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Routing issues to AWS environment.
by Curt Rice 09 May '19

09 May '19

Hi are there any AWS engineers out there? We are seeing routing problems between NTT and AWS in Ashburn, Va and would like to find out which side is having the problem. Thanks, Curt

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FW: Sprint Operations
by Stockdale, Tom D [CTO] 09 May '19

09 May '19

James, Can you send me some specifics so I can try and figure out how to help with your concerns? V/r, Tom From: Fiumano, Michael F [CTO] Subject: FW: Sprint Operations Tom, Stephanie, Is this something you could help with? Or fwd in the right direction? Thanks, Michael Fiumano Manager, Sprint Internet & WAN Engineering From: NANOG [mailto:nanog-bounces@nanog.org] On Behalf Of James Breeden Sent: Thursday, May 9, 2019 11:05 AM To: nanog(a)nanog.org<mailto:nanog@nanog.org> Subject: Sprint Operations CAUTION: This email originated from outside of the organization. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe. Hello, If anyone from Sprint Mobile operations is on list, could you reach out to me off list? Having issues with some ip ranges properly communicating with your WiFi Calling and SMS over IP hosts. James Sent via the Samsung Galaxy Note9, an AT&T 5G Evolution capable smartphone

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Sprint Operations
by James Breeden 09 May '19

09 May '19

Hello, If anyone from Sprint Mobile operations is on list, could you reach out to me off list? Having issues with some ip ranges properly communicating with your WiFi Calling and SMS over IP hosts. James Sent via the Samsung Galaxy Note9, an AT&T 5G Evolution capable smartphone

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NTP for ASBRs?
by Lars Prehn 09 May '19

09 May '19

Hi everyone, do you NTP sync your AS boundary routers? If so, what are incentives for doing so? Are there incentives, e.g. security considerations, not to do it? Best regards, Lars

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EXERCISE: 2019 IAA Planetary Defence Conference - Day 5 Scenario
by Sean Donelan 09 May '19

09 May '19

EXERCISE Only The scenario was chosen to stress the partcipants, not an actual asteroid impact. It was a fictional scenario. This was only an exercise. 60 meter asteroid impact in New York City, NY (roughly Central Park, NYC) 10,117,016 population directly affected Estimated unsurvivable area (complete destruction) 32 square miles Internet Communications 30 Internet exchange points (1 unsurvivable, 8 critical damage, 20 severe damage, 1 serious damage) 708 Data centers (16 unsurvivable, 229 crtical damage, 446 severe damage, 16 serious: 6,300 Points of presence (1853 unsurvivable, 453 critical damage, 1447 severe damage, 456 serious damage) Indirect Internet impacts Mass communications Social media, misinformation and malinformation https://cneos.jpl.nasa.gov/pd/cs/pdc19/

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Re: NTP for ASBRs?
by Scott Weeks 09 May '19

09 May '19

--- valdis.kletnieks(a)vt.edu wrote: From: "Valdis Klētnieks" <valdis.kletnieks(a)vt.edu> On Wed, 08 May 2019 14:00:11 -0700, "Scott Weeks" said: > From: Job Snijders <job(a)ntt.net> > > on this topic, i strongly recommend to operate all > devices in the Etc/UTC timezone, this makes > coordination with external entities much easier. > ---------------------------------------- > > > Yes, this! Holy crap I come upon a lot of networks > that don't do this and it's always painful. Newfoundland time, anybody? :) ------------------------------------ I had to go and look that up: "The Newfoundland Time Zone (NT) is a geographic region that keeps time by subtracting 3 1⁄2 hours from Coordinated Universal Time (UTC) during standard time, resulting in UTC−03:30; or subtracting 2 1⁄2 hours during daylight saving time." WTF??? This is exactly what I mean on a geographicly dispersed network. Do everything UTC and put clocks on your computer/wall/phone/whatever. Then, like Job said, it's easier to coordinate with others not in your timezone. scott

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Spoofer Report for NANOG for Apr 2019
by CAIDA Spoofer Project 08 May '19

