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Looking Glass Wiki
by Janet Sullivan 25 Jun '04

25 Jun '04

Since I've been hitting a lot of looking glass sites on traceroute.org lately that no longer worked, I decided to make my own list in wiki form. That way, as links drop off the face of the earth, or as new looking glass pages turn up, the community can edit the wiki page to keep it current. If anyone is interested, its at http://www.bgp4.net/cgi-bin/bgp4wiki.cgi?Looking_Glasses_Wiki and currently lists well over 200 looking glasses.

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RE: Attn MCI/UUNet - Massive abuse from your network
by Smith, Donald 25 Jun '04

25 Jun '04

I am not a lawyer. I am not aware of the law that requires uunet to go to court to prevent spammers who are not their direct customers from using their network. Spammers use many differnt means to send their spam. Most ISPs use AUP's to prevent spamming but afaik no isp has successfully sued a spammer and recovered any reasonable percentage of their expenses in fighting this same spam. When that becomes a method to pay for combating spam I am sure most ISPs will pursue it. This is a money issue. NSP/ISP have shareholders who desire a return on their investment. When I notify the abuse team at uunet of a spammer they act promptly shutting down any account that I can show is being used for spam. Chris is a very trusted and active member of the NSP community, to his credit is a detailed document on blackhole filtering one of the primary tools used by other NSP/ISP's for stopping bad traffic. AFAIK he can not authorize legal action against spammers. donald.smith(a)qwest.com my opinions are mine and do not reflect qwest policy. -----Original Message----- From: Dr. Jeffrey Race To: Smith, Donald Cc: nanog(a)merit.edu Sent: 6/24/2004 9:40 PM Subject: RE: Attn MCI/UUNet - Massive abuse from your network On Thu, 24 Jun 2004 19:26:10 -0600, Smith, Donald wrote: >Are you offering to finance ISP's legal battles against spammers? No, it's their network and their legal responsibility to keep it clean. However I did voluntarily prepare a case for Neil Patel to file on behalf of UUNET under the Va computer crimes act, and he refused. I would have been a witness. At this point (esp when he said the matter lay with "Mr Ebbers", who is now up on other criminal charges) it became obvious what was the ethical level of this firm's management. Jeffrey Race

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AOL Orders the Spam Special
by Henry Linneweh 25 Jun '04

25 Jun '04

And just when things looked dismal this had to happen to make it more so.... http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A1898-2004Jun24.html?referrer… -Henry

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Re: Teaching/developing troubleshooting skills
by John Neiberger 25 Jun '04

25 Jun '04

>>> Pete Kruckenberg <pete(a)kruckenberg.com> 6/24/04 5:09:19 PM >>> >It's been so long since I learned network troubleshooting >techniques I can't remember how I learned them or even how I >used to do it (so poorly). > >Does anyone have experience with developing a >skills-improvement program on this topic? I find that it's helpful to teach troubleshooting in two stages: 1) Define the problem. 2) Isolate the problem For stage one, teach them the basic skillset needed to define the issue in a general way based on available information. Is a circuit obviously down? Are certain destinations unreachable? Are *all* destinations unreachable? Is network access slow? You get the picture. Once the nature of the problem is determined, I find that a layered approach to troubleshooting is helpful and that is what I teach to others. The exact order of steps might changed based on information learned in step one, but generally I work my way up the OSI model. If the problem could possibly be caused by a physical layer issue, try to determine such. Check the circuits for errors, bouncing links, indications of mismatched clocking configurations, faulty CSU/DSUs, faulty router interfaces, or bad cabling. If all of that appears to be okay then I consider the datalink layer. Could the problem defined in step one be caused by a datalink layer issue? Was the encapsulation changed on a router interface? If frame relay, is the router seeing LMI from the frame relay switch? Is there evidence of dropped frames completely within the cloud (granted, that's not necessarily datalink layer, but it is a separate 'administrative' layer if it's out of your control.) I'm sure you can think of a number of other examples. Could the problem defined in step one be the results of a network layer issue? Is there evidence of a routing loop? Do the devices involved have routing tables that appear to be correct? What do traceroutes and pings show? Teach them to go hop-by-hop and verify that everything appears as it should, starting with the device closest to the problem if it's possible to narrow it down that far. If routing is determined to be correct, could this be a transport layer issue? Is it possible that an access list or firewall somewhere is blocking only certain types of traffic? Does the problem only involve HTTP? SMTP? Is there policy routing involved that might be redirecting certain types of traffic to the wrong destination? Where there *any* recent configuration changes? If so, what were they? Find out, because they might be the cause of the problem. This is the general framework I use for troubleshooting and that's how I've taught the people that work with me. It's constantly evolving and, of course, the specific steps taken depend on the nature of the issue, but I find that it helps to have a good foundational troubleshooting framework. John --

