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Federal Security Bureau asks for more authority to control Internet
by Sean Donelan 29 Apr '05

29 Apr '05

http://en.rian.ru/russia/20050428/39757635.html The Federal Security Service proposes setting new rules for Internet providers so that it could prevent the spread of extremist ideas, track down illegal online operations, and get access to databases with mobile telephone subscribers' details, such as e-mail addresses, Frolov said. There should be compulsory registration of mobile phone users with Internet connectivity.

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ICANN needs you!
by Rodney Joffe 29 Apr '05

29 Apr '05

Folks, The archives of NANOG are riddled with complaints and comments about the lack of competent representation and influence for the networking community within the ICANN world. So this is your opportunity to make your voice heard through action that actually carries influence. And responsibility. The Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) has just posted a call for recommendations and statements of interest for leadership positions on its Board of Directors and its Supporting Organizations. Additional detail are contained below. Note: the submission deadline is 15 June 2005. I encourage every one of you (the positions encompass almost all constituencies) to read the material below, and to consider who might be appropriate and strong candidates in each area for such submissions. If you have any suitable candidates in mind, please take action. Your participation is crucial to the direction that ICANN takes, and the decisions it makes. This is the step that can lead to significant changes. If you're interested in being considered, you can also submit a statement of interest directly. Please feel free to redistribute this message to any and all relevant individuals and groups. Rodney Joffe Member, 2005 Nominating Committee ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~oOo~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ The ICANN Nominating Committee invites Recommendations and Statements of Interest from the community as it seeks qualified candidates for the following positions: - two members of the ICANN Board of Directors; - two members of the Council of the Generic Names Supporting Organization (GNSO); - one member of the Council of the Country-Code Names Supporting Organization (ccNSO); and - three members of the At Large Advisory Committee (ALAC). Those individuals selected by the Nominating Committee will have a unique opportunity to work with accomplished colleagues from around the globe, address intriguing technical coordination problems and related policy development challenges with diverse functional, cultural, and geographic dimensions, and gain valuable insights and experience from working across these boundaries of knowledge, responsibility and perspective. Additionally, those selected will gain the satisfaction of making a valuable public service contribution. Placing the broad public interest ahead of any particular interests, they will help ensure the stability and security of the Internet for critically important societal functions. These voluntary positions are not remunerated, although direct expenses incurred in the course of duty may be reimbursed. These positions may involve significant international travel, including personal presence at periodic ICANN meetings, as well as regular telephone and Internet communications. Candidates should be women and men with a high level of qualifications and experience with an international outlook including some familiarity with the Internet. They should be prepared to contribute to the collective decision-making process among ICANN's constituencies, supporting organizations and advisory bodies. Selection criteria, eligibility factors, roles of each position, application procedure, and contacts are posted at: http://www.icann.org/committees/nom-comm/formalcall-22apr05.htm Applications will be handled confidentially and should be received by 12:00 GMT on 15 June 2005 for full consideration. Selections will be made in October with service beginning in December 2005. ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~oOo~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

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RE: Internet impact of Apple Tiger
by Mark Segal 29 Apr '05

29 Apr '05

> Yes, but the difference is that Firefox doesn't come with a > pre-populated set of news feeds. Mine did. (although it is aggregated by mozilla) Mark -- Mark Segal Director, Corporate Strategy FCI Broadband Tel: 905-284-4070 Fax: 416-987-4701 http://www.fcibroadband.com

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Re: PAIX Outages
by Brandon Butterworth 29 Apr '05

29 Apr '05

> > > With public peering you simply never know how much spare > > > capacity your peer has free. > > > > So? That doesn't make public peering bad, you don't know that > > for PI or transit either > > For PI I know how much spare I have towards them, taking for > granted they can move the traffic. That's still no different than public, the two may terminate in the same router/back haul. If you assume for one you may as well assume for both > > Yes and more fool you if they have and you haven't > > This was not about 'my' or 'our' side, believe me... The royal you, not personally brandon

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Re: PAIX Outages
by Brandon Butterworth 29 Apr '05

