- Test - lists.nanog.org

Re: Opengear alternatives that support 5g?
by Mel Beckman 28 Apr '24

28 Apr '24

Mike, Thanks for that info. Alas, I’m not seeing any Mikrotik 5G devices cheaper than a ~$500 Peplink. Am I misunderstanding your suggested solution? -mel On Apr 26, 2024, at 9:50 PM, Mike Lyon <mike.lyon(a)gmail.com> wrote: Peplink is nice, but there are cheaper options: Mikrotik-dot-com Then for cellular service, sign up for an IOT with an IOT MVNO that bills usage based (and can also offer you a static, public, IP address AND will also allow you to build a VPN across all of your devices) such as SimBase: simbase-dot-com Cheers, Mike On Apr 26, 2024, at 21:37, Mel Beckman <mel(a)beckman.org> wrote: I’ve been loooking at the $600 Peplink MAX BR1-MINI (HW3) industrial 5G router. It has a 1x embedded 5G modem (Verizon, AT&T, T-Mobile, and FirstNet). three GigE ports, four antenna connectors, and comes with an stick antenna set and AC PS. It uses a nanoSIM. Yes, it’s a pure IP router with no knowledge of serial protocols. So I would just put an air console behind it to get to my serial ports. I’m still evaluating 5G plans, and Verizon just offered an amazing $15 per month unlimited data deal, but it seems to have a 50 gig limit before you get to throttling. That might not matter at all with serial traffic though. We've been using the Netgear 4G cellular router, but that’s becoming increasingly unreliable. The NG has a nailed up IPsec VPN tunnel, obviating the need for a static IP, and the keepalive traffic is low enough that it doesn’t cost us much on the 4G network. I’m hoping 5G will be even cheaper and faster. I’d love to see if anybody found anything better before I spring for a Peplink test unit. -mel On Apr 26, 2024, at 9:45 AM, Warren Kumari <warren(a)kumari.net> wrote: On Fri, Apr 26, 2024 at 12:43 AM, Saku Ytti <saku(a)ytti.fi<mailto:saku@ytti.fi>> wrote: On Fri, 26 Apr 2024 at 03:11, David H <ispcolohost(a)gmail.com<mailto:ispcolohost@gmail.com>> wrote: Curious if anyone has particular hardware they like for OOB / serial management, similar to OpenGear, but preferably with 5G support, maybe even T-Mobile support? It’s becoming increasingly difficult to get static IP 4g machine accounts out of Verizon, and the added speed would be nice too. Or do you separate the serial from the access device (cell+firewall, etc.)? You could get a 5G Catalyst with an async NIM or SM. But I think you're setting up yourself for unnecessary costs and failures by designing your OOB to require static IP. You could design it so that the OOB spokes dial-in to the central OOB hub, and the OOB hub doesn't care what IP they come from, using certificates or PSK for identity, instead of IP. Yup, I agree — but that simply rewrites the question to be: "Curious if anyone has particular hardware they like for OOB / serial management, similar to OpenGear, but preferably with 5G support, which can be a spoke that dials in to the central OOB hub, and the OOB hub doesn't care what IP they come from, using certificates or PSK for identity, instead of IP." I've been on the same quest, and I have some additional requests / features. Ideally it: 1: would be small - my particular use-case is for a "traveling rack", and so 0U is preferred. 2: would be fairly cheap. 3: would not be a Raspberry-Pi, a USB hub and USB-to-serial cables. We tried that for a while, and it was clunky — the SD card died a few times (and jumped out entirely once!), people kept futzing with the OS and fighting over which console software to use, installing other packages, etc. 4: support modern SSH clients (it seems like you shouldn't have to say this, but… ) 5: actually be designed as a termserver - the current thing we are using doesn't really understand terminals, and so we need to use 'socat -,raw,echo=0,escape=0x1d TCP:<termserver>:<port>' to get things like tab-completion and "up-arrow for last command" to work. 6: support logging of serial (e.g crash-messages) to some sort of log / buffer / similar (it's useful to be able to see what a device barfed all over the console when it crashes. The Get Console Airconsole TS series meets many of these requirements, but it doesn't do #6. It also doesn't really feel like they have been updating / maintaining these. Yes, I fully acknowledge that #3 falls into the "Doctor, Doctor, it hurts when I do this" camp, but, well… W -- ++ytti

3 3

Weekly Global IPv4 Routing Table Report
by Routing Table Analysis Role Account 26 Apr '24

