- Test - lists.nanog.org

Internet Week NY Jun 2 - Jun 9
by WWWhatsup 22 May '08

22 May '08

> Please note that Internet Week NY coincides with the NANOG meet. Some events may be of interest: http://www.internetweekny.com/schedule/list Joly MacFie http://isoc-ny.org

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Nortel 4450T switches and QoS?
by Brett Charbeneau 21 May '08

21 May '08

Does anyone have any experience with switches of this ilk - and how well they do throttling P2P traffic? The sales material purports that these switches "filter" at L2 which sounds groovy and all, but I'd really like to hear from someone who has used these for this purpose. And how well that actually worked for them. -- ******************************************************************** Brett Charbeneau, GSEC Gold, GCIH Gold Network Administrator Williamsburg Regional Library 7770 Croaker Road Williamsburg, VA 23188-7064 (757)259-4044 www.wrl.org (757)259-4079 (fax) brett(a)wrl.org ********************************************************************

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[NANOG-announce] Program Committee Vacancy Call for Volunteers Extension
by Todd Underwood 21 May '08

21 May '08

. o O ( i'm thinking about just leaving this program committee chair hat on) the call for volunteers to the nanog program committee (originally sent: http://mailman.nanog.org/pipermail/nanog/2008-April/000153.html ) has been extended through the end of the weekend (to sunday, 25 may 2008). there were some miscommunications among nominators and the program committee that means that a number of nominations and solicitations did not take place in a timely fashion. i believe the fair thing to do is to extend the time frame for several days to make it possible for everyone who is interested in this seat to offer their name. so if you're interested, review the call for volunteers and submit your name promptly, please. thanks, todd -- _____________________________________________________________________ todd underwood +1 603 643 9300 x101 renesys corporation general manager babbledog todd(a)renesys.com http://www.renesys.com/blog _______________________________________________ NANOG-announce mailing list NANOG-announce(a)nanog.org http://mailman.nanog.org/mailman/listinfo/nanog-announce

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[NANOG-announce] Lightning Talk submissions open for NANOG42
by Todd Underwood 21 May '08

21 May '08

/me dons the NANOG PC Chair hat again Lightning talk submissions for NANOG42 are now open: http://nanogpc.org/lightning/ Lightning talks are short talks of interest to the audience in line with the rest of the program. They are strictly limited to 10 minutes (including questions). Lightning talks are selected by the program committee during the conference but we will probably select the first round of lightning talks just prior to the start of the conference. Get your submissions in. /me takes off the hat and wipes his brow -- _____________________________________________________________________ todd underwood +1 603 643 9300 x101 renesys corporation general manager babbledog todd(a)renesys.com http://www.renesys.com/blog _______________________________________________ NANOG-announce mailing list NANOG-announce(a)nanog.org http://mailman.nanog.org/mailman/listinfo/nanog-announce

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[NANOG-announce] New socials for NANOG 42 Brooklyn -- Register
by Todd Underwood 21 May '08

21 May '08

<hat org="NANOG" group="program committee" role="chair"> howdy, NANOG42 will take place in brooklyn, NY in about a week and a half. there are two new socials (you can read "socials" as "free drinks and snacks") that have been added to the agenda at http://nanog.org/mtg-0806/agenda.html * equinix is sponsoring a social on tuesday evening: http://nanog.org/mtg-0806/invitation.html * and our host, Telx is sponsoring an event on wednesday evening: http://nanog.org/mtg-0806/invitation2.html both events are open to all nanog attendees. if you have not yet registered for NANOG42, please do so now. the hotel rooms at good rates are all gone, but the registration numbers indicate that many of you are waiting until the last minute to register. please take a minute to do so now so that we can have a more accurate count of the number of expected attendees: https://nanog.merit.edu/registration/ thanks, todd </hat> -- _____________________________________________________________________ todd underwood +1 603 643 9300 x101 renesys corporation general manager babbledog todd(a)renesys.com http://www.renesys.com/blog _______________________________________________ NANOG-announce mailing list NANOG-announce(a)nanog.org http://mailman.nanog.org/mailman/listinfo/nanog-announce