08 May '19

In response to feedback from operational security communities, CAIDA's source address validation measurement project (https://spoofer.caida.org) is automatically generating monthly reports of ASes originating prefixes in BGP for systems from which we received packets with a spoofed source address. We are publishing these reports to network and security operations lists in order to ensure this information reaches operational contacts in these ASes. This report summarises tests conducted within usa, can. Inferred improvements during Apr 2019: ASN Name Fixed-By 53597 HOYOS-CONSULTING-LLC 2019-04-09 2828 XO-AS15 2019-04-10 33523 ROWANUNIVERSITY 2019-04-24 Further information for the inferred remediation is available at: https://spoofer.caida.org/remedy.php Source Address Validation issues inferred during Apr 2019: ASN Name First-Spoofed Last-Spoofed 6939 HURRICANE 2016-02-22 2019-04-04 5650 FRONTIER-FRTR 2016-02-22 2019-04-15 7029 WINDSTREAM 2016-06-21 2019-04-06 209 CENTURYLINK-US-LEGACY-QWEST 2016-08-16 2019-04-30 6128 CABLE-NET-1 2016-09-03 2019-04-11 20412 CLARITY-TELECOM 2016-09-30 2019-04-27 6181 FUSE-NET 2016-10-10 2019-04-30 25787 ROWE-NETWORKS 2016-10-21 2019-04-27 174 COGENT-174 2016-10-21 2019-04-02 30341 SCTA-ASN 2016-10-31 2019-04-16 32440 LONI 2016-11-03 2019-04-24 12083 WOW-INTERNET 2016-11-09 2019-04-25 13427 SOFTCOM-INTERNET-COMMUNICATION 2016-11-14 2019-04-30 21832 KELLINCOM-1 2017-02-03 2019-04-29 18451 LESNET 2017-02-22 2019-04-05 36007 KAMATERA 2017-04-21 2019-04-26 19624 SERVERROOM 2017-06-02 2019-04-30 6461 ZAYO-6461 2017-06-21 2019-04-15 63296 AMARILLO-WIRELESS 2017-09-01 2019-04-25 33523 ROWANUNIVERSITY 2017-10-29 2019-04-17 12222 AKAMAI 2018-02-14 2019-04-26 4201 ORST 2018-04-19 2019-04-30 393564 SPOKANE 2018-06-05 2019-04-17 225 VIRGINIA 2018-06-18 2019-04-26 40911 L2NC 2018-08-31 2019-04-24 33452 RW 2018-09-19 2019-04-11 20448 VPNTRANET-LLC 2018-09-20 2019-04-10 11215 LOGIXCOMM 2018-09-20 2019-04-02 11996 LOBOIS 2018-09-24 2019-04-02 13825 TROYCABLE-NET 2018-11-21 2019-04-11 393437 KLAYER 2018-12-21 2019-04-27 62957 HOSPITALITY-NETWORK 2018-12-30 2019-04-06 63275 RADIOWIRE 2019-02-07 2019-04-29 19531 NODESDIRECT 2019-03-14 2019-04-25 11297 LIPSCOMB 2019-03-29 2019-04-12 14813 BB-COLUMBUS 2019-04-08 2019-04-11 15290 ALLST-15290 2019-04-09 2019-04-10 8047 GCI 2019-04-11 2019-04-30 10745 ARIN-ASH-CHA 2019-04-29 2019-04-29 Further information for these tests where we received spoofed packets is available at: https://spoofer.caida.org/recent_tests.php?country_include=usa,can&no_block… Please send any feedback or suggestions to spoofer-info(a)caida.org

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Re: NTP for ASBRs?
by John Kristoff 08 May '19

08 May '19

On Wed, 8 May 2019 07:56:33 +0000 Lars Prehn <lprehn(a)mpi-inf.mpg.de> wrote: > do you NTP sync your AS boundary routers? If so, what are incentives for > doing so? Are there incentives, e.g. security considerations, not to do it? In addition to what others have mentioned, if these systems are to perform route origin validation (ROV), an accurate notion of time would be desirable. From section 6 in IETF RFC 7115 / BCP 185 - Origin Validation Operation Based on the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI): As a router must evaluate certificates and ROAs that are time dependent, routers' clocks MUST be correct to a tolerance of approximately an hour. John

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historical BGP announcements? (pre-1997)
by John Osmon 08 May '19

08 May '19

I've got a need to look for some announcements from the mid 1990s. The oldest I've found at at the University of Oregon Route Views Project, but the earliest I can find there appears to be November of 1997. Anyone have pointers to date from earlier?

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Re: EXERCISE: 2019 IAA Planetary Defence Conference - Day 5 Scenario
by Scott Weeks 08 May '19

08 May '19

--- sean(a)donelan.com wrote: From: Sean Donelan <sean(a)donelan.com> Of course, any fictional scenario is more likely to hit an ocean...But that makes for a dull exercise. ------------------------------------- Not for some of us... ;-) scott

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