- Test - lists.nanog.org

The root KSK roll has occurred
by Matt Larson 11 Oct '18

11 Oct '18

On behalf of the root zone management partners (ICANN and Verisign), I would like to report that the root KSK rollover occurred at 1600 UTC today, 11 October, with the publication of the root zone with serial number 2018101100. For the 48 hours after the rollover, we will be monitoring several mailing lists, including this one, so please reply here with any issues or concerns. Matt -- Matt Larson, VP of Research ICANN Office of the CTO

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Oct. 3, 2018 EAS Presidential Alert test
by Andy Ringsmuth 11 Oct '18

11 Oct '18

Did anyone on AT&T or an iPhone receive the test today? I believe it was supposed to happen at 2:18 EDT, followed by one on broadcast radio at 2:20 EDT. I’m in CDT, so 1:18 and 1:20 p.m. CDT. Message was heard on my desk radio at 1:21:35 p.m. CDT but as of the sending of this at 1:52 p.m. CDT, nothing on phones. I have an office full of AT&T iPhones and not a single one of them alerted. FEMA says https://www.fema.gov/emergency-alert-test "Cell towers will broadcast the WEA test for approximately 30 minutes beginning at 2:18 p.m. EDT. During this time, WEA compatible cell phones that are switched on, within range of an active cell tower, and whose wireless provider participates in WEA should be capable of receiving the test message. Some cell phones will not receive the test message, and cell phones should only receive the message once." My wife, with a Sprint iPhone, received the test. ---- Andy Ringsmuth 5609 Harding Drive Lincoln, NE 68521-5831 (402) 304-0083 andy(a)andyring.com

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RE: bloomberg on supermicro: sky is falling
by Scott Weeks 10 Oct '18

10 Oct '18

--- SNaslund(a)medline.com wrote: From: "Naslund, Steve" <SNaslund(a)medline.com> You are free to disagree all you want with the default deny-all policy but it is a DoD 5200.28-STD requirement and NSA Orange Book TCSEC requirement. It is baked into all approved secure operating systems including SELINUX so it is really not open for debate if you have meet these requirements. ------------------------------------------------------- I believe you need to specify what type of DoD networks you're talking about. NIPR is not default deny. scott

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Cell tower backup plans
by Sean Donelan 10 Oct '18

10 Oct '18

On Wed, 10 Oct 2018, Naslund, Steve wrote: > I am wondering if this seems common to most of you on here. In my area > it seems that all cellular sites have backup generators and battery > backup. Seems like the biggest issues we see are devices remote from > the central offices that lose power and cause disruptions, like RSTs > and SLCs. During hurricane Katrina we saw a lot of active outside > plant devices underwater and that caused lots of disruption even when > the CO survived. As Hurricane Michael moves across the southeast, cell carriers will report to the FCC how many cell sites are out of service. Generally, there are more cell sites in cities. The loss of a city cell site is less severe because neighboring cell sites are close to overlap the area. There are more sources of backup power, and fuel (natural gas, diesel, etc) for generators. In cities, cell sites are less exposed on buildings than free-standing cell towers. COWs, COLTs, etc. are also more quickly deployed in cities. COWs and COLTs need connectivity to the PSTN to work, and there are most connection options in cities. In rural areas, there are fewer cell sites, spread further apart. The loss of even a single cell sites in rural areas often has a huge impact compared to cell sites in cities because no nearby towers, difficult to reach for repairs, electical grid is sparser. Land is cheaper in rural areas, so its cheaper to install a solar panel array. But as happened in Puerto Rico, solar panels don't survive Catagory 5 hurricanes any better than cell towers. Long way to say Both city and rural cell sites have some backup power (usually batteries). You just notice the loss of a few cell towers in rural areas more than the same number of cell sites in cities. Of course, catastrophic damage such as in Puerto Rico impacts everywhere.

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Spectrum residential IPv6 rDNS - thank you !
by Brandon Applegate 10 Oct '18

10 Oct '18

Wanted to give a shoutout / thank you to Spectrum for this. Just noticed today my home PD now has dynamic/synthesized rDNS for IPv6. Some of my dumb little scripts outputs are a bit happier today ! :) -- Brandon Applegate - CCIE 10273 PGP Key fingerprint: 0641 D285 A36F 533A 73E5 2541 4920 533C C616 703A "For thousands of years men dreamed of pacts with demons. Only now are such things possible."

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DHS: Report on Alerting Tactics
by Sean Donelan 10 Oct '18

10 Oct '18

Communication service providers play a critical role, but too often view public alerting as "someone else's job." https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/1051_IAS_Report-on-Ale… Report on Alerting Tactics August 7, 2018 However, there was not consensus on which combination of tools is generally most effective. The alerting ecosystem consists of multiple systems alert originators can use to reach the public with alert and warning information, “as well as diverse channels of message delivery, distributed sensing devices, and feedback mechanisms.” Alerting ecosystem components include: • Alerts and warnings from Federal, state, and local alerting authorities to the public; • Coordination between alerting authorities and other governmental entities (e.g., 911); • Public information sharing to alerting authorities (e.g., social media requests); and • Public information exchange between community members

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Re: Oct. 3, 2018 EAS Presidential Alert test
by Scott Weeks 10 Oct '18

