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[Fwd: BBN (GTE) Suffers another major power problem.]
by Peter Giza 08 Aug '97

08 Aug '97

-- --/ Peter E. Giza || Technical Consultant || ADSmart Corporation fone 508.684.3609 || phax 508.684.3618 || page 800.632.1746 || http://www.adsmart.net /--

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Re: BBN (GTE) Suffers another major power problem.
by John Curran 08 Aug '97

08 Aug '97

At 11:39 8/8/97, Robert T. Nelson wrote: >If you're in a 24x7, customer-driven market, you should have either: > >a) enough go-juice (via fuel contractor) to go until the grid is on-line Did you read the previous email from jhawk? There is an extremely large generator at one of the affected facilities (read: cogeneration plant) but no amount of fuel helps if the plant is damaged in the explosion. /John p.s. No, we've have not deployed redundant power plants (yet)

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spam relaying by the big boys
by Jon Lewis 08 Aug '97

08 Aug '97

Just yesterday, UUNet released a statement on it's anti-spam policy, which included: UUNET's anti-spamming policy includes: - limiting the length of email recipient lists; - blacklisting mail sent from known spamming locations or organizations; - maintaining a mailbox (abuse(a)uu.net) which allows victims to report spam incidents; Imagine my surprise when I bounced some newly received spam to abuse(a)uu.net and received the following response: ----- The following addresses had permanent fatal errors ----- <abuse(a)uu.net> ----- Transcript of session follows ----- ... while talking to mail.uu.net.: >>> RCPT To:<abuse(a)uu.net> <<< 550 <abuse(a)uu.net>... User unknown 550 <abuse(a)uu.net>... User unknown Oh joy! ------------------------------------------------------------------ Jon Lewis <jlewis(a)fdt.net> | Unsolicited commercial e-mail will Network Administrator | be proof-read for $199/message. Florida Digital Turnpike | ______http://inorganic5.fdt.net/~jlewis/pgp for PGP public key____

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Re: BBN (GTE) Suffers another major power problem.
by Sean M. Doran 08 Aug '97

08 Aug '97

| There is no excuse for a large player like GTE to lose power for any | extended period off time. (I can understand a brief, reboot long, outage | if something went awry, but hours? No sir.) Sure there is. It's called money. Enough of it can by enormous physical plant redundancy that this sort of thing would never happen, but then I imagine whoever invests that kind of money would want to recover costs plus a percentage, which will tend to push their prices upwards. People who expect prices to rise on the consumer front very soon in the U.S. and consumers to choose to spend more for their connectivity to a network with lots of diesel generators in bomb-proof buildings and the like are probably radicals who don't expect what price theory people call rational behaviour. Consequently, look carefully at anyone who starts investing huge sums of money into preventing against edge cases in the Internet like massive long-term utility interruptions. It may be smart engineering but I wouldn't want to invest in them. Moreover, I would begin wondering if the absence of a known set of potential failures was worth a large extra price to me as a consumer, when there are much more frequent known potential failures that the extra price wouldn't fix in the short run. However, note that there are companies who leverage _previous_ investments into such facilities into their Internet business. Such facilities almost always belong to or are leased by businesses involving per-minute charging with such huge gross per-minute revenues that most outages cost more than the fortunes required to prevent them. The Internet connectivity market has consistently demonstrated for some time now that there is no huge drop in revenues as a result of failures due to third parties that could only have been avoided by raising Internet connectivity prices substantially. Picking on BBN Planet (which is not yet fully GTEified, I mean, it hasn't been THAT long since they were acquired) because they were the victims of a weird accident that affected most of the rest of the city is economically irrational and also makes little engineering sense. Sean.