29 Apr '05

> With public peering you simply never know how much spare > capacity your peer has free. So? That doesn't make public peering bad, you don't know that for PI or transit either > And would you expect your > peer with 400 Mbit/s total to have 400 reserved on his AMSIX > port for you when you see 300 at LINX and LINX goes down? Yes and more fool you if they have and you haven't Of course commercially that may be something you gamble with for profit margin brandon

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The Cidr Report
by cidr-report＠potaroo.net 29 Apr '05

29 Apr '05

This report has been generated at Fri Apr 29 21:44:46 2005 AEST. The report analyses the BGP Routing Table of an AS4637 (Reach) router and generates a report on aggregation potential within the table. Check http://www.cidr-report.org/as4637 for a current version of this report. Recent Table History Date Prefixes CIDR Agg 22-04-05 156923 107484 23-04-05 157135 107456 24-04-05 157077 107474 25-04-05 157045 107557 26-04-05 157177 107650 27-04-05 157306 107816 28-04-05 157320 107880 29-04-05 157191 107933 AS Summary 19431 Number of ASes in routing system 7964 Number of ASes announcing only one prefix 1469 Largest number of prefixes announced by an AS AS7018 : ATT-INTERNET4 - AT&T WorldNet Services 90497280 Largest address span announced by an AS (/32s) AS721 : DLA-ASNBLOCK-AS - DoD Network Information Center Aggregation Summary The algorithm used in this report proposes aggregation only when there is a precise match using the AS path, so as to preserve traffic transit policies. Aggregation is also proposed across non-advertised address space ('holes'). --- 29Apr05 --- ASnum NetsNow NetsAggr NetGain % Gain Description Table 157240 107940 49300 31.4% All ASes AS4323 1105 228 877 79.4% TWTC - Time Warner Telecom AS18566 801 8 793 99.0% COVAD - Covad Communications AS4134 894 220 674 75.4% CHINANET-BACKBONE No.31,Jin-rong Street AS721 1117 563 554 49.6% DLA-ASNBLOCK-AS - DoD Network Information Center AS7018 1469 944 525 35.7% ATT-INTERNET4 - AT&T WorldNet Services AS27364 539 22 517 95.9% ACS-INTERNET - Armstrong Cable Services AS22773 481 23 458 95.2% CCINET-2 - Cox Communications Inc. AS6197 892 472 420 47.1% BATI-ATL - BellSouth Network Solutions, Inc AS3602 506 143 363 71.7% SPRINT-CA-AS - Sprint Canada Inc. AS17676 431 78 353 81.9% JPNIC-JP-ASN-BLOCK Japan Network Information Center AS9929 350 46 304 86.9% CNCNET-CN China Netcom Corp. AS4766 571 278 293 51.3% KIXS-AS-KR Korea Telecom AS6478 406 114 292 71.9% ATT-INTERNET3 - AT&T WorldNet Services AS9583 729 457 272 37.3% SIFY-AS-IN Sify Limited AS6140 403 135 268 66.5% IMPSAT-USA - ImpSat AS7545 492 231 261 53.0% TPG-INTERNET-AP TPG Internet Pty Ltd AS14654 264 6 258 97.7% WAYPORT - Wayport AS9443 374 123 251 67.1% INTERNETPRIMUS-AS-AP Primus Telecommunications AS1239 905 659 246 