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BGP Update Report
by cidr-report＠potaroo.net 13 Apr '07

13 Apr '07

BGP Update Report Interval: 30-Mar-07 -to- 12-Apr-07 (14 days) Observation Point: BGP Peering with AS4637 TOP 20 Unstable Origin AS Rank ASN Upds % Upds/Pfx AS-Name 1 - AS9121 33665 3.0% 33.2 -- TTNET TTnet Autonomous System 2 - AS17974 27902 2.5% 102.6 -- TELKOMNET-AS2-AP PT TELEKOMUNIKASI INDONESIA 3 - AS9829 18425 1.6% 85.7 -- BSNL-NIB National Internet Backbone 4 - AS306 14447 1.3% 79.4 -- DNIC - DoD Network Information Center 5 - AS24731 13737 1.2% 305.3 -- ASN-NESMA National Engineering Services and Marketing Company Ltd. (NESMA) 6 - AS5786 10301 0.9% 65.2 -- UPRENET - University of Puerto Rico 7 - AS4775 9535 0.8% 80.8 -- GLOBE-TELECOM-AS Telecom Carrier / ISP Plus + 8 - AS8447 9171 0.8% 129.2 -- TELEKOM-AT Telekom Austria AutonomousSystem 9 - AS9583 8859 0.8% 9.7 -- SIFY-AS-IN Sify Limited 10 - AS5803 7429 0.7% 78.2 -- DDN-ASNBLK - DoD Network Information Center 11 - AS702 7327 0.7% 27.9 -- AS702 Verizon Business EMEA - Commercial IP service provider in Europe 12 - AS4249 6907 0.6% 51.5 -- LILLY-AS - Eli Lilly and Company 13 - AS22291 6906 0.6% 14.2 -- CHARTER-LA - Charter Communications 14 - AS17645 6609 0.6% 600.8 -- NTT-SG-AP ASN - NTT SINGAPORE PTE LTD 15 - AS17557 6096 0.6% 16.3 -- PKTELECOM-AS-AP Pakistan Telecom 16 - AS25233 6069 0.5% 83.1 -- AWALNET-ASN Autonomus System number for Awalnet 17 - AS12654 6068 0.5% 148.0 -- RIPE-NCC-RIS-AS RIPE NCC RIS project 18 - AS30890 5852 0.5% 28.3 -- EVOLVA Evolva Telecom 19 - AS19108 5720 0.5% 15.3 -- SUDDENLINK-COMMUNICATIONS - Suddenlink Communications 20 - AS36487 5682 0.5% 811.7 -- NEB-SANDHILLS-NET - Consolidated Telephone Company TOP 20 Unstable Origin AS (Updates per announced prefix) Rank ASN Upds % Upds/Pfx AS-Name 1 - AS31594 4114 0.4% 4114.0 -- FORTESS-AS Fortess LLC Network 2 - AS3043 1373 0.1% 1373.0 -- AMPHIB-AS - Amphibian Media Corporation 3 - AS38077 5344 0.5% 1336.0 -- TIMOR-TELECOM-AS-AP Timor Telecom, SA 4 - AS29700 2698 0.2% 899.3 -- CYPRESS-SEMICONDUCTOR - Cypress Semiconductor 5 - AS34378 850 0.1% 850.0 -- RUG-AS Razguliay-UKRROS Group 6 - AS5609 1644 0.1% 822.0 -- ASN-CSELT # AS-CSELT CONVERTED TO ASN-CSELT FOR RPSL COMPLIANCE CSELT S.p.A. is a Research Center for the study, research, 7 - AS9747 1642 0.1% 821.0 -- EZINTERNET-AS-AP EZInternet Pty Ltd 8 - AS36487 5682 0.5% 811.7 -- NEB-SANDHILLS-NET - Consolidated Telephone Company 9 - AS1708 1599 0.1% 799.5 -- FR-CNET-ISSY - Centre National d'Etudes des Telecommunication -- CNET 10 - AS30707 1598 0.1% 799.0 -- 11 - AS11828 3326 0.3% 665.2 -- SOINET - State of Illinois/CMS 12 - AS12408 625 0.1% 625.0 -- BIKENT-AS Bikent Ltd. Autonomous system 13 - AS32761 616 0.1% 616.0 -- WASSE-NYC - Wasserstein & Co. 14 - AS17645 6609 0.6% 600.8 -- NTT-SG-AP ASN - NTT SINGAPORE PTE LTD 15 - AS3944 558 0.1% 558.0 -- PARTAN-LAB - Partan & Partan 16 - AS19760 532 0.1% 532.0 -- CALPINECORP-1 - CALPINE CORP 17 - AS41555 528 0.1% 528.0 -- NOVATKL-AS FW Austria, Kundl 18 - AS14346 3076 0.3% 512.7 -- S.A O Estado de Sao Paulo 19 - AS33188 1012 0.1% 506.0 -- SCS-NETWORK-1 - Sono Corporate Suites 20 - AS17555 498 0.0% 498.0 -- SPRINGFIELD-AS-AP Springfield NOC TOP 20 Unstable Prefixes Rank Prefix Upds % Origin AS -- AS Name 1 - 81.213.47.0/24 7290 0.5% AS9121 -- TTNET TTnet Autonomous System 2 - 81.212.197.0/24 6726 0.5% AS9121 -- TTNET TTnet Autonomous System 3 - 194.242.124.0/22 4114 0.3% AS31594 -- FORTESS-AS Fortess LLC Network 4 - 59.94.240.0/20 4042 0.3% AS9829 -- BSNL-NIB National Internet Backbone 5 - 59.94.192.0/20 4042 0.3% AS9829 -- BSNL-NIB National Internet Backbone 6 - 59.95.240.0/20 4042 0.3% AS9829 -- BSNL-NIB National Internet Backbone 7 - 59.94.160.0/20 4042 0.3% AS9829 -- BSNL-NIB National Internet Backbone 8 - 81.212.39.0/24 3728 0.3% AS9121 -- TTNET TTnet Autonomous System 9 - 89.4.131.0/24 3417 0.2% AS24731 -- ASN-NESMA National Engineering Services and Marketing Company Ltd. (NESMA) 10 - 89.4.129.0/24 3378 0.2% AS24731 -- ASN-NESMA National Engineering Services and Marketing Company Ltd. (NESMA) 11 - 89.4.128.0/24 3357 0.2% AS24731 -- ASN-NESMA National Engineering Services and Marketing Company Ltd. (NESMA) 12 - 163.191.160.0/19 3319 0.2% AS11828 -- SOINET - State of Illinois/CMS 13 - 89.4.130.0/24 3218 0.2% AS24731 -- ASN-NESMA National Engineering Services and Marketing Company Ltd. (NESMA) 14 - 81.212.141.0/24 2874 0.2% AS9121 -- TTNET TTnet Autonomous System 15 - 203.177.8.0/24 2347 0.2% AS4775 -- GLOBE-TELECOM-AS Telecom Carrier / ISP Plus + 16 - 80.243.64.0/20 2326 0.2% AS21332 -- NTC-AS New Telephone Company 17 - 203.177.132.0/24 2311 0.2% AS4775 -- GLOBE-TELECOM-AS Telecom Carrier / ISP Plus + 18 - 203.177.10.0/24 2306 0.2% AS4775 -- GLOBE-TELECOM-AS Telecom Carrier / ISP Plus + 19 - 202.136.182.0/24 2202 0.2% AS17645 -- NTT-SG-AP ASN - NTT SINGAPORE PTE LTD 20 - 202.136.176.0/24 2200 0.2% AS17645 -- NTT-SG-AP ASN - NTT SINGAPORE PTE LTD Details at http://bgpupdates.potaroo.net ------------------------------------ Copies of this report are mailed to: nanog(a)merit.edu eof-list(a)ripe.net apops(a)apops.net routing-wg(a)ripe.net afnog(a)afnog.org ausnog(a)ausnog.net

