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Re: CIDR deployment
by avg＠titan.sprintlink.net 17 Mar '94

17 Mar '94

>Would someone in NSI care to coment about routing? Are you folks carrying >a default to your FIX-W router or what? NSI -- you may want to start peering with ICM-FIX-W and default to it. It has all the routes and does not depend on any databases. --vadim

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Re: CIDR deployment
by Erik-Jan Bos 17 Mar '94

17 Mar '94

Dennis, > > NET ASN REGIONAL COUNTRY RESULT > > ------------ -------- -------------------- ------------- --------- > > 133.11.0.0 AS372(?) NSN-AMES-AS(?) Japan Unreach > > 128.250.0.0 AS372(?) NSN-AMES-AS(?) Australia Unreach > > This is not actually NSI's problem, it is caused by the fact that the > NSFnet has not been configured to accept 192.87.111/22 and hence is > not carrying it. The confusing part is that connectivity through > there to most places still works because the NSFnet has a default > route pointing at Washington2.Dante.net, which runs without route > filters. What this breaks, however, is that since NASA doesn't default > to anyone they won't be able to reach anything which isn't explicitly > announced to them, but we don't have the route to send to them. Right. The request for sending a NACR for 192.87.108/22 (not 111!) was issued today, but I was too quick, it has to be processed of course :-). I'll consider this when I publish more results tomorrow. > At the current state of the art, then, you really need to have the > aggregate configured into the NSFnet database before this will work > well. We should also consider pulling the default route from > the backbone, it is in principle no longer needed and causes no end > of confusion about where the problems are occurring. And removes the function of IGC (Internet Garbage Collector) from the Washington.date.net box. __ Erik-Jan.

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CERT Advisory - SunOS /usr/ucb/rdist Vulnerability
by CERT Advisory 17 Mar '94

17 Mar '94

============================================================================= CA-94:04 CERT Advisory March 17, 1994 SunOS /usr/ucb/rdist Vulnerability ============================================================================= The CERT Coordination Center has received information concerning a vulnerability in /usr/ucb/rdist in Sun Microsystems, Inc. SunOS 4.1.1, 4.1.2, 4.1.3, and 4.1.3c on all sun3 and sun4 architectures. SunOS 4.1.3_U1, Solaris 2.x, and Solbourne's 4.1B and 4.1C are not vulnerable. This is a Sun specific Advisory. Please reference CERT Advisory CA-91:20 "/usr/ucb/rdist Vulnerability" for general information regarding other vendors. A vendor status file pub/cert_advisories/rdist-patch-status is available via anonymous FTP from info.cert.org. This vulnerability is being actively exploited; please review CERT Advisory CA-94:01 "Ongoing Network Monitoring Attacks." Patches can be obtained from local Sun Answer Centers worldwide as well as through anonymous FTP from ftp.uu.net in the /systems/sun/sun-dist directory. In Europe, these patches are available from ftp.eu.net in the /sun/fixes directory. Information concerning specific patches is outlined below. Please note that Sun sometimes updates patch files. If you find that the checksum is different, please contact Sun. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- I. Description A security vulnerability exists in /usr/ucb/rdist that can be used to gain unauthorized privileges. Under some circumstances /usr/ucb/rdist can be used to create setuid root programs. II. Impact This vulnerability allows a local user to gain root access. III. Solution A. If rdist is not being used, change the permissions on the file. # chmod 700 /usr/ucb/rdist B. Obtain and install the appropriate patches according to the instructions included with the patches. Module Patch ID Filename ---------- --------- --------------- rdist 100383-06 100383-06.tar.Z BSD Checksum = 58984 121 System V Checksum = 9125 241 MD5 Checksum = f8f78ddab19af5efabb9bd66fc8f5c1a --------------------------------------------------------------------------- If you believe that your system has been compromised, contact the CERT Coordination Center or your representative in Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams (FIRST). Internet E-mail: cert(a)cert.org Telephone: 412-268-7090 (24-hour hotline) CERT personnel answer 8:30 a.m.-5:00 p.m. EST(GMT-5)/EDT(GMT-4), and are on call for emergencies during other hours. CERT Coordination Center Software Engineering Institute Carnegie Mellon University Pittsburgh, PA 15213-3890 Past advisories, information about FIRST representatives, and other information related to computer security are available for anonymous FTP from info.cert.org.

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CIDR deployment
by yakov＠watson.ibm.com 17 Mar '94

17 Mar '94

Ref: Your note of Thu, 17 Mar 1994 18:19:24 +0100 Erik-Jan, Seems that your testing indicates connectivity problem to Far East. Do you know who is on the path from you to Far East that is CIDR-incapable ? Yakov.

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Re: New supernet routes from AS 200
by avg＠titan.sprintlink.net 16 Mar '94

16 Mar '94

>FYI, we should now be originating the following CIDR routes into the NSFNET >and to our BGP4-capable peers: > > 192.216.0.0 mask 255.255.0.0 [192.216/16] > 198.31.0.0 mask 255.255.0.0 [198.31/16] > 198.92.0.0 mask 255.252.0.0 [198.92/14] > 198.92.0.0 mask 255.255.128.0 [198.92/17] > 198.93.160.0 mask 255.255.224.0 [198.93.160/19] SprintLink do not see those CIDR routes (because of CIX...). --vadim

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New supernet routes from AS 200
by yakov＠watson.ibm.com 16 Mar '94

16 Mar '94

Ref: Your note of Wed, 16 Mar 94 11:16:33 PST Vince, >... because the number of our peers (i.e. CIX-WEST) are still >not yet with BGP4/CIDR... Do we have somebody from the CIX on BGPD and/or regional-techs mailing lists ? If yes, could these folks provide us with information on their schedule with respect to providing BGP4/CIDR capabilities on CIX-WEST ? Who are the other peers (besides CIX-WEST) you are referring to ? Yakov.