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RE: Attn MCI/UUNet - Massive abuse from your network
by Smith, Donald 25 Jun '04

25 Jun '04

Michael, I agree totally. Every ISP I know of is working to combat spam. They all have a staffed abuse desk. They all coordinate with other ISP's that is one of the reasons I joined this list. I believe its time to move this to the next level. Follow the money. When you see spam report it to the abuse team for the isp the spam came from AND report the advertiser (follow the link in the spam) to their ISP. Getting the advertiser ($$$) site shutdown will be more effective then getting the trojaned/botted/infected pc disabled. When spam is no longer a profitable method of advertisement then it will end. Till then we will continue to see virii and worms add proxy ports to allow the spammers 1000's of points to bounce their spam off of. Donald.Smith(a)qwest.com GCIA I reserve the right to be wrong but don't exercise it too often. > -----Original Message----- > From: owner-nanog(a)merit.edu [mailto:owner-nanog@merit.edu] On > Behalf Of Michael Painter > Sent: Friday, June 25, 2004 4:11 AM > To: nanog(a)merit.edu > Subject: Re: Attn MCI/UUNet - Massive abuse from your network > > > > ----- Original Message ----- > From: "Dr. Jeffrey Race" <jrace(a)attglobal.net> > To: "Smith, Donald" <Donald.Smith(a)qwest.com> > Cc: <nanog(a)merit.edu> > Sent: Thursday, June 24, 2004 6:22 PM > Subject: RE: Attn MCI/UUNet - Massive abuse from your network > > > > > > On Thu, 24 Jun 2004 21:39:26 -0600, Smith, Donald wrote: > > > > >I am not a lawyer. I am not aware of the law that requires uunet to > > >go to court to prevent spammers who are not their direct > customers from using > > their network. > > > > > > Doctrine of attractive nuisance > > When I worked for IBM back in the '60s, on many occasions > during my 7 years there I heard > upper management say that they were proud to be with a > company that tried to be a "Good Corporate Citizen ". > One branch manager had a cube on his desk which had printed > on each side the(ir) manifesto of Corporate Social Responsibility. > > From the AOL theft article: > "The revelations come as AOL and other Internet providers > have ramped up their efforts to track down the purveyors of > spam, which > has grown into a maddening scourge that costs consumers and > businesses billions of dollars a year." > > Perhaps those Corporate Citizens who can do something to > ensure the viability of E-mail, should. > > --Michael > > > > >

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The Cidr Report
by cidr-report＠potaroo.net 25 Jun '04