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The Cidr Report
by cidr-report＠potaroo.net 13 Apr '07

13 Apr '07

This report has been generated at Fri Apr 13 21:50:00 2007 AEST. The report analyses the BGP Routing Table of an AS4637 (Reach) router and generates a report on aggregation potential within the table. Check http://www.cidr-report.org/as4637 for a current version of this report. Recent Table History Date Prefixes CIDR Agg 06-04-07 214183 138447 07-04-07 214323 138473 08-04-07 214396 138547 09-04-07 214610 138763 10-04-07 214432 138786 11-04-07 214552 138836 12-04-07 214559 138907 13-04-07 214609 138920 AS Summary 24809 Number of ASes in routing system 10482 Number of ASes announcing only one prefix 1485 Largest number of prefixes announced by an AS AS7018 : ATT-INTERNET4 - AT&T WorldNet Services 90404864 Largest address span announced by an AS (/32s) AS721 : DISA-ASNBLK - DoD Network Information Center Aggregation Summary The algorithm used in this report proposes aggregation only when there is a precise match using the AS path, so as to preserve traffic transit policies. Aggregation is also proposed across non-advertised address space ('holes'). --- 13Apr07 --- ASnum NetsNow NetsAggr NetGain % Gain Description Table 214763 138891 75872 35.3% All ASes AS4134 1244 307 937 75.3% CHINANET-BACKBONE No.31,Jin-rong Street AS4323 1266 358 908 71.7% TWTC - Time Warner Telecom, Inc. AS4755 1095 194 901 82.3% VSNL-AS Videsh Sanchar Nigam Ltd. Autonomous System AS9498 967 91 876 90.6% BBIL-AP BHARTI BT INTERNET LTD. AS6478 1091 279 812 74.4% ATT-INTERNET3 - AT&T WorldNet Services AS18566 999 199 800 80.1% COVAD - Covad Communications Co. AS11492 1027 377 650 63.3% CABLEONE - CABLE ONE AS22773 697 52 645 92.5% CCINET-2 - Cox Communications Inc. AS8151 1040 426 614 59.0% Uninet S.A. de C.V. AS17488 663 84 579 87.3% HATHWAY-NET-AP Hathway IP Over Cable Internet AS19262 707 170 537 76.0% VZGNI-TRANSIT - Verizon Internet Services Inc. AS6197 1034 509 525 50.8% BATI-ATL - BellSouth Network Solutions, Inc AS7018 1485 974 511 34.4% ATT-INTERNET4 - AT&T WorldNet Services AS18101 530 31 499 94.2% RIL-IDC Reliance Infocom Ltd Internet Data Centre, AS19916 568 101 467 82.2% ASTRUM-0001 - OLM LLC AS17676 503 65 438 87.1% JPNIC-JP-ASN-BLOCK Japan Network Information Center AS4766 740 317 423 57.2% KIXS-AS-KR Korea Telecom AS4812 451 74 377 83.6% CHINANET-SH-AP China Telecom (Group) AS2386 1090 735 355 32.6% INS-AS - AT&T Data Communications Services AS721 618 277 341 55.2% DISA-ASNBLK - DoD Network Information Center AS5668 581 247 334 57.5% AS-5668 - CenturyTel Internet Holdings, Inc. AS7029 569 235 334 58.7% WINDSTREAM - Windstream Communications Inc AS15270 521 188 333 63.9% AS-PAETEC-NET - PaeTec.net -a division of PaeTecCommunications, Inc. AS16852 398 74 324 81.4% BROADWING-FOCAL - Broadwing Communications Services, Inc. AS7011 781 464 317 40.6% FRONTIER-AND-CITIZENS - Frontier Communications, Inc. AS4668 312 8 304 97.4% LGNET-AS-KR LG CNS AS33588 437 136 301 68.9% BRESNAN-AS - Bresnan Communications, LLC. AS14654 303 5 298 98.3% WAYPORT - Wayport AS6198 567 270 297 52.4% BATI-MIA - BellSouth Network Solutions, Inc AS855 566 274 292 51.6% CANET-ASN-4 - Bell Aliant Total 22850 7521 15329 67.1% Top 30 total Possible Bogus Routes 24.48.0.0/13 AS19548 ADELPHIA-AS2 - Road Runner HoldCo LLC 24.246.0.0/17 AS7018 ATT-INTERNET4 - AT&T WorldNet Services 24.246.128.0/18 AS7018 ATT-INTERNET4 - AT&T WorldNet Services 41.202.189.0/24 AS22351 INTELSAT Intelsat Global BGP Routing Policy 60.253.0.0/18 AS27572 THEBOE-27572 - The Boeing Company 60.253.64.0/19 AS27572 THEBOE-27572 - The Boeing Company 63.140.213.0/24 AS22555 UTC - Universal Talkware Corporation 63.140.238.0/24 AS20471 MONCUR - Moncur Design 63.141.42.0/24 AS701 UUNET - MCI Communications Services, Inc. d/b/a Verizon Business 63.141.159.0/24 AS17216 VERITECT-EAST - Veritect 63.248.0.0/16 AS3356 LEVEL3 Level 3 Communications 63.248.0.0/17 AS3356 LEVEL3 Level 3 Communications 64.7.112.0/21 AS13511 64.7.120.0/21 AS13537 64.17.32.0/24 AS13488 CBWU-13488 - Continental Broadband Florida, Inc DBA WebUnited 64.17.33.0/24 AS13488 CBWU-13488 - Continental Broadband Florida, Inc DBA WebUnited 64.17.37.0/24 AS13488 CBWU-13488 - Continental Broadband Florida, Inc DBA WebUnited 64.46.96.0/20 AS13680 AS13680 Hostway Corporation Tampa, FL 64.46.112.0/20 AS30217 DESYNC Desync Corporation 