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Cisco Security Advisory: Cisco IOS Secure Shell Denial of Service
by Cisco Systems Product Security Incident Response Team 21 May '08

21 May '08

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 Cisco Security Advisory: Cisco IOS Secure Shell Denial of Service Vulnerabilities Advisory ID: cisco-sa-20080521-ssh http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20080521-ssh.shtml Revision 1.0 For Public Release 2008 May 21 1600 UTC (GMT) +-------------------------------------------------------------------- Summary ======= The Secure Shell server (SSH) implementation in Cisco IOS contains multiple vulnerabilities that allow unauthenticated users the ability to generate a spurious memory access error or, in certain cases, reload the device. The IOS SSH server is an optional service that is disabled by default, but its use is highly recommended as a security best practice for management of Cisco IOS devices. SSH can be configured as part of the AutoSecure feature in the initial configuration of IOS devices, AutoSecure run after initial configuration, or manually. Devices that are not configured to accept SSH connections are not affected by these vulnerabilities. Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) identifier CVE-2008-1159 has been assigned to this vulnerability. This advisory is posted at http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20080521-ssh.shtm Affected Products ================= Vulnerable Products +------------------ Cisco devices running certain 12.4-based IOS releases and configured to be managed via SSH may be affected by this issue. The IOS secure shell server is disabled by default. To determine if SSH is enabled, use the show ip ssh command. Router#show ip ssh SSH Enabled - version 2.0 Authentication timeout: 120 secs; Authentication retries: 3 The previous output shows that SSH is enabled on this device and that the SSH protocol major version that is being supported is 2.0. If the text "SSH Disabled" is displayed, the device is not vulnerable. Possible values for the SSH protocol version reported by IOS are: * 1.5: only SSH protocol version 1 is enabled * 1.99: SSH protocol version 2 with SSH protocol version 1 compatibility enabled * 2.0: only SSH protocol version 2 is enabled For more information about SSH versions in IOS, please check the following URL: http://www.cisco.com/en/US/docs/ios/12_3t/12_3t4/feature/guide/gt_ssh2.html The SSH server is not available in all IOS images. Devices that do not support SSH are not vulnerable. Please consult the table of fixed software in the Software Version and Fixes section for the specific 12.4-based IOS releases that are affected. To determine the software running on a Cisco product, log in to the device and issue the show version command to display the system banner. Cisco IOS software will identify itself as "Internetwork Operating System Software" or simply "IOS". The image name will be displayed between parentheses on the next line of output followed by "Version" and the IOS release name. Other Cisco devices will not have the show version command or will give different output. The following example identifies a Cisco product running IOS release 12.4(17): Cisco IOS Software, C2600 Software (C2600-ADVENTERPRISEK9-M), Version 12.4(17), RELEASE SOFTWARE (fc1) Technical Support: http://www.cisco.com/techsupport Copyright (c) 1986-2007 by Cisco Systems, Inc. Compiled Fri 07-Sep-07 16:05 by prod_rel_team ROM: System Bootstrap, Version 12.2(8r) [cmong 8r], RELEASE SOFTWARE (fc1) Router uptime is 1 week, 5 hours, 5 minutes System returned to ROM by power-on System image file is "flash:c2600-adventerprisek9-mz.124-17.bin" Additional information about Cisco IOS release naming is available at http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/620/1.html Products Confirmed Not Vulnerable +-------------------------------- Cisco devices that do not run IOS are not affected. Cisco IOS devices that do not have the SSH server feature enabled are not affected. IOS-XR images are not affected. The following IOS release trains are not affected: * 10-based releases * 11-based releases * 12.0-based releases * 12.1-based releases * 12.2-based releases * 12.3-based releases IOS releases prior to 12.4(7), 12.4(13d)JA, and 12.4(9)T are not affected by this vulnerability. No other Cisco products are currently known to be affected by these vulnerabilities. Details ======= Secure shell (SSH) was developed as a secure replacement for the telnet, ftp, rlogin, rsh, and rcp