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Re: More Sidgemore on per-bit pricing
by sthaug＠nethelp.no 06 Dec '98

06 Dec '98

> One notable thing about per-bit pricing, as well, is that once one > provider really rolls it out and pushes it at a low cost, it's bound > to become a surety. Suddenly the provider with per-bit billing will > be able to steal all of the low-usage customers, while leaving the > expensive near-saturation customers at other providers... effectively > raising their cost per DS1... I have seen it argued several times that if the price is "low enough", customers prefer a fixed price, even if that price is slightly higher than they could get by a variable-rate pricing scheme. Why do you think per-bit pricing would be significantly different here? Steinar Haug, Nethelp consulting, sthaug(a)nethelp.no

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Worldcom Fiber Cut
by Mark Moore 05 Dec '98

05 Dec '98

Worldcom has confirmed the cut of over 300 DS3s and 12 OC12s. Apparently CSX is to blame. ~mark ---------------------------- Mark Moore <mark(a)gleim.com> Network Administrator Gleim Publications, Inc. http://www.gleim.com (352) 375-0772 ext. 116 (800) 87-GLEIM ext. 116 FAX: (352) 375-6940 -----------------------------

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RE: More Sidgemore on per-bit pricing
by Peter Ford 05 Dec '98

05 Dec '98

Let's see: You accect per piece pricing and identify that it is existing practice. Sounds like you object to the units? Should the units be in terms of T-1s (as you accept as exiting practice), DS-0 (probably the prominent per piece model in use today) or what? So is your complaint that that units might not be in terms of T-1s? Or is it that the units are soft/virtual instead of hard as defined by the Telco physical hierarchy? If Sidgemore's experience matches others in the ISP business I suspect he is considering/planning such service plans because several of his important customers are asking for it. And I am sure he has the ability/mechanisms to retain those customers who demand flat/predictable billing by offering that as an option ... chaeers, peter -----Original Message----- From: Pete Kruckenberg [mailto:pete@kruckenberg.com] Sent: Friday, December 04, 1998 9:43 AM To: nanog(a)merit.edu Subject: More Sidgemore on per-bit pricing Sidgemore talks again: http://www.news.com/News/Item/0,4,29533,00.html?st.ne.fd.gif.a I'm sure this subject has been discussed at length here, but I still fail to see any benefit for per-piece pricing other than to the seller's revenue stream. I think it's always interesting that discussions of per-piece pricing always fail to mention the fundamental issue: provide a disincentive to the consumer to use the service. There is already per-piece pricing: 1.544Mbps of traffic costs $500 to $2000+/mo, depending upon how much the provider is counting on you to not use the service. However, in this case the burden is placed on the ISP to balance closing the sale with making money off of how much the customer actually uses the service. The thing I most distrust about people who talk about per-piece pricing is that in spite of the fact that it should end up costing lower-use customers less, for some reason it always ends up costing everyone more. Look at UUNet's pricing now (for 256K ASU, or something like that), versus the flat-rate price available from equivalent NSP's. Is that where things are going? Pete.

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Re: Lawsuit threat against RBL users
by Dean Anderson 05 Dec '98

05 Dec '98

At 11:53 PM 12/3/1998 -0500, Scott Lampert wrote: > I don't know about where you live but here in BellSouth land you can >call the phone company and block outgoing 900 number calls from your line. Correct: YOU can ask to have things blocked on YOUR line. The phone company (or ISP) can't do that without YOUR permission. But if (say a CLEC) offers phone services without any 900 services, they have your permission when you sign up. Likewise, YOU can use the RBL to block YOUR mail, and your ISP can use the RBL if you give them permission. Which you do for example (according to US Attorney somewhere), if their service definition includes blocking. The ethics of the RBL and its ability to coerce people and organizations arbitrarily notwithstanding, its existance is probably not illegal. However, that does not mean that it can't be used to illegally block mail by people that don't have permission to block. The idea promulgated by some that a network operator can do whatever they feel like with "their equipment" is plainly wrong. There are laws which govern how that equipment can be used by its owners. The people who feel otherwise seem to be falling into the kook category, so I don't see any point in arguing further. 'Szechuan Death' brings up some good ethical and moral points about the RBL. ORBS is even more arbitrary and unethical. But I'm not sure this is of any operational importance. Hasn't the operational value of this discussion been exhausted? --Dean ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ Plain Aviation, Inc dean(a)av8.com LAN/WAN/UNIX/NT/TCPIP http://www.av8.com ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++