26 Apr '24

This is an automated weekly mailing describing the state of the Global IPv4 Routing Table as seen from APNIC's router in Japan. The posting is sent to APOPS, NANOG, AfNOG, SANOG, PacNOG, SAFNOG UKNOF, TZNOG, MENOG, BJNOG, SDNOG, CMNOG, LACNOG and the RIPE Routing WG. Daily listings are sent to bgp-stats(a)lists.apnic.net. For historical data, please see https://thyme.apnic.net. If you have any comments please contact Philip Smith <pfsinoz(a)gmail.com>. IPv4 Routing Table Report 04:00 +10GMT Sat 27 Apr, 2024 BGP Table (Global) as seen in Japan. Report Website: https://thyme.apnic.net Detailed Analysis: https://thyme.apnic.net/current/ Analysis Summary ---------------- BGP routing table entries examined: 945677 Prefixes after maximum aggregation (per Origin AS): 361558 Deaggregation factor: 2.62 Unique aggregates announced (without unneeded subnets): 461329 Total ASes present in the Internet Routing Table: 75744 Prefixes per ASN: 12.49 Origin-only ASes present in the Internet Routing Table: 64957 Origin ASes announcing only one prefix: 26638 Transit ASes present in the Internet Routing Table: 10787 Transit-only ASes present in the Internet Routing Table: 515 Average AS path length visible in the Internet Routing Table: 4.3 Max AS path length visible: 55 Max AS path prepend of ASN (265020) 50 Prefixes from unregistered ASNs in the Routing Table: 1054 Number of instances of unregistered ASNs: 1056 Number of 32-bit ASNs allocated by the RIRs: 44273 Number of 32-bit ASNs visible in the Routing Table: 36321 Prefixes from 32-bit ASNs in the Routing Table: 185962 Number of bogon 32-bit ASNs visible in the Routing Table: 16 Special use prefixes present in the Routing Table: 1 Prefixes being announced from unallocated address space: 600 Number of addresses announced to Internet: 3028129152 Equivalent to 180 /8s, 125 /16s and 149 /24s Percentage of available address space announced: 81.8 Percentage of allocated address space announced: 81.8 Percentage of available address space allocated: 100.0 Percentage of address space in use by end-sites: 99.6 Total number of prefixes smaller than registry allocations: 311967 APNIC Region Analysis Summary ----------------------------- Prefixes being announced by APNIC Region ASes: 250709 Total APNIC prefixes after maximum aggregation: 73906 APNIC Deaggregation factor: 3.39 Prefixes being announced from the APNIC address blocks: 242790 Unique aggregates announced from the APNIC address blocks: 100697 APNIC Region origin ASes present in the Internet Routing Table: 14121 APNIC Prefixes per ASN: 17.19 APNIC Region origin ASes announcing only one prefix: 4280 APNIC Region transit ASes present in the Internet Routing Table: 1880 Average APNIC Region AS path length visible: 4.6 Max APNIC Region AS path length visible: 32 Number of APNIC region 32-bit ASNs visible in the Routing Table: 9507 Number of APNIC addresses announced to Internet: 761371776 Equivalent to 45 /8s, 97 /16s and 156 /24s APNIC AS Blocks 4608-4864, 7467-7722, 9216-10239, 17408-18431 (pre-ERX allocations) 23552-24575, 37888-38911, 45056-46079, 55296-56319, 58368-59391, 63488-64098, 64297-64395, 131072-153913 APNIC Address Blocks 1/8, 14/8, 27/8, 36/8, 39/8, 42/8, 43/8, 49/8, 58/8, 59/8, 60/8, 61/8, 101/8, 103/8, 106/8, 110/8, 111/8, 112/8, 113/8, 114/8, 115/8, 116/8, 117/8, 118/8, 119/8, 120/8, 121/8, 122/8, 123/8, 124/8, 125/8, 126/8, 133/8, 150/8, 153/8, 163/8, 171/8, 175/8, 180/8, 182/8, 183/8, 202/8, 203/8, 210/8, 211/8, 218/8, 219/8, 220/8, 221/8, 222/8, 223/8, ARIN Region Analysis Summary ---------------------------- Prefixes being announced by ARIN Region ASes: 275608 Total ARIN prefixes after maximum aggregation: 124937 ARIN Deaggregation factor: 2.21 Prefixes being announced from the ARIN address blocks: 280646 Unique aggregates announced from the ARIN address blocks: 133663 ARIN Region origin ASes present in the Internet Routing Table: 19144 ARIN Prefixes per ASN: 14.66 ARIN Region origin ASes announcing only one prefix: 6970 ARIN Region transit ASes present in the Internet Routing Table: 1980 Average ARIN Region AS path length visible: 3.7 Max ARIN Region AS path length visible: 25 Number of ARIN region 32-bit ASNs visible in the Routing Table: 4891 Number of ARIN addresses announced to Internet: 1268586752 Equivalent to 75 /8s, 157 /16s and 25 /24s ARIN AS Blocks 1-1876, 1902-2042, 2044-2046, 2048-2106 (pre-ERX allocations) 2138-2584, 2615-2772, 2823-2829, 2880-3153 3354-4607, 4865-5119, 5632-6655, 6912-7466 7723-8191, 10240-12287, 13312-15359, 16384-17407 18432-20479, 21504-23551, 25600-26591, 26624-27647, 29696-30719, 31744-33791 35840-36863, 39936-40959, 46080-47103 53248-55295, 62464-63487, 64198-64296, 393216-402332 ARIN Address Blocks 3/8, 4/8, 6/8, 7/8, 8/8, 9/8, 11/8, 12/8, 13/8, 15/8, 16/8, 17/8, 18/8, 19/8, 20/8, 21/8, 22/8, 23/8, 24/8, 26/8, 28/8, 29/8, 30/8, 32/8, 33/8, 34/8, 35/8, 38/8, 40/8, 44/8, 47/8, 48/8, 50/8, 52/8, 53/8, 54/8, 55/8, 56/8, 57/8, 63/8, 64/8, 65/8, 66/8, 67/8, 68/8, 69/8, 70/8, 71/8, 72/8, 73/8, 74/8, 75/8, 76/8, 96/8, 97/8, 98/8, 99/8, 100/8, 104/8, 107/8, 108/8, 128/8, 129/8, 130/8, 131/8, 132/8, 134/8, 135/8, 136/8, 137/8, 138/8, 139/8, 140/8, 142/8, 143/8, 144/8, 146/8, 147/8, 148/8, 149/8, 152/8, 155/8, 156/8, 157/8, 158/8, 159/8, 160/8, 161/8, 162/8, 164/8, 165/8, 166/8, 167/8, 168/8, 169/8, 170/8, 172/8, 173/8, 174/8, 184/8, 192/8, 198/8, 199/8, 204/8, 205/8, 206/8, 207/8, 208/8, 209/8, 214/8, 215/8, 216/8, RIPE Region Analysis Summary ---------------------------- Prefixes being announced by RIPE Region ASes: 265665 Total RIPE prefixes after maximum aggregation: 126893 RIPE Deaggregation factor: 2.09 Prefixes being announced from the RIPE address blocks: 260334 Unique aggregates announced from the RIPE address blocks: 163822 RIPE Region origin ASes present in the Internet Routing Table: 28629 RIPE Prefixes per ASN: 9.09 RIPE