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Korea Telecom Contacts?
by just me 28 Oct '03

28 Oct '03

I'm trying to find some KT contacts. Email to the sales contacts on their web pages are vanishing, and we'd really like to colo. Any contact info would be appreciated. thanx! matto --mghali(a)snark.net------------------------------------------<darwin>< Flowers on the razor wire/I know you're here/We are few/And far between/I was thinking about her skin/Love is a many splintered thing/Don't be afraid now/Just walk on in. #include <disclaim.h>

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SoCal fires
by Andy Grosser 28 Oct '03

28 Oct '03

First, I hope everyone is doing OK out there. I experienced a good deal of the surreality of CA's complex ecosystem when I lived there a while back, and I know things can be pretty scary. Secondly, anyone have any outage-related news for network traffic in San Diego, San Bernardino, Ventura, Orange, or LA counties? Peace, and water, Andy --- Andy Grosser, CCNP andy(a)meniscus.org ---

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RE: [arin-announce] IPv4 Address Space (fwd)
by Michel Py 28 Oct '03

28 Oct '03

>> Does anybody honestly think companies will commit the capex >> needed to implement IPv6? > William Leibzon wrote: > Not without additional benefits. I agree, and they're all gone now. To my deepest regrets, IPv6 has become nothing more than IPv4 with more bits (it's actually worse than IPv4 as of today). > We need either applications that are working a lot better at > ipv6 or we may yet have to see ipv4 space ran out before it > becomes clear to everybody that ipv6 is a must. Besides, IPv4 will never run out; as pointed out to me recently, it will simply become more expensive as it becomes rarer, and large and/or wealthy corporation in developed countries will likely always be able to afford it. Note, I'm not saying this is good, all I'm saying is that's just the way it is. Michel.

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RE: ISPs' willingness to take action
by Adam Hall 28 Oct '03

28 Oct '03

Brian.. I would agree with you that sometimes, you can't offer "filtered pipe" services to everyone and expect the same general acceptance of the product across the board. However, how much liability should a business take-on when abuse@ accounts are filling up daily because hundreds of customers not keeping up with Windows Update? We put in filters our WAN a few months back when everyone was feeling the wraths of the various Windows exploit of the week. Still today, we make no exceptions to this rule. We've even lost a few customers in the process, I'm sure. My issue is that in most cases (minus a few exceptions, of course) service providers are bombarded with complaints from customers that a) don't know how to change the default Exchange ports away from 135/139 or the security risk in broadcasting 135/139 to the world, b) didn't think they should have to worry about it (even as they were broadcasting from infected servers and machines on their network), or c) have a textbook MCSE, crash-course CCNA network administrator/consultant didn't really have an understanding of what was going on or how they should respond to it. Personally, I'm beginning to feel doubt that the technology industry will be able to maintain the level of competence and respect that we all need and deserve to have. I can't imagine what the health care industry would be like if ignorance was embraced as well as it seems to be in the technology industry. -Adam >Problem is, some applications, like Outlook for example (if I remember correctly), like to >use the 135, 137, 139 and others to connect to the Exchange server. You block them, and >it will start to croak. You have a lot of home users not using a VPN to connect to their > office exchange servers. I used to do this myself at times. >When you sell a service to someone, and neglect to mention you block certain incoming >ports, especially to a possible business user or home user trying to access their office, >you put yourself in a really bad position. >> By the way, can anybody explain to me a legitimate use for port >> 135/137 traffic across the Internet, like it's somebody's private LAN? >> Seems to me anybody who still thinks that's legitimate is living in the past. >> So, the big question: why don't ISPs do more of this? Are they afraid >> of client reaction? Doesn't wash, for me: most clients would be >> highly grateful, and all it really takes for the remainder is fair >> warning. Cost? >> Again, you can judge for yourselves how low the fruit you choose to >> pick; the biggest gains have the best ROI. >> Happy clients, liberated bandwidth, faster servers -- what's to loose?

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Route-Views peering at PAIX and NSPIXP
by David Meyer 27 Oct '03

27 Oct '03

As part of the "Route-Views Update" presentation delivered at the NANOG 29 in Chicago, we openly invited participants at the PAIX (install pending) and NSPIXP (WIDE) exchanges to peer with Route-Views (AS6447). For those who may have forgotten or were not present, we thought we would repeat the offer. Those willing to peer, please contact us at help(a)routeviews.org. Thanks, The Route-Views Team

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Re: ISPs' willingness to take action
by Stewart, William C (Bill), RTSLS 27 Oct '03

27 Oct '03

Brian Bruns asserts that there are lots of home users connecting to their office Exchange servers without VPNs, and that therefore blocking the Microsoft ports was bad. While I agree with his point that you shouldn't do it without documenting what you are or are not blocking, I'm really surprised to hear the assertion that people are leaving unfirewalled Exchange servers out on the net. Is this actually common? /shudders...