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Worldcom Fiber Cut - Orlando, FL
by Mark Moore 04 Dec '98

04 Dec '98

Worldcom has reported a fiber cut between Lake Mary and Orlando, FL. No word yet on repair time or how many circuits are down. ~mark ---------------------------- Mark Moore <mark(a)gleim.com> Network Administrator Gleim Publications, Inc. http://www.gleim.com (352) 375-0772 ext. 116 (800) 87-GLEIM ext. 116 FAX: (352) 375-6940 -----------------------------

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The Cidr Report
by Tony Bates 04 Dec '98

04 Dec '98

This is an auto-generated mail on Fri Dec 4 12:00:00 PST 1998 It is not checked before it leaves my workstation. However, hopefully you will find this report interesting and will take the time to look through this to see if you can improve the amount of aggregation you perform. The report is split into sections: 0) General Status List the route table history for the last week, list any possibly bogus routes seen and give some status on ASes. 1) Gains by aggregating at the origin AS level This lists the "Top 30" players who if they decided to aggregate their announced classful prefixes at the origin AS level could make a significant difference in the reduction of the current size of the Internet routing table. This calculation does not take into account the inclusion of holes when forming an aggregate so it is possible even larger reduction should be possible. 2) Weekly Delta A summary of the last weeks changes in terms of withdrawn and added routes. Please note that this is only a snapshot but does give some indication of ASes participating in CIDR. Clearly, it is generally a good thing to see a large amont of withdrawls. 3) Interesting aggregates Interesting here means not an aggregate made as a set of classful routes. Thanks to xara.net for giving me access to their routing tables once a day. Please send any comments about this report directly to me. Check http://www.employees.org/~tbates/cidr-report.html for a daily update of this report. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ CIDR REPORT for 04Dec98 0) General Status Table History ------------- Date Prefixes 271198 54161 281198 53936 291198 53897 301198 54139 011298 54213 021298 54287 031298 54269 041298 56909 Check http://www.employees.org/~tbates/cidr.plot.html for a plot of the table history. Possible Bogus Routes --------------------- AS Summary ---------- Number of ASes in routing system: 4292 Number of ASes announcing only one prefix: 2100 (1123 cidr, 977 classful) Largest number of cidr routes: 353 announced by AS3561 Largest number of classful routes: 981 announced by AS701 1) Gains by aggregating at the origin AS level --- 04Dec98 --- ASnum NetsNow NetsCIDR NetGain % Gain Description AS271 349 152 197 56.4% BCnet Backbone AS3749 230 70 160 69.6% TECNET AS2493 335 188 147 43.9% iSTAR Internet, Inc. AS1785 534 400 134 25.1% NYSERNet Backbone AS701 981 848 133 13.6% Alternet AS174 688 557 131 19.0% Performance Systems International AS5668 125 39 86 68.8% Century Telephone Inc. AS4200 170 90 80 47.1% AGIS (Apex Global Information Ser AS1267 109 30 79 72.5% IUNET-AS AS4755 135 63 72 53.3% Videsh Sanchar Nigam Ltd. India AS4293 205 133 72 35.1% IMCI AS549 223 155 68 30.5% ONet Backbone AS4740 388 328 60 15.5% Ozemail Pty Ltd (ASN-OZEMAIL) AS1221 387 330 57 14.7% AARNET-AS AS8517 127 71 56 44.1% UNKNOWN AS7046 258 202 56 21.7% UUNET-CUSTOMER AS6335 71 19 52 73.2% NTRNET AS7545 117 66 51 43.6% TPG Internet Pty Ltd AS72 88 40 48 54.5% Schlumberger Information Network AS7657 134 87 47 35.1% The Internet Group Limited AS1239 524 477 47 9.0% SprintLink Backbone AS577 210 165 45 21.4% CA*net Networking Inc Backbone AS7496 75 31 44 58.7% Power Up AS3221 84 42 42 50.0% RIPE-ASNBLOCK4 AS852 170 129 41 24.1% AGT Advance Communication AS10928 89 48 41 46.1% UNKNOWN AS719 440 401 39 8.9% LANLINK-AS AS7122 113 76 37 32.7% MTS ADVANCED Network Policy AS803 71 35 36 50.7% SaskNet Backbone AS3564 69 36 33 47.8% Microserve Infromation Systems In For the rest of the previous weeks gain information please see http://www.employees.org:80/~tbates/cidr-report.html 2) Weekly Delta Please see http://www.employees.org:80/~tbates/cidr-report.html for this part of the report 3) Interesting aggregates Please see http://www.employees.org:80/~tbates/cidr-report.html for this part of the report