25 Jun '04

This report has been generated at Fri Jun 25 21:43:33 2004 AEST. The report analyses the BGP Routing Table of an AS4637 (Reach) router and generates a report on aggregation potential within the table. Check http://www.cidr-report.org/as4637 for a current version of this report. Recent Table History Date Prefixes CIDR Agg 18-06-04 138004 95920 19-06-04 138130 95941 20-06-04 138165 95988 21-06-04 138209 96029 22-06-04 138290 96187 23-06-04 138373 95506 24-06-04 137840 95574 25-06-04 137983 95562 AS Summary 17400 Number of ASes in routing system 7055 Number of ASes announcing only one prefix 1420 Largest number of prefixes announced by an AS AS7018 : ATTW AT&T WorldNet Services 54042880 Largest address span announced by an AS (/32s) AS721 : DNIC DoD Network Information Center Aggregation Summary The algorithm used in this report proposes aggregation only when there is a precise match using the AS path, so as to preserve traffic transit policies. Aggregation is also proposed across non-advertised address space ('holes'). --- 25Jun04 --- ASnum NetsNow NetsAggr NetGain % Gain Description Table 138030 95564 42466 30.8% All ASes AS6347 926 162 764 82.5% SAVV SAVVIS Communications Corporation AS18566 724 8 716 98.9% CVAD Covad Communications AS4134 740 160 580 78.4% CHINANET-BACKBONE No.31,Jin-rong Street AS4323 738 205 533 72.2% TWTC Time Warner Telecom AS7018 1420 978 442 31.1% ATTW AT&T WorldNet Services AS7843 511 128 383 75.0% ADELPH-13 Adelphia Corp. AS6197 704 324 380 54.0% BNS-14 BellSouth Network Solutions, Inc AS701 1275 913 362 28.4% UU UUNET Technologies, Inc. AS22909 393 34 359 91.3% CMCS Comcast Cable Communications, Inc. AS9583 460 120 340 73.9% SATYAMNET-AS Satyam Infoway Ltd., AS27364 376 38 338 89.9% ARMC Armstrong Cable Services AS6198 568 232 336 59.2% BNS-14 BellSouth Network Solutions, Inc AS22773 388 64 324 83.5% CXAB Cox Communications Inc. Atlanta AS1239 949 642 307 32.3% SPRN Sprint AS11172 353 56 297 84.1% Servicios Alestra S.A de C.V AS17676 339 50 289 85.3% JPNIC-JP-ASN-BLOCK Japan Network Information Center AS4355 381 99 282 74.0% ERSD EARTHLINK, INC AS9929 314 33 281 89.5% CNCNET-CN China Netcom Corp. AS6478 320 53 267 83.4% ATTW AT&T WorldNet Services AS6467 289 36 253 87.5% ACSI e.spire Communications, Inc. AS14654 239 6 233 97.5% WAYPOR-3 Wayport AS25844 243 16 227 93.4% SASMFL-2 Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP AS6140 387 165 222 57.4% IMPSA ImpSat AS3356 899 681 218 24.2% LEVEL3 Level 3 Communications AS4766 479 264 215 44.9% KIXS-AS-KR Korea Telecom AS2548 362 165 197 54.4% ATCW Allegiance Telecom Companies Worldwide AS2386 425 229 196 46.1% ADCS-1 AT&T Data Communications Services AS5668 385 196 