- Test - lists.nanog.org

comcast east noc
by Zak Thompson 01 Mar '07

01 Mar '07

Can someone from Comcast or their east noc contact me off list? Cheers, Zak Thompson

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Msn.com
by Eric Ortega 01 Mar '07

01 Mar '07

Can someone from msn.com contact me offlist? Thanks! Eric Ortega Midcontinent Communications Network Engineer 605.357.5720 eric.ortega(a)midco.net

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Re: FCC on wifi at hotel
by Robert Bonomi 28 Feb '07

28 Feb '07

> Date: Wed, 28 Feb 2007 17:38:10 -0500 > From: Jared Mauch <jared(a)puck.nether.net> > Subject: Re: FCC on wifi at hotel > [[.. munch ..]] > http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-06-157A1.pdf > > I do suggest reading this. They can not legally bar you from > using the devices. They can charge you outrageous fees to get to/from > the MMR or telco demarc and make it prohibitively expensive. > > It may also be problematic to be held hostage showing up > and them saying that no, you can not install your equipment while you > hire a lawyer to explain to them that you are violating FCC fules > for the "OTARD rules". > > - Jared Note well that the 'OTARD rules' do *NOT* apply to an organization holding a meeting at a hotel, or other meeting/convention facility. I quote: For the OTARD rules to apply, the antenna must be installed "on property within the exclusive use or control of an antenna user where the user has a direct or indirect ownership or leasehold interest in the property" upon which the antenna is located. An orgaization contractig for the short-term use of a meeting facility has _no_ such 'ownership or leashold' interest in the property.

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Is there a Hotmail contact around?
by William Schultz 28 Feb '07

28 Feb '07

Could you please contact me off list? Sorry for the clutter... -Wil

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Cisco Security Advisory: Cisco Catalyst 6000, 6500 and Cisco 7600 Series MPLS Packet Vulnerability
by Cisco Systems Product Security Incident Response Team 28 Feb '07