27.2% SPRINTLINK - Sprint AS15270 271 36 235 86.7% AS-PAETEC-NET - PaeTec.net -a division of PaeTecCommunications, Inc. AS23126 253 18 235 92.9% KMCTELCOM-DIA - KMC Telecom, Inc. AS5668 488 264 224 45.9% AS-5668 - CenturyTel Internet Holdings, Inc. AS6198 458 234 224 48.9% BATI-MIA - BellSouth Network Solutions, Inc AS2386 846 629 217 25.7% INS-AS - AT&T Data Communications Services AS9498 288 74 214 74.3% BBIL-AP BHARTI BT INTERNET LTD. AS11456 317 110 207 65.3% NUVOX - NuVox Communications, Inc. AS6167 277 78 199 71.8% CELLCO-PART - Cellco Partnership AS6517 318 128 190 59.7% YIPESCOM - Yipes Communications, Inc. AS6467 432 253 179 41.4% ESPIRECOMM - e.spire Communications, Inc. AS6147 197 20 177 89.8% Telefonica del Peru S.A.A. Total 16874 6594 10280 60.9% Top 30 total Possible Bogus Routes 24.246.0.0/17 AS7018 ATT-INTERNET4 - AT&T WorldNet Services 24.246.128.0/18 AS7018 ATT-INTERNET4 - AT&T WorldNet Services 64.9.224.0/19 AS209 ASN-QWEST - Qwest 64.17.32.0/24 AS13488 CBWU-13488 - Continental Broadband Florida, Inc DBA WebUnited 64.17.33.0/24 AS13488 CBWU-13488 - Continental Broadband Florida, Inc DBA WebUnited 64.17.37.0/24 AS13488 CBWU-13488 - Continental Broadband Florida, Inc DBA WebUnited 64.57.203.0/24 AS22822 LLNW - Limelight Networks, LLC 64.127.0.0/18 AS7018 ATT-INTERNET4 - AT&T WorldNet Services 66.37.96.0/20 AS3764 IA-HOU-AS - Internet America, Inc. 66.164.232.0/24 AS6197 BATI-ATL - BellSouth Network Solutions, Inc 67.47.0.0/17 AS4765 WORLDNET-AS World Net & Services Co., Ltd. 67.47.0.0/18 AS4765 WORLDNET-AS World Net & Services Co., Ltd. 67.47.64.0/18 AS4765 WORLDNET-AS World Net & Services Co., Ltd. 172.32.0.0/24 AS7011 CITLINK - Citizens Utilities 172.122.28.0/24 AS210 WEST-NET-WEST - Utah Education Network 192.30.93.0/24 AS17757 HPAUS-AP HP Australia 192.30.94.0/24 AS17757 HPAUS-AP HP Australia 192.40.105.0/24 AS5515 SONERA-GLOBAL-IP Sonera Solution Autonomous System 192.43.230.0/24 AS7575 AARNET-AS-AP Australian Academic and Reasearch Network (AARNet) 192.44.0.0/19 AS702 AS702 MCI EMEA - Commercial IP service provider in Europe 192.44.0.0/24 AS5501 FRAUNHOFER-CLUSTER-BW Fraunhofer Gesellschaft 192.70.164.0/24 AS25689 NRCNET-AS - National Research Council of Canada 192.81.182.0/24 AS719 ELISA-AS Elisa Oyj 192.81.183.0/24 AS719 ELISA-AS Elisa Oyj 192.81.184.0/24 AS719 ELISA-AS Elisa Oyj 192.119.135.0/24 AS270 PSCNI-AS - National Aeronautics and Space Administration 192.124.252.0/22 AS680 DFN-IP service G-WiN 192.133.6.0/24 AS4004 GLOBALONE-EQUANT-UK Equant UK & Greece Autonomous System 192.135.50.0/24 AS7018 ATT-INTERNET4 - AT&T WorldNet Services 192.136.53.0/24 AS8346 SONATEL-AS Autonomous System 192.153.144.0/21 AS721 DLA-ASNBLOCK-AS - DoD Network Information Center 192.172.0.0/19 AS721 DLA-ASNBLOCK-AS - DoD Network Information Center 192.188.208.0/20 AS721 DLA-ASNBLOCK-AS - DoD Network Information Center 