189 49.1% CIH-12 CenturyTel Internet Holdings, Inc. AS6327 218 34 184 84.4% SHAWC-2 Shaw Communications Inc. AS14824 278 103 175 62.9% NCC-105 NewSouth Communications Corp. Total 16083 6194 9889 61.5% Top 30 total Possible Bogus Routes 24.138.80.0/20 AS11260 AHSICHCL Andara High Speed Internet c/o Halifax Cable Ltd. 24.246.0.0/17 AS7018 ATTW AT&T WorldNet Services 24.246.128.0/18 AS7018 ATTW AT&T WorldNet Services 64.46.4.0/22 AS11711 TULARO TULAROSA COMMUNICATIONS 64.46.12.0/24 AS7850 IHIGHW iHighway.net, Inc. 64.46.27.0/24 AS8674 NETNOD-IX Netnod Internet Exchange Sverige AB 64.46.34.0/24 AS3408 64.46.63.0/24 AS7850 IHIGHW iHighway.net, Inc. 66.114.0.0/19 AS16526 BIRCHT Birch Telecom, Inc. 69.26.32.0/19 AS17307 VIRTEL-15 Virtela Communications 132.0.0.0/10 AS568 DISOUN DISO-UNRRA 137.0.0.0/13 AS721 DNIC DoD Network Information Center 138.136.0.0/13 AS721 DNIC DoD Network Information Center 158.0.0.0/13 AS721 DNIC DoD Network Information Center 192.30.93.0/24 AS17757 HPAUS-AP HP Australia 192.30.94.0/24 AS17757 HPAUS-AP HP Australia 192.30.127.0/24 AS719 LANLINK Elisa Oyj 192.40.105.0/24 AS5515 SONERA-GLOBAL-IP Sonera Solution Autonomous System 192.43.230.0/24 AS4738 SAARDNET-AS South Australian Academic Research and Development Network 192.44.0.0/19 AS702 AS702 MCI EMEA 192.81.182.0/24 AS719 LANLINK Elisa Oyj 192.81.183.0/24 AS719 LANLINK Elisa Oyj 192.81.184.0/24 AS719 LANLINK Elisa Oyj 192.119.135.0/24 AS270 NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration 192.124.252.0/22 AS680 DFN-IP service G-WiN 192.133.6.0/24 AS4004 GLOBALONE-EQUANT-UK Equant UK & Greece Autonomous System 192.135.50.0/24 AS7018 ATTW AT&T WorldNet Services 192.136.71.0/24 AS719 LANLINK Elisa Oyj 192.136.79.0/24 AS719 LANLINK Elisa Oyj 192.153.144.0/21 AS721 DNIC DoD Network Information Center 192.172.0.0/19 AS568 DISOUN DISO-UNRRA 192.188.208.0/20 AS721 DNIC DoD Network Information Center 192.243.32.0/23 AS2044 PALINA Palin Aquisitions Inc. 198.23.26.0/24 AS4390 BELLAT-7 Bell Atlantic, Inc. 198.97.72.0/21 AS568 DISOUN DISO-UNRRA 198.97.80.0/20 AS568 DISOUN DISO-UNRRA 198.97.88.0/24 AS89 NUSC-1 Naval Underwater Systems Center 198.97.240.0/20 AS568 DISOUN DISO-UNRRA 198.97.247.0/24 AS3475 DEPART-52 Department of the Navy 198.101.4.0/22 AS568 DISOUN DISO-UNRRA 198.136.32.0/20 AS19329 MCBCC Martin County Board of County Commissioners 198.144.32.0/19 AS3998 CITY CityNet, Inc. 198.161.87.0/24 AS6539 GTGR GT Group Telecom Services Corp. 198.161.165.0/24 AS852 AGTA Telus Advanced Communications 198.163.155.0/24 AS684 MRN Manitoba Regional Network 198.167.0.0/16 AS7456 INS-51 Interhop Network SERVICES Inc. 198.167.163.0/24 AS15290 ACCA-2 Allstream Corp. Corporation Allstream 