64.89.224.0/20 AS15276 MAX-LV - Intuitive Logic 64.186.72.0/21 AS25795 ARPNET - ARP NETWORKS, INC. 64.188.0.0/16 AS3356 LEVEL3 Level 3 Communications 65.36.52.0/24 AS701 UUNET - MCI Communications Services, Inc. d/b/a Verizon Business 65.36.121.0/24 AS29957 UINET - UI NET LLC 65.60.45.0/24 AS32311 JKS-ASN - JKS Media, LLC 66.6.34.0/24 AS14935 MONTICELLO - Monticello Networks, Inc. 66.11.32.0/20 AS6261 VISINET - Visionary Systems, Inc. 66.11.40.0/21 AS6261 VISINET - Visionary Systems, Inc. 66.54.91.0/24 AS30506 BLACKSUN-1 - Blacksun Technologies LLC 66.55.160.0/19 AS29994 66.64.96.0/20 AS3790 RADIGRAFICA COSTARRICENSE 66.97.32.0/20 AS11305 INTERLAND-NET1 - Interland Incorporated 66.180.239.0/24 AS35888 VIGNETTE - VIGNETTE CORPORATION 66.235.158.0/23 AS7018 ATT-INTERNET4 - AT&T WorldNet Services 66.241.96.0/21 AS10271 TCIX - Troy City Internet Exchange, Inc 67.20.0.0/14 AS19548 ADELPHIA-AS2 - Road Runner HoldCo LLC 68.64.0.0/13 AS19548 ADELPHIA-AS2 - Road Runner HoldCo LLC 68.64.208.0/20 AS20001 ROADRUNNER-WEST - Road Runner HoldCo LLC 68.65.192.0/18 AS20001 ROADRUNNER-WEST - Road Runner HoldCo LLC 68.66.64.0/18 AS20001 ROADRUNNER-WEST - Road Runner HoldCo LLC 68.67.16.0/21 AS20001 ROADRUNNER-WEST - Road Runner HoldCo LLC 68.68.192.0/19 AS20001 ROADRUNNER-WEST - Road Runner HoldCo LLC 68.168.0.0/14 AS19548 ADELPHIA-AS2 - Road Runner HoldCo LLC 68.171.32.0/19 AS20001 ROADRUNNER-WEST - Road Runner HoldCo LLC 68.232.0.0/14 AS19548 ADELPHIA-AS2 - Road Runner HoldCo LLC 68.234.32.0/19 AS20001 ROADRUNNER-WEST - Road Runner HoldCo LLC 69.55.108.0/24 AS4977 NET1 - Pecos Technologies 69.71.192.0/20 AS13818 PHX-INTL-TELEPORT - Phoenix International Teleport 69.160.0.0/12 AS19548 ADELPHIA-AS2 - Road Runner HoldCo LLC 69.168.0.0/14 AS19548 ADELPHIA-AS2 - Road Runner HoldCo LLC 69.169.0.0/17 AS20001 ROADRUNNER-WEST - Road Runner HoldCo LLC 70.32.0.0/13 AS19548 ADELPHIA-AS2 - Road Runner HoldCo LLC 70.33.64.0/18 AS20001 ROADRUNNER-WEST - Road Runner HoldCo LLC 70.35.0.0/18 AS20001 ROADRUNNER-WEST - Road Runner HoldCo LLC 70.40.0.0/16 AS19548 ADELPHIA-AS2 - Road Runner HoldCo LLC 72.9.128.0/20 AS27572 THEBOE-27572 - The Boeing Company 92.192.0.0/16 AS12654 RIPE-NCC-RIS-AS RIPE NCC RIS project 92.255.248.0/21 AS12654 RIPE-NCC-RIS-AS RIPE NCC RIS project 93.192.0.0/16 AS12654 RIPE-NCC-RIS-AS RIPE NCC RIS project 93.255.248.0/21 AS12654 RIPE-NCC-RIS-AS RIPE NCC RIS project 116.112.128.0/17 AS3758 ERX-SINGNET SingNet 128.209.0.0/16 AS4017 131.64.0.0/12 AS721 DISA-ASNBLK - DoD Network Information Center 132.0.0.0/10 AS721 DISA-ASNBLK - DoD Network Information Center 137.0.0.0/13 AS721 DISA-ASNBLK - DoD Network Information Center 138.136.0.0/13 AS721 DISA-ASNBLK - DoD Network Information Center 151.135.0.0/16 AS4763 TELSTRANZ-AS TelstraClear Ltd 158.0.0.0/13 AS721 DISA-ASNBLK - DoD Network Information Center 159.3.211.0/24 AS2687 ASATTCA AT&T Global Network Services - AP 159.220.0.0/22 AS16050 REUTERS-DOCKLANDS-RES-AS Reuters Docklands resiliancy 159.220.4.0/22 AS16050 REUTERS-DOCKLANDS-RES-AS Reuters Docklands resiliancy 159.220.4.0/24 AS16050 REUTERS-DOCKLANDS-RES-AS Reuters Docklands resiliancy 159.220.8.0/22 AS35528 REUTERS-UK2-AS Reuters-UK2 159.220.40.0/24 AS1787 REUTERS-AMERICA-ISP-CELL-AS - Reuters America Inc. 159.220.41.0/24 AS1787 REUTERS-AMERICA-ISP-CELL-AS - Reuters America Inc. 159.220.42.0/24 AS1787 REUTERS-AMERICA-ISP-CELL-AS - Reuters America Inc. 159.220.43.0/24 AS1787 REUTERS-AMERICA-ISP-CELL-AS - Reuters America Inc. 159.220.64.0/23 AS24977 MONEYLINE-UK Moneyline Telerate 163.142.0.0/16 AS2500 JPNIC-ASBLOCK-AP JPNIC 180.190.0.0/16 AS24003 JUBL-MAIN-AS-IN JUBILANT ORGANOSYS LTD., INDIA, LEADING CHEMICAL MANUFACTURER 190.54.0.0/16 AS6429 Core Internet AT&T Chile 192.30.93.0/24 AS17757 HPAUS-AP HP Australia 192.30.94.0/24 AS17757 HPAUS-AP HP Australia 192.40.105.0/24 AS12582 TSF-DATANET-NGD-AS TSF MPLS VPN Services 192.69.107.0/24 AS5515 SONERA-GLOBAL-IP Sonera Solution Autonomous System 192.69.108.0/24 AS5515 SONERA-GLOBAL-IP Sonera Solution Autonomous System 192.69.177.0/24 AS5515 SONERA-GLOBAL-IP Sonera Solution Autonomous System 192.70.164.0/24 AS25689 NRCNET-AS - National Research Council of Canada 192.81.160.0/24 AS719 ELISA-AS Elisa Oyj 192.81.182.0/24 AS719 ELISA-AS Elisa Oyj 192.81.183.0/24 AS719 ELISA-AS Elisa Oyj 192.81.184.0/24 AS719 ELISA-AS Elisa Oyj 192.88.99.0/24 AS559 SWITCH SWITCH, Swiss Education and Research Network 