28 Feb '07

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 Cisco Security Advisory: Cisco Catalyst 6000, 6500 and Cisco 7600 Series MPLS Packet Vulnerability Advisory ID: cisco-sa-20070228-mpls Revision 1.0 For Public Release 2007 February 28 - --------------------------------------------------------------------- Summary ======= Cisco Catalyst 6500 series systems that are running certain versions of Cisco Internetwork Operating System (IOS) are vulnerable to an attack from a Multi Protocol Label Switching (MPLS) packet. Only the systems that are running in Hybrid Mode (Catalyst OS (CatOS) software on the Supervisor Engine and IOS Software on the Multilayer Switch Feature Card (MSFC)) or running with Cisco IOS Software Modularity are affected. MPLS packets can only be sent from the local network segment. This advisory is posted at http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20070228-mpls.shtml Affected Products ================= Vulnerable Products +------------------ The following products are affected by this vulnerability: * Cisco Catalyst 6500 systems that run 12.2(18)SXF4 with Cisco IOS Software Modularity are affected. Images that support Cisco IOS Software Modularity have a "-vz" suffix in their image name. The following is a conclusive list of all image names that are running with Cisco IOS Software Modularity and are affected by this vulnerability. + s72033-adventerprisek9_wan-vz.122-18.SXF4.bin + s72033-advipservicesk9_wan-vz.122-18.SXF4.bin + s72033-entservicesk9_wan-vz.122-18.SXF4.bin + s72033-ipservices_wan-vz.122-18.SXF4.bin + s72033-ipservicesk9_wan-vz.122-18.SXF4.bin + s72033-ipservicesk9-vz.122-18.SXF4.bin * Cisco Catalyst 6000, 6500 and Cisco 7600 series systems with an MSFC2 or MSFC3 that run in Hybrid Mode are affected. In Hybrid Mode, Catalyst OS (CatOS) software runs on the Supervisor Engine and IOS runs on the MSFC. It is different from the Native Mode in which IOS runs both on the Supervisor Engine and MSFC. This vulnerability affects MSFC2, MSFC2a and MSFC3 that run certain images in Hybrid mode. In Hybrid Mode, IOS images that run on MSFC start with "c6msfc2", "c6msfc2a" or "c6msfc3". Several image names that run on MSFC in hybrid mode are provided below for reference: + c6msfc2a-adventerprisek9_wan-mz.122-18.SXF + c6msfc3-jsv-mz.122-14.SX2 Products Confirmed Not Vulnerable +-------------------------------- * Systems that are running in Native Mode without Cisco IOS Software Modularity are not affected. * Systems without an MSFC2, MSFC2a or MSFC3 are not affected. No other Cisco products are known to be affected by this vulnerability. Details ======= Cisco IOS Software Modularity combines subsystems into individual processes and enhances the Cisco IOS Software memory architecture to provide process-level fault isolation and subsystem "In Service Software Upgrade" (ISSU) capability. These enhancements are delivered in Cisco IOS Software for the Catalyst 6500 Series Supervisor Engine 720 and Supervisor Engine 32. Cisco IOS Software Modularity was first delivered as an option in a Cisco IOS Software Release 12.2(18)SXF4. More information on Modular IOS can be found at the following URL: http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/hw/switches/ps708/prod_bulletin0900aecd… Not all 12.2(18)SXF4 images support Modular IOS. Only the images with a "-vz" in the image name support Modular IOS and are affected by this vulnerability. A conclusive list of all affected image names that support Cisco IOS Software Modularity is provided in the Affected Products section. In Hybrid Mode, a CatOS image is used as the system software to run the Supervisor Engine on the Catalyst systems. If an MSFC is installed, a separate IOS Software image is used in order to run the MSFC. CatOS provides the Layer 2 (L2) switching functionality. The Cisco IOS on the MSFC provides the Layer 3 (L3) routing functionality. It differs from the Native Mode, in which a single Cisco IOS Software image is used as the system software to run both the Supervisor Engine and MSFC on the Catalyst systems. IOS software that runs on MSFC in Hybrid Mode is also affected by this vulnerability. More information about the differences between Hybrid and Native Modes can be found at the following URL: http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/hw/switches/ps708/products_white_paper0… MPLS packets received by a Route Processor (MSFC) Layer 3 interface can potentially trigger this vulnerability. The system in question does not need to be configured for MPLS to be vulnerable. MPLS packets can only be sent from the local network segment, limiting the scope of the exploitation. This issue is documented in bug IDs CSCsd37415 ( registered customers only) and CSCef90002 ( registered customers only) . Vulnerability Scoring Details +---------------------------- Cisco is providing scores for the vulnerabilities in this advisory based on the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS). Cisco will provide a base and temporal score. Customers can then compute environmental scores to assist in determining the impact of the vulnerability in individual networks. Cisco PSIRT will set the bias in all cases to normal. Customers are