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Re: Outages and Nanog
by Sean Donelan 26 Jul '98

26 Jul '98

>If there is a North-American network-outages list, I'd like to know >where I could get information about it. There are several. Most major providers claim to have one. But you usually have to be a customer, and rarely post information about outages. A provider's 'official' definition of an outage doesn't seem at all related to what an ordinary person would consider an outage. The DAL outage list often carries outage information from a variety of sources, official and unofficial. outage(a)dal.net. But be prepared for an onslaught of Bull's Eye Targeted E-mail. General discussion about outage lists (but not outages) is on the outage-discuss(a)academ.com list. A relatively quiet list. And finally, CNN has coverage of outages on an irregular basis. -- Sean Donelan, Data Research Associates, Inc, St. Louis, MO Affiliation given for identification not representation

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The Cidr Report
by Tony Bates 24 Jul '98

24 Jul '98

This is an auto-generated mail on Fri Jul 24 12:00:00 PDT 1998 It is not checked before it leaves my workstation. However, hopefully you will find this report interesting and will take the time to look through this to see if you can improve the amount of aggregation you perform. The report is split into sections: 0) General Status List the route table history for the last week, list any possibly bogus routes seen and give some status on ASes. 1) Gains by aggregating at the origin AS level This lists the "Top 30" players who if they decided to aggregate their announced classful prefixes at the origin AS level could make a significant difference in the reduction of the current size of the Internet routing table. This calculation does not take into account the inclusion of holes when forming an aggregate so it is possible even larger reduction should be possible. 2) Weekly Delta A summary of the last weeks changes in terms of withdrawn and added routes. Please note that this is only a snapshot but does give some indication of ASes participating in CIDR. Clearly, it is generally a good thing to see a large amont of withdrawls. 3) Interesting aggregates Interesting here means not an aggregate made as a set of classful routes. Thanks to xara.net for giving me access to their routing tables once a day. Please send any comments about this report directly to me. Check http://www.employees.org/~tbates/cidr-report.html for a daily update of this report. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ CIDR REPORT for 24Jul98 0) General Status Table History ------------- Date Prefixes 170798 52681 180798 52642 190798 52713 200798 52774 210798 53149 220798 52850 230798 52922 240798 52857 Check http://www.employees.org/~tbates/cidr.plot.html for a plot of the table history. Possible Bogus Routes --------------------- AS Summary ---------- Number of ASes in routing system: 3754 Number of ASes announcing only one prefix: 1827 (958 cidr, 869 classful) Largest number of cidr routes: 353 announced by AS3561 Largest number of classful routes: 1137 announced by AS701 1) Gains by aggregating at the origin AS level --- 24Jul98 --- ASnum NetsNow NetsCIDR NetGain % Gain Description AS3602 525 313 212 40.4% Sprint Canada Inc. AS701 1137 934 203 17.9% Alternet AS271 344 144 200 58.1% BCnet Backbone AS4293 469 273 196 41.8% IMCI AS2493 432 254 178 41.2% iSTAR Internet, Inc. AS3749 223 66 157 70.4% TECNET AS174 723 586 137 18.9% Performance Systems International AS2685 267 162 105 39.3% IBM Global Network - US AS5668 134 50 84 62.7% Century Telephone Inc. AS3221 112 42 70 62.5% RIPE-ASNBLOCK4 AS4969 86 20 66 76.7% Net Access AS3804 220 155 65 29.5% Bell Solutions AS4755 114 50 64 56.1% Videsh Sanchar Nigam Ltd. India AS7046 228 165 63 27.6% UUNET-CUSTOMER AS4740 393 336 57 14.5% ASN-OZEMAIL (Ozemail Pty Ltd) AS10928 101 46 55 54.5% UNKNOWN AS3403 180 126 54 30.0% TIAC AS8517 122 72 50 41.0% UNKNOWN AS6335 68 19 49 72.1% NTRNET AS549 202 153 49 24.3% ONet Backbone AS72 85 37 48 56.5% Schlumberger Information Network AS1239 539 492 47 8.7% SprintLink Backbone AS719 452 406 46 10.2% LANLINK-AS AS4539 71 26 45 63.4% NETROPOLIS AS4200 144 99 45 31.2% AGIS (Apex Global Information Ser AS852 157 116 41 26.1% AGT Advance Communication AS1785 293 252 41 14.0% NYSERNet Backbone AS10459 48 7 41 85.4% WANSASN AS10921 57 19 38 66.7% KIHNETWORK AS762 117 80 37 31.6% WELLFLEET-AS For the rest of the previous weeks gain information please see http://www.employees.org:80/~tbates/cidr-report.html 2) Weekly Delta Please see http://www.employees.org:80/~tbates/cidr-report.html for this part of the report 3) Interesting aggregates Please see http://www.employees.org:80/~tbates/cidr-report.html for this part of the report