192.96.36.0/24 AS5713 SAIX-NET 192.96.37.0/24 AS10474 NETACTIVE 192.96.135.0/24 AS2018 TENET-1 192.96.136.0/23 AS2018 TENET-1 192.96.140.0/24 AS2018 TENET-1 192.96.143.0/24 AS2018 TENET-1 192.96.145.0/24 AS2018 TENET-1 192.96.177.0/24 AS6083 POSIX-AFRICA 192.96.250.0/24 AS2018 TENET-1 192.122.212.0/24 AS209 ASN-QWEST - Qwest 192.124.252.0/22 AS680 DFN-IP service G-WiN 192.131.233.0/24 AS7891 BELLSOUTH-NET-BLK2 - Bellsouth.Net 192.133.6.0/24 AS10282 EQUANT-CEEUR EQUANT AS for Central and Eastern Europe region 192.139.3.0/24 AS23184 PERSONA - PERSONA COMMUNICATIONS INC. 192.153.136.0/21 AS721 DISA-ASNBLK - DoD Network Information Center 192.153.144.0/21 AS721 DISA-ASNBLK - DoD Network Information Center 192.172.0.0/19 AS721 DISA-ASNBLK - DoD Network Information Center 192.188.208.0/20 AS721 DISA-ASNBLK - DoD Network Information Center 192.245.235.0/24 AS10913 INTERNAP-BLK - Internap Network Services 193.33.178.0/23 AS39602 CRYSTAL-AS No Wires 194.31.227.0/24 AS21461 TRANSFAIRNET Transfair-net GmbH Krefeld 194.59.176.0/20 AS1273 CW Cable & Wireless 194.153.107.0/24 AS8897 MISTRAL Mistral Internet Group Limited 194.246.72.0/23 AS8893 ARTFILES-AS Artfiles New Media GmbH 196.6.108.0/24 AS5713 SAIX-NET 196.6.175.0/24 AS3741 IS 196.6.176.0/23 AS3741 IS 196.6.183.0/24 AS3741 IS 196.6.196.0/24 AS3741 IS 196.6.199.0/24 AS3741 IS 196.6.204.0/22 AS3741 IS 196.6.208.0/24 AS3741 IS 196.6.211.0/24 AS3741 IS 196.6.212.0/23 AS3741 IS 196.6.212.0/24 AS3741 IS 196.6.222.0/23 AS3741 IS 196.6.237.0/24 AS3741 IS 196.10.119.0/24 AS2018 TENET-1 196.10.122.0/23 AS2018 TENET-1 196.10.136.0/22 AS3741 IS 196.10.140.0/22 AS3741 IS 196.10.231.0/24 AS3741 IS 196.10.251.0/24 AS2018 TENET-1 196.10.252.0/23 AS2018 TENET-1 196.10.254.0/24 AS2018 TENET-1 196.11.0.0/20 AS3741 IS 196.11.40.0/21 AS3741 IS 196.11.135.0/24 AS3741 IS 196.11.188.0/23 AS3741 IS 196.11.190.0/24 AS3741 IS 196.11.251.0/24 AS3741 IS 196.13.101.0/24 AS2018 TENET-1 196.13.102.0/23 AS2018 TENET-1 196.13.104.0/24 AS2018 TENET-1 196.13.108.0/24 AS3741 IS 196.13.116.0/22 AS2018 TENET-1 196.13.121.0/24 AS2018 TENET-1 196.13.125.0/24 AS2018 TENET-1 196.13.126.0/24 AS2018 TENET-1 196.13.128.0/22 AS3741 IS 196.13.144.0/22 AS2905 TICSA-ASN 196.13.152.0/21 AS2905 TICSA-ASN 196.13.160.0/24 AS2905 TICSA-ASN 196.13.169.0/24 AS2018 TENET-1 196.13.174.0/23 AS2018 TENET-1 196.13.176.0/21 AS2018 TENET-1 196.13.188.0/22 AS2018 TENET-1 196.13.192.0/22 AS2018 TENET-1 196.13.196.0/24 AS2018 TENET-1 196.13.214.0/23 AS3741 IS 196.13.216.0/23 AS3741 IS 198.23.26.0/24 AS4390 BELLATLANTIC-COM - Bell Atlantic, Inc. 198.54.82.0/24 AS2018 TENET-1 198.54.92.0/24 AS2018 TENET-1 198.54.222.0/24 AS2018 TENET-1 198.54.249.0/24 AS2018 TENET-1 198.54.250.0/24 AS2018 TENET-1 198.54.251.0/24 AS2018 TENET-1 198.97.72.0/21 AS721 DISA-ASNBLK - DoD Network Information Center 198.97.80.0/20 AS721 DISA-ASNBLK - DoD Network Information Center 198.97.96.0/19 AS721 DISA-ASNBLK - DoD Network Information Center 198.97.240.0/20 AS721 DISA-ASNBLK - DoD Network Information Center 198.161.87.0/24 AS6539 GT-BELL - Bell Canada 198.163.155.0/24 AS684 MTSAL-ASN - MTS Allstream Inc. 198.167.0.0/16 AS7456 INTERHOP - Interhop Network SERVICES Inc. 198.168.0.0/16 AS701 UUNET - MCI Communications Services, Inc. d/b/a Verizon Business 198.169.0.0/16 AS803 SASKTEL - SaskTel 199.9.128.0/17 AS668 ASN-ASNET-NET-AS - Defense Research and Engineering Network 199.10.0.0/16 AS721 DISA-ASNBLK - DoD Network Information Center 199.60.0.0/20 AS271 BCNET-AS - University of British Columbia 199.114.0.0/21 AS721 DISA-ASNBLK - DoD Network Information Center 199.114.128.0/18 AS721 DISA-ASNBLK - DoD Network Information Center 199.114.130.0/24 AS721 DISA-ASNBLK - DoD Network Information Center 199.114.132.0/24 AS721 DISA-ASNBLK - DoD Network Information Center 199.114.134.0/24 AS3541 ITSDN-U4 - DISA/UNRRA 199.114.136.0/24 AS27044 DDN-ASNBLK1 - DoD Network Information Center 199.114.138.0/24 AS27064 DDN-ASNBLK1 - DoD Network Information Center 199.114.140.0/24 AS3544 ITSDN-U7 - DISA/UNRRA 199.114.142.0/24 AS27064 DDN-ASNBLK1 - DoD Network Information Center 199.114.144.0/24 AS27064 DDN-ASNBLK1 - DoD Network Information Center 199.114.148.0/24 AS721 DISA-ASNBLK - DoD Network Information Center 199.114.150.0/24 AS721 DISA-ASNBLK - DoD Network Information Center 199.114.152.0/24 AS27033 DDN-ASNBLK1 - DoD Network Information Center 199.114.153.0/24 AS27034 DDN-ASNBLK1 - DoD