encouraged to apply the bias parameter when determining the environmental impact of a particular vulnerability. CVSS is a standards-based scoring method that conveys vulnerability severity and helps determine urgency and priority of response. Cisco has provided an FAQ to answer additional questions regarding CVSS at http://www.cisco.com/web/about/security/intelligence/cvss-qandas.html. Cisco has also provided a CVSS calculator to help compute the environmental impact for individual networks at http://intellishield.cisco.com/security/alertmanager/cvss. CSCsd37415 - RP crashed on sending MPLS packet to a interface CVSS Base Score: 3.3 - - Access Vector: Remote - - Access Complexity: Low - - Authentication: Not Required - - Confidentiality Impact: None - - Integrity Impact: None - - Availability Impact: Complete - - Impact Bias: Normal CVSS Temporal Score: 2.7 - - Exploitability: Functional - - Remediation Level: Official Fix - - Report Confidence: Confirmed CSCef90002 - MSFC crashed due to corrupted program counter CVSS Base Score: 3.3 - - Access Vector: Remote - - Access Complexity: Low - - Authentication: Not Required - - Confidentiality Impact: None - - Integrity Impact: None - - Availability Impact: Complete - - Impact Bias: Normal CVSS Temporal Score: 2.7 - - Exploitability: Functional - - Remediation Level: Official Fix - - Report Confidence: Confirmed Impact ====== Successful exploitation of the vulnerability may result in the reload of the system on systems that are running with Cisco IOS Software Modularity and the reload of MSFC on systems that are running in Hybrid Mode. Repeated exploitation may lead to a denial of service condition. Software Version and Fixes ========================== When considering software upgrades, also consult http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt and any subsequent advisories to determine exposure and a complete upgrade solution. In all cases, customers should exercise caution to be certain that the devices to be upgraded contain sufficient memory and that current hardware and software configurations will continue to be supported properly by the new release. If the information is not clear, contact the Cisco Technical Assistance Center ("TAC") or your contracted maintenance provider for assistance. Each row of the Cisco IOS software table (below) describes a release train and the platforms or products for which it is intended. If a given release train is vulnerable, then the earliest possible releases that contain the fix (the "First Fixed Release") and the anticipated date of availability for each are listed in the "Rebuild" and "Maintenance" columns. A device running a release in the given train that is earlier than the release in a specific column (less than the First Fixed Release) is known to be vulnerable. The release should be upgraded at least to the indicated release or a later version (greater than or equal to the First Fixed Release label). For more information on the terms "Rebuild" and "Maintenance," consult the following URL: http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/620/1.html. +---------------------------------------+ | | Availability of Fixed | | Trains | Releases | | |-----------------------------| | | Rebuild | Maintenance | |---------+-----------------------------| | 12.1E | Not vulnerable | |---------+-----------------------------| | 12.2SXA | Vulnerable. Migrate to 12.2 | | | (17d)SXB5 or later | |---------+-----------------------------| | 12.2SXB | 12.2(17d)SXB5 | | |---------+---------------+-------------| | 12.2SXD | 12.2(18)SXD3 | | |---------+-----------------------------| | 12.2SXE | Not vulnerable | |---------+-----------------------------| | 12.2SXF | 12.2(18)SXF5 | | | (*) | | | +---------------------------------------+ * Only 12.2(18)SXF4 with IOS Software Modularity is affected. 12.2SXF releases that run in Hybrid Mode are not affected. Please see the Affected Products section for more information. A special patch for 12.2(18)SXF4 with Cisco IOS Software Modularity is also available. Patch Name: MA0045 Image Name: s72033-AMA0045-patch.122-18.SXF4 The above patch can be downloaded from the Cisco IOS Software Modularity Patch Navigator at http://tools.cisco.com/swdf/ionpn/jsp/main.jsp Workarounds =========== There are no workarounds for this vulnerability. Additional mitigations that can be deployed on Cisco devices within the network are available in the Cisco Applied Intelligence companion document for this advisory: http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-air-20070228-mpls.shtml Obtaining Fixed Software ======================== Cisco will make free software available to address this vulnerability for affected customers. This advisory will be updated as fixed software becomes available. Prior to deploying software, customers should consult their maintenance provider or check the software for feature set compatibility and known issues specific to their environment. Customers may only install and expect support for the feature sets they have purchased. By installing, downloading, accessing or otherwise using such software upgrades, customers agree to be bound by the terms of Cisco's software license terms found at