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RE: ISPs' willingness to take action
by Michael.Dillon＠radianz.com 27 Oct '03

27 Oct '03

>VPN technologies are either too weak, like PPTP, too >expensive or difficult to grasp like IPsec, or too new >like the HTTPS tunnels. A couple of years ago, I was working at a company that used Exchange for corporate email. They had a web version of Outlook that, I believe, was part of Exchange server. It is almost a no-brainer to put that up on an HTTPS server. Due to the prevalence of online shopping and banking, even relatively clueless users understand how to look for the secure web browsing icon (key or lock). This is reasonably strong security, cheap to implement and easy to grasp. It's also been proven for almost 10 years now. And if you don't like Outlook's web version, there is always one of the many web email packages like SquirrelMail http://www.squirrelmail.org/ which can use IMAP or POP (both supported on Exchange server) and which can be secured via SSL/HTTPS. Somebody oughta sell a secure email box that plugs in between the Exchange server and the network and includes a secure SMTP server relay, secure POP server, secure IMAP server and secure web email interface. No doubt somebody already supplies boxes like this, and ISPs just have to start reselling them. >I don't recall the source, but it was recently reported >that 40% of the exchange server base is still on the v5.5 >platform. Using that as a general indication, many of >these shops probably won't plan to upgrade anytime soon. According to Google, Exchange 5.5 does both POP and IMAP so the possibility of secure web mail service is there. Seems to me that you could sell some service and educate the users about safe email practices at the same time. --Michael Dillon

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Re: NOAA warning for rf communications
by Chris Yarnell 27 Oct '03

27 Oct '03

my office experienced 802.11b weirdness (sudden bouts of 0% signal for no apparent reason) earlier this week. i'm fully expecting more tomorrow. :) > There is a high likelihood that things like 802.11, licensed and > unlicensed microwave links, and certainly satellite links will sustain > interference over the next few days. I assume that everyone on the list > is both aware, and prepared ;-)

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I-D ACTION:draft-savola-bcp38-multihoming-update-01.txt (fwd)
by Pekka Savola 27 Oct '03

27 Oct '03

FYI, This document has passed the IETF Last Call for Best Current Practice, and has been significantly revised based on the comments. I'll be on the IESG agenda in a couple of weeks. Feedback and comments is still sought (especially, I'd like to reword the title to be more generic, but couldn't figure out anything :-). Sending them off-list would probably be the most appropriate choice. Thanks, Pekka & Fred ---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: Fri, 24 Oct 2003 10:35:41 -0400 From: Internet-Drafts(a)ietf.org To: IETF-Announce: ; Subject: I-D ACTION:draft-savola-bcp38-multihoming-update-01.txt A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories. Title : Ingress Filtering for Multihomed Networks Author(s) : F. Baker, P. Savola Filename : draft-savola-bcp38-multihoming-update-01.txt Pages : 19 Date : 2003-10-23 RFC 2827, BCP 38, is designed to limit the impact of distributed denial of service attacks, by denying traffic with spoofed addresses access to the network, and to help ensure that traffic is traceable to its correct source network. As a side effect of protecting the Internet against such attacks, the network implementing the solution also protects itself from this and other attacks, such as spoofed management access to networking equipment. However, it causes problems of its own. This document addresses the issues and proposes several possible solutions. This memo updates RFC 2827. A URL for this Internet-Draft is: http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-savola-bcp38-multihoming-update-0…

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Re: AOL fixing Microsoft default settings
by Stewart, William C (Bill), RTSLS 27 Oct '03

27 Oct '03

Most ISPs don't provide users with a heavy-duty client that replaces or patches lots of the operating system's functions, though may will offer friendly customized browsers for users who want them, and a few misguided carriers will provide drivers for PPPoE or other evil excuses for protocols (:-) Generally, ISPs tell you the network settings to use on Windows, and tell you or let you guess for other popular operating systems, and they may give you a friendly dialer program that knows how to find their nearest POP but doesn't mess around much. Making major changes to a user's OS violates the principle of Least Astonishment (which is usually a policy problem, not an operational one, though you could argue that having a random network protocol not work quite right on Windows is less astonishing to most users than a flood of popups), but it also often fails to work successfully on security-compromised machines, which is an operational issue. So it won't stop viruses or trojans or spammerbots or crackers or spyware or worms or bad ActiveX or Javascripts. On the other hand, it could reduce some risks on machines that aren't cracked, and could reduce the spam level they receive, and can protect most of the users who aren't doing anything fancy, so as long as it's part of some friendly user interface menu and can be turned on and off it's ok. The alternative place to provide this kind of protection is in the network edge, which is probably the dial POP for most AOL users. If you implement it in a way that can be turned on or off per user, that's usually much cleaner, usually more scalable, and can work even when user machines are compromised. Bill Stewart, bill.stewart(a)pobox.com

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