Network Information Center 199.114.154.0/24 AS3542 ITSDN-U5 - DISA/UNRRA 199.114.156.0/24 AS1733 CENTAF-SWA - AF DDN PMO 199.114.160.0/24 AS1733 CENTAF-SWA - AF DDN PMO 199.121.0.0/16 AS721 DISA-ASNBLK - DoD Network Information Center 199.123.0.0/18 AS721 DISA-ASNBLK - DoD Network Information Center 199.123.16.0/20 AS721 DISA-ASNBLK - DoD Network Information Center 199.123.80.0/21 AS721 DISA-ASNBLK - DoD Network Information Center 199.189.32.0/19 AS7332 IQUEST-AS - IQuest Internet 199.202.0.0/16 AS701 UUNET - MCI Communications Services, Inc. d/b/a Verizon Business 199.246.116.0/24 AS813 UUNET-CANADA - MCI Communications Services, Inc. d/b/a Verizon Business 202.4.160.0/24 AS9498 BBIL-AP BHARTI BT INTERNET LTD. 202.4.161.0/24 AS9498 BBIL-AP BHARTI BT INTERNET LTD. 202.4.162.0/24 AS9498 BBIL-AP BHARTI BT INTERNET LTD. 202.9.64.0/19 AS9290 202.45.132.0/22 AS24314 202.58.113.0/24 AS19161 INNOCOM-TELECOM - INNOCOM TELECOM 202.59.8.0/21 AS17557 PKTELECOM-AS-AP Pakistan Telecom 202.86.252.0/22 AS4748 RESOLINK-AS Resources Linke Network Limited 202.86.253.0/24 AS9304 HUTCHISON-AS-AP Hutchison Global Communications 202.86.254.0/24 AS9304 HUTCHISON-AS-AP Hutchison Global Communications 202.86.255.0/24 AS9304 HUTCHISON-AS-AP Hutchison Global Communications 202.90.33.0/24 AS9830 SWIFTONLINE-AS-AP SWIFT ONLINE BORDER AS 202.90.40.0/24 AS9830 SWIFTONLINE-AS-AP SWIFT ONLINE BORDER AS 202.90.41.0/24 AS9830 SWIFTONLINE-AS-AP SWIFT ONLINE BORDER AS 202.90.42.0/24 AS9830 SWIFTONLINE-AS-AP SWIFT ONLINE BORDER AS 202.90.43.0/24 AS9830 SWIFTONLINE-AS-AP SWIFT ONLINE BORDER AS 202.90.44.0/24 AS9830 SWIFTONLINE-AS-AP SWIFT ONLINE BORDER AS 202.94.70.0/24 AS9837 POWERTEL-AP Powertel Ltd 202.124.16.0/24 AS24485 202.124.17.0/24 AS24485 202.124.18.0/24 AS24485 202.124.19.0/24 AS24485 202.124.20.0/24 AS24485 202.124.21.0/24 AS24485 202.124.22.0/24 AS24485 202.124.23.0/24 AS24485 202.124.192.0/24 AS17557 PKTELECOM-AS-AP Pakistan Telecom 202.124.193.0/24 AS17557 PKTELECOM-AS-AP Pakistan Telecom 202.124.194.0/24 AS17557 PKTELECOM-AS-AP Pakistan Telecom 202.124.195.0/24 AS17557 PKTELECOM-AS-AP Pakistan Telecom 202.124.196.0/24 AS17557 PKTELECOM-AS-AP Pakistan Telecom 202.124.197.0/24 AS17557 PKTELECOM-AS-AP Pakistan Telecom 202.124.198.0/24 AS17557 PKTELECOM-AS-AP Pakistan Telecom 202.124.199.0/24 AS17557 PKTELECOM-AS-AP Pakistan Telecom 202.124.200.0/24 AS17557 PKTELECOM-AS-AP Pakistan Telecom 202.124.201.0/24 AS17557 PKTELECOM-AS-AP Pakistan Telecom 202.124.202.0/24 AS17557 PKTELECOM-AS-AP Pakistan Telecom 202.124.203.0/24 AS17557 PKTELECOM-AS-AP Pakistan Telecom 202.124.204.0/24 AS17557 PKTELECOM-AS-AP Pakistan Telecom 202.124.205.0/24 AS17557 PKTELECOM-AS-AP Pakistan Telecom 202.124.206.0/24 AS17557 PKTELECOM-AS-AP Pakistan Telecom 202.124.207.0/24 AS17911 BRAINPK-AS-AP Brain Telecommunication Ltd. 202.125.96.0/20 AS7693 COMNET-TH KSC Commercial Internet Co. Ltd. 202.128.109.0/24 AS4802 ASN-IINET iiNet Limited 202.128.110.0/23 AS4802 ASN-IINET iiNet Limited 202.136.254.0/24 AS4808 CHINA169-BJ CNCGROUP IP network China169 Beijing Province Network 202.136.255.0/24 AS4808 CHINA169-BJ CNCGROUP IP network China169 Beijing Province Network 202.148.32.0/20 AS17495 GATEWAY-AP BROADBAND WIRELESSS INTERNET SERVICE PROVIDER 202.164.100.0/24 AS18101 RIL-IDC Reliance Infocom Ltd Internet Data Centre, 202.174.70.0/24 AS21175 M-LINK M-Link Teleport s.a. 202.174.71.0/24 AS23924 202.174.72.0/22 AS23924 202.182.32.0/22 AS10223 UECOMM-AU Uecomm Ltd 203.13.171.0/24 AS1221 ASN-TELSTRA Telstra Pty Ltd 203.62.0.0/17 AS7575 AARNET-AS-AP Australian Academic and Reasearch Network (AARNet) 203.78.48.0/20 AS9299 IPG-AS-AP Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company 203.89.139.0/24 AS17911 BRAINPK-AS-AP Brain Telecommunication Ltd. 203.111.192.0/20 AS7473 SINGTEL-AS-AP Singapore Telecom 203.128.128.0/19 AS4134 CHINANET-BACKBONE No.31,Jin-rong Street 203.152.136.0/23 AS23649 NEWSKIES-AS-AP New Skies Satellites, Hong Kong Teleport 203.152.138.0/23 AS23649 NEWSKIES-AS-AP New Skies Satellites, Hong Kong Teleport 203.152.142.0/24 AS23649 NEWSKIES-AS-AP New Skies Satellites, Hong Kong Teleport 203.152.143.0/24 AS23649 NEWSKIES-AS-AP New Skies Satellites, Hong Kong Teleport 203.160.104.0/22 AS23914 OCI-AS-VN One-Connection Internet Company 203.160.110.0/23 AS7643 VNN-AS-AP Vietnam Posts and Telecommunications (VNPT) 204.29.196.0/24 AS7018 ATT-INTERNET4 - AT&T WorldNet