January 1997 - Test - lists.nanog.org

Re: Internic registries
by William Sommers 11 Jan '97

11 Jan '97

On Sat, 11 Jan 1997 20:23:37 -0500 (EST) Mark Kosters wrote: > I see this and have noticed in the change logs that the whois dumper > program was recently updated. I've backed out the change and the old > info will return by 6:00AM or so tomorrow. > > (Ingres database looks ok but obviously whois is not). > > Thanks, > Mark Were I InterNIC management, I'd be wondering why it took an employee perusing an off-topic thread in this list to have the problem brought to somebody's attention. I reported it to action(a)internic.net yesterday morning, at which time it had already been going on for at least a day. Then again, since I've long been convinced my mail to InterNIC is just plain blackholed anyway (based on a response rate of exactly 0% to date), I don't know why I thought that one would have been treated any differently. (Sorry, couldn't resist.) :-) William Sommers San Francisco Online Televolve, Inc. sommers(a)sfo.com

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Re: Internic registries
by Brian Pettingell 11 Jan '97

11 Jan '97

> Dave, > > It wasn't just March 18. I think the whole db is corrupt (it was ok a > couple of weeks ago). > > > Joffe, Rodney L (RJ48) rjoffe(a)GENUITY.NET > Conco Companies > 4041 N. Central Avenue > 16th Floor > Phoenix, AZ 85012 > (602)207-6404 (602)207-6400 (FAX) (602)207-6410 > > Record last updated on 06-Aug-96. > > I've never even heard of Conco. Hrrmm.. I sure hope it isn't spreading. I can remember mine being messed up about six months ago?, around the time they implemeted the "guardian", however, my handle is okay at the present. I did have to change it though when I found out it was messed up. Pettingell, Brian E [Network Engineer] (BP221) bpetting(a)GENUITY.NET GENUITY 4041 N. Central suite 400 Phoenix, Az 85012 (602) 207-6400 (FAX) (602) 207-6410 Record last updated on 21-Sep-96. Brian -- Brian Pettingell Backbone Engineer G E N U I T Y

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RE: Internic registries
by Rodney Joffe 11 Jan '97

11 Jan '97

Dave, It wasn't just March 18. I think the whole db is corrupt (it was ok a couple of weeks ago). Joffe, Rodney L (RJ48) rjoffe(a)GENUITY.NET Conco Companies 4041 N. Central Avenue 16th Floor Phoenix, AZ 85012 (602)207-6404 (602)207-6400 (FAX) (602)207-6410 Record last updated on 06-Aug-96. I've never even heard of Conco. Rodney Joffe Chief Technology Officer Genuity Inc., a Bechtel company http://www.genuity.net >-----Original Message----- >From: Dave Pokorney [SMTP:dp@ufl.edu] >Sent: Saturday, January 11, 1997 2:31 PM >To: jordy >Cc: nanog(a)merit.edu; Dallas Antley >Subject: Re: Internic registries > >Jordy, > >You are not alone. Dallas is having some trouble with his dna.org domain. >We are both about to give up trying to get them to repair it as well. >Your email prompted me to check my handle and that too has been corrupted. >Looks like March 18 may have been a bad day for the Internic. I work for >the Northeast Regional Data Center at UF, not Vega Solutions... > >dp@nersp $ whois dp173 >Pokorney, Dave (DP173) dp(a)UFL.EDU > Vega Solutions > Rm.112 SSRB, University of Florida > Gainesville, FL 32611 > 352-392-2061 > > Record last updated on 18-Mar-96. > > >Let us know how you manage to convince them to repair it. good luck, I'm >sure the University of Florida is pleased to hear that Vega Solutions is >doing business on their premis. Guess I need to submit another update >request for my own handle this time. Past requests (before dna.org >corruption) have been handled without trouble sigh, -d > >-- >On Sat, 11 Jan 1997, jordy wrote: > >> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- >> >> >> I was doing some maintanace on some of my domains a few days back and >> decided to update my Internic contact information. Low and behold I found >> that the company field in the whois query was wrong. I did a whois on a >> few other internic handles I know and it looks as if they are wrong as >> well. >> >> I thought at first that maybe someone changed my Internic contact >> registration (which is why I'm sending my PGP key to them right now), but >> the last update time is months ago, and I'm sure I would have noticed it >> before now. >> >> So did Internic's whois server break? Or did their registery get corrupt? >> >> - -- >> Jordan Mendelson : www.wserv.com/~jordy >> Web Services, Inc. : www.wserv.com >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- >> Version: 2.6.2 >> >> iQCVAwUBMtfN2hA7rx9toVxZAQFz+AP8Cy2WMeemqq7utDt2OIFWEI/ZLSs+VlRI >> JZsRGPQjHcrz2yHSXeWvg24SKBRlgy2O7OTRMclZaEAmsOTfA4fIAoR5cT5uXcyK >> Oo7fz0Xwt+sXvGrc4SFjiJyHMBAc71ohakhFVDafqyWipjb+04HCV7VN5zk7TgKV >> xsVnGzgx+SA= >> =tuPj >> -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- >> >> > >