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Re: Effects of traffic shaping ICMP (&c.)
by Hank Nussbacher 04 Dec '98

04 Dec '98

At 09:43 PM 12/3/98 -0500, Mark R. Lindsey wrote: >: ==>Could traffic shaping, or similar QoS configurations, be used to solve >: ==>such issues in a more general way? >: >[...] >: It has information on using Cisco's Committed Access Rate (CAR) feature >: to rate-limit traffic such as ICMP echo/echo-reply and TCP SYNs. > >Thanks, everyone, for your responses. It seems that lots of us agree >that CAR sounds like a wonderful mechanism for taming smurf-like >attacks. (Thanks, Cisco and others who have provided it.) > >So isn't this the solution(**) to smurfing that we should be lobbying for? >Consider: Using CAR to limit ICMP to a statistically normal range on >all links has these features: > * It can be implemented from the core out > * It must be implemented by clueful network operators (because they > run the core) > * It must be implemented on a relatively small handful of > rigorously-maintained routers Implementing it on the core has some limitations. CAR works on a per protocol basis - not on a per flow basis. This means that someone with an OC-3 to some NAP might want to limit ICMP to 500kb/sec or some other reasonable number. What you want is not only an upper limit but a 8kb/sec limit on per flow or some other reasonable number. You also want a guarantee on certain IP addresses to get through and not be limited by CAR. When the Smurf is happening, you don't want your NOC pings and traceroutes dropped because of some CAR limit being exceeded. So you need to create a careful policy as to what gets bypassed by CAR limits and what gets shaped by CAR limits. -Hank > >Compare this to the drive for limitations on directed broadcasts: > * It must be implemented at the edges > * It must be implemented by widely-varying clue levels > * It must be implemented on hundreds of thousands of routers that no > one ever touches > >In short, the core grows slower, and is run by people with more experience. >If the problem can be addressed there, then it seems like we *must* address >it there. > >Comments, please. > > > >(**) You could well argue that limiting ICMP traffic on core/distribution > links doesn't actually solve the problem -- lots of trash traffic > can be generated on networks whose routers allow directed broadcasts. > But that's if we define the problem to be trash ICMP because > hosts reply to pings (or fraggle, or whatever); in such a case, > traffic limitations are simply a kludge. > > However, if you define the problem to be packet floods, then I think > CAR provides a viable and real solution. After all, directed broadcast > is a useful tool; in such a definition, disabling it on a network > is a kludge. My limited studies seem to show that there are enough > smurf amplifiers on the Internet to easily saturate OC-48s. Perhaps > the real problem *is* flooding -- not directed broadcast. > >

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RE: Lawsuit threat against RBL users
by Chris Mauritz 04 Dec '98