Services 204.29.197.0/24 AS7018 ATT-INTERNET4 - AT&T WorldNet Services 204.48.58.0/24 AS4323 TWTC - Time Warner Telecom, Inc. 204.48.60.0/24 AS4323 TWTC - Time Warner Telecom, Inc. 204.153.68.0/24 AS4017 204.153.71.0/24 AS4017 204.153.104.0/24 AS10913 INTERNAP-BLK - Internap Network Services 204.154.125.0/24 AS3952 TELLABS-ASN - TELLABS Operations, Inc. 204.154.126.0/24 AS3952 TELLABS-ASN - TELLABS Operations, Inc. 204.154.127.0/24 AS3952 TELLABS-ASN - TELLABS Operations, Inc. 205.150.0.0/15 AS701 UUNET - MCI Communications Services, Inc. d/b/a Verizon Business 206.55.208.0/20 AS22180 206.128.104.0/21 AS11709 VIC - VIRTUAL INTERACTIVE CENTER 206.191.192.0/18 AS6287 SPACESTAR - Spacestar Communications 207.7.64.0/19 AS14093 207.98.192.0/24 AS701 UUNET - MCI Communications Services, Inc. d/b/a Verizon Business 207.98.209.0/24 AS701 UUNET - MCI Communications Services, Inc. d/b/a Verizon Business 207.98.223.0/24 AS701 UUNET - MCI Communications Services, Inc. d/b/a Verizon Business 207.98.250.0/23 AS30329 TELESPECTRA - Telespectra, LLC 207.189.62.0/23 AS7132 SBIS-AS - SBC Internet Services 207.204.168.0/24 AS15150 BELLTECH-AS - BELLWETHER TECHNOLOGY CORPORATION 207.204.222.0/24 AS15218 COX-OKC - Cox Communications 207.204.248.0/24 AS6653 PRIVATEI - privateI, LLC 207.231.96.0/19 AS11194 NUNETPA - NuNet Inc 207.246.192.0/20 AS5656 ACCESSUS-DOM - accessU.S./BASENet 208.64.12.0/22 AS22773 CCINET-2 - Cox Communications Inc. 209.54.42.0/24 AS6653 PRIVATEI - privateI, LLC 209.54.93.0/24 AS15218 COX-OKC - Cox Communications 209.54.111.0/24 AS15218 COX-OKC - Cox Communications 209.54.123.0/24 AS6062 NETPLEX - NETPLEX 209.54.142.0/24 AS12284 IPNS-AS - Internet Professionals & Network Solutions 209.54.240.0/21 AS10887 BPSI-AS - BPSI Internet Services 209.105.224.0/19 AS20074 209.140.64.0/20 AS22307 209.140.90.0/24 AS14461 NTSL - NET SOLUTIONS 209.140.224.0/21 AS10573 WEBNEXUS - WebNexus Communications Inc. 209.140.234.0/24 AS10573 WEBNEXUS - WebNexus Communications Inc. 209.140.235.0/24 AS10573 WEBNEXUS - WebNexus Communications Inc. 209.140.236.0/24 AS10573 WEBNEXUS - WebNexus Communications Inc. 209.140.237.0/24 AS10573 WEBNEXUS - WebNexus Communications Inc. 209.140.238.0/24 AS10573 WEBNEXUS - WebNexus Communications Inc. 209.140.239.0/24 AS10573 WEBNEXUS - WebNexus Communications Inc. 209.141.4.0/24 AS6653 PRIVATEI - privateI, LLC 209.141.16.0/21 AS10573 WEBNEXUS - WebNexus Communications Inc. 209.141.48.0/22 AS14461 NTSL - NET SOLUTIONS 209.141.104.0/24 AS6653 PRIVATEI - privateI, LLC 209.159.128.0/19 AS209 ASN-QWEST - Qwest 209.207.24.0/24 AS21829 JADETECH-NET - Jade Technologies, Inc. 209.207.36.0/24 AS21829 JADETECH-NET - Jade Technologies, Inc. 210.5.128.0/20 AS4837 CHINA169-BACKBONE CNCGROUP China169 Backbone 216.7.139.0/24 AS701 UUNET - MCI Communications Services, Inc. d/b/a Verizon Business 216.21.1.0/24 AS11652 216.21.6.0/24 AS11652 216.21.7.0/24 AS11652 216.21.15.0/24 AS11652 216.21.17.0/24 AS11652 216.59.0.0/17 AS3356 LEVEL3 Level 3 Communications 216.65.160.0/19 AS7770 TRITON - Triton Technologies, Inc. 216.75.228.0/24 AS32097 WII-KC - WholeSale Internet 216.115.73.0/24 AS26834 DURA - Dura Automotive 216.115.80.0/20 AS35921 IFCI-US - InternetFCI LLC 216.116.56.0/24 AS9237 HUTCHCA-AS Corporate Access (HK) Ltd. 216.116.59.0/24 AS7132 SBIS-AS - SBC Internet Services 216.172.198.0/24 AS15218 COX-OKC - Cox Communications 216.172.199.0/24 AS15218 COX-OKC - Cox Communications 216.210.86.0/24 AS577 BACOM - Bell Canada 216.211.160.0/21 AS11584 IGEUNET Intergate Europe Inc. 216.224.64.0/19 AS6440 EMF-AS - emf.net 216.230.224.0/20 AS15270 AS-PAETEC-NET - PaeTec.net -a division of PaeTecCommunications, Inc. 216.235.96.0/19 AS13645 BROADBANDONE - BroadbandONE, Inc. 216.235.224.0/20 AS22136 NYCT - New York Connect 216.236.160.0/21 AS23272 216.236.168.0/23 AS23272 216.236.170.0/24 AS4565 EPOCH-INTERNET - Epoch Networks 216.236.171.0/24 AS4565 EPOCH-INTERNET - Epoch Networks 216.236.172.0/24 AS4565 EPOCH-INTERNET - Epoch Networks 216.236.174.0/23 AS23272 216.251.203.0/24 AS7132 SBIS-AS - SBC Internet Services 216.251.205.0/24 AS209 ASN-QWEST - Qwest 216.251.207.0/24 AS1239 SPRINTLINK - Sprint Please see http://www.cidr-report.org for the full report ------------------------------------ Copies of this report are mailed to: nanog(a)merit.edu eof-list(a)ripe.net apops(a)apops.net routing-wg(a)ripe.net afnog(a)afnog.org ausnog(a)ausnog.net

