- Test - lists.nanog.org

Anton Kapela on what the BGP attack *really* means
by Jay R. Ashworth 28 Aug '08

28 Aug '08

[ I'm unthreading this, because Anton didn't think to, and I wouldn't want anyone who canned the other thread to miss it. --jra ] On Thu, Aug 28, 2008 at 11:56:30AM -0400, Steven M. Bellovin wrote: > On Thu, 28 Aug 2008 10:16:16 -0500 > "Anton Kapela" <tkapela(a)gmail.com> wrote: > > > I thought I'd toss in a few comments, considering it's my fault that > > few people are understanding this thing yet. > > > > >> On Thu, Aug 28, 2008 at 2:28 PM, Gadi Evron <ge(a)linuxbox.org> > > >> wrote: > > >>> > > >>> People (especially spammers) have been hijacking networks for a > > >>> while > > > > I'd like to 'clear the air' here. Clearly, I failed at Defcon, WIRED, > > AFP, and Forbes. > > > > We all know sub-prefix hijacking is not news. What is news? Using > > as-path loop detection to selectively blackhole the hijacked route - > > which creates a transport path _back to_ the target. > > > > That's all it is, nothing more. All but the WIRED follow-up article > > missed this point *completely.* They over-represented the 'hijacking' > > aspects, while only making mention of the 'interception' potential. > > > > Lets end this thread with the point I had intended two weeks ago: > > we've presented a method by which all the theory spewed by academics > > can be actualized in a real network (the big-I internet) to effect > > interception of data between (nearly) arbitrary endpoints from > > (nearly) any edge or stub AS. That, I think, is interesting. > > Indeed, and I thank you for it. As noted, I and others have been > warning about the problem for a long time. You've shown that it isn't > just an ivory tower exercise; maybe people will now get serious about > deploying a solution. > > To quote Bruce Schneier quoting an NSA maxim, attacks only get better; > they never get worse. We now have running code of one way to do this. > I think most NANOG readers can see many more ways to do it. A real > solution will take years to deploy, but it will never happen if we > don't start. And we want to have the solution out there *before* we > see serious attacks on BGP. > > Again, thank you -- it was really nice work. > > --Steve Bellovin, http://www.cs.columbia.edu/~smb Cheers, -- jra -- Jay R. Ashworth Baylink jra(a)baylink.com Designer