Region origin ASes announcing only one prefix: 12121 RIPE Region transit ASes present in the Internet Routing Table: 3978 Average RIPE Region AS path length visible: 4.4 Max RIPE Region AS path length visible: 28 Number of RIPE region 32-bit ASNs visible in the Routing Table: 11759 Number of RIPE addresses announced to Internet: 714824960 Equivalent to 42 /8s, 155 /16s and 93 /24s RIPE AS Blocks 1877-1901, 2043, 2047, 2107-2136, 2585-2614 (pre-ERX allocations) 2773-2822, 2830-2879, 3154-3353, 5377-5631 6656-6911, 8192-9215, 12288-13311, 15360-16383 20480-21503, 24576-25599, 28672-29695 30720-31743, 33792-35839, 38912-39935 40960-45055, 47104-52223, 56320-58367 59392-61439, 61952-62463, 64396-64495 196608-216475 RIPE Address Blocks 2/8, 5/8, 25/8, 31/8, 37/8, 46/8, 51/8, 62/8, 77/8, 78/8, 79/8, 80/8, 81/8, 82/8, 83/8, 84/8, 85/8, 86/8, 87/8, 88/8, 89/8, 90/8, 91/8, 92/8, 93/8, 94/8, 95/8, 109/8, 141/8, 145/8, 151/8, 176/8, 178/8, 185/8, 188/8, 193/8, 194/8, 195/8, 212/8, 213/8, 217/8, LACNIC Region Analysis Summary ------------------------------ Prefixes being announced by LACNIC Region ASes: 121581 Total LACNIC prefixes after maximum aggregation: 28932 LACNIC Deaggregation factor: 4.20 Prefixes being announced from the LACNIC address blocks: 119777 Unique aggregates announced from the LACNIC address blocks: 49590 LACNIC Region origin ASes present in the Internet Routing Table: 11085 LACNIC Prefixes per ASN: 10.81 LACNIC Region origin ASes announcing only one prefix: 2614 LACNIC Region transit ASes present in the Internet Routing Table: 2392 Average LACNIC Region AS path length visible: 4.9 Max LACNIC Region AS path length visible: 55 Number of LACNIC region 32-bit ASNs visible in the Routing Table: 8960 Number of LACNIC addresses announced to Internet: 177147648 Equivalent to 10 /8s, 143 /16s and 15 /24s LACNIC AS Blocks 26592-26623, 27648-28671, 52224-53247, 61440-61951, 64099-64197, 262144-274844 + ERX transfers LACNIC Address Blocks 177/8, 179/8, 181/8, 186/8, 187/8, 189/8, 190/8, 191/8, 200/8, 201/8, AfriNIC Region Analysis Summary ------------------------------- Prefixes being announced by AfriNIC Region ASes: 31060 Total AfriNIC prefixes after maximum aggregation: 6200 AfriNIC Deaggregation factor: 5.01 Prefixes being announced from the AfriNIC address blocks: 41530 Unique aggregates announced from the AfriNIC address blocks: 13091 AfriNIC Region origin ASes present in the Internet Routing Table: 1841 AfriNIC Prefixes per ASN: 22.56 AfriNIC Region origin ASes announcing only one prefix: 653 AfriNIC Region transit ASes present in the Internet Routing Table: 360 Average AfriNIC Region AS path length visible: 4.9 Max AfriNIC Region AS path length visible: 31 Number of AfriNIC region 32-bit ASNs visible in the Routing Table: 1204 Number of AfriNIC addresses announced to Internet: 105882112 Equivalent to 6 /8s, 79 /16s and 162 /24s AfriNIC AS Blocks 36864-37887, 327680-329727 & ERX transfers AfriNIC Address Blocks 41/8, 45/8, 102/8, 105/8, 154/8, 196/8, 197/8, APNIC Region per AS prefix count summary ---------------------------------------- ASN No of nets /20 equiv MaxAgg Description 9808 9891 8744 68 CHINAMOBILE-CN China Mobile Communicati 7545 5668 777 678 TPG-INTERNET-AP TPG Telecom Limited, AU 4538 4938 4192 74 ERX-CERNET-BKB China Education and Rese 7552 3881 1330 20 VIETEL-AS-AP Viettel Group, VN 9498 3610 500 257 BBIL-AP BHARTI Airtel Ltd., IN 7713 3584 1043 63 TELKOMNET-AS-AP PT Telekomunikasi Indon 45899 3288 1872 99 VNPT-AS-VN VNPT Corp, VN 24560 2781 863 372 AIRTELBROADBAND-AS-AP Bharti Airtel Ltd 4766 2308 11524 584 KIXS-AS-KR Korea Telecom, KR 4755 2197 434 195 TATACOMM-AS TATA Communications formerl Complete listing at https://thyme.apnic.net/current/data-ASnet-APNIC ARIN Region per AS prefix count summary --------------------------------------- ASN No of nets /20 equiv MaxAgg Description 16509 9805 11358 3507 AMAZON-02, US 11492 4597 305 618 CABLEONE, US 7155 4169 287 89 VIASAT-SP-BACKBONE, US 6327 3614 1320 79 SHAW, CA 22773 3506 3046 240 ASN-CXA-ALL-CCI-22773-RDC, US 174 3414 6630 840 COGENT-174, US 749 3200 54911 2452 DNIC-AS-00749, US 16625 3113 1323 2217 AKAMAI-AS, US 367 2820 3548 1345 DNIC-ASBLK-00306-00371, US 396982 2767 3639 415 GOOGLE-CLOUD-PLATFORM, US Complete listing at https://thyme.apnic.net/current/data-ASnet-ARIN RIPE Region per AS prefix count summary --------------------------------------- ASN No of nets /20 equiv MaxAgg Description 12479 7709 1708 144 UNI2-AS, ES 39891 4741 285 59 ALJAWWALSTC-AS, SA 20940 3904 3396 132 AKAMAI-ASN1, NL 9009 3298 286 1620 M247, RO 12389 2771 2293 883 ROSTELECOM-AS, RU 8551 2626 368 35 BEZEQ-INTERNATIONAL-AS Bezeqint Interne 34984 2347 363 584 TELLCOM-AS, TR 13188 1607 100 26 TRIOLAN, UA 8452 1563 1852 14 TE-AS TE-AS, EG 44477 1531 100 723 STARK-INDUSTRIES, GB Complete listing at https://thyme.apnic.net/current/data-ASnet-RIPE LACNIC Region per AS prefix count summary ----------------------------------------- ASN No of nets /20 equiv MaxAgg Description 8151 12384 3314 484 UNINET, MX 10620 3526 495 909 Telmex Colombia S.A., CO 13999 2540 351 661 Mega Cable, S.A. de C.V., MX 11830 2004 369 64 Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad 28573 1347 2313 251 Claro NXT Telecomunicacoes Ltda, BR 3816 1314 788 192 COLOMBIA TELECOMUNICACIONES S.A. ESP, C 11664 1165 176 433 Techtel LMDS Comunicaciones Interactiva 6503 1133 314 478 Axtel, S.A.B. de C.V., MX 6147 1104 369 22 Telefonica del Peru S.A.A., PE 22884 1071 114 374 TOTAL PLAY TELECOMUNICACIONES SA DE CV, Complete listing at https://thyme.apnic.net/current/data-ASnet-LACNIC AfriNIC Region per AS prefix count summary ------------------------------------------ ASN No of nets /20 equiv MaxAgg Description 24835 1549 545 28 RAYA-AS, EG 24863 1503 389 20 LINKdotNET-AS, EG 36992 1370 1519 282 ETISALAT-MISR, EG 36903 1249 554 96 MT-MPLS, MA 29571 1203 76 65 