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RE: Thoughts on increasing MTUs on the internet
by Neil J. McRae 13 Apr '07

13 Apr '07

Saku Ytti wrote: > IXP peeps, why are you not offering high MTU VLAN option? > From my point of view, this is biggest reason why we today > generally don't have higher end-to-end MTU. > I know that some IXPs do, eg. NetNOD but generally it's > not offered even though many users would opt to use it. Larger MTU size was something I did some work on back in the FDDI days and the benefits are significant. More than just CPU improvements. Throughput and server performance increased substantially also. But FDDI and the like didn't come cheap so little interest at the time. At the LINX a few providers did run larger MTUs during those FDDI days. We did some testing with SRP/DPT in Stockholm and London also and again it worked well but again not cheap. (we were looking at this for storage and exchange of cached content at the time) Unfortunately I think the time where IXPs could make a difference might be past - and to make this happen tere needs to be more of a demand from the members of tose exchanges, its not just a case of turning on a vlan either the impact to the main fabric needs to be understood. Also atleast here in Europe many of the circuits into exchanges are Ethernet based also and I suspect many circuits into exchanges would require a lot of work to support Jumbos. And then again lots of circuits into customer premise are Ethernet based now also some on GFP based SDH systems, some ATM and other whacko technologies with dubious support for jumbo or larger frames. Then there is the actual interface card support of large amounts of jumbos which in my experience is questionable based on a limitedl amount of testing though - Come back POS all is forgiven! Regards, Neil

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counting the cost
by bmanning＠karoshi.com 13 Apr '07

13 Apr '07

thanks ferg - and the local FBI concurs. http://www.tech-404.com/calculator.html` --bill

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RE: Limiting email abuse by subscribers [was: Abuse procedures... Reality Checks]
by Frank Bulk 12 Apr '07

12 Apr '07

Leigh: How many customers do you serve that you have just 50 exceptions? It's my understanding that the most efficient way to keep things clean for cable modem subscribers is to educate subscribers to use port 587 with SMTP AUTH for both the ISP's own servers and their customer's external mail server, and then block destination port 25 on the cable modem. For alternative access technologies, block destination port 25 on the access gear or core routers/firewalls. Regards, Frank -----Original Message----- From: Frank Bulk Sent: Thursday, April 12, 2007 7:48 AM To: Mikael Abrahamsson Cc: nanog(a)merit.edu Subject: Re: Abuse procedures... Reality Checks Mikael Abrahamsson wrote: > > On Wed, 11 Apr 2007, Frank Bulk wrote: > >> It truly is a wonder that Comcast doesn't apply DOCSIS config file >> filters >> on their consumer accounts, leaving just the IPs of their email servers >> open. Yes, it would take an education campaign on their part for all >> the >> consumers that do use alternate SMTP servers, but imagine how much >> work it >> would save their abuse department in the long run. > > There are several large ISPs (millions of subscribers) that have done > away with TCP/25 altogether. If you want to send email thru the ISPs > own email system you have to use TCP/587 (SMTP AUTH). > > Yes, this takes committment and resources, but it's been done > successfully. > You don't even need to do that. We just filter TCP/25 outbound and force people to use our mail servers that have sensible rate limiting etc. People who use alternate SMTP servers can fill in a simple web form to have them added to the exception list. We have about 50 on this list so far. -- Leigh Porter

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rbl.cluecentral.net is back in the air
by Sabri Berisha 12 Apr '07

12 Apr '07

Dear all, This is to let you know that I have resuscitated the DNSBL which lists all IPv4 space currently announced by ASN and country-code. For those of you who remember, I closed it down for personal reasons 18 months ago. The current version is light-coded, easy to maintain and almost fully-automatic. One of the main reasons to build it again was the high number of queries which was still incoming on the servers, so apparently it was very popular. More information on how to use it can be found on http://www.cluecentral.net/rbl/ If you reply or flame, please reply-to-poster. Thanks, -- Sabri

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Re: Abuse procedures... Reality Checks
by Scott Weeks 11 Apr '07

11 Apr '07

--- rsk(a)gsp.org wrote: On Wed, Apr 11, 2007 at 03:44:01PM -0400, Warren Kumari wrote: > The same thing happens with things like abuse -- it is easy to deal > with abuse on a small scale. It is somewhat harder on a medium scale > and harder still on a large scale -- the progression from small to > medium to large is close to linear. : First, I don't buy this. I think dealing with abuse is *much* : easier for large operations than small. The original email I sent was about *how* you deal with it. J. Oquendo vociferously defended his position when he finally got around to saying, "...if someone cannot get out somewhere, they're obviously going to get in touch with me as to why. Once this is done, it is explained [...] I've always contacted someone [...] after about 3 attempts at getting someone to assess their network..." I said this doesn't scale even to hundreds of thousands of customers much less higher numbers. There are definitely scaling issues with this method of dealing with abuse. You can't just hire more phone monkeys linearly to the number of customers you have. <snip> : Second, I don't really care how hard it is. It's YOUR network, YOU : built it, YOU plugged it into our Internet: therefore, however hard : it is, it's YOUR problem. Fix it. Not always. I have inherited various networks over the years that were already built by folks that didn't care. You do the best you can to get it to as good a network as possible, but you never completely reach the goal of "good". Additionally, upper management gives or takes away manpower many times without the understanding of what 'should' be done to be a good netizen and this defines how much effort can be spent on fixing the problems. The only thing a person can really do is quit and move on. That's not always an option. There're very few interesting-to-operate networks here in Hawaii. So, you focus on the top priorities: keeping the current customers and getting more by operating the network in as efficient a manner as possible. Myself, I work outside business hours to try to be a good guy, fix stuff and serve the Hawaiian community in an altruistic manner, but there's only so much stuff one person can do. <snip> scott