http://www.cisco.com/public/sw-license-agreement.html, or as otherwise set forth at Cisco.com Downloads at http://www.cisco.com/public/sw-center/sw-usingswc.shtml. Do not contact either "psirt(a)cisco.com" or "security-alert(a)cisco.com" for software upgrades. Customers with Service Contracts +------------------------------- Customers with contracts should obtain upgraded software through their regular update channels. For most customers, this means that upgrades should be obtained through the Software Center on Cisco's worldwide website at http://www.cisco.com. Customers using Third Party Support Organizations +------------------------------------------------ Customers whose Cisco products are provided or maintained through prior or existing agreement with third-party support organizations such as Cisco Partners, authorized resellers, or service providers should contact that support organization for guidance and assistance with the appropriate course of action in regards to this advisory. The effectiveness of any workaround or fix is dependent on specific customer situations such as product mix, network topology, traffic behavior, and organizational mission. Due to the variety of affected products and releases, customers should consult with their service provider or support organization to ensure any applied workaround or fix is the most appropriate for use in the intended network before it is deployed. Customers without Service Contracts +---------------------------------- Customers who purchase direct from Cisco but who do not hold a Cisco service contract and customers who purchase through third-party vendors but are unsuccessful at obtaining fixed software through their point of sale should get their upgrades by contacting the Cisco Technical Assistance Center (TAC). TAC contacts are as follows. * +1 800 553 2447 (toll free from within North America) * +1 408 526 7209 (toll call from anywhere in the world) * e-mail: tac(a)cisco.com Have your product serial number available and give the URL of this notice as evidence of your entitlement to a free upgrade. Free upgrades for non-contract customers must be requested through the TAC. Refer to http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/687/Directory/DirTAC.shtml for additional TAC contact information, including special localized telephone numbers and instructions and e-mail addresses for use in various languages. Exploitation and Public Announcements ===================================== The Cisco PSIRT is not aware of any public announcements or malicious use of the vulnerability described in this advisory. This vulnerability was reported by a customer. Status of this Notice:FINAL =========================== THIS DOCUMENT IS PROVIDED ON AN "AS IS" BASIS AND DOES NOT IMPLY ANY KIND OF GUARANTEE OR WARRANTY, INCLUDING THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR USE. YOUR USE OF THE INFORMATION ON THE DOCUMENT OR MATERIALS LINKED FROM THE DOCUMENT IS AT YOUR OWN RISK. CISCO RESERVES THE RIGHT TO CHANGE OR UPDATE THIS DOCUMENT AT ANY TIME. A stand-alone copy or Paraphrase of the text of this document that omits the distribution URL in the following section is an uncontrolled copy, and may lack important information or contain factual errors. Distribution ============ This advisory is posted on Cisco's worldwide website at: http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20070228-mpls.shtml In addition to worldwide web posting, a text version of this notice is clear-signed with the Cisco PSIRT PGP key and is posted to the following e-mail and Usenet news recipients. * cust-security-announce(a)cisco.com * first-teams(a)first.org * bugtraq(a)securityfocus.com * vulnwatch(a)vulnwatch.org * cisco(a)spot.colorado.edu * cisco-nsp(a)puck.nether.net * full-disclosure(a)lists.grok.org.uk * comp.dcom.sys.cisco(a)newsgate.cisco.com Future updates of this advisory, if any, will be placed on Cisco's worldwide website, but may or may not be actively announced on mailing lists or newsgroups. Users concerned about this problem are encouraged to check the above URL for any updates. Revision History ================ +----------------------------------------+ | Revision | | Initial | | 1.0 | 2007-February-28 | public | | | | release. | +----------------------------------------+ Cisco Security Procedures ========================= Complete information on reporting security vulnerabilities in Cisco products, obtaining assistance with security incidents, and registering to receive security information from Cisco, is available on Cisco's worldwide website at http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/products_security_vulnerability_policy.…. This includes instructions for press inquiries regarding Cisco security notices. All Cisco security advisories are available at http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.6 (GNU/Linux) iD4DBQFF5ao38NUAbBmDaxQRAteJAJ0V2Z5JKXq0q9cWFe+FQmt95sRURwCXQJJX 0qRnFtLmdKZUWuSa+b6kYQ== =nIdj -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Cisco Security Advisory: Cisco Catalyst 6000, 6500 Series and Cisco 7600 Series NAM (Network Analysis Module) Vulnerability
by Cisco Systems Product Security Incident Response Team 28 Feb '07