ORANGE-COTE-IVOIRE, CI 36935 935 521 42 Vodafone-, EG 6713 556 1861 35 IAM-AS, MA 15399 531 55 54 WANANCHI-, KE 36914 486 82 3 KENET-AS, KE 24757 435 73 5 EthioNet-AS, ET Complete listing at https://thyme.apnic.net/current/data-ASnet-AFRINIC Global Per AS prefix count summary ---------------------------------- ASN No of nets /20 equiv MaxAgg Description 8151 12384 3314 484 UNINET, MX 9808 9891 8744 68 CHINAMOBILE-CN China Mobile Communicati 16509 9805 11358 3507 AMAZON-02, US 12479 7709 1708 144 UNI2-AS, ES 7545 5668 777 678 TPG-INTERNET-AP TPG Telecom Limited, AU 4538 4938 4192 74 ERX-CERNET-BKB China Education and Rese 39891 4741 285 59 ALJAWWALSTC-AS, SA 11492 4597 305 618 CABLEONE, US 7155 4169 287 89 VIASAT-SP-BACKBONE, US 20940 3904 3396 132 AKAMAI-ASN1, NL Complete listing at https://thyme.apnic.net/current/data-ASnet Global Per AS Maximum Aggregation summary ----------------------------------------- ASN No of nets Net Savings Description 9808 9891 9823 CHINAMOBILE-CN China Mobile Communications Grou 12479 7709 7565 UNI2-AS, ES 16509 9805 6298 AMAZON-02, US 7545 5668 4990 TPG-INTERNET-AP TPG Telecom Limited, AU 4538 4938 4864 ERX-CERNET-BKB China Education and Research Net 39891 4741 4682 ALJAWWALSTC-AS, SA 7155 4169 4080 VIASAT-SP-BACKBONE, US 11492 4597 3979 CABLEONE, US 7552 3881 3861 VIETEL-AS-AP Viettel Group, VN 20940 3904 3772 AKAMAI-ASN1, NL Complete listing at https://thyme.apnic.net/current/data-CIDRnet List of Unregistered Origin ASNs (Global) ----------------------------------------- Bad AS Designation Net Originated Transit AS Transit AS Name 65536 DOCUMENT 5.102.30.0/24 65512 -Private Use AS-, ZZ 33123 UNALLOCATED 8.10.69.0/24 174 COGENT-174, US 12169 UNALLOCATED 8.15.207.0/24 32787 PROLEXIC-TECHNOLOGIES-DDOS-M 40493 UNALLOCATED 8.17.26.0/24 3356 LEVEL3, US 46639 UNALLOCATED 8.17.66.0/24 701 UUNET, US 53775 UNALLOCATED 8.20.88.0/24 7029 WINDSTREAM, US 62828 UNALLOCATED 8.21.130.0/24 3356 LEVEL3, US 393266 UNALLOCATED 8.23.52.0/24 46887 CROWNCASTLE-AS46887, US 396894 UNALLOCATED 8.28.201.0/24 46887 CROWNCASTLE-AS46887, US 394936 UNALLOCATED 8.33.224.0/24 22442 HOU-PHONOSCOPE, US Complete listing at https://thyme.apnic.net/current/data-badAS Prefixes from the Special Purpose Address Registry (Global) ----------------------------------------------------------- Prefix Origin AS Description 192.88.99.0/24 6939 HURRICANE, US Complete listing at https://thyme.apnic.net/current/data-spar Advertised Unallocated Addresses -------------------------------- Unassigned Network ASN Information AS Name 23.140.216.0/24 Origin: 27176 DATAWAGON, US 23.140.216.0/24 Transit: 20278 NEXEON, US 23.141.0.0/24 Origin: 395350 RESERVED, ZZ 23.141.0.0/24 Transit: 11426 TWC-11426-CAROLINAS, US 23.176.168.0/24 Origin: 17095 BUILDBUDDY-01, US 23.176.168.0/24 Transit: 36236 NETACTUATE, US 23.189.192.0/24 Origin: 27593 RESERVED, ZZ 23.189.192.0/24 Transit: 174 COGENT-174, US 27.0.192.0/22 Origin: 138415 YANCYLIMITED-AS-HK Yancy Limited, HK 27.0.192.0/22 Transit: 51847 NEAROUTE, HK Complete listing at https://thyme.apnic.net/current/data-add-IANA Number of prefixes announced per prefix length (Global) ------------------------------------------------------- /1:0 /2:0 /3:0 /4:0 /5:0 /6:0 /7:0 /8:16 /9:14 /10:37 /11:95 /12:298 /13:582 /14:1183 /15:2067 /16:13275 /17:8269 /18:13744 /19:24829 /20:43910 /21:51691 /22:111358 /23:98731 /24:574852 /25:726 /26:0 /27:0 /28:0 /29:0 /30:0 /31:0 /32:0 Advertised prefixes smaller than registry allocations ----------------------------------------------------- ASN No of nets Total ann. Description 12479 6820 7709 UNI2-AS, ES 8151 6426 12384 UNINET, MX 11492 3510 4597 CABLEONE, US 39891 3424 4741 ALJAWWALSTC-AS, SA 6327 3410 3614 SHAW, CA 7155 3113 4169 VIASAT-SP-BACKBONE, US 22773 2596 3506 ASN-CXA-ALL-CCI-22773-RDC, US 30036 2153 2499 MEDIACOM-ENTERPRISE-BUSINESS, US 10620 2139 3526 Telmex Colombia S.A., CO 8551 2102 2626 BEZEQ-INTERNATIONAL-AS Bezeqint Internet Backbo Complete listing at https://thyme.apnic.net/current/data-sXXas-nos Number of /24s announced per /8 block (Global) ---------------------------------------------- 1:1653 2:1487 3:332 4:6 5:4528 6:163 7:6 8:1511 9:1 11:172 12:1458 13:365 14:2411 15:317 16:209 17:369 18:767 20:364 21:4 22:188 23:6760 24:2711 25:2 27:2568 29:19 31:2606 32:48 34:61 35:131 36:2294 37:4475 38:7352 39:893 40:122 41:4124 42:985 43:2382 44:314 45:17082 46:4460 47:306 49:1947 50:1925 51:573 52:1578 54:307 55:986 56:5 57:169 58:1922 59:1246 60:1031 61:2597 62:2694 63:1898 64:5522 65:2340 66:4678 67:2991 68:1337 69:4107 70:1190 71:576 72:2889 74:2600 75:1554 76:611 77:2470 78:1854 79:2510 80:2189 81:2008 82:1556 83:1335 84:1656 85:3140 86:848 87:2262 88:1243 89:4089 90:671 91:8102 92:2299 93:2684 94:3663 95:4132 96:1295 97:315 98:1043 99:741 100:74 101:1184 102:3166 103:32588 104:4860 105:656 106:945 107:2791 108:1111 109:4055 110:2148 111:3295 112:2070 113:1594 114:1798 115:2035 116:1897 117:2623 118:2392 119:1970 120:1807 121:1327 122:2688 123:2234 124:1626 125:2887 126:32 128:1483 129:937 130:1130 131:1832 132:804 133:410 134:1733 135:321 136:937 137:1066 138:2823 139:1557 140:1396 141:1367 142:1585 143:1477 144:1001 145:361 146:2053 147:1867 148:2497 149:2699 150:1035 151:1348 152:2050 153:524 154:6469 155:1460 156:2466 157:1753 158:1149 159:2322 160:2654 161:1657 162:3563 163:1700 164:1640 165:2122 166:1173 167:1790 168:3871 169:798 170:4828 171:1024 172:3837 173:3041 174:897 175:1204 176:3641 177:4683 178:3737 179:2221 180:2347 181:3719 182:3437 183:1808 184:2267 185:20753 186:5000 187:4451 188:4066 189:4161 190:9400 191:1466 192:10969 193:9094 194:7493 195:5260 196:3161 197:2476 198:6051 199:7717 200:7993 201:6319 202:10487 203:10176 204:4585 205:3790 206:4494 207:3540 208:4150 209:5061 210:4656 211:2581 212:4270 213:3439 214:1060 215:50 216:6773 217:2950 218:1359 219:579 220:2053 221:1033 222:883 223:2245 End of report

