. In the event that the inflow exceeds the outflow, hit the SCRAM switch before you fry something. This is the main reason I have it (SCRAM), but I'm damned if I can justify it for that reason. It's a lot easier to talk about fire. It should be left in the Fire codes. What are the four seasons in California? Earthquake, Drought, Fire, and Flood. You've no doubt heard about the "Oakland Hills Fire" but no one has ever talked about the mud-slides, in the Winter following the "Oakland Hills Fire", caused by the ground-cover being burnt off. In fact, no one hears much about California flooding. That's because it is a natural part of the ecology here and not as sexy as earthquakes and brush fires. > -----Original Message----- > From: Sean Donelan [mailto:sean@donelan.com] > Sent: Sunday, November 05, 2000 8:58 PM > To: tme(a)21rst-century.com > Cc: nanog(a)merit.edu > Subject: Re: Fire protection in ISPs and collocation facilities > > > > On Sun, 05 November 2000, Marshall Eubanks wrote: > > In Fairfax and Loudon Counties here in Virginia, fire codes require > > water for fire suppression (you can use other means, but you have to > > have water). So all the co-lo and exchange facilities here have > > pressurised water fire suppression. I have been surprised > at how many > > of these do not have DRAINS for the water. > > In my real estate experience, whenever you have > > the possibility of water release, you will eventually HAVE water > > release. With no drains, that means you will have > > to move the equipment out to get the water out... > > Its a catch-22. In Rochelle Park, a substantional amount of the > flooding entered the building through the drains and plumbing. If > you have openings for the water to flow out, the water can also flow > in. On the other hand, there have also been colo's (in Virginia) with > depressed/raised floors which turned into concrete pools submerging > all the data cables and power cables below the raised floor. > > Do I have a solution? No. I've thought about building in dry sumps > and containment (i.e. like nuclear reactor buildings). But that > has problems too. > > >

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Re: Fire protection in ISPs and collocation facilities
by Sean Donelan 05 Nov '00

05 Nov '00

On Sun, 05 November 2000, Marshall Eubanks wrote: > In Fairfax and Loudon Counties here in Virginia, fire codes require > water for fire suppression (you can use other means, but you have to > have water). So all the co-lo and exchange facilities here have > pressurised water fire suppression. I have been surprised at how many > of these do not have DRAINS for the water. > In my real estate experience, whenever you have > the possibility of water release, you will eventually HAVE water > release. With no drains, that means you will have > to move the equipment out to get the water out... Its a catch-22. In Rochelle Park, a substantional amount of the flooding entered the building through the drains and plumbing. If you have openings for the water to flow out, the water can also flow in. On the other hand, there have also been colo's (in Virginia) with depressed/raised floors which turned into concrete pools submerging all the data cables and power cables below the raised floor. Do I have a solution? No. I've thought about building in dry sumps and containment (i.e. like nuclear reactor buildings). But that has problems too.

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Re: Fire protection in ISPs and collocation facilities
by Sean Donelan 05 Nov '00

05 Nov '00

Several people have asked where can they obtain a copy of the US Air Force draft. Engineering Technical Letter (ETL) 00-3: Fire Protection Engineering Criteria - Electronic Equipment Installations http://www.afcesa.af.mil/Publications/Drafts/ETL00-3Draft.pdf I find it interesting how the designs created by people who have to operate an installation are different from the designs from consultants and vendors, or even the National Fire Protection Association. Or commercials on television like those being run by Janus. But back to my original question. What is the real fire risk for ISPs and collocation operators. Is it burned buttered popcorn in the microwave setting off the FM-200 system? Is it home-made computers? Is it the Emergency Power Off switch? State Farm Insurance has started a project to change the National Electrical Code for computer rooms and the requirement for an EPO switch. Is this something other ISPs and collocation providers would be interested in seeing changed? If so, we need to collect data and evidence to support the change.

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