28 Feb '07

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 Cisco Security Advisory: Cisco Catalyst 6000, 6500 Series and Cisco 7600 Series NAM (Network Analysis Module) Vulnerability Advisory ID: cisco-sa-20070228-nam Revision 1.0 For Public Release 2007 February 28 - --------------------------------------------------------------------- Summary ======= Cisco Catalyst 6000, 6500 series and Cisco 7600 series that have a Network Analysis Module installed are vulnerable to an attack, which could allow an attacker to gain complete control of the system. Only Cisco Catalyst systems that have a NAM on them are affected. This vulnerability affects systems that run Internetwork Operating System (IOS) or Catalyst Operating System (CatOS). Cisco has made free software available to address this vulnerability for affected customers. This advisory is posted at http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20070228-nam.shtml Affected Products ================= Vulnerable Products +------------------ Catalyst 6000, 6500 series and Cisco 7600 series that have a NAM installed in them are affected. A system that has a NAM can be identified by the show module command. A NAM will be seen as WS-SVC-NAM-1, WS-SVC-NAM-2 or WS-X6380-NAM in this output. This vulnerability affects systems that run IOS or CatOS. A sample output for a system that has a NAM-2 on it is provided below: Cat6k#show module Mod Ports Card Type Model Serial No. - --- ----- -------------------------------------- ------------------ ----------- 1 2 Catalyst 6000 supervisor 2 (Active) WS-X6K-SUP2-2GE SAL06417E23 3 48 48 port 10/100 mb RJ-45 ethernet WS-X6248-RJ-45 SAD050108R4 5 8 8 port 1000mb ethernet WS-X6408-GBIC SAD041300CL 6 8 Network Analysis Module WS-SVC-NAM-2 SAD093002AM Products Confirmed Not Vulnerable +-------------------------------- * Catalyst 6000, 6500 and Cisco 7600 series that do not have a NAM are not affected. * Network Analysis Modules for Cisco Branch Routers (NM-NAM) are not affected. No other Cisco products are known to be affected by this vulnerability. Details ======= NAMs are deployed in Catalyst 6000, 6500 series and Cisco 7600 series to monitor and analyze network traffic by using Remote Monitoring (RMON), RMON2, and other MIBs. More information about NAMs can be found at the following URL: http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/hw/switches/ps708/products_module_confi… NAMs communicate with the Catalyst system by using the Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP). By spoofing the SNMP communication between the Catalyst system and the NAM an attacker may obtain complete control of the Catalyst system. Devices running both Cisco IOS and Cisco CatOS are affected by this vulnerability. This vulnerability is introduced in CatOS at 7.6(15) and 8.5(1). Older CatOS images are not vulnerable. This issue is documented in bug IDs CSCsd75273 ( registered customers only) , CSCse52951 ( registered customers only) for IOS and CSCse39848 ( registered customers only) for CatOS. Vulnerability Scoring Details +---------------------------- Cisco is providing scores for the vulnerabilities in this advisory based on the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS). Cisco will provide a base and temporal score. Customers can then compute environmental scores to assist in determining the impact of the vulnerability in individual networks. Cisco PSIRT will set the bias in all cases to normal. Customers are encouraged to apply the bias parameter when determining the environmental impact of a particular vulnerability. CVSS is a standards-based scoring method that conveys vulnerability severity and helps determine urgency and priority of response. Cisco has provided an FAQ to answer additional questions regarding CVSS at http://www.cisco.com/web/about/security/intelligence/cvss-qandas.html. Cisco has also provided a CVSS calculator to help compute the environmental impact for individual networks at http://intellishield.cisco.com/security/alertmanager/cvss CSCsd75273 - Cat6k NAM vulnerability CVSS Base Score: 10 - - Access Vector: Remote - - Access Complexity: Low - - Authentication: Not Required - - Confidentiality Impact: Complete - - Integrity Impact: Complete - - Availability Impact: Complete - - Impact Bias: Normal CVSS Temporal Score: 8.3 - - Exploitability: Functional - - Remediation Level: Official Fix - - Report Confidence: Confirmed CSCse52951 - Catk NAM vulnerability, additional protection CVSS Base Score: 10 - - Access Vector: Remote - - Access Complexity: Low - - Authentication: Not Required - - Confidentiality Impact: Complete - - Integrity Impact: Complete - - Availability Impact: Complete - - Impact Bias: Normal CVSS Temporal Score: 8.3 - - Exploitability: Functional - - Remediation Level: Official Fix - - Report Confidence: Confirmed CSCse39848 - Cat6k NAM vulnerability in CatOS CVSS Base Score: 10 - - Access Vector: Remote - - Access Complexity: Low - - Authentication: Not Required - - Confidentiality Impact: Complete - - Integrity Impact: Complete - - Availability Impact: Complete - - Impact Bias: Normal CVSS Temporal Score: 8.3 - - Exploitability: Functional - - Remediation Level: Official Fix - - Report Confidence: Confirmed Impact ====== By successfully exploiting this vulnerability, an attacker may gain complete control of the device. Software Version and Fixes ========================== When considering software upgrades, also consult http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt and any subsequent advisories to determine exposure and a complete upgrade solution. In all cases, customers should exercise caution to be certain the devices to be upgraded contain sufficient memory and that current hardware and software configurations will continue