198.168.0.0/16 AS701 UU UUNET Technologies, Inc. 198.169.0.0/16 AS803 SASK SaskTel 198.232.133.0/24 AS23075 SKOTOS Skotos Tech, Inc 199.10.0.0/16 AS568 DISOUN DISO-UNRRA 199.60.0.0/20 AS271 UBC-3 University of British Columbia 199.84.0.0/16 AS701 UU UUNET Technologies, Inc. 199.114.0.0/18 AS568 DISOUN DISO-UNRRA 199.114.0.0/21 AS568 DISOUN DISO-UNRRA 199.114.128.0/18 AS568 DISOUN DISO-UNRRA 199.114.130.0/24 AS721 DNIC DoD Network Information Center 199.114.132.0/24 AS721 DNIC DoD Network Information Center 199.114.136.0/24 AS1913 DLA-8 Defense Logistics Agency 199.114.138.0/24 AS721 DNIC DoD Network Information Center 199.114.140.0/24 AS3544 DISAUN DISA/UNRRA 199.114.142.0/24 AS721 DNIC DoD Network Information Center 199.114.144.0/24 AS721 DNIC DoD Network Information Center 199.114.148.0/24 AS721 DNIC DoD Network Information Center 199.114.150.0/24 AS721 DNIC DoD Network Information Center 199.114.152.0/24 AS1913 DLA-8 Defense Logistics Agency 199.114.154.0/24 AS1733 ADP-41 AF DDN PMO 199.114.156.0/24 AS1913 DLA-8 Defense Logistics Agency 199.114.160.0/24 AS1733 ADP-41 AF DDN PMO 199.120.32.0/19 AS16582 NXLI NEXTLEVEL INTERNET, INC. 199.121.0.0/16 AS568 DISOUN DISO-UNRRA 199.123.0.0/18 AS568 DISOUN DISO-UNRRA 199.123.16.0/20 AS568 DISOUN DISO-UNRRA 199.123.80.0/21 AS568 DISOUN DISO-UNRRA 199.189.32.0/19 AS7332 IQUEST IQuest Internet 199.197.8.0/22 AS21814 PARSON-18 Parsons Corp. 199.202.0.0/16 AS701 UU UUNET Technologies, Inc. 202.47.1.0/24 AS7491 PI-PH-AS-AP PI-PHILIPINES 202.56.160.0/20 AS10199 DISHNET-AS-AP DishnetDSL Limited 202.70.0.0/20 AS4658 NETFRONT-AS NETFRONT I.T. LIMITED (HONG KONG) 202.70.28.0/24 AS4515 ERX-STAR Star Internet Services Ltd. 202.73.128.0/22 AS4058 LINKAGENET-AP CPCNet Hong Kong Ltd. 202.93.0.0/20 AS4134 CHINANET-BACKBONE No.31,Jin-rong Street 202.123.96.0/20 AS9288 COMCEN-AS-AP Com-Cen Pty Ltd 202.133.3.0/24 AS9335 CIP-JAPAN-AS-AP ATT IPlus 202.136.128.0/20 AS10199 DISHNET-AS-AP DishnetDSL Limited 202.141.160.0/24 AS9237 HUTCHCA-AS BTN Access Limited 202.141.190.0/24 AS10026 ANC Asia Netcom Corporation 202.164.224.0/19 AS7599 IPXC-AS-AP IP Exchange 203.32.4.0/23 AS7617 203.62.0.0/17 AS7572 AARNET-ACT-RNO Australian Academic and Reasearch Network (AARNet) 203.84.145.0/24 AS4637 REACH Reach Network Border AS 203.84.146.0/24 AS4637 REACH Reach Network Border AS 203.132.107.0/24 AS10236 FOXGOLD-NET-AU-AP FOXGOLD COMMUNICATIONS 203.188.16.0/21 AS4755 VSNL-AS Videsh Sanchar Nigam Ltd. Autonomous System 204.69.144.0/22 AS5668 CIH-12 CenturyTel Internet Holdings, Inc. 204.154.125.0/24 AS3952 TELLAB-1 TELLABS Operations, Inc. 204.154.126.0/24 AS3952 TELLAB-1 TELLABS Operations, Inc. 204.154.127.0/24 AS3952 TELLAB-1 TELLABS Operations, Inc. 