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Re: BBN (GTE) Suffers another major power problem.
by wb8foz 08 Aug '97

08 Aug '97

Next time YOU place a POP, better confirm you CAN get a generator placed there. I recall a time when a RBOC {not called that then} placed a new CO in a downtown office tower, then looked at the fire regulations..... In short, no one's perfect. My sympathy to the family of the utility employee. I'm glad no one else died, too. -- A host is a host from coast to coast.................wb8foz(a)nrk.com & no one will talk to a host that's close........[v].(301) 56-LINUX Unless the host (that isn't close).........................pob 1433 is busy, hung or dead....................................20915-1433

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Re: BBN (GTE) Suffers another major power problem.
by wb8foz 08 Aug '97

08 Aug '97

A different-BBN-division friend in Boston said half of Cambridge went dark, and there was one utility death, due to that fire. But BBN was up. MIT has a BBN POP; he wonders if that was went off. [The main facility does have generator backup..] -- A host is a host from coast to coast.................wb8foz(a)nrk.com & no one will talk to a host that's close........[v].(301) 56-LINUX Unless the host (that isn't close).........................pob 1433 is busy, hung or dead....................................20915-1433

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Re: Implementing anti-abuse techniques on ISP networks....
by Andy Pitts 08 Aug '97

08 Aug '97

> I don't know about the "huge players", but we're an Internet Service > Provider, not an Internet Blockage Provider. We don't allow spoofing, > and we don't allow relaying, but we're not about to put filters > to prevent dialup customers from connecting wherever they want. I too, am a small Internet Service Provider, and I too, don't want to block sites that my users may want to access. But there seems to be a few domains that do nothing but generate spam. Am I not providing a service to my users if I prevent them from being smothered with spam from those sites? -- Andy Pitts : "Knowledge is a deadly friend andy(a)rbdc.rbdc.com : When no one sets the rules." http://www.rbdc.com : --King Crimson--

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UUNET - PSI - ?
by jamie＠intuition.iagnet.net 08 Aug '97

08 Aug '97

Something wrong with this? > sho ip bgp 137.39.0.0 255.255.0.0 BGP routing table entry for 137.39.0.0/16, version 533944 Paths: (2 available, best #2, advertised over IBGP) 174 192.41.177.245 from 192.41.177.245 Origin IGP, metric 30, localpref 100, valid, external Community: 2548:668 701 198.32.186.248 from 198.32.186.248 (137.39.3.57) Origin IGP, metric 2, localpref 100, valid, external, best Community: 2548:668 *174*? -- jamie g.k. rishaw dal/efnet:gavroche IAGnet/CICNet/netILLINOIS 'whois JGR2' for PGP keyID/Fingerprint __ Network Operations/TSD DID:216.902.5455 FAX:216.623.3566 \/ 800.637.4IAGx5455 "The machine's fine. It just doesn't work." -dan(a)nic.net

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An end to spam through Graphnet
by dhudes＠graphnet.com 07 Aug '97

07 Aug '97

Hi folks, Some time back before the latest round of cable cuts and BIND arguments you may recall that I notified everyone that Graphnet was being abused to transit spam. An ugly mess -- between the bounces and the flood of 'remove' from angry recepients plus one wise guy who impersonated our marketing department it brought a dual cpu sparc20 to its knees at its height, with over 100mb on the mail queue awaiting re-delivery or more likely expiration. We have put an end to this madness on our systems by building and configuring the very latest Sendmail v8 and BIND 4.9.6 (attempts to use v8 failed for being too Berkley, on a Solaris 2.x system -- but don't start arguing that here please) in combination with filters on our gateway router. Load has dropped way down on our sparc20, and hopefully the spammers will go play with someone else instead of futilely occupying bandwidth on our circuits . Let this be an object lesson to those of you out there who have yet to upgrade: the spammers will find you sooner or later. They walk down every A record in every zone until they find a victim. They look in public databases like RIPE to see what mailboxes are registered for the zone and they use those names to try to get past your sendmail filters and launch spam in your name (doesn't work on us, I thought of that trick). So go forth to www.isc.org and www.sendmail.org and compile. Dana Hudes Graphnet

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IGP selection
by Marcelo Manta 07 Aug '97

07 Aug '97

Thanks a lot for the answers about IGP (and for the excellent book recommendation). The results so far are: 50% OSPF 37,5% IS-IS 12,5% IBGP (Using any IGPs when multipath occurs) 0% EIGRP The impressions are that the old backbones use IS-IS and the new ones are using OSPF. -- Marcelo Manta SAGA PGP fingerprint = E3 B8 AC AF 24 61 E7 E5 B8 38 01 D1 3C F4 32 5E

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