192.200.100.0/24 AS7018 ATT-INTERNET4 - AT&T WorldNet Services 196.2.95.0/24 AS8668 TELONE-AS TelOne Zimbabwe P/L 196.3.162.0/24 AS6083 AFRINIC African Network Information Center 198.23.26.0/24 AS4390 BELLATLANTIC-COM - Bell Atlantic, Inc. 198.97.72.0/21 AS721 DLA-ASNBLOCK-AS - DoD Network Information Center 198.97.80.0/20 AS721 DLA-ASNBLOCK-AS - DoD Network Information Center 198.97.88.0/24 AS89 NUSC-CSTLNET-AS - Naval Underwater Systems Center 198.97.240.0/20 AS721 DLA-ASNBLOCK-AS - DoD Network Information Center 198.97.247.0/24 AS3475 LANT-AFLOAT - Department of the Navy 198.101.4.0/22 AS721 DLA-ASNBLOCK-AS - DoD Network Information Center 198.136.32.0/20 AS19329 MCNET - Martin County Board of County Commissioners 198.144.32.0/19 AS3998 CITY-NET - CityNet, Inc. 198.160.171.0/24 AS7046 UUNET-CUSTOMER - UUNET Technologies, Inc. 198.161.87.0/24 AS6539 GROUPTLCOM - GT Group Telecom Services Corp. 198.163.155.0/24 AS684 MBNET-AS - Manitoba Regional Network 198.167.0.0/16 AS7456 INTERHOP - Interhop Network SERVICES Inc. 198.167.163.0/24 AS15290 ALLST-15290 - Allstream Corp. Corporation Allstream 198.168.0.0/16 AS701 ALTERNET-AS - UUNET Technologies, Inc. 198.169.0.0/16 AS803 SASKTEL - SaskTel 198.232.133.0/24 AS23075 SKOTOS-AS - Skotos Tech, Inc 199.10.0.0/16 AS721 DLA-ASNBLOCK-AS - DoD Network Information Center 199.60.0.0/20 AS271 BCNET-AS - University of British Columbia 199.96.44.0/23 AS19092 360NETWORKS-US - 360Networks (USA) Inc. 199.96.46.0/24 AS19092 360NETWORKS-US - 360Networks (USA) Inc. 199.114.0.0/21 AS721 DLA-ASNBLOCK-AS - DoD Network Information Center 199.114.128.0/18 AS721 DLA-ASNBLOCK-AS - DoD Network Information Center 199.114.130.0/24 AS721 DLA-ASNBLOCK-AS - DoD Network Information Center 199.114.132.0/24 AS721 DLA-ASNBLOCK-AS - DoD Network Information Center 199.114.134.0/24 AS3541 ITSDN-U4 - DISA/UNRRA 199.114.136.0/24 AS27044 DDN-ASNBLK1 - DoD Network Information Center 199.114.138.0/24 AS721 DLA-ASNBLOCK-AS - DoD Network Information Center 199.114.140.0/24 AS3544 ITSDN-U7 - DISA/UNRRA 199.114.142.0/24 AS721 DLA-ASNBLOCK-AS - DoD Network Information Center 199.114.144.0/24 AS721 DLA-ASNBLOCK-AS - DoD Network Information Center 199.114.148.0/24 AS721 DLA-ASNBLOCK-AS - DoD Network Information Center 199.114.150.0/24 AS721 DLA-ASNBLOCK-AS - DoD Network Information Center 199.114.152.0/24 AS27033 DDN-ASNBLK1 - DoD Network Information Center 199.114.153.0/24 AS27034 DDN-ASNBLK1 - DoD Network Information Center 199.114.154.0/24 AS1733 CENTAF-SWA - AF DDN PMO 199.114.156.0/24 AS27034 DDN-ASNBLK1 - DoD Network Information Center 199.114.160.0/24 AS1733 CENTAF-SWA - AF DDN PMO 199.120.32.0/19 AS16582 NEXTLEVELINTERNET - NEXTLEVEL INTERNET, INC. 199.121.0.0/16 AS721 DLA-ASNBLOCK-AS - DoD Network Information Center 199.123.0.0/18 AS721 DLA-ASNBLOCK-AS - DoD Network Information Center 199.123.16.0/20 AS721 