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Worldcom cut?!?
by Adam Rothschild 24 Jul '98

24 Jul '98

Anyone have any information about the extent of this Worldcom phiber cut in PA, est. repair time, etc? Thanks in advance, -Adam

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ALTER.NET SFO is FUBAR
by John M. Brown 24 Jul '98

24 Jul '98

Incase you are dependant on ALTER.NET's SFO ATM link its having problems. Thus you may not be able to get to A, J, L and M root servers or Internic.net No other info is available at this time. jmbrown

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Re: Worldcom cut?!?
by Leo Bicknell 24 Jul '98

24 Jul '98

In article <6p89q9$d33(a)gizmo.dimension.net> you write: >I have noticed that different 'fiber cuts' (or other transmission >facility problems) seem to get different kinds of reactions. Some >carriers' fiber cuts seem to pass unnoticed. While other carriers' >cable cuts make the front pages of newspapers across the country. A lot of it depends on who is impacted by the cut, and how the cut impacts traffic. Some observations by me, the non-telcohead router-geek to just buys circuits and expects them to work: 1) Why do my "SONET protected with redundant rings" based circuits go down from a fiber cut? I have to assume either I was lied to, and they are not redundant, or both "redundant rings" ran down the same path...making me wonder what good they ever were in the first place. Carriers with diverse physical paths win big here. 2) Why do circuits "bounce" after a cut. I've seen circuits pop up and down after a cut, which just causes all sorts of problems. I think this mainly comes from attempts to "re-route" traffic. Having the circuit bounce up and down is almost always worse then if it was just down. 3) Does the cut take out a lot of little circuits, or a few big ones? Taking out 4 OC-12's into a mae often makes things 10,000 times worse than taking out the 360 DS1's that could be in the same fiber. (IP like networks often can absorb a T1 here or there in reroutes, but not an OC-12....excess capacity has it's cost.) I think more data would be highly useful, but not necessarily in the sort of way the FCC looks at it. The FCC has issues like "will 911 work", where the ISP has issues like can I provide service to my users. In some ISP networks losing a circuit would be inconvenient, but fully planned for and not impact service. Also, things like point 1, was there a redundant path so the "cut" had minimal impact are very important to me, as a purchaser of circuits. There could be a lot of value in an tracking the performance in a more abstract way than the FCC does. -- Leo Bicknell - bicknell(a)dimension.net Network Engineer (CCIE #3440) - Dimension Enterprises 1-703-709-7500, fax, 1-703-709-7699

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Re: Worldcom cut?!?
by Sean Donelan 23 Jul '98

23 Jul '98

Although it will be a few months before I can get my hands on recent FCC outage reports, even though they are supposedly "public" I always seem to run into difficulty obtaining copies, I'll use this message as a jumping off point. I have noticed that different 'fiber cuts' (or other transmission facility problems) seem to get different kinds of reactions. Some carriers' fiber cuts seem to pass unnoticed. While other carriers' cable cuts make the front pages of newspapers across the country. Further it is not clear to me if the current FCC reporting methods are really capturing the relevant data. Whether a fiber cut is a "reportable" event depends a lot on what type of customers had communication circuits on the fiber. If AOL had a fiber cut and was down for a week, it would not be a reportable event. Irregardless of whether all the newspapers report on it. Because AOL is considered one 'customer' as far as the reporting requirements. Even 635 DS3s being cut may not be a reportable event if most of the fiber is being used by only a a few hundred Internet providers (no matter how many end-users are effected). On the other hand, if the fiber was being used mostly for DS-0 switched voice circuits, it would be a likely be a reportable event because of the definition of blocked calls and circuits. Should ISPs start collecting and pooling data on the performance of various facility carriers because the data being collecting by the traditional facility carrier organizations such as ATIS and FCC Network Reliability Council doesn't seem to reflect the information required or received by ISPs? > This afternoon at about 13:45 WorldCom experienced a fiber cut, the > cause of which is unknown. > > The location of the cut has been determined to be between Stanton, DE > and Broyhill, MD. > > WorldCom has sent technicians. > > Repairs are estimated to take 3-4 hours. > > Approximately 635 DS3s have been effected by this outage. > > A variety of IXCs have been effected. -- Sean Donelan, Data Research Associates, Inc, St. Louis, MO Affiliation given for identification not representation

