- Test - lists.nanog.org

I remember IANA... rfc2468
by Rodney Joffe 16 Oct '07

16 Oct '07

It's hard to believe that it has already been 9 years. http://www.postel.org/postel.html http://www.isoc.org/postel/index.shtml

2 1

Re: Geographic map of IPv6 availability
by Paul Vixie 15 Oct '07

15 Oct '07

Nathan Ward <nanog(a)daork.net> writes: > ... > Nice rant though :-) agreed. > ... > Does anyone have info on how bind (and other recursive resolvers) > select whether to use v6 or v4 if an NS points at a resource with both > A and AAAA records? Most OSes prefer the AAAA record, does bind behave > the same? yes. -- Paul Vixie

6 9

Sorry if this is off-topic :-)
by Drew Weaver 15 Oct '07

15 Oct '07

I don't believe it is, it may be, sorry if it is ;-) Does anyone have any real world experience with IDS gear from TopLayer? If so could you contact me off-list with your comments/suggestions? We're looking at some IDS / DDOS mitigation gear. Any suggestions from folks who have already deployed solutions would be helpful. I would also like information on solutions specifically that have customer level access/control (i.e. customers can set their own thresholds, etc for their traffic based on what you define...) Thanks in advance, Drew

1 0

readable version of my perfect storm slides
by David Meyer 15 Oct '07

15 Oct '07

http://www.1-4-5.net/~dmm/talks/NANOG41/perfect_storm.pdf Dave

1 0

Re: How to Handle ISPs Who Turn a Blind Eye to Criminal Activity?
by Florian Weimer 15 Oct '07

15 Oct '07

* Steve Bertrand: >> Anyway, if you've got a customer account that was created with a stolen >> credit card, and you get complaints about activity on that account from >> various parties, and you still don't act, this shows a rather >> significant level of carelessness. > > Further to carelessness, this may be pushing the boundary in many places > of guilt by act of omission. I'm not familiar with the finer points of the US criminal code. I'm rather skeptical that such a risk actually exists (Foonet/CSI notwithstanding). If people actually cared about compromises, I would be more concerned that not handling abuse complaints would expose ISPs to liability from their own customers, who would have learnt earlier about their compromise if the ISP told them. Part of the reason why this discussion is somewhat heated is that there's zero incentive in most markets to deal with customer compromises. Otherwise, people would just lean back and think, "yeah, right, let them try and see how it works for them".

2 1

Comcast.net E-mail Admin
by Tom Daly 15 Oct '07

15 Oct '07

Hello, Can a comcast.net e-mail admin please contact me off-list? Thanks, Tom Daly -- Tom Daly tom(a)dyndns.com Dynamic Network Services, Inc. http://www.dyndns.com/

1 0

Re: more-specifics via IX
by Andy Davidson 15 Oct '07

15 Oct '07

On 15 Oct 2007, at 13:33, John Payne wrote: > To answer the OP's question I'd be looking at manually filtering > the more specifics if they are also sending the aggregates through > the IX. The customer's customer is still going to see *your* routes via the MLP, unless (without knowing what exchange) you can attach a community to the announcement that forbids the route-server from propagating it to specific networks.

1 0

Re: How to Handle ISPs Who Turn a Blind Eye to Criminal Activity?
by Paul Ferguson 15 Oct '07

15 Oct '07

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 - -- Mike Lewinski <mike(a)rockynet.com> wrote: >On a side note, now that I've gotten back on -post.... I will say that I've had pretty dismal experiences working with Law Enforcement over the years as a service provider. When you have to explain to the Feds just what IRC (for example) is, you've lost the battle :( After repeated attempts at getting what seems to be blatant criminal activity investigated, a provider might start to think "If Law Enforcement doesn't care, why should I?" (I've avoided falling into that trap, but it is frustrating to boot someone for illegal activities and see them go on to pull the same thing at another provider even after providing evidence to authorities.). > Exactly. Sometimes I think to myself that "...ISPs have Terms of Service and Acceptable Use Policies, so they have the scope and tools they need to boot a 'customer" who break the rules." But all too often, it would appear, the potential loss of revenue seems to win out over enforcing those policies. And as you say, if the ISP boots them, they just set up shop elsewhere. So, back to my original question: If you alert an ISP that "bad and possibly criminal" activity is taking place by one of their customer, and they do not take corrective action (even after a year), what do you do? - - ferg -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: PGP Desktop 9.6.3 (Build 3017) wj8DBQFHD+XAq1pz9mNUZTMRAub9AKDGpuf2fwYYS2Q1rF/v4EtB76wr5wCcDSFY Ya7MTzjQcUJ+qL5UfSe5gw0= =2pba -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- -- "Fergie", a.k.a. Paul Ferguson Engineering Architecture for the Internet fergdawg(at)netzero.net ferg's tech blog: http://fergdawg.blogspot.com/

5 4

Re: Researchers ping through first full 'Internet census' in 25 years
by Tim Franklin 15 Oct '07

15 Oct '07

On Fri, October 12, 2007 10:08 pm, Mark Foster wrote: > Its all very well for those that know better to carry on like this, but I > would suggest that those sortsa complaints only come from people who > don't know better. They don't know how to interpret their Firewall > warnings. And they don't know whats genuine and whats not. You're right, they don't. My complaint is with those who *think* they do. > Suggest that rather than knocking those who genuinely think that its a > warzone out there (and isn't it?) efforts of ISPs to educate clients as > to what is genuine abuse (and what isn't) should be rewarded. Absolutely. I've always been happy to try and educate those who come with even the slightest inclination towards education. It's the ones who are convinced that either any error message from their firewall or OS is the Word of God, or that because they're skilled in some other field, any attempt to educate them about networking or computers is a direct attack on their mental prowess - they bug me. It seems that neither group is getting smaller :( Regards, Tim.

1 0

Re: How to Handle ISPs Who Turn a Blind Eye to Criminal Activity?
by Paul Ferguson 14 Oct '07

14 Oct '07

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 - -- Gadi Evron <ge(a)linuxbox.org> wrote: >That's a different question all together, not about criminal ISPs, which >[...] No, not necessarily. Given that there are Tier 1 ISPs, Tier 2, etc., so you can certainly have some small-ish ISP colluding with criminal activity, in effect, by ignoring it or claiming ignorance. However, it's kind of hard to plead ignorance when, say, people continually alert them to the issues and they persist. That's just one example... I can come up with more. :-) - - ferg -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: PGP Desktop 9.6.3 (Build 3017) wj8DBQFHD/N0q1pz9mNUZTMRAqtkAKCLJifYupBbpjmqVfVGUND95NVGNwCdFYp8 SM37ObYbO88K2iCkd99fp7c= =DjDg -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- -- "Fergie", a.k.a. Paul Ferguson Engineering Architecture for the Internet fergdawg(at)netzero.net ferg's tech blog: http://fergdawg.blogspot.com/

3 3