1 0

“With Great Risk Comes Great Reward” A (Tech) Road Less Traveled with ISC's CEO Jeff Osborn, Community Events, Video of the Week, + NANOG Sponsor Showcase
by Nanog News 25 Apr '24

25 Apr '24

*"With Great Risk Comes Great Reward"* *A (Tech) Road Less Traveled with ISC's CEO Jeff Osborn* "When you're a kid working with venture capitalists, everybody talks about taking their money and running to a tropical island…and nobody ever does. But I did," Jeff Osborn, president and CEO of Internet Systems Consortium (ISC), a leading developer of DNS (BIND) and DHCP open-source software, said. "I was 37 years old. I took 15 years off, raced sailboats all over the Caribbean, and blew a king's ransom having way too much fun," he continued. *Why it's worth your time:* Jeff has been a member of NANOG since 2013 and represents our community's incredible professionals. Learn more about his story and our new mentorship program. *READ MORE <https://nanog.org/stories/articles/with-great-risk-comes-great-reward/>* *Community Events * *Midwest Peering Summit* Extend your stay in Kansas City and attend the Midwest Peering Summit, which will take place 13-14 June 2024. Learn more and register here. *Designing and Deploying Computer Networks (DDCN) Course* - This is a special version of the course designed for the NANOG Community. This course will start on May 27th, 2024. Designed for students with a basic understanding of computer hardware and software who are already familiar with personal computers. It begins with teaching the fundamentals of networking, Ethernet, and Wi-Fi technologies. Find out more info + register here. *NANOG Video of the Week!* *Highlight Reel: NANOG 86 - Hollywood* *Why it's worth your time: *At every NANOG meeting, we create a recap video highlighting some memorable moments from the event. It's an opportunity to relive the event + experience what makes a NANOG meeting special. *Catch some familiar faces —you may spot your own!* Start with the recap video of NANOG 86 (Hollywood, 13 - 15 Oct. 2022). Then check out other recap videos from past events on NANOG TV or our YouTube channel. *WATCH NOW <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=45QfCRt-jz4&list=PLO8DR5ZGla8jtquZaIDizi3q-…>* *NANOG Showcase Sponsorships Available! * *Your Logo Belongs Here* Check out our newest offering to connect and network with NANOG attendees over a 3-hour time block in high-traffic areas. Only $8k per booth with a branded table-top banner, provided by NANOG! Contact Shawn Winstead, swinstead(a)nanog.org, to learn more.

1 0

Help with removing DNS shinkhole FP from Charter/Spectrum
by Validin Axon 23 Apr '24