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Re: Domain names for ISP infrastructure links
by Peter Lothberg 11 Jan '97

11 Jan '97

> > So how do we name internal links in a way that is usefull for > > all operators, and conforms to the A-Z 0-9 and "-" and can > > be proposed as an RFC? > How about the Sprintlink: I where not thinking on SL only, I where looking at something more generic. > sl-pop-router#-port[-speed].sprintlink.net The speed thing is debatable, some people wants it, someone does not, and someone are willing to pay me $50/mont to make DNS say OC3c on their DS0. SL-POP-ROUTER is kindof Sprint specific, others have other ideas on how to name routers, how about this; router-slot#-port#[-port#][-ts#-#][-dlci#].europa.net Where "router" is something that is syntactically correct. A cisco with a VIP in slot 0 and a hssi in PA-slot 1 with a HSSI port in 0 would be; peter-bath-room-slot0-port1-port0.europa.net Ts for timeslots on a chanalized card Dlci for a flame-delay circiut ATM? X.25? SMDS? > But instead of h0/0, use h0-0; s2-6; etc... Is this actually usefull, the NOC person will be guided to the right box/slot/port and can use other tools to figure out the media type, wich is in my opionion not very usefull to knew. > i.e. icm-petersbathroom-2-s2-1-512.icp.net Nope, my routers have another naming convention, bathroom is for example, r29a.. --Peter

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Re: Update on mail bombing threats--not so funny
by Vadim Antonov 11 Jan '97

11 Jan '97

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Dan Busarow wrote: >I'm not trying to discourage the use of PGP, just point out that >it is unlikely to solve the problem at hand. >Long term, yes, today, no. Depends on what you think "today" is :) I'm old enough to see way many things change -- when i started hacking, computers with no ICs in them were still quite useful. - --vadim -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6 iQCVAgUBMtdWq0DODjim2XUVAQFRyAP8DrKTVfeDyG+Rni6p9tVl/7/LjG9h9YQ0 PnfCYS4jiFkWUtioGvToJxWIR0i+hYpYNj4qZfcH911bvVFEV9P+rQCMPqGJSPJ5 PXZ9wuwx134NBoTU2n2VGNsBRKxWtp7xXjiyEUV9oMBInPIOSgCLMcfxDGIi/NJp OSe5d1WSmgE= =rAAf -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: Update on mail bombing threats--not so funny
by Vadim Antonov 11 Jan '97

11 Jan '97

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- >The Usenix key signing is a good model for techie types, but >we are the minority. How would the great unwashed have their >keys signed? This looks like a business opportunity. I think it may make sense for somebody to establish a nation wide network of Public Notaries who'd be certifying that the physical person has this-and-that document (drivers license, etc) and has that key. A central office would maintain a registry of personal keys. We all could use the registry to verify the signatures. Such certification could cost something like $10 per key. I'd certainly be willing to pay that much to have a certified key. Given the potential customer base of 20-50 million, that would make a nice business case. - --vadim -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6 iQCVAgUBMtcm6kDODjim2XUVAQEAzAP/VwfOex0ZonDepPv0xHVpB4A5ZG06DfZ7 O1BZqFzEGwvkjcsubuaE8FoOIZX6Mp26lCWM5G7VJkDCPVILjn9/ZzyB2gU+qZD1 HOGmkAf92V/EG8VfuIQSVIP9DuEwtd3FGJ4NkQyNIyi+ZrheYXTnE/mpNX+TqVDl aU7yPfmDbHE= =nVVX -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- ..

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Re: Update on mail bombing threats--not so funny
by Paul Ferguson 11 Jan '97

11 Jan '97

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- At 07:09 PM 1/10/97 -0800, Dan Busarow wrote: > >So in order to post to nanog you would have to have your PGP >key signed by NANOG or the list operator or another entity trusted >by all. How do you establish trust for that signing? > Having a key-signing party at the upcoming NANOG is a good place to start. >The Usenix key signing is a good model for techie types, but >we are the minority. How would the great unwashed have their >keys signed? Besides, I like being able to post without having to >attend a NANOG meeting though I could live with the restriction. Strong crypto for the masses! For what it's worth, the same model holds true for meetings of the IETF; Ted Tso has been organizing key-signing parties that are held one evening during IETF week. - - paul -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMtcOs5RLcZSdHMBNAQF8HQQAi+p3dsTucTTXPD7tMvNIUFn3DKgBTjjX JExLVyCojuq2fIIWRAlS/o14Rqy7nQK4aULDVo07Gz1jIpTygJLyOPT44XsozFAz IvgVdpS0np11u422mxQ+NMG72pIJyyucZSQq2FzLVidleChnWcBqysQsb2/JP+BO jej9ymeAjNA= =E37p -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Version: 2.6.2 mQCNAiuk0/8AAAEEALqlLc+x9lmgiJCRSpu/aPhQdi0hMjwiGlN2B/GJQqgZPhTb pR+u5/blGogqT+WwcXZ2XfEdIV19FrJY4BXGGn4+4TjdVN3XuuCHuueoygBAmOQD IloU6SJuDqJa0kFA5X/i/1ELn86I5+8A4Hx88FiYJIVUBR6SApRLcZSdHMBNAAUR tCJQYXVsIEZlcmd1c29uIDxwZmVyZ3Vzb0BjaXNjby5jb20+ =p8D4 -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- -- Paul Ferguson || || Consulting Engineering || || Herndon, Virginia USA |||| |||| tel: +1.703.397.5938 ..:||||||:..:||||||:.. e-mail: pferguso(a)cisco.com c i s c o S y s t e m s