protocols, which allow for the remote access of devices. The main difference between SSH and older protocols is that SSH provides strong authentication, guarantees confidentiality, and uses encrypted transactions. The server side of the SSH implementation in Cisco IOS contains multiple vulnerabilities that allow an unauthenticated user to generate a spurious memory access or, in certain cases, reload the device. If the attacker is able to reload the device, these vulnerabilities could be repeatedly exploited to cause an extended Denial of Service (DoS) condition. A device with the SSH server enabled is vulnerable. These vulnerabilities are documented in Cisco Bug IDs: * CSCsk42419 ( registered customers only) * CSCsk60020 ( registered customers only) * CSCsh51293 ( registered customers only) Vulnerability Scoring Details ============================= Cisco is providing scores for the vulnerabilities in this advisory based on the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS). The CVSS scoring in this Security Advisory is done in accordance with CVSS version 2.0. Cisco will provide a base and temporal score. Customers can then compute environmental scores to assist in determining the impact of the vulnerability in individual networks. CVSS is a standards-based scoring method that conveys vulnerability severity and helps determine urgency and priority of response. Cisco has provided an FAQ to answer additional questions regarding CVSS at http://www.cisco.com/web/about/security/intelligence/cvss-qandas.html Cisco has also provided a CVSS calculator to help compute the environmental impact for individual networks at http://intellishield.cisco.com/security/alertmanager/cvss * CSCsk42419 - SSHv2 spurious memory access CVSS Base Score - 7.8 Access Vector - Network Access Complexity - Low Authentication - None Confidentiality Impact - None Integrity Impact - None Availability Impact - Complete CVSS Temporal Score - 6.4 Exploitability - Functional Remediation Level - Official-Fix Report Confidence - Confirmed * CSCsk60020 - SSHv2 spurious memory access CVSS Base Score - 7.8 Access Vector - Network Access Complexity - Low Authentication - None Confidentiality Impact - None Integrity Impact - None Availability Impact - Complete CVSS Temporal Score - 6.4 Exploitability - Functional Remediation Level - Official-Fix Report Confidence - Confirmed * CSCsh51293 - Spurious memory access when SSH packets received CVSS Base Score - 7.8 Access Vector - Network Access Complexity - Low Authentication - None Confidentiality Impact - None Integrity Impact - None Availability Impact - Complete CVSS Temporal Score - 6.4 Exploitability - Functional Remediation Level - Official-Fix Report Confidence - Confirmed Impact ====== Successful exploitation of these vulnerabilities may result in a spurious memory access or, in certain cases, reload the device potentially resulting in a DoS condition. Software Versions and Fixes =========================== When considering software upgrades, also consult http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt and any subsequent advisories to determine exposure and a complete upgrade solution. In all cases, customers should exercise caution to be certain the devices to be upgraded contain sufficient memory and that current hardware and software configurations will continue to be supported properly by the new release. If the information is not clear, contact the Cisco Technical Assistance Center ("TAC") or your contracted maintenance provider for assistance. Each row of the Cisco IOS software table (below) describes a release train and the platforms or products for which it is intended. If a given release train is vulnerable, then the earliest possible releases that contain the fix (the "First Fixed Release") and the anticipated date of availability for each are listed in the "Rebuild" and "Maintenance" columns. A device running a release in the given train that is earlier than the release in a specific column (less than the First Fixed Release) is known to be vulnerable. The release should be upgraded at least to the indicated release or a later version (greater than or equal to the First Fixed Release label). For more information on the terms "Rebuild" and "Maintenance," consult the following URL: http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/620/1.html IOS releases prior to 12.4(7), 12.4(13d)JA, and 12.4(9)T are not affected by this vulnerability. +----------------------------------------+ | Major | Availability of Repaired | | Release | Releases | |------------+---------------------------| | Affected | First Fixed | Recommended | | 12.0-Based | Release | Release | | Releases | | | |----------------------------------------| | There are no affected 12.0 based | | releases | |----------------------------------------| | Affected | First Fixed | Recommended | | 12.1-Based | Release | Release | | Releases | | | |----------------------------------------| | There are no affected 12.1 based | | releases | |----------------------------------------| | Affected | First Fixed | Recommended | | 12.2-Based | Release | Release | | Releases | | | |----------------------------------------| | There are no affected 12.2 based | | releases | |----------------------------------------| | Affected | First Fixed | Recommended | | 12.3-Based | Release | Release | | Releases | | | |----------------------------------------| | There are no affected 12.3 based | | releases | |----------------------------------------| | Affected | First Fixed | Recommended | | 12.4-Based | Release | Release | | Releases | | | |------------+-------------+-------------| | | 12.4(13f) | | | | | | | | 12.4(16b) | | | 12.4 | | 12.4(18b) | | | 12.4(17a) | | | | | | | | 12.4(18) | | |------------+-------------+-------------| | | Only 12.4 | | | | (13d)JA and | | | | 12.4(13d) | | | | JA1 are | | | 12.4JA | vulnerable, | 12.4(16b) | | | all other | JA3 | | | 12.4JA | | | | releases | | | | are not | | | | affected. | | |------------+-------------+-------------| | 12.4JK | Not | | | | Vulnerable | | |------------+-------------+-------------| | 12.4JMA | Not | | | | Vulnerable | | |------------+-------------+-------------| | 12.4JMB | Not | | | | Vulnerable | | |------------+-------------+-------------| | 12.4JMC | Not | | | | Vulnerable | | |------------+-------------+-------------| | 12.4JX | Not | | | | Vulnerable | | |------------+-------------+-------------| | 12.4MD | Not | | | | Vulnerable | | |------------+-------------+-------------| | 12.4MR | 12.4(16)MR2 | 12.4(16)MR | |------------+-------------+-------------| | 12.4SW | 12.4(15)SW1 | 12.4(15)SW1 | |------------+-------------+-------------| | | 12.4(9)T6 | | | | | | | | 12.4(11)T4 | | | 12.4T | | 12.4(15)T5 | | | 12.4(15)T2 | | | | | | | | 12.4(20)T | | |------------+-------------+-------------| | 12.4XA | Not | | | | Vulnerable | | |------------+-------------+-------------| | 12.4XB | Not | | | | Vulnerable | | |------------+-------------+-------------| | 12.4XC | Not | | | | Vulnerable | | |------------+-------------+-------------| | 12.4XD | Not | | | | Vulnerable | | |------------+-------------+-------------| | | Vulnerable; | | | 12.4XE | first fixed | 12.4(15)T5 | | | in 12.4T | | |------------+-------------+-------------| | | Vulnerable; | | | 12.4XF | first fixed | 12.4(15)T5 | | | in 12.4T | | |------------+-------------+-------------| | 12.4XG | Not | | | | Vulnerable | | |------------+-------------+-------------| | | Vulnerable; | | | 12.4XJ | first fixed | 12.4(15)T5 | | | in 12.4T | | |------------+-------------+-------------| | | Vulnerable; | | | 12.4XK | first fixed | 12.4(15)T5 | | | in 12.4T | | |------------+-------------+-------------| | 12.4XL | Not | | | | Vulnerable | | |------------+-------------+-------------| | 12.4XM | Not | | | | Vulnerable | | |------------+-------------+-------------| | 12.4XN | Not | | | | Vulnerable | | |------------+-------------+-------------| | 12.4XQ | Not | | | | Vulnerable | | |------------+-------------+-------------| | 12.4XT | Not | | | | Vulnerable | | |------------+-------------+-------------| | 12.4XV | Vulnerable; | | | | contact TAC | | |------------+-------------+-------------| | 12.4XW | 12.4(11)XW6 | 12.4(11)XW6 | |------------+-------------+-------------| | 12.4XY | Not | | | | Vulnerable | | |------------+-------------+-------------| | 12.4XZ | Not | | | | Vulnerable | | +----------------------------------------+ Workarounds =========== If disabling the IOS SSH Server is not feasible, the following workarounds may be useful to some customers in their environments. Telnet +----- Telnet is not vulnerable to the issue described in this advisory and may be used as an insecure alternative to SSH. Telnet does not encrypt the authentication information or data; therefore, it should only be enabled for trusted local networks. VTY Access Class +--------------- It is possible to limit the exposure of the Cisco device by applying a VTY access class to allow only known, trusted hosts to connect to the device via SSH. For more information on restricting traffic to VTYs, please consult: http://cisco.com/en/US/products/sw/iosswrel/ps1835/products_command_referen… The following example permits access to VTYs from the 192.168.1.0/24 netblock and the single IP address 172.16.1.2 while denying access from anywhere else: Router(config)# access-list 1 permit 192.168.1.0 0.0.0.255 Router(config)# access-list 1 permit host 172.16.1.2 Router(config)# line vty 0 4 Router(config-line)# access-class 1 in Different Cisco platforms support different numbers of terminal lines. Check your device's configuration to determine the correct number of terminal lines for your platform. Infrastructure ACLs (iACL) +------------------------- Although it is often difficult to block traffic transiting your network, it is possible to identify traffic that should never be allowed to target your infrastructure devices and block that traffic at the border of your network. Infrastructure ACLs are considered a network security best practice and should be considered as a long-term addition to good network security as well as a workaround for this specific vulnerability. The ACL example shown below should be included as part of the deployed infrastructure access-list, which will protect all devices with IP addresses in the infrastructure IP address range. A sample access list for devices running Cisco IOS is below: !--- Permit SSH services from trusted hosts destined !--- to infrastructure addresses. access-list 150 permit tcp TRUSTED_HOSTS MASK INFRASTRUCTURE_ADDRESSES MASK eq 22 !--- Deny SSH packets from all other sources destined to infrastructure addresses. access-list 150 deny tcp any INFRASTRUCTURE_ADDRESSES MASK eq 22 !--- Permit all other traffic to transit the device. access-list 150 permit IP any any interface serial 2/0 ip access-group 150 in The white paper titled "Protecting Your Core: Infrastructure Protection Access Control Lists" presents guidelines and recommended deployment techniques for infrastructure protection access lists. This white paper can be obtained here: http://www.cisco.com/en/US/tech/tk648/tk361/technologies_white_paper09186a0… Control Plane Policing (CoPP) +---------------------------- The Control Plane Policing (CoPP) feature may be used to mitigate these vulnerabilities. In the following example, only SSH traffic from trusted hosts and with 'receive' destination IP addresses is permitted to reach the route processor (RP). Note: Dropping traffic from unknown or untrusted IP addresses may affect hosts with dynamically assigned IP addresses from connecting to the Cisco IOS device. access-list 152 deny tcp TRUSTED_ADDRESSES MASK any eq 22 access-list 152 permit tcp any any eq 22 ! class-map match-all COPP-KNOWN-UNDESIRABLE match access-group 152 ! ! policy-map COPP-INPUT-POLICY class COPP-KNOWN-UNDESIRABLE drop ! control-plane service-policy input COPP-INPUT-POLICY In the above CoPP example, the ACL entries that match the exploit packets with the "permit" action result in these packets being discarded by the policy-map "drop" function, while packets that match the "deny" action are not affected by the policy-map drop function. CoPP is available in Cisco IOS release trains 12.0S, 12.2SX, 12.2S, 12.3T, 12.4, and 12.4T. Additional information on the configuration and use of the CoPP feature can be found at the following URL: http://www.cisco.com/en/US/prod/collateral/iosswrel/ps6537/ps6586/ps6642/pr… Obtaining Fixed Software ======================== Cisco has made free software available to address this vulnerability for affected customers. Prior to deploying software, customers should consult their maintenance provider or check the software for feature set compatibility and known issues specific to their environment. Customers may only install and expect support for the feature sets they have purchased. By installing, downloading, accessing or otherwise using such software upgrades, customers agree to be bound by the terms of Cisco's software license terms found at http://www.cisco.com/public/sw-license-agreement.html, or as otherwise set forth at Cisco.com Downloads at http://www.cisco.com/public/sw-center/sw-usingswc.shtml Do not contact either "psirt(a)cisco.com" or "security-alert(a)cisco.com" for software upgrades. Customers with Service Contracts +------------------------------- Customers with contracts should obtain upgraded software through their regular update channels. For most customers, this means that upgrades should be obtained through the Software Center on Cisco's worldwide website at http://www.cisco.com Customers using Third-party Support Organizations +------------------------------------------------ Customers whose Cisco products are provided or maintained through prior or existing agreement with third-party support organizations such as Cisco Partners, authorized resellers, or service providers should contact that support organization for guidance and assistance with the appropriate course of action in regards to this advisory. The effectiveness of any workaround or fix is dependent on specific customer situations such as product mix, network topology, traffic behavior, and organizational mission. Due to the variety of affected products and releases, customers should consult with their service provider or support organization to ensure any applied workaround or fix is the most appropriate for use in the intended network before it is deployed. Customers without Service Contracts +---------------------------------- Customers who purchase direct from Cisco but who do not hold a Cisco service contract and customers who purchase through third-party vendors but are unsuccessful at obtaining fixed software through their point of sale should get their upgrades by contacting the Cisco Technical Assistance Center (TAC). TAC contacts are as follows. * +1 800 553 2447 (toll free from within North America) * +1 408 526 7209 (toll call from anywhere in the world) * e-mail: tac(a)cisco.com Have your product serial number available and give the URL of this notice as evidence of your entitlement to a free upgrade. Free upgrades for non-contract customers must be requested through the TAC. Refer to http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/687/Directory/DirTAC.shtml for additional TAC contact information, including special localized telephone numbers and instructions and e-mail addresses for use in various languages. Exploitation and Public Announcements ===================================== The Cisco PSIRT is not aware of any public announcements or malicious use of the vulnerability described in this advisory. This vulnerability was discovered by Cisco internal testing and customer service requests. Status of This Notice: FINAL ============================ THIS DOCUMENT IS PROVIDED ON AN "AS IS" BASIS AND DOES NOT IMPLY ANY KIND OF GUARANTEE OR WARRANTY, INCLUDING THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR USE. YOUR USE OF THE INFORMATION ON THE DOCUMENT OR MATERIALS LINKED FROM THE DOCUMENT IS AT YOUR OWN RISK. CISCO RESERVES THE RIGHT TO CHANGE OR UPDATE THIS DOCUMENT AT ANY TIME. A stand-alone copy or Paraphrase of the text of this document that omits the distribution URL in the following section is an uncontrolled copy, and may lack important information or contain factual errors. Distribution ============ This advisory is posted on Cisco's worldwide website at http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20080521-ssh.shtml In addition to worldwide web posting, a text version of this notice is clear-signed with the Cisco PSIRT PGP key and is posted to the following e-mail and Usenet news recipients. * cust-security-announce(a)cisco.com * first-teams(a)first.org * bugtraq(a)securityfocus.com * vulnwatch(a)vulnwatch.org * cisco(a)spot.colorado.edu * cisco-nsp(a)puck.nether.net * full-disclosure(a)lists.grok.org.uk * comp.dcom.sys.cisco(a)newsgate.cisco.com Future updates of this advisory, if any, will be placed on Cisco's worldwide website, but may or may not be actively announced on mailing lists or newsgroups. Users concerned about this problem are encouraged to check the above URL for any updates. Revision History ================ +---------------------------------------+ | Revision | | Initial | | 1.0 | 2008-May-21 | public | | | | release. | +---------------------------------------+ Cisco Security Procedures ========================= Complete information on reporting security vulnerabilities in Cisco products, obtaining assistance with security incidents, and registering to receive security information from Cisco, is available on Cisco's worldwide website at http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/products_security_vulnerability_policy.… This includes instructions for press inquiries regarding Cisco security notices. All Cisco security advisories are available at http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.8 (Darwin) iEYEARECAAYFAkg0RSMACgkQ86n/Gc8U/uCX8QCaA9y2y/y0uC1DPonlJwMGR1Kd jaMAnAz/4J+L7nxWxhppehcJsr0bGmsA =WzxB -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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[NANOG] AUTO: Kamal Mehta is on vacation (returning 05/21/2008)
by Kamal Mehta 20 May '08