23 Apr '24

Looking for some help/advice. Spectrum is sinkholing my company's domain, validin[.]com, to 127.0.0.54. The sinkhole responses come from their recursive DNS servers, 209.18.47.61 and 209.18.47.62, which are defaults for and in use by many of their customers and are only reachable from within the Spectrum network. I've had 4 people over the last week (think: customers, prospects, etc) who use Charter/Spectrum tell me that they have difficulty accessing my website as a result of this sinkhole behavior. This behavior is causing reputational harm to my company. I've personally confirmed this behavior from the Spectrum network (I am also a customer) using dig to test their DNS servers: ``` $ dig +short @209.18.47.61 validin.com 127.0.0.54 $ dig +short @209.18.47.62 validin.com 127.0.0.54 ``` Using Cloudflare/Google/etc works correctly: ``` $ dig +short @1.1.1.1 validin.com 137.184.54.107 157.245.112.183 $ dig +short @8.8.8.8 validin.com 157.245.112.183 137.184.54.107 ``` I suspect my domain was blocklisted last year when a threat researcher included my domain name in a blog post about a threat they were investigating and cited my company as the source for their data. Someone scraped that post, and my company's domain was accidentally added to two Alient Vault OTX pulses and at least one collection on Virus Total. I removed the domain via false positive reporting from everything I could. However, it appears that being added to Spectrum's DNS sinkhole list is effectively permanent and there's no clear path for false positive remediation. I've tried the official Spectrum support lines for months to no avail, and recently tried reaching out on Twitter, but have had no success there either. I'm clearly not able to find the right people through these routes, as none of the people I reach understand the difference between a DNS sinkhole and an IP block list and don't appear to be aware that DNS blocklisting is a separate behavior from their opt-in content filtering via Security Shield. So, if someone could please help me find the team or individual responsible for Spectrum's DNS sinkhole behavior, I would be exceptionally grateful. :-) As I mentioned, this is causing reputation harm, so switching my own DNS servers is not sufficient. People who need to reach me, can't. So, I would appreciate any other help or advice you have, Kenneth

9 17

OARC 43 - Call for Contribution
by John Todd 23 Apr '24

23 Apr '24

The DNS-OARC Programme Committee is seeking contributions from the community. This workshop will be a hybrid event. Date - likely in the week of 23-27 September 2024, details will be confirmed later Location - South America, exact location will be confirmed later Time zone - approximately 09:00-17:00 UTC -5 (TBC) Partnered/co-located with - related industry events, will be confirmed later Submission requirements Topic must be related to DNS 10 or 20 minutes (there will be additional 5 min of Q&A following each talk) Will be broadcast live and recorded for future reference Presentation slides will be publicly available before, during and after meeting Acceptance Criteria Proposal should be at a high technical level suitable to the audience Submissions should include draft slides or at least detailed description of the proposed talk content PC might require improvements to slides before and after talk acceptance How to submit Submission deadline: 2024-06-23 23:59 UTC You will need to create an account in the Indico system A Step-by-Step guide to submitting in Indico can be found here: <https://bit.ly/49GftMx> Suggested Topics All DNS-related subjects and discussion topics are welcome! Here’s a non-exhaustive list of ideas: Operations: Any operational gotchas, lessons learned from an outage, details/reasons for a recent outage (how to improve time to recovery, tooling), interoperability concerns and experience. Deployment: DNS config management and release process. Monitoring: Log ingestion pipeline, analytics infrastructure, anomaly detection. Scaling: DNS performance management and metrics. Increasing DNS server efficiency Security/Privacy: DNSSEC signing and validation, key storage, qname minimization, DoH/DoT/DoQ Workshop Milestones CFP submissions open in Indico: now Deadline for Submissions: 2024-06-23 23:59 UTC Preliminary list of contributions published: end of June 2024 Full agenda published: beginning of July 2024 Deadline for slides submission - no changes possible: 2024-09-12 23:59 UTC Remote speaker rehearsal: will be confirmed later Relevant Links Registration page and details for presentation submission <https://www.dns-oarc.net/oarc43> FAQ - Submitting a Proposal for the Workshop <https://bit.ly/49GftMx> Contact information (who to contact for what) <https://indico.dns-oarc.net/event/51/page/294-who-do-i-contact> Guidelines for presentation slides <https://www.devconf.info/cz/speakerguide/> Note: DNS-OARC provides registration fee waivers for the workshop to support those who are part of underrepresented groups to speak at and/or attend DNS-OARC. More details will be provided when registration opens. If you have questions or concerns you can contact the Programme Committee: https://www.dns-oarc.net/oarc/programme via submissions(a)dns-oarc.net John Todd, for the DNS-OARC Programme Committee For OARC 43 we are open to patronage and donations to fund the Workshop and associated events. Please contact sponsor(a)dns-oarc.net if your organization is interested in becoming an OARC 43 patron. (Please note that OARC is run on a non-profit basis, and is not in a position to reimburse expenses or time for speakers at its meetings.)

1 0

Question about mutual transit and complex BGP peering
by Sriram, Kotikalapudi (Fed) 22 Apr '24

22 Apr '24

Requesting responses to the following questions. Would be helpful in some IETF work in progress. Q1: Consider an AS peering relationship that is complex (or hybrid) meaning, for example, provider-to-customer (P2C) for one set of prefixes and lateral peers (i.e., transit-free peer-to-peer (P2P)) for another set of prefixes. Are these diverse relationships usually segregated, i.e., P2C on one BGP session and P2P on another? How often they might co-exist within one single BGP session? Q2: Consider an AS peering relationship that is mutual transit (i.e., P2C relationship in each direction for all prefixes). Is this supported within one single BGP session? How often the ASes might setup two separate BGP sessions between them -- one for P2C in one direction (AS A to AS B) and the other for P2C in the opposite direction (AS B to AS A)? Thank you. Sriram Kotikalapudi Sriram, US NIST

2 1

Re: Help with removing DNS shinkhole FP from Charter/Spectrum
by Validin Axon 22 Apr '24