to be supported properly by the new release. If the information is not clear, contact the Cisco Technical Assistance Center ("TAC") or your contracted maintenance provider for assistance. Each row of the Cisco IOS software table (below) describes a release train and the platforms or products for which it is intended. If a given release train is vulnerable, then the earliest possible releases that contain the fix (the "First Fixed Release") and the anticipated date of availability for each are listed in the "Rebuild" and "Maintenance" columns. A device running a release in the given train that is earlier than the release in a specific column (less than the First Fixed Release) is known to be vulnerable. The release should be upgraded at least to the indicated release or a later version (greater than or equal to the First Fixed Release label). For more information on the terms "Rebuild" and "Maintenance," consult the following URL: http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/620/1.html. +-----------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | Major Release | Availability of Repaired Releases | |------------------------------+----------------------------------------------| | Affected 12.1-Based Release | Rebuild | Maintenance | |------------------------------+---------------------+------------------------| | | 12.1(26)E8 | | |12.1E |---------------------+------------------------| | | 12.1(27b)E1 | | |------------------------------+---------------------+------------------------| | 12.1EX | 12.1(12c)EX | 12.1(13)EX | |------------------------------+---------------------+------------------------| | Affected 12.2-Based Release | Rebuild | Maintenance | |------------------------------+----------------------------------------------| | 12.2EU | Vulnerable; migrate to 12.2(25)EWA7 or later | |------------------------------+----------------------------------------------| | 12.2EW | Vulnerable; migrate to 12.2(25)EWA7 or later | |------------------------------+----------------------------------------------| | 12.2EWA | | 12.2(25)EWA7 | |------------------------------+----------------------------------------------| | 12.2IXA | Vulnerable; migrate to 12.2(18)IXB2 or later | |------------------------------+----------------------------------------------| | 12.2IXB | 12.2(18)IXB2 | | |------------------------------+---------------------+------------------------| | | 12.2(14)S3 | | |12.2S |---------------------+------------------------| | | 12.2(18)S5 | 12.2(20)S | |------------------------------+---------------------+------------------------| | 12.2SG | 12.2(25)SG1 | | |------------------------------+---------------------+------------------------| | 12.2SGA | 12.2(31)SGA1 | | |------------------------------+---------------------+------------------------| | 12.2SRA | 12.2(33)SRA2 | | |------------------------------+----------------------------------------------| | 12.2SX | Vulnerable; migrate to 12.2(18)SXD7a or | | | later | |------------------------------+----------------------------------------------| | 12.2SXA | Vulnerable; migrate to 12.2(18)SXD7a or | | | later | |------------------------------+----------------------------------------------| | 12.2SXB | Vulnerable; migrate to 12.2(18)SXD7a or | | | later | |------------------------------+----------------------------------------------| | 12.2SXD | 12.2(18)SXD7a | | |------------------------------+---------------------+------------------------| | 12.2SXE | 12.2(18)SXE6a | | |------------------------------+---------------------+------------------------| | 12.2SXF | 12.2(18)SXF5 | | |------------------------------+----------------------------------------------| | 12.2SY | Vulnerable; migrate to 12.2(18)SXD7a or | | | later | |------------------------------+----------------------------------------------| | 12.2ZA | Vulnerable; migrate to 12.2(18)SXD7a or | | | later | |------------------------------+----------------------------------------------| | 12.2ZU | 12.2(18)ZU1 | | +-----------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +---------------------------------------+ | | Availability of Fixed | | CatOS | Releases | | Release |-------------------------| | | Interim | Maintenance | |-------------+-------------------------| | 5.x | Not vulnerable | |-------------+-------------------------| | 6.x | Not vulnerable | |-------------+-------------------------| | 7.6(1) | | | through 7.6 | Not vulnerable | | (14) | | |-------------+-------------------------| | 7.6(15) | | 7.6(20) | | through |7.6(19.2)| Available | | 7.6(19) | | 2007-Mar-09 | |-------------+---------+---------------| | 8.5(1) | | | | through | 8.5(5.3)| 8.5(6) | | 8.5(5) | | | |-------------+-------------------------| | 8.6(x) | Not vulnerable | +---------------------------------------+ Workarounds =========== No workarounds exist for this vulnerability. This vulnerability requires an attacker to spoof SNMP packets from the IP address of the NAM. Filtering SNMP traffic to an affected device can be used as a mitigation. Filtering SNMP traffic needs to be done on systems that are deployed in front of an affected device, since it is ineffective to filter against such spoofed packets on the device itself. Anti-spoofing measures and infrastructure access-lists can also be deployed at your network edge as a potential mitigation technique. Refer to http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/iacl.html for examples on how to apply ACLs on Cisco routers for infrastructure protection. Additional mitigations that can be deployed on Cisco devices within the network are available in the Cisco Applied Intelligence companion document for this advisory: http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-air-20070228-nam.shtml Obtaining Fixed Software ======================== Cisco will make free software available to address this vulnerability for affected customers. This advisory will be updated as fixed software becomes available. Prior to deploying software, customers should consult their maintenance provider or check the software for feature set compatibility and known issues specific to their environment. Customers may only install and expect support for the feature sets they have purchased. By installing, downloading, accessing or otherwise using such software upgrades, customers agree to be bound by the terms of Cisco's software license terms found at http://www.cisco.com/public/sw-license-agreement.html, or as otherwise set forth at Cisco.com Downloads at http://www.cisco.com/public/sw-center/sw-usingswc.shtml. Do not contact either "psirt(a)cisco.com" or "security-alert(a)cisco.com" for software upgrades. Customers with Service Contracts +------------------------------- Customers with contracts should obtain upgraded software through their regular update channels. For most customers, this means that upgrades should be obtained through the Software Center on Cisco's worldwide website at http://www.cisco.com. Customers using Third Party Support Organizations +------------------------------------------------ Customers whose Cisco products are provided or maintained through prior or existing agreement with third-party support organizations such as Cisco Partners, authorized resellers, or service providers should contact that support organization for guidance and assistance with the appropriate course of action in regards to this advisory. The effectiveness of any workaround or fix is dependent on specific customer situations such as product mix, network topology, traffic behavior, and organizational mission. Due to the variety of affected products and releases, customers should consult with their service provider or support organization to ensure any applied workaround or fix is the most appropriate for use in the intended network before it is deployed. Customers without Service Contracts +---------------------------------- Customers who purchase direct from Cisco but who do not hold a Cisco service contract and customers who purchase through third-party vendors but are unsuccessful at obtaining fixed software through their point of sale should get their upgrades by contacting the Cisco Technical Assistance Center (TAC). TAC contacts are as follows. * +1 800 553 2447 (toll free from within North America) * +1 408 526 7209 (toll call from anywhere in the world) * e-mail: tac(a)cisco.com Have your product serial number available and give the URL of this notice as evidence of your entitlement to a free upgrade. Free upgrades for non-contract customers must be requested through the TAC. Refer to http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/687/Directory/DirTAC.shtml for additional TAC contact information, including special localized telephone numbers and instructions and e-mail addresses for use in various languages. Exploitation and Public Announcements ===================================== The Cisco PSIRT is not aware of any public announcements or malicious use of the vulnerability described in this advisory. This vulnerability was found internally. Status of this Notice:FINAL =========================== THIS DOCUMENT IS PROVIDED ON AN "AS IS" BASIS AND DOES NOT IMPLY ANY KIND OF GUARANTEE OR WARRANTY, INCLUDING THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR USE. YOUR USE OF THE INFORMATION ON THE DOCUMENT OR MATERIALS LINKED FROM THE DOCUMENT IS AT YOUR OWN RISK. CISCO RESERVES THE RIGHT TO CHANGE OR UPDATE THIS DOCUMENT AT ANY TIME. A stand-alone copy or Paraphrase of the text of this document that omits the distribution URL in the following section is an uncontrolled copy, and may lack important information or contain factual errors. Distribution ============ This advisory is posted on Cisco's worldwide website at: http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20070228-nam.shtml In addition to worldwide web posting, a text version of this notice is clear-signed with the Cisco PSIRT PGP key and is posted to the following e-mail and Usenet news recipients. * cust-security-announce(a)cisco.com * first-teams(a)first.org * bugtraq(a)securityfocus.com * vulnwatch(a)vulnwatch.org * cisco(a)spot.colorado.edu * cisco-nsp(a)puck.nether.net * full-disclosure(a)lists.grok.org.uk * comp.dcom.sys.cisco(a)newsgate.cisco.com Future updates of this advisory, if any, will be placed on Cisco's worldwide website, but may or may not be actively announced on mailing lists or newsgroups. Users concerned about this problem are encouraged to check the above URL for any updates. Revision History ================ +----------------------------------------+ | Revision | | Initial | | 1.0 | 2007-February-28 | public | | | | release. | +----------------------------------------+ Cisco Security Procedures ========================= Complete information on reporting security vulnerabilities in Cisco products, obtaining assistance with security incidents, and registering to receive security information from Cisco, is available on Cisco's worldwide website at http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/ products_security_vulnerability_policy.html. This includes instructions for press inquiries regarding Cisco security notices. All Cisco security advisories are available at http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.6 (GNU/Linux) iD8DBQFF5aqN8NUAbBmDaxQRAvcNAJ9nzpHY+ASnfCKO0lzvHG90fTLSmQCfSfCt 0tlVaNPyb/2PmoCudiRws/E= =Uymr -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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165 Halsey Newark 3rd Floor *explosion* ?
by Eric Kagan 28 Feb '07