DLA-ASNBLOCK-AS - DoD Network Information Center 199.123.80.0/21 AS721 DLA-ASNBLOCK-AS - DoD Network Information Center 199.189.32.0/19 AS7332 IQUEST-AS - IQuest Internet 199.202.0.0/16 AS701 ALTERNET-AS - UUNET Technologies, Inc. 202.86.252.0/22 AS4748 RESOLINK-AS Resources Linke Network Limited 202.93.0.0/20 AS4134 CHINANET-BACKBONE No.31,Jin-rong Street 202.164.224.0/19 AS7599 IPXC-AS-AP IP Exchange 203.32.4.0/23 AS7617 TELEONE-HK TeleTeleOne (HK) Limited 203.62.0.0/17 AS7572 AARNET-ACT-RNO Australian Academic and Reasearch Network (AARNet) 203.99.0.0/19 AS17746 ORCONINTERNET-NZ-AP Orcon Internet 203.99.142.0/24 AS9826 ILINK-HK-AP iLink.net Ltd 203.210.69.0/24 AS17536 PRODIGY-AS-AP Prodidgy Telecommunications 204.48.118.0/23 AS29912 CITIZENS-PROPERTY-INSURANCE-CORPORATION - Citizens Property Insurance Corporation 204.48.119.0/24 AS29912 CITIZENS-PROPERTY-INSURANCE-CORPORATION - Citizens Property Insurance Corporation 204.154.125.0/24 AS3952 TELLABS-ASN - TELLABS Operations, Inc. 204.154.126.0/24 AS3952 TELLABS-ASN - TELLABS Operations, Inc. 204.154.127.0/24 AS3952 TELLABS-ASN - TELLABS Operations, Inc. 204.194.110.0/23 AS30653 EXOBIT - Exobit Networks Inc. 205.150.0.0/15 AS701 ALTERNET-AS - UUNET Technologies, Inc. 206.108.96.0/19 AS577 BACOM - Bell Advanced Communications Inc. 206.128.104.0/21 AS11709 VIC - VIRTUAL INTERACTIVE CENTER 206.167.57.0/24 AS376 RISQ-AS - Reseau Interordinateurs Scientique Quebecois (RISQ) 206.191.64.0/18 AS15290 ALLST-15290 - Allstream Corp. Corporation Allstream 206.191.96.0/19 AS15290 ALLST-15290 - Allstream Corp. Corporation Allstream 207.231.96.0/19 AS11194 NUNETPA - NuNet Inc 208.53.224.0/19 AS13576 SDNET - SOUTH DAKOTA NETWORK 208.138.48.0/20 AS7955 SOURCENET - SourceNet Corporation 209.27.51.0/24 AS14132 INTERNETGATEWAY - Internet Gateway Inc. 209.134.0.0/18 AS8082 WORLDSITE - Worldsite Networks 209.205.69.0/24 AS21578 Universidad autonoma de Bucaramanga 209.205.70.0/24 AS21578 Universidad autonoma de Bucaramanga 209.205.81.0/24 AS15066 SkyNet de Colombia S.A. 209.205.82.0/24 AS15066 SkyNet de Colombia S.A. 209.205.84.0/24 AS15066 SkyNet de Colombia S.A. 209.213.32.0/19 AS10629 INTERPAC - Inter-Pacific Network Services 209.222.137.0/24 AS27429 TIL - Telesat International Ltd. 209.251.0.0/19 AS11036 SISCOM - SISCOM, Inc 216.37.110.0/23 AS4264 CERNET-ASN-BLOCK - California Education and Research Federation Network 216.82.160.0/20 AS13823 CALYX-USA - Calyx Internet Access Corp. 216.96.128.0/18 AS7018 ATT-INTERNET4 - AT&T WorldNet Services 216.145.200.0/21 AS20304 JVLNET - JVLNET Internet Services 216.171.96.0/20 AS3356 LEVEL3 Level 3 Communications Please see http://www.cidr-report.org for the full report ------------------------------------ Copies of this report are mailed to: nanog(a)merit.edu eof-list(a)ripe.net apops(a)apops.net routing-wg(a)ripe.net afnog(a)afnog.org swinog(a)swinog.ch