204.194.110.0/23 AS30653 EXOBI Exobit Networks Inc. 205.150.0.0/15 AS701 UU UUNET Technologies, Inc. 205.159.72.0/24 AS1660 ANSCOM-5 ANS Communications 206.81.187.0/24 AS19194 SNL-8 Sentris Network LLC 206.167.57.0/24 AS376 RISQR-3 Reseau Interordinateurs Scientique Quebecois (RISQ) 206.191.64.0/18 AS15290 ACCA-2 Allstream Corp. Corporation Allstream 206.251.69.0/24 AS27429 TIL-33 Telesat International Ltd. 206.253.190.0/23 AS8123 POLYBA Polybase 207.231.96.0/19 AS11194 NUNETI NuNet Inc 208.81.187.0/24 AS19194 SNL-8 Sentris Network LLC 209.169.219.0/24 AS189 LVLT Level 3 Communications, Inc. 209.169.223.0/24 AS189 LVLT Level 3 Communications, Inc. 209.172.0.0/18 AS7770 TRTI Triton Technologies, Inc. 209.205.69.0/24 AS21578 Universidad autonoma de Bucaramanga 209.205.70.0/24 AS21578 Universidad autonoma de Bucaramanga 209.205.81.0/24 AS15066 SkyNet de Colombia S.A. 209.205.82.0/24 AS15066 SkyNet de Colombia S.A. 209.205.84.0/24 AS15066 SkyNet de Colombia S.A. 209.213.32.0/19 AS10629 INS-52 Inter-Pacific Network Services 209.213.50.0/24 AS10629 INS-52 Inter-Pacific Network Services 209.213.51.0/24 AS10629 INS-52 Inter-Pacific Network Services 209.213.55.0/24 AS10629 INS-52 Inter-Pacific Network Services 209.213.56.0/24 AS10629 INS-52 Inter-Pacific Network Services 209.222.137.0/24 AS27429 TIL-33 Telesat International Ltd. 209.251.0.0/19 AS11036 SISCOM-1 SISCOM, Inc 216.96.128.0/18 AS7018 ATTW AT&T WorldNet Services 216.145.130.0/24 AS11937 TRXI TRX Inc. 216.145.132.0/24 AS11937 TRXI TRX Inc. 216.145.133.0/24 AS11937 TRXI TRX Inc. 216.145.134.0/24 AS11937 TRXI TRX Inc. 216.145.135.0/24 AS11937 TRXI TRX Inc. 216.145.152.0/24 AS10758 INWAVE INWave Internet, Inc 216.145.156.0/24 AS20304 JIS-32 JVLNET Internet Services 216.145.158.0/24 AS20304 JIS-32 JVLNET Internet Services 216.145.176.0/21 AS20304 JIS-32 JVLNET Internet Services 216.145.177.0/24 AS20304 JIS-32 JVLNET Internet Services 216.145.178.0/24 AS20304 JIS-32 JVLNET Internet Services 216.145.184.0/21 AS10758 INWAVE INWave Internet, Inc 216.145.200.0/21 AS20304 JIS-32 JVLNET Internet Services 216.186.151.0/24 AS3356 LEVEL3 Level 3 Communications 216.186.152.0/21 AS3356 LEVEL3 Level 3 Communications 216.186.160.0/23 AS3356 LEVEL3 Level 3 Communications 216.186.164.0/22 AS3356 LEVEL3 Level 3 Communications 216.186.192.0/22 AS3356 LEVEL3 Level 3 Communications 216.186.198.0/23 AS3356 LEVEL3 Level 3 Communications 216.186.248.0/23 AS3356 LEVEL3 Level 3 Communications Please see http://www.cidr-report.org for the full report ------------------------------------ Copies of this report are mailed to: nanog(a)merit.edu eof-list(a)ripe.net apops(a)apops.net routing-wg(a)ripe.net afnog(a)afnog.org swinog(a)swinog.ch