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Re: Abuse procedures... Reality Checks
by Scott Weeks 11 Apr '07

11 Apr '07

: if someone cannot get out somewhere, they're obviously : going to get in touch with me as to why. Once this is : done, it is explained : I've always contacted someone : after about 3 attempts at getting someone to assess : their network I know from experience this doesn't scale into the hundreds of thousands of customers and can only imagine the big ass eyeball network's scalability issues... scott --- sil(a)infiltrated.net wrote: From: "J. Oquendo" <sil(a)infiltrated.net> To: nanog(a)merit.edu Cc: Warren Kumari <warren(a)kumari.net> Subject: Re: Abuse procedures... Reality Checks Date: Wed, 11 Apr 2007 13:49:40 -0400 Warren Kumari wrote: > > So, I have always wondered -- how do you customers really react when > they can no longer reach www.example.com, a site hosted a few IPs away > from www.badevilphisher.net? And do you really think that you blocking > them is going to make example.com contact their provider to get things > fixed? > You confused two things. 1) I do my best to stop malicious traffic from leaving my network. With this said, if someone cannot get out somewhere, they're obviously going to get in touch with me as to why. Once this is done, it is explained to them that either their machine, or a machine on their network was doing something fuzzy therefore they were blocked. Most are actually thankful that it was pointed out to them as opposed to having to wait for Security Company X to update its virus/spamware definitions. 2) I do not block getting TO company X at first signs of garbage coming into my network from them. I've always contacted someone to some degree so don't misconstrue my actions as "I block the first packets I see." On the contrary I only block CIDR's after about 3 attempts at getting someone to assess their network. After that, I begin with services. This is my network so this is how it pans out... Spam? A CIDR to my email ports are blocked. SSH brute forcing, etc., those ports are blocked. Network who's blocked on ports continues, everything is then blocked. > > Have you considered that being a little politer and not insulting > everyone on the list might be a more constructive way of getting your > point across -- if I were to call you a "big, fat, doodoo head" you > would probably be less receptive than if I didn't... > What does being polite and "matter of factly" have to do with administrators cleaning up their networks? Should I beg an administrator of some network to be polite and not refer me to their generic abuse desk who'll do nothing about the issue? I actually am a little too polite in the fact that 1) I'm doing network operators a favor pointing them out to rogue hosts on THEIR networks not mines. If they want to continue hosting said rogue idiots, their problem. I won't be allowing it into my range. If you knew me personally, or have dealt with me, I can guarantee you within minutes of you contacting me for something I would be on it. I as an admin/engineer whatever you want to call me would want to make sure that nothing internal to me is affecting anyone else since it is likely to make things more difficult for me if left unchecked. So on issues of politeness, I am being polite contacting people. I'm being double polite posting evil doing networks on my personal site so others can be aware that "These networks are infected. Here are there hosts if you want to block them." I do this on my own spare time, my own expense, and my own filtering of the denials of service that ensue when some botnet reject sees me post a percentage of his botnet. So please don't my messages as anything other than "Hey... When is someone going to deal with this?" frustration targeted at those with the power to do actually something about it instead of waiting for someone else to take the first move. Analogy: You live in a house and sweep your property. Your neighbors don't. Would you stop sweeping your house? Would you keep your house dirty simply because the majority around you do? I'm sure if you convinced the most visible neighbor to make a change, the others would follow suit. Heck in some areas those neighbors who didn't comply would face fines after some point. Why not bring this chain of thought to a network you maintain/manage. As for documentation on this... There is PLENTY of it. Why should I write another document no one would follow. If some can't follow normal standards set by governmental bodies (for lack of better terms), what makes you think someone would say "Gee... That Oquendo sure wrote a nice document... Let me follow it" How about following standards and using good old fashioned common sense. -- ==================================================== J. Oquendo http://pgp.mit.edu:11371/pks/lookup?op=get&search=0x1383A743 sil . infiltrated @ net http://www.infiltrated.net The happiness of society is the end of government. John Adams

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RE: Abuse procedures... Reality Checks
by Azinger, Marla 11 Apr '07

11 Apr '07

I have to disagree. SWIP is not meaningless. In my company some functions related to sending a SWIP are automated, but my company has people on staff who know that it is happening and what it means. And I talk with plenty of other companies that fall into the same boat. In short I find this one comment below to be argumentive and full of conjecture. Regards Marla Azinger Frontier Communications -----Original Message----- From: owner-nanog(a)merit.edu [mailto:owner-nanog@merit.edu]On Behalf Of michael.dillon(a)bt.com Sent: Monday, April 09, 2007 1:39 PM To: nanog(a)merit.edu Subject: RE: Abuse procedures... Reality Checks > I would have to respectfully disagree with you. When network > operators do due diligence and SWIP their sub-allocations, they > (the sub-allocations) should be authoritative in regards to things > like RBLs. How do you tell when they have actually done "due diligence". Existence of a SWIP record is essentially meaningless in this day and age. Many people do them automatically and there may well be nobody left on staff who knows that this is happening or what it all means. --Michael Dillon

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RE: Abuse procedures... Reality Checks
by Frank Bulk 11 Apr '07

11 Apr '07

Comcast is known to emit lots of abuse -- are you blocking all their networks today? Frank -----Original Message----- From: Frank Bulk Sent: Tuesday, April 10, 2007 7:43 AM To: nanog(a)merit.edu Subject: Re: Abuse procedures... Reality Checks On Sat, Apr 07, 2007 at 09:50:34PM +0000, Fergie wrote: > I would have to respectfully disagree with you. When network > operators do due diligence and SWIP their sub-allocations, they > (the sub-allocations) should be authoritative in regards to things > like RBLs. After thinking it over: I partly-to-mostly agree. In principal, yes. In practice, however, [some] negligent network operators have built such long and pervasive track records of large-scale abuse that their allocations can be classified into two categories: 1. Those that have emitted lots of abuse. 2. Those that are going to emit lots of abuse. In such cases, I'm not inclined to wait for (2) to become reality. ---Rsk

2 1