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NANOG going to be available over IPv6 ?
by Jeroen Massar 29 Apr '05

29 Apr '05

Hi, I just noticed the allocation of 2001:48a8::/32 to MERIT, does this mean NANOG is going to be available over IPv6 soon ? :) BTW: google's allocation is already visible in the routing tables, microsoft has one but it is not visible (yet) Greets, Jeroen -- OrgName: Merit Network Inc. OrgID: MICH Address: 1000 Oakbrook Drive, Suite 200 City: Ann Arbor StateProv: MI PostalCode: 48104 Country: US NetRange: 2001:48A8:0000:0000:0000:0000:0000:0000 - 2001:48A8:FFFF:FFFF:FFFF:FFFF:FFFF:FFFF CIDR: 2001:48A8:0000:0000:0000:0000:0000:0000/32 NetName: MICH-V6-1 NetHandle: NET6-2001-48A8-1 Parent: NET6-2001-4800-0 NetType: Direct Allocation NameServer: DNS.MERIT.NET NameServer: DNS2.MERIT.NET NameServer: DNS3.MERIT.NET Comment: RegDate: 2005-04-28 Updated: 2005-04-28

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RE: PAIX Outages
by Huopio Kauto 29 Apr '05

29 Apr '05

> From: Alexander Koch [mailto:koch@tiscali.net] [..] > As another matter I do not believe in public peering at all > when you have flows to a single peer that are ore than half > of a full GE. Been there, was not at all nice. I guess more > and more operators will have less and less public IX ports, > and the open peering coalition will start wondering at some > point... The AMSIX has a lot of 10G peers. While they just > take two ports, and the AMSIX supposedly also being redundant > (and cheap <g>) it is just a time- bomb. How many times did > either LINX or AMSIX had issues (actually very rare!) and we > happily overloaded our peers' interfaces at the respective > other IX... Say what you want, but public peering (yes/no) > has a lot to do with your amount of traffic, and your peers. > It depends. Thinking of reliability: FICIX over here in Finland requires all full members to join _two_ switches in physically separate locations from separate points in your own network, using redundant fiber paths. Result: a very reliable IX. In Sweden Netnod has IX facilities in five cities around the country. AFAIK most of the traffic exchange is done over public peerings in Finland and Sweden - very reliably. --Kauto

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OT: calling Apple (apple.com)
by Paul G 29 Apr '05

29 Apr '05

folks, <sorry for the spam> if anyone at apple's noc (or someone who knows a way to get in touch w them) is listening, please get back to me (off-list of course). you're sourcing a few hundred kpps of dos traffic. i'd rather not be receiving it and i assume you'd rather not have an owned box (or are you celebrating tiger's release? ;) on your network. i wouldn't be posting this if you had a reachable noc. </spam> -p --- paul galynin

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Re: Internet email performance study
by Crist Clark 28 Apr '05

28 Apr '05

Brad Knowles wrote: > At 3:05 PM -0700 2005-04-28, Crist Clark wrote: > >>> http://www.albury.net.au/netstatus/derouted.html >> >> >> No, it doesn't. Please read their paper. In the paper and as he stated >> again in the response above, their definition of a "loss" requires the >> message to be delivered successfully in the first place. The anti-spam >> measure described in the above URL causes the remote MTA to not accept >> mail at all from the blocked source. This would not be counted as a loss >> in their methodology, but possibly as an "error." > > > Yeah, but there are plenty of other places that will otherwise do > the same sort of thing, but instead of de-routing the address, they will > silently discard all messages from that IP address. > > AOL is one known big offender in that area, because I helped set up > the bounce processing system at AOL that did exactly that. > > > So, while albury.net themselves would not cause the kinds of results > that are being seen, they do have an otherwise good explanation for the > kinds of things that many sites tend to do when faced with excessive > probes or other activity that they believe is likely to be an indication > of spam or something that is spam-related. It's possible. Those with very sensitive threasholds that would pick up one email every fifteen minutes as a scan could produce drop rates between zero and one. Assuming the threashold detection is a well defined algorithm, however, one would expect the drops to be deterministic, e.g. after one hour (four sets) of attempts, they fall into black hole, come out after one hour, two hours, eight hours, or a day, and then the whole thing repeats. The authors couldn't find patterns, but that does not mean that there are not any patterns to find. I considered looking at their raw data myself until I saw it was a 100+ MB gzipped tarball. Anyone can test these kinds of theories if they are willing to download and slog through the data. -- Crist J. Clark crist.clark(a)globalstar.com Globalstar Communications (408) 933-4387

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