20 May '08

I am out of the office until 05/21/2008. I am on vacation and will not have access to e-mail. I will try to reply to your message on my return. If you need immediate assistance, please call the IBM AOD Service Center at 877-737-3700. Note: This is an automated response to your message "NANOG Digest, Vol 4, Issue 49" sent on 5/20/08 6:00:02. This is the only notification you will receive while this person is away.

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[NANOG] AUTO: Kamal Mehta is on vacation (returning 05/21/2008)
by Kamal Mehta 20 May '08

20 May '08

I am out of the office until 05/21/2008. I am on vacation and will not have access to e-mail. I will try to reply to your message on my return. If you need immediate assistance, please call the IBM AOD Service Center at 877-737-3700. Note: This is an automated response to your message "NANOG Digest, Vol 4, Issue 49" sent on 5/20/08 6:00:02. This is the only notification you will receive while this person is away.

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[NANOG] IOS rootkits
by Gadi Evron 20 May '08

20 May '08

At the upcoming EusecWest Sebastian Muniz will apparently unveil an IOS rootkit. skip below for the news item itself. We've had discussions on this before, here and elsewhere. I've been heavily attacked on the subject of considering router security as an issue when compared to routing security. I have a lot to say about this, looking into this threat for a few years now and having engaged different organizations within Cisco on the subject in the past. Due to what I refer to as an "NDA of honour" I will just relay the following until it is "officially" public, then consider what should be made public, including: 1. Current defense startegies possible with Cisco gear 2. Third party defense strategies (yes, they now exist) 2. Cisco response (no names or exact quotes will likely be given) 3. A bet on when such a rootkit would be public, and who won it (participants are.. "relevant people"). From: http://www.networkworld.com/news/2008/051408-hacker-writes-rootkit-for-cisc… "A security researcher has developed malicious rootkit software for Cisco's routers, a development that has placed increasing scrutiny on the routers that carry the majority of the Internet's traffic. Sebastian Muniz, a researcher with Core Security Technologies, developed the software, which he will unveil on May 22 at the EuSecWest conference in London. " Gadi Evron.

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[NANOG] Installation troubles with GlobalCrossing
by Erich Hohermuth 20 May '08

20 May '08

Dear members, I just want to ask if anyone else have major troubles to install new or upgrade services with Global Crossing ? The story: Last year on December we ordered two layer2 point to point connections based on gigabit ethernet connections. The main idea was to directly connect to the peering point. After waiting 3 months and lots of mails they get the right hardware in place but now 6 months later we still don't have a running service, because they just implement something with tagged interfaces on one the peering point site without asking. Regards Eric

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