22 Apr '24

Hi Mel, I appreciate the suggestion. During my earlier research, I'd noticed that as well. However, the DNS block includes all validin.com subdomains, covering those on completely different ASNs. It also does NOT affect other domains that resolve to the exact same IP addresses (e.g., validin.net) So, I'm inclined to think it's not that simple, unfortunately. I'd considered switching domains, but that doesn't guarantee the problem wouldn't just reappear again, and it'd impact the search engine ranking we've built up. We rely 100% on inbound, so that'd be a big set back. Warm regards, Kenneth On Mon, Apr 22, 2024 at 10:29 AM Mel Beckman <mel(a)beckman.org> wrote: > > UCEPROTECTL3 137.184.54.107 was listed > > I notice from MXToolbox.com that your domain’s IP address is on the > UCEPROTECTL3 blacklist. > > This is a notoriously evil blacklist that charges people for removal. This > may be why Spectrum is blackholing your domain. Most respectable ISPs won’t > use it. But Spectrum… > > There is no delisting procedure without making a “donation” to the UCEPROTECT3 > black sparrow account. They’re famous for blacklisting large swaths of IP > addresses that catch up innocent parties that have never spammed a flea. > > -mel > > > On Apr 22, 2024, at 7:24 AM, Mel Beckman <mel(a)beckman.org> wrote: > > I notice you’re on the UCEPROTECT3 blacklist: > > <logo_square_1900.png> > Network Tools: DNS,IP,Email > <https://mxtoolbox.com/SuperTool.aspx?action=mx%3aValidin.com&run=toolpage> > mxtoolbox.com > <https://mxtoolbox.com/SuperTool.aspx?action=mx%3aValidin.com&run=toolpage> > <https://mxtoolbox.com/SuperTool.aspx?action=mx%3aValidin.com&run=toolpage> > > UCEPROTECTL3 137.184.54.107 was listed > This is a notoriously evil blacklist that charges people for removal. > This may be why Spectrum is blackholing your domain. Most respectable ISPs > won’t use it. But Spectrum… > > There is no delisting procedure without making a “donation” to the UCEPROTECT3 > black sparrow account. They’re famous for blacklisting large swaths of IP > addresses that catch up innocent parties that have never spammed a flea. > > -mel > > On Apr 22, 2024, at 4:51 AM, Validin Axon <axon(a)validin.com> wrote: > > > Looking for some help/advice. Spectrum is sinkholing my company's domain, > validin[.]com, to 127.0.0.54. The sinkhole responses come from their > recursive DNS servers, 209.18.47.61 and 209.18.47.62, which are defaults > for and in use by many of their customers and are only reachable from > within the Spectrum network. I've had 4 people over the last week (think: > customers, prospects, etc) who use Charter/Spectrum tell me that they have > difficulty accessing my website as a result of this sinkhole behavior. This > behavior is causing reputational harm to my company. > > I've personally confirmed this behavior from the Spectrum network (I am > also a customer) using dig to test their DNS servers: > ``` > $ dig +short @209.18.47.61 validin.com > 127.0.0.54 > $ dig +short @209.18.47.62 validin.com > 127.0.0.54 > ``` > Using Cloudflare/Google/etc works correctly: > ``` > $ dig +short @1.1.1.1 validin.com > 137.184.54.107 > 157.245.112.183 > $ dig +short @8.8.8.8 validin.com > 157.245.112.183 > 137.184.54.107 > ``` > > I suspect my domain was blocklisted last year when a threat researcher > included my domain name in a blog post about a threat they were > investigating and cited my company as the source for their data. Someone > scraped that post, and my company's domain was accidentally added to > two Alient Vault OTX pulses and at least one collection on Virus Total. I > removed the domain via false positive reporting from everything I could. > However, it appears that being added to Spectrum's DNS sinkhole list is > effectively permanent and there's no clear path for false positive > remediation. > > I've tried the official Spectrum support lines for months to no avail, and > recently tried reaching out on Twitter, but have had no success there > either. I'm clearly not able to find the right people through these routes, > as none of the people I reach understand the difference between a DNS > sinkhole and an IP block list and don't appear to be aware that DNS > blocklisting is a separate behavior from their opt-in content filtering via > Security Shield. > > So, if someone could please help me find the team or individual > responsible for Spectrum's DNS sinkhole behavior, I would be exceptionally > grateful. :-) > > As I mentioned, this is causing reputation harm, so switching my own DNS > servers is not sufficient. People who need to reach me, can't. So, I would > appreciate any other help or advice you have, > > Kenneth > >

1 0

Re: Help with removing DNS shinkhole FP from Charter/Spectrum
by Mel Beckman 22 Apr '24

22 Apr '24

I notice from MXToolbox.com that your domain’s IP address is on the UCEPROTECTL3 blacklist. This is a notoriously evil blacklist that charges people for removal. This may be why Spectrum is blackholing your domain. Most respectable ISPs won’t use it. But Spectrum… There is no delisting procedure without making a “donation” to the UCEPROTECT3 black sparrow account. They’re famous for blacklisting large swaths of IP addresses that catch up innocent parties that have never spammed a flea. -mel On Apr 22, 2024, at 4:51 AM, Validin Axon <axon(a)validin.com> wrote: Looking for some help/advice. Spectrum is sinkholing my company's domain, validin[.]com, to 127.0.0.54. The sinkhole responses come from their recursive DNS servers, 209.18.47.61 and 209.18.47.62, which are defaults for and in use by many of their customers and are only reachable from within the Spectrum network. I've had 4 people over the last week (think: customers, prospects, etc) who use Charter/Spectrum tell me that they have difficulty accessing my website as a result of this sinkhole behavior. This behavior is causing reputational harm to my company. I've personally confirmed this behavior from the Spectrum network (I am also a customer) using dig to test their DNS servers: ``` $ dig +short @209.18.47.61 validin.com<http://validin.com> 127.0.0.54 $ dig +short @209.18.47.62 validin.com<http://validin.com> 127.0.0.54 ``` Using Cloudflare/Google/etc works correctly: ``` $ dig +short @1.1.1.1<http://1.1.1.1> validin.com<http://validin.com> 137.184.54.107 157.245.112.183 $ dig +short @8.8.8.8<http://8.8.8.8> validin.com<http://validin.com> 157.245.112.183 137.184.54.107 ``` I suspect my domain was blocklisted last year when a threat researcher included my domain name in a blog post about a threat they were investigating and cited my company as the source for their data. Someone scraped that post, and my company's domain was accidentally added to two Alient Vault OTX pulses and at least one collection on Virus Total. I removed the domain via false positive reporting from everything I could. However, it appears that being added to Spectrum's DNS sinkhole list is effectively permanent and there's no clear path for false positive remediation. I've tried the official Spectrum support lines for months to no avail, and recently tried reaching out on Twitter, but have had no success there either. I'm clearly not able to find the right people through these routes, as none of the people I reach understand the difference between a DNS sinkhole and an IP block list and don't appear to be aware that DNS blocklisting is a separate behavior from their opt-in content filtering via Security Shield. So, if someone could please help me find the team or individual responsible for Spectrum's DNS sinkhole behavior, I would be exceptionally grateful. :-) As I mentioned, this is causing reputation harm, so switching my own DNS servers is not sufficient. People who need to reach me, can't. So, I would appreciate any other help or advice you have, Kenneth