04 Dec '98

That's a pretty shortsighted view, Sheryl. I suspect you haven't been on the receiving end of some idtiot buying a leased line/virtual web presence from you and then spamming from an AOL/PSI/earhlink/yadda yadda account. It isn't pleasant. Folks aren't stupid. They ignore the fact that the tool used to spam was a throwaway account and go right for the jugular (you). It's better to have a zero tolerance policy and not have to deal with the silliness in the first place. Chris Chris Mauritz Director, Systems Administration Rare Medium, Inc. chrism(a)raremedium.com -----Original Message----- From: Sheryl Chapin [mailto:schapin@ctel.net] Sent: Thursday, November 19, 1998 8:48 AM To: nanog(a)merit.edu Subject: Re: Lawsuit threat against RBL users >That's right. It stops the practice of using a sacrificial account, from >AOL or netcom, to spam for a web-site that is otherwise protected. Does it >make a difference that they didn't spam from their own ISP? That customer >is *still* a spammer whether they did it from your site or not. Maybe >you're of the "It's alright as long as they don't do it here" crowd? Well, >that's one of the things that the RBL was built for. The rest of us don't >have to put up with your negligence. I don't see it as "it's alright as long as they don't do it here". I see it as "I have control over my network, but not over anyone elses". I have an AUP that specifically states spamming is not allowed. I have kicked off users who have spammed. However, I do not have an AUP that says "If you ever spam anyone ever in the world on any network anywhere I will disconnect whatever service you have". I don't control the entire internet, just my little piece of it. :-) Sheryl Chapin Senior Network Engineer CommTel Internet 207.377.3508 Winthrop, Maine schapin(a)ctel.net

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197/8
by Andrew Partan 04 Dec '98

04 Dec '98

Question: is 197/8 being allocated? I see these: MAE-East Looking Glass Results ----------------------------------------------------------------- Query: bgp Addr: 197.0.0.0 255.0.0.0 l BGP table version is 13188566, local router ID is 165.117.1.121 Status codes: s suppressed, d damped, h history, * valid, > best, i - internal Origin codes: i - IGP, e - EGP, ? - incomplete Network Next Hop Metric LocPrf Weight Path * i197.67.126.0 198.32.136.129 4294967294 100 0 1239 i * i197.71.190.0 137.39.129.153 4294967294 100 0 701 816 i * i197.98.2.0 198.32.136.129 4294967294 100 0 1239 i ----------------------------------------------------------------- But I also see this: asp@home-9189: whois -h whois.arin.net 197.0.0.0 IANA (NETBLK-RESERVED-13) Information Sciences Institute University of Southern California 4676 Admiralty Way, Suite 1001 Marina del Rey, CA 90292-6695 Netname: RESERVED-13 Netblock: 197.0.0.0 - 197.255.255.255 Thanks, --asp(a)partan.com (Andrew Partan)

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Re: Effects of traffic shaping ICMP (&c.)
by mark＠vielle.datasys.net 04 Dec '98

04 Dec '98

: ==>Could traffic shaping, or similar QoS configurations, be used to solve : ==>such issues in a more general way? : [...] : It has information on using Cisco's Committed Access Rate (CAR) feature : to rate-limit traffic such as ICMP echo/echo-reply and TCP SYNs. Thanks, everyone, for your responses. It seems that lots of us agree that CAR sounds like a wonderful mechanism for taming smurf-like attacks. (Thanks, Cisco and others who have provided it.) So isn't this the solution(**) to smurfing that we should be lobbying for? Consider: Using CAR to limit ICMP to a statistically normal range on all links has these features: * It can be implemented from the core out * It must be implemented by clueful network operators (because they run the core) * It must be implemented on a relatively small handful of rigorously-maintained routers Compare this to the drive for limitations on directed broadcasts: * It must be implemented at the edges * It must be implemented by widely-varying clue levels * It must be implemented on hundreds of thousands of routers that no one ever touches In short, the core grows slower, and is run by people with more experience. If the problem can be addressed there, then it seems like we *must* address it there. Comments, please. (**) You could well argue that limiting ICMP traffic on core/distribution links doesn't actually solve the problem -- lots of trash traffic can be generated on networks whose routers allow directed broadcasts. But that's if we define the problem to be trash ICMP because hosts reply to pings (or fraggle, or whatever); in such a case, traffic limitations are simply a kludge. However, if you define the problem to be packet floods, then I think CAR provides a viable and real solution. After all, directed broadcast is a useful tool; in such a definition, disabling it on a network is a kludge. My limited studies seem to show that there are enough smurf amplifiers on the Internet to easily saturate OC-48s. Perhaps the real problem *is* flooding -- not directed broadcast.

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