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Re: Attn MCI/UUNet - Massive abuse from your network
by Dr. Jeffrey Race 25 Jun '04

25 Jun '04

On Thu, 24 Jun 2004 16:27:32 +0200, Brad Knowles wrote: >> It is the same way credit reporting works: you mess up, you get no>> credit. > Except then you can generate yet another fake credit card and go >on with your life. Do that a few thousand times a day, even -- no >problem. > The credit reporting scheme only works against people who are >willing to play by the rules. Even then, it only hurts the >legitimate credit card holders who don't know how to fight the system. >> Come on guys, you are all smart engineers. This is not rocket science. > > See above. Credit card fraud is a multi-billion dollar business. >When the credit card companies have figured out this problem, maybe >we can apply similar techniques to the spam problem. Please, this is trivial. You have to prove your personal identity. What many firms do is to require a bank to certify it. The credit card thievery to which you refer is done anonymously; not relevant here

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SprintPCS spam policies
by Bruce Robertson 25 Jun '04

25 Jun '04

I just wanted to give everyone a heads-up on the antispam policies of SprintPCS, so that you will know what to expect if you start getting blocked by their mx.messaging.sprintpcs.com mail servers. Background: One of our customers was infected by one of the viruses that spams SprintPCS cell phones. Naturally we were blocked when this occurred, which is what I would expect. Once we detected the problem, we suspended the customer until they cleaned out the virus. Here's what we discovered from this: When you are blocked by SprintPCS, they simply disconnect the SMTP connection without an error of any kind. They provide no way to contact them on this. We had to have our Sprint Internet sales person find out who to contact. It would have been very helpful if there was contact information displayed on an SMTP banner before disconnecting. When a clueful person finally called me a week later, I was treated with suspicion. It was clear that he didn't believe me when I said a customer was infected by a virus, even though the existence of virii that have that behavior is clear with a quick Google search. He clearly considered me to be a spammer, rather than a responsible ISP. The SprintPCS person finally agreed to remove the block for my network, with the exception of the one mail server that my customer was using. He utterly refused to remove the block for that server, in spite of the fact that it hasn't sent them any spam for a week. This leaves me having to explain to my customers sending legitimate text pages why their email bounces occasionally. It also is ineffective, because I can easily change the IP address of the mail server they're blocking. If anyone has similar experience, I hope you fare better. -- Bruce Robertson, President/CEO +1-775-348-7299 Great Basin Internet Services, Inc. fax: +1-775-348-9412 http://www.greatbasin.net

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RE: Attn MCI/UUNet - Massive abuse from your network
by Smith, Donald 25 Jun '04

25 Jun '04

Are you offering to finance ISP's legal battles against spammers? -----Original Message----- From: owner-nanog(a)merit.edu To: Ben Browning Cc: nanog(a)merit.edu Sent: 6/24/2004 9:16 PM Subject: Re: Attn MCI/UUNet - Massive abuse from your network On Thu, 24 Jun 2004 11:50:44 -0700, Ben Browning wrote: >Likewise, I imagine MCI could argue that the damage is to their core >product; namely, the trust of other ISPs and their willingness to exchange >traffic with MCI. This was Earthlink's argument in the case I cited in <http://www.camblab.com/nugget/spam_03.pdf>: their connectivity was jeopardized by the spammer's activity. As far as I know they prevailed. The point is, we have not seen MCI go down valiantly on the field of battle against the spammers in court or anywhere else. I proposed a complete open-and-shut legal case to MCI, with the perp's legal service address, and Neil Patel refused to take any action. The management's intention was clear: continue to profit rather than take the perps to court. All this talk about how difficult it would be blah blah blah is just a smokescreen for inaction Jeffrey Race

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RE: Unplugging spamming PCs
by Joe Shen 25 Jun '04

25 Jun '04

Hi, >Mail servers should be registered just like domains and shutdown by a >registrar if they are misusing their registered services. This really >needs to be handled by a multi-lateral legal solution, industry will not >fix it alone. No, I don't think this is good solution First of all, we could not ask customers to register everything they planned with leased line without legal reasons. Second, if I hire DSL/leased_line service from ISP and set up domain name for myself, ISP could not ask me to tell them which port should be opened as I'm not taking a firewalling service, I'm not a member of my service provider. I should be able to do anything that are not perhibited by law or affact someothers. Blocking_port_25 indicates ISP pre-assume that customers will SPAM their network. But, SPAMmer is just a very small group of people. Maybe most of them comes from other countries ( what happens in China). To me, the proper way of anti-spam may ask cooperation between ISPs and Email service providers. Anyway, strengthening anti-spam ability in Email server is a must. regards Joe > >LP > >Best Regards, > >Larry Cool Things Happen When Mac Users Meet! Join the community in Boston this July: www.macworldexpo.com

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