1 0

Re: constant FEC errors juniper mpc10e 400g
by Saku Ytti 22 Apr '24

22 Apr '24

On Sat, 20 Apr 2024 at 14:35, Mark Tinka <mark(a)tinka.africa> wrote: > Even when our market seeks OTN from European backhaul providers to extend submarine access into Europe and Asia-Pac, it is often for structured capacity grooming, and not for OAM benefit. > > It would be interesting to learn whether other markets in the world still make a preference for OTN in lieu of Ethernet, for the OAM benefit, en masse. When I worked in Malaysia back in the day (2007 - 2012), WAN-PHY was generally asked for for 10G services, until about 2010; when folk started to choose LAN-PHY. The reason, back then, was to get that extra 1% of pipe bandwidth :-). Oh I don't think OTN or WAN-PHY have any large deployment future, the cheapest option is 'good enough' and whatever value you could extract from OTN or WAN-PHY, will be difficult to capitalise, people usually don't even capitalise the capabilities they already pay for in the cheaper technologies. Of course WAN-PHY is dead post 10GE, a big reason for it to exist was very old optical systems which simply could not regenerate ethernet framing, not any features or functional benefits. -- ++ytti

6 12

constant FEC errors juniper mpc10e 400g
by Aaron Gould 20 Apr '24

20 Apr '24

We recently added MPC10E-15C-MRATE cards to our MX960's to upgrade our core to 400g. During initial testing of the 400g interface (400GBASE-FR4), I see constant FEC errors. FEC is new to me. Anyone know why this is occurring? Shown below, is an interface with no traffic, but seeing constant FEC errors. This is (2) MX960's cabled directly, no dwdm or anything between them... just a fiber patch cable. {master} me@mx960> clear interfaces statistics et-7/1/4 {master} me@mx960> show interfaces et-7/1/4 | grep rror | refresh 2 ---(refreshed at 2024-04-17 14:18:53 CDT)--- Link-level type: Ethernet, MTU: 1514, MRU: 1522, Speed: 400Gbps, BPDU Error: None, Loop Detect PDU Error: None, Loopback: Disabled, Source filtering: Disabled, Bit errors 0 Errored blocks 0 Ethernet FEC statistics Errors FEC Corrected Errors 0 FEC Uncorrected Errors 0 FEC Corrected Errors Rate 0 FEC Uncorrected Errors Rate 0 ---(refreshed at 2024-04-17 14:18:55 CDT)--- Link-level type: Ethernet, MTU: 1514, MRU: 1522, Speed: 400Gbps, BPDU Error: None, Loop Detect PDU Error: None, Loopback: Disabled, Source filtering: Disabled, Bit errors 0 Errored blocks 0 Ethernet FEC statistics Errors FEC Corrected Errors 4302 FEC Uncorrected Errors 0 FEC Corrected Errors Rate 8 FEC Uncorrected Errors Rate 0 ---(refreshed at 2024-04-17 14:18:57 CDT)--- Link-level type: Ethernet, MTU: 1514, MRU: 1522, Speed: 400Gbps, BPDU Error: None, Loop Detect PDU Error: None, Loopback: Disabled, Source filtering: Disabled, Bit errors 0 Errored blocks 0 Ethernet FEC statistics Errors FEC Corrected Errors 8796 FEC Uncorrected Errors 0 FEC Corrected Errors Rate 146 FEC Uncorrected Errors Rate 0 ---(refreshed at 2024-04-17 14:18:59 CDT)--- Link-level type: Ethernet, MTU: 1514, MRU: 1522, Speed: 400Gbps, BPDU Error: None, Loop Detect PDU Error: None, Loopback: Disabled, Source filtering: Disabled, Bit errors 0 Errored blocks 0 Ethernet FEC statistics Errors FEC Corrected Errors 15582 FEC Uncorrected Errors 0 FEC Corrected Errors Rate 111 FEC Uncorrected Errors Rate 0 ---(refreshed at 2024-04-17 14:19:01 CDT)--- Link-level type: Ethernet, MTU: 1514, MRU: 1522, Speed: 400Gbps, BPDU Error: None, Loop Detect PDU Error: None, Loopback: Disabled, Source filtering: Disabled, Bit errors 0 Errored blocks 0 Ethernet FEC statistics Errors FEC Corrected Errors 20342 FEC Uncorrected Errors 0 FEC Corrected Errors Rate 256 FEC Uncorrected Errors Rate 0 {master} me@mx960> show interfaces et-7/1/4 | grep "put rate" Input rate : 0 bps (0 pps) Output rate : 0 bps (0 pps) {master} me@mx960> show interfaces et-7/1/4 Physical interface: et-7/1/4, Enabled, Physical link is Up Interface index: 226, SNMP ifIndex: 800 Link-level type: Ethernet, MTU: 1514, MRU: 1522, Speed: 400Gbps, BPDU Error: None, Loop Detect PDU Error: None, Loopback: Disabled, Source filtering: Disabled, Flow control: Enabled Pad to minimum frame size: Disabled Device flags : Present Running Interface flags: SNMP-Traps Internal: 0x4000 Link flags : None CoS queues : 8 supported, 8 maximum usable queues Schedulers : 0 Last flapped : 2024-04-17 13:55:28 CDT (00:36:19 ago) Input rate : 0 bps (0 pps) Output rate : 0 bps (0 pps) Active alarms : None Active defects : None PCS statistics Seconds Bit errors 0 Errored blocks 0 Ethernet FEC Mode : FEC119 Ethernet FEC statistics Errors FEC Corrected Errors 801787 FEC Uncorrected Errors 0 FEC Corrected Errors Rate 2054 FEC Uncorrected Errors Rate 0 Link Degrade : Link Monitoring : Disable Interface transmit statistics: Disabled Logical interface et-7/1/4.0 (Index 420) (SNMP ifIndex 815) Flags: Up SNMP-Traps 0x4004000 Encapsulation: ENET2 Input packets : 1 Output packets: 1 Protocol inet, MTU: 1500 Max nh cache: 75000, New hold nh limit: 75000, Curr nh cnt: 1, Curr new hold cnt: 0, NH drop cnt: 0 Flags: Sendbcast-pkt-to-re Addresses, Flags: Is-Preferred Is-Primary Destination: 10.10.10.76/30, Local: 10.10.10.77, Broadcast: 10.10.10.79 -- -Aaron

13 31