28 Feb '07

We lost a bunch of MCI circuits at 8am EST this morning and the colo provider informed us there was some kind of explosion on the 3rd floor. Anyone have additional info or details ? Not sure how serious - our power is still on and our XO and ATT circuits are still up as well as bandwidth. Thanks Eric Eric Kagan

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RE: botnets: web servers, end-systems and Vint Cerf [LONG, sorry]
by michael.dillon＠bt.com 28 Feb '07

28 Feb '07

> But suppose you put such a firewall in place. You'll need to > configure the firewall properly -- paying as much attention to > outbound rules as inbound. Sounds like a good thing to document in a best practices document that can be used to certify firewall implementations. When trying to solve a social problem, techniques like the Good Housekeeping seal of approval are quite effective. As recommended by the editors of... > You'll need to add anti-virus software. And anti-spyware software. > Then you need to make sure the "signature" databases for both of those > are updated early and often, What if the guidelines state that subscription and database oriented techniques for virus detection are not adequate and therefore not compliant. Only heuristic, capability-based systems are acceptable. > And you'll need to de-install IE and Outlook, Thus ensuring that Firefox/Thunderbird will be the main target of the malware people. Is this necessarily any better? Note that Windows provides an extensive series of hooks which can be used by an application which wishes to subvert the normal operation of the OS. That subversive application could be the security monitor which is required by the ISP for Internet access because it is recommended in your guidelines. > Something which requires this much work just to make it through its > first day online, while being used by J. Random Person, is hopelessly > inadequate. Which is why systems like this are routinely > compromised in > huge numbers. Which is why we have a large-scale problem on > our hands. We live in a complex world. Computers are more complex than they were. OSes are more complex. Apps are more complex. Networks are more complex. And SOLUTIONS are more complex. But if the designers of computers, OSes, apps and networks can deal with the complexity, why can't security folks do likewise? > This left me with >1.5M observed hosts seen in a month. > They're all sending > spam. (How do I know? Because 100% of the mail traffic sent to that > server is spam.) What you did sounds dumb except that you said this is an experiment. Unfortunately, real live email servers do exactly the same, i.e. talk to all comers, because the email architecture is flat like a pancake. Some people consider this to be a Windows malware problem. I consider it to be an email architecture problem. We all know that you need hierarchy to scale networks and I submit that any email architecture without hierarchy is broken by design and no amount of ill-thought-out bandaids will fix it. > Pop quiz, bonus round: how much does it cost Comcast to defend its > mail servers from Verizon's spam, and vice versa? Heck, how much > does it cost Comcast to defend its mail servers from its own spam? That actually sounds like an answerable question, if a company took it seriously enough. If the senders and receiver are both on your network, your finance department should be able to come up with some cost figures. --Michael Dillon

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Re: 96.2.0.0/16 Bogons
by Fergie 28 Feb '07

28 Feb '07

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 - -- Randy Bush <randy(a)psg.com> wrote: >> your interpersonal skills are improving. > >well, at least i am actually doing research instead of doing nothing but >blindly whining abour anything by others that moves. Regardless of your slides, some people are still questioning that particular issue. $.02, - - ferg -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: PGP Desktop 9.5.3 (Build 5003) wj8DBQFF5SYhq1pz9mNUZTMRAtzJAJsGIl8mAadGTt7n/YTO08+PHpJHGgCePOCX C0DuVsTnXcSsQ+5Ph2ephXw= =wOuc -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- -- "Fergie", a.k.a. Paul Ferguson Engineering Architecture for the Internet fergdawg(at)netzero.net ferg's tech blog: http://fergdawg.blogspot.com/

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Chicago Sprint - Global Crossing
by Mike Hammett 27 Feb '07

27 Feb '07

Does anyone else notice any issues? [root@ds00209 mhammett]# tcptraceroute 63.175.151.3 5060 Selected device eth0, address 205.218.65.34, port 51739 for outgoing packets Tracing the path to 63.175.151.3 on TCP port 5060, 30 hops max 1 205.138.198.193 2.686 ms 0.404 ms 1.042 ms 2 ge5-1.br03.chc01.pccwbtn.net (63.218.5.97) 0.444 ms 0.504 ms 0.411 ms 3 * * * 4 ge0-2-0-1000M.ar1.CHI2.gblx.net (67.17.107.193) 0.885 ms 0.531 ms 0.464 ms 5 sprint-1.ar1.CHI2.gblx.net (64.212.107.82) 26.533 ms 9.346 ms 54.376 ms 6 sl-bb22-chi-5-0.sprintlink.net (144.232.20.90) 112.045 ms 209.869 ms 202.905 ms 7 sl-bb20-roa-8-0-0.sprintlink.net (144.232.18.37) 15.198 ms 13.906 ms 32.054 ms 8 sl-gw20-roa-10-0.sprintlink.net (144.232.17.190) 104.213 ms 36.510 ms 34.817 ms 9 sl-essex-6-0.sprintlink.net (144.223.151.22) 53.096 ms 75.561 ms 51.180 ms 10 * * * 11 voip.essex1.com (63.175.151.3) [closed] 35.588 ms 69.591 ms * This is normally a < 5 ms traceroute.

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