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Re: Smurfable Networks
by Richard Thomas 23 Jul '98

23 Jul '98

-----Original Message----- From: Brian Horvitz <horvitz(a)shore.net> To: Richard Thomas <buglord(a)ex-pressnet.com> Cc: nanog(a)merit.edu <nanog(a)merit.edu> Date: Wednesday, July 22, 1998 2:51 PM Subject: Re: Smurfable Networks >Actually, it turns out that a some of what I posted were only echo replies >from single hosts. This was indeed a real smurf..at one point we were >pulling about 50 Meg over 3 T3s. The error I made was in generating the >list of amplifier networks from my log files. Networks with even one >single echo reply to the target address were included in the list. Such >was the case with the net 12 entries - each one corresponded only to one >IP address, not a whole network worth. I tried about 30 from the list and didn't get a single dupe, but anyhow, check out SmurfLog v1.1 available at http://www.sy.net/security by yours truly, a much better way to gather only the guilty without generating 2 gig log files in the process.

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Re:Worldcom Fiber Cut
by Martin, Christian 22 Jul '98

22 Jul '98

600 DS3s affected. ETR 19:30-20:00. This is the second major cut in as many weeks. Whatver happened to SONET redundancy, hmmm???? -Chris

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Smurfable Networks
by Brian Horvitz 22 Jul '98

22 Jul '98

Well, it's been an exhaustive evening. We've been the target of a pretty good smurt attack, which has had my network sucking down between 30 and 50 Meg for the last 10 hours or so. I'd appreciate it if you all could have a look at the following list of source blocks and let me know if you own them and preferably do something about it. Thanks. Brian Horvitz Shore.Net 12.127.131 12.68.136 12.68.160 128.109.34 128.135.2 128.135.253 128.135.91 128.193.6 128.195.23 128.2.203 128.213.4 128.241.3 128.252.221 128.252.233 128.252.5 129.107.1 129.11.11 129.11.12 129.11.13 129.11.14 129.11.152 129.11.159 129.11.16 129.11.20 129.11.22 129.11.8 129.11.9 129.110.10 129.110.13 129.110.14 129.110.15 129.110.4 129.110.5 129.110.6 129.110.7 129.110.8 129.110.9 129.111.2 129.115.4 129.115.6 129.115.8 129.117.1 129.117.10 129.117.11 129.117.12 129.117.14 129.117.17 129.117.20 129.117.22 129.117.24 129.117.36 129.117.41 129.117.5 129.117.8 129.122.16 129.122.20 129.122.46 129.125.1 129.125.13 129.125.136 129.125.14 129.125.16 129.125.17 129.125.19 129.125.20 129.125.5 129.125.8 129.128.1 129.128.15 129.131.1 129.131.12 129.131.15 129.133.1 129.133.10 129.133.12 129.133.13 129.133.15 129.133.16 129.133.18 129.133.19 129.133.2 129.133.20 129.133.21 129.139.10 129.139.128 129.139.14 129.139.2 129.139.20 129.139.22 129.139.23 129.139.8 129.139.9 129.141.120 129.141.20 129.141.22 129.141.5 129.142.6 129.142.7 129.161.16 129.173.13 129.173.249 129.180.1 129.180.11 129.180.16 129.180.9 129.182.13 129.182.14 129.182.15 129.182.16 129.182.17 129.182.18 129.182.21 129.182.22 129.182.3 129.182.5 129.182.9 129.183.1 129.183.16 129.183.19 129.183.20 129.183.4 129.189.1 129.189.10 129.189.180 129.189.2 129.189.9 129.191.1 129.207.10 129.210.11 129.210.12 129.210.13 129.210.15 129.210.16 129.210.17 129.210.18 129.210.19 129.210.20 129.210.21 129.210.4 129.210.5 129.210.8 129.212.11 129.213.12 129.214.251 129.214.3 129.215.162 129.215.2 129.215.3 129.219.16 129.223.1 129.223.10 129.223.14 129.223.2 129.223.20 129.223.8 129.223.9 129.231.10 129.231.17 129.234.16 129.234.8 129.238.12 129.238.13 129.238.14 129.238.28 129.242.10 129.244.1 129.244.14 129.244.17 129.244.18 129.244.20 129.244.22 129.244.41 129.244.5 129.244.6 129.244.8 129.246.101 129.246.13 129.246.20 129.246.22 129.246.229 129.246.25 129.250.20 129.250.255 129.253.0 129.253.16 129.253.18 129.253.19 129.253.31 129.253.64 129.254.10 129.254.11 129.254.143 129.254.2 129.254.20 129.254.21 129.254.224 129.254.3 129.254.5 129.254.6 129.254.7 129.254.9 129.255.128 129.255.14 129.255.22 129.255.230 129.255.246 129.3.254 129.32.0 129.32.25 129.32.4 129.32.6 129.32.8 129.37.0 129.40.16 129.40.3 129.40.4 129.46.49 129.47.10 129.47.180 129.5.176 129.52.251 129.52.7 129.52.9 129.61.21 129.66.1 129.66.12 129.66.2 129.66.20 129.66.3 129.66.4 129.7.18 129.74.10 129.78.1 129.78.22 129.78.23 129.79.2 129.79.5 129.80.22 129.81.10 129.81.153 129.81.174 129.81.186 129.81.241 129.84.2 129.84.3 129.84.4 129.89.18 129.93.1 129.93.11 129.93.116 129.93.12 129.93.120 129.93.13 129.93.14 129.93.16 129.93.17 129.93.18 129.93.19 129.93.21 129.93.22 129.93.3 129.93.4 129.93.56 129.93.6 129.93.66 129.93.8 129.94.1 129.94.12 129.94.129 129.94.17 129.94.177 129.94.18 129.94.19 129.94.2 129.94.20 129.94.22 129.94.4 129.94.66 129.94.8 129.96.201 130.244.194 131.151.7 132.178.181 132.241.60 134.222.200 134.24.32 134.24.42 135.206.251 136.176.5 136.176.80 137.145.202 137.52.129 138.171.6 139.130.5 140.142.12 140.247.210 141.198.1 144.224.23 144.228.134 144.232.139 144.92.233 146.97.254 149.171.204 150.252.40 150.252.47 152.163.194 152.163.201 152.163.204 152.163.205 152.166.26 152.205.20 153.37.94 157.130.192 165.166.8 166.48.23 166.48.234 166.48.92 169.130.112 169.130.73 172.19.59 192.12.10 192.132.65 192.160.127 192.225.17 192.234.72 192.65.88 193.107.188 193.54.185 193.54.238 198.174.96 198.182.76 198.185.178 198.252.208 198.79.72 199.164.151 199.179.169 2.0.0 200.0.227 203.15.123 203.251.18 204.202.169 204.233.137 204.27.123 204.49.9 204.62.245 204.70.181 204.70.227 204.70.29 204.70.40 204.70.43 204.71.52 205.173.178 205.240.124 205.252.130 206.111.144 206.127.8 206.13.28 206.150.138 206.162.64 206.165.113 206.173.136 206.175.105 206.245.156 207.158.78 207.170.53 207.171.46 207.21.136 207.214.13 207.217.208 207.227.71 207.235.31 207.25.201 207.69.200 207.79.35 207.8.5 207.90.198 208.135.168 208.16.152 208.23.202 209.1.169 209.216.44 209.30.66 209.42.128 209.45.240 209.51.160 209.54.110 24.112.115 32.101.8 38.2.195 38.2.99

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Re: Worldcom cut?!?
by Adam Rothschild 22 Jul '98

22 Jul '98

Uhmm, the BENGI list sez: There is a huge worldcom fibercut between Stanton and Foyshill penn.. there is no ETA, worldcom has dispatched. Strange. On Wed, Jul 22, 1998 at 02:02:11PM -0600, Hui-Hui Hu wrote: > > I donno, but I got a message about a fibre cut by Worldcom in > Stanton, CT that is affecting much northeast traffic. > What's in PA? > > : Anyone have any information about the extent of this Worldcom phiber cut in P > : A, est. repair time, etc? > : > : Thanks in advance, > : -Adam > :

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