10 Oct '18

--- andy(a)andyring.com wrote: From: Andy Ringsmuth <andy(a)andyring.com> Yeah, this thread is getting somewhat removed from the original question, so what the heck. I’ve often thought that vehicle radios should have a location-based weather radio built in --------------------------------------------------- This is coming. See IETF's ipwave. https://www.ietfjournal.org/vehicular-networks-are-expected-to-save-lives-b… https://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/ipwave/documents/ scott

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Re: Oct. 3, 2018 EAS Presidential Alert test
by Scott Weeks 09 Oct '18

09 Oct '18

--- sean(a)donelan.com wrote: From: Sean Donelan <sean(a)donelan.com> Sometimes people are asleep (disasters don't always happen at 2pm on a work day), live alone, are not constantly watching TV or checking social media. Its unlikely any system will ever be able to reach everyone. ------------------------------------------- Or some live where there is no cell coverage, don't watch TV, live where their neighbors are far away and no gov't folks are going to knock on doors because the driveway is long, locked at the front gate and there're dogs in the yard... :-) scott

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contact for offerup
by Tom Ammon 09 Oct '18

09 Oct '18

Can somebody from offerup.com contact me off-list regarding your blocking of our ASN (23089)? Thanks in advance, Tom -- ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- Tom Ammon M: (801) 784-2628 thomasammon(a)gmail.com -----------------------------------------------------------------------------

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Spoofer Report for NANOG for Sep 2018
by CAIDA Spoofer Project 08 Oct '18

08 Oct '18

In response to feedback from operational security communities, CAIDA's source address validation measurement project (https://spoofer.caida.org) is automatically generating monthly reports of ASes originating prefixes in BGP for systems from which we received packets with a spoofed source address. We are publishing these reports to network and security operations lists in order to ensure this information reaches operational contacts in these ASes. This report summarises tests conducted within usa, can. Inferred improvements during Sep 2018: ASN Name Fixed-By 16842 5DL 2018-09-04 4 ISI 2018-09-07 2152 CSUNET-NW 2018-09-10 22742 CT-EDU-NET 2018-09-13 Further information for the inferred remediation is available at: https://spoofer.caida.org/remedy.php Source Address Validation issues inferred during Sep 2018: ASN Name First-Spoofed Last-Spoofed 5650 FRONTIER-FRTR 2016-02-22 2018-09-27 577 BACOM 2016-03-09 2018-09-27 7922 COMCAST-7922 2016-06-04 2018-09-30 209 CENTURYLINK-US-LEGACY-QWEST 2016-08-16 2018-09-28 20412 CLARITY-TELECOM 2016-09-30 2018-09-25 6181 FUSE-NET 2016-10-10 2018-09-29 15305 SYRINGANETWORKS 2016-10-21 2018-09-29 25787 ROWE-NETWORKS 2016-10-21 2018-09-26 174 COGENT-174 2016-10-21 2018-09-25 271 BCNET 2016-10-24 2018-09-26 2828 XO-AS15 2016-10-25 2018-09-20 31857 PRIORITY-TERABIT 2016-10-25 2018-09-28 30341 SCTA-ASN 2016-10-31 2018-09-30 32440 LONI 2016-11-03 2018-09-26 33182 DimeNOC 2016-11-08 2018-09-27 12083 WOW-INTERNET 2016-11-09 2018-09-29 3549 LVLT-3549 2016-11-16 2018-09-19 7106 INDEPENDENTSFIBERNETWORK 2017-01-09 2018-09-14 21832 KELLINCOM-1 2017-02-03 2018-09-29 23314 ORLANDOTELCO 2017-04-14 2018-09-01 7122 MTS-ASN 2017-05-16 2018-09-27 6461 ZAYO-6461 2017-06-21 2018-09-24 63296 AMARILLO-WIRELESS 2017-09-01 2018-09-27 7233 YAHOO-US 2017-09-07 2018-09-29 33523 ROWANUNIVERSITY 2017-10-29 2018-09-28 2152 CSUNET-NW 2017-11-08 2018-09-26 546 PARSONS-PGS-1 2017-11-20 2018-09-17 54540 INCERO 2018-01-15 2018-09-17 12222 AKAMAI 2018-02-14 2018-09-13 3257 GTT-BACKBONE 2018-03-06 2018-09-04 29384 Qatar-Foundation 2018-03-08 2018-09-30 23148 TERRENAP 2018-03-15 2018-09-25 20009 WADSNET 2018-04-13 2018-09-21 4201 ORST 2018-04-19 2018-09-14 11827 WSU 2018-04-19 2018-09-24 393564 SPOKANE 2018-06-05 2018-09-26 35911 BNQ-1 2018-06-06 2018-09-28 225 VIRGINIA 2018-06-18 2018-09-21 40911 L2NC 2018-08-31 2018-09-11 2381 WISCNET1 2018-09-04 2018-09-25 22742 CT-EDU-NET 2018-09-05 2018-09-06 54804 CSMIII-BUNKIELA 2018-09-15 2018-09-30 33452 RW 2018-09-19 2018-09-26 20448 VPNTRANET-LLC 2018-09-20 2018-09-28 11215 LOGIXCOMM 2018-09-20 2018-09-20 11996 LOBOIS 2018-09-24 2018-09-24 10326 WORCESTER-1 2018-09-26 2018-09-30 16570 TELOIP-SW-ASN 2018-09-27 2018-09-27 Further information for these tests where we received spoofed packets is available at: https://spoofer.caida.org/recent_tests.php?country_include=usa,can&no_block… Please send any feedback or suggestions to spoofer-info(a)caida.org

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