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New supernet routes from AS 200
by noc＠barrnet.net 16 Mar '94

16 Mar '94

FYI, we should now be originating the following CIDR routes into the NSFNET and to our BGP4-capable peers: 192.216.0.0 mask 255.255.0.0 [192.216/16] 198.31.0.0 mask 255.255.0.0 [198.31/16] 198.92.0.0 mask 255.252.0.0 [198.92/14] 198.92.0.0 mask 255.255.128.0 [198.92/17] 198.93.160.0 mask 255.255.224.0 [198.93.160/19] 198.93.160/19 and 198.92/17 are more-specific subsets of 198.92/14 which are multi-homed via AS 1740 - don't know if they are announcing these yet. No more-specific routes have been withdrawn yet, principally because a number of our peers (i.e. CIX-WEST) are still not yet with the BGP4/CIDR program. --Vince

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Re: CIDR deployment
by Havard Eidnes 16 Mar '94

16 Mar '94

> >By the way, I once again removed 129.241/16 from our announcement... > > Does that mean that we have the first case of CIDR-based routing > (just a prefix with no individual components)? I don't know for sure. I still announce 129.240/16 -- which is also covered by 129.240/15. No need to expose too many people at once to potential problems... (There still are some reachability problems this time on this side of the Atlantic, so I'll have to revert again. Sorry. I'll tell you when the problem has been rectified again and when I've once again removed our 129.241/16 announcement.) - Havard

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News about Ed Anselmo
by Dan Long 16 Mar '94

16 Mar '94

Dear Friends and Customers of Ed Anselmo: It is with my deepest regret that I must inform you of Ed's death this weekend while on a ski vacation in Colorado. Ed had arrived in Denver at noon on Saturday, had driven to Steamboat Springs, and had hit the slopes around 2:00 with the wife of one of his several friends who were attending a convention (of Doctors) there. They skied until 4:00 and then he hooked up with his friends. They were about to buy lift tickets for the week of skiing they had planned when Ed realized he'd left his credit card in the hotel room. His friends waited at the ticket booth for him to return and, after a long wait, called the hospital in desperation. Ed *was* at the hospital as he had collapsed in the parking lot of the hotel either on his way to or from his room. Prolonged efforts to resuscitate him were unsuccesful. Subsequent investigation indicated that his major arteries were severely clogged and that the combination of altitude change and exertion were enough to trigger the attack. Ed joined the NEARNET project in August of 1992. In the short time he was here, he became friend and mentor to all. Professionally, he was outstanding. His services where sought after by customers and BBNers alike. Socially, he was just as outstanding. He was never without a smile. A pleasant word, a funny story, and genuine concern for others were his trademark. I know I can speak for everyone who knew Ed that we will miss him immensely. He was an exceptional individual, co-worker, and friend. A copy of Ed's obituary is attached below. A service in Belmont, MA where Ed lived is planned in a few weeks. Mail to anselmo=service(a)nic.near.net to be put on the list to receive information about the time & place and to anselmo=notes(a)nic.near.net if you have any remembrances you'd like to pass along to Ed's family or to us here. The work that Ed was involved in for NEARNET and other BBN customers will be reassigned to others in the team here. Please contact me if you were in the middle of anything with Ed that needs to be handled. Sorry for the bad news, Dan Long Manager, Technical Services NEARNET BBN ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- Appearing today in the Ann Arbor News: Anselmo, Edward G. Belmont, MA formerly of Lansing Age 34, died March 12, 1994 in Steamboat Springs, CO. Born April 25, 1959 in Lansing. Mr. Anselmo graduated from Lansing Eastern High School in 1977 where he was a National Merit Scholar. He was a graduate of U. of Michigan in Ann Arbor and was a Systems Analyst at U. of M. Medical Center and later at Yale University. He was employed with BBN Systems and Technologies, Cambridge, MA as a Senior Network Analyst. His hobbies include skiing, biking and tennis. Surviving are his parents, Ricardo and Fe Anselmo of Lansing; 3 sisters, Feliccia (Tim) Ryan of Royal Oak, Patricia (Greg) Sovitch of Canton, MI and Stella (Mike) Boldrick of Toledo, OH; beloved nephew and God Son, Nathan Edward Sovitch of Canton; many aunts, uncles and cousins. The Funeral Mass will be celebrated Saturday, March 19, 10:00AM at the Church of the Resurrection, 1531 E. Michigan Ave., Lansing with The Reverands William Koenigsknect and Francis Martin, officiating. Interment will follow in St. Joseph Catholic Cemetery. Friends may call at the Gorsline-Runciman Co. East Chapel, 1730 East Grand River, East Lansing, MI 48823 where the family will receive friends Thursday and Friday from 3-5 and 7-9PM. A Vigil Service will be prayed both Thursday and Friday at 7PM. Those desiring may make contributions to the American Heart Foundation or to the National Wildlife Federation in memory of Mr. Anselmo. [These may be sent to Gorsline-Runciman for forwarding to these organizations, if you like.] -----------------------------------------------------------------------------

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CIDR deployment
by yakov＠watson.ibm.com 16 Mar '94

16 Mar '94

Ref: Your note of Wed, 16 Mar 1994 10:02:53 +0100 Havard, >I know, it's not ideal, but then again I think there is some urgency >in getting CIDR really off the ground by now... I think this should be *strongly* encouraged. We should clearly steer away from search for an "ideal" solution, and rather focus on pragmatic considerations. Yakov. P.S. One of my collegues observed a while ago that if he would be looking for an "ideal" wife he would never get married (of course, he is married and is quite happy now). His observation could be generalized to any scenario that involves search for an "ideal" solution... :-)

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