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Re: Update on mail bombing threats--not so funny
by Vadim Antonov 10 Jan '97

10 Jan '97

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- I told it many times already that the freedom of speech includes not only right to speak but also right not to listen. Internet is very good at the first part; and woefully indaequate at the second. Can it be fixed? Of course. But the first step in filtering out those who are trying to push their unwanted speech on us is to make sure they won't pretend to be somebody whose words we'd want to listen to. So -- the problem has two aspects: the first is authentication, the second is defense against flooding attacks. They are closely related, but not identical. The source address verification is powerful enough to get flood attacks stopped. It is still not enough to get rid of unwanted messages. The second line of defense should be digital signatures on messages, certified by some authorities (what is "authority" depends on your personal point of view -- you're free to choose whom to believe) which to a some extent make sure that signatures correspond to physical people. Then you can just stop accepting any unsigned mail (note that a reputable anonymous remailer would also check signatures on incoming messages; and substitute them with its own). There's no magic technology involved; this is just the problem of how to actually implement it. Until we do that we all live in danger of having our name smeared if some jerk decides he's pissed and posts some nazi propaganda, or threats, with a reputable person's e-mail address. I already was an antisemite, and an agent of KGB, thank you very much. Now, how about doing the right thing: make the NANOG list the first one to require signed messages? Somebody has to start. - --vadim -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6 iQCVAgUBMtaqSEDODjim2XUVAQFuBwP+N7JhLLT7yFcF8Se7XvfRd9DOPceAa0U5 vvnjbCCEZpq8xWh6H7cMyq3vZdQeFzYnCC6007PQt4AyodJ8DQC77RLL72YthHzz /ZWQdbS7xlJQxsUAFQiZprpeW6cAExRwIiPrKimjx96kvBvufFPeOtLjhV1Vpalo o4e+DHJRGbY= =EMOb -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Agenda items for February
by Susan R. Harris 10 Jan '97

10 Jan '97

Greetings - here are topics we've lined up so far for the Feburary NANOG: Squid update Introduction to Trawhoisd Pathologic applications in the Internet Exchange point updates (10-minute IXP presentations welcome) Consideration of policy: issues of signaling for access and usage End-to-end TCP packet dynamics InterNIC update Non-BGP multihoming for Web sites Internet routing instability Using the IRR to assist in aggregation Are there other topics you'd like to hear about? ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Susan R. Harris, Ph.D. Merit Network, Inc. srh(a)merit.edu Phone: (313) 936-2100 Fax: (313) 747-3185 ------------------------------------------------------------------------

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Re: Update on mail bombing threats--not so funny
by Vadim Antonov 10 Jan '97

10 Jan '97

There is no use to attempt to find legal fixes for massive spam and other flooding attacks. The spam sources will simply move out of U.S. and will start loading international circuits with their crap. I.e. the legal cure will only make spam even more annoying, but won't stop anybody. Why won't we concentrate on doing technical solutions? Fortunately, it is relatively easy to get rid of the flooding attacks by reducing their effectiveness to nothing. The solution is source address filtering at edges, to relieve attackers from the benefit of forged source addresses, and reverse lookup authentication in MTAs -- just do not accept any mail coming from an invalid source address, or source address not corresponding to what is in Sender, Reply-To or From field. That will arguably break some setups (for example, when outgoing mail leaves hosts directly, but return mail comes thru a centralized server); but that can be fixed. That scheme is obviously not bullet-proof, but neither are locks on the doors. They do deter crime, though. BTW, the e-mail sender address authentication would also do wonders for non-flooding variety of spammers -- getting tons of angry mail from the targets of the spam does have some effect. Also, it gives ISPs ability to identify abusers, and create a black list of people not to have any business with, and a legitimate reason to refuse service to them. There's a historical precedent in doing source address authentication which initially broke service for a lot of peple, but ultimately made Internet a saner place -- the FTP archive at UUNET at some time started requiring that reverse DNS lookups should provide correct names. Oops -- nobody with broken reverse zones could access it. Now, the question is how to make people to actually implement it. I guess the big providers should consider it in their best interest -- or they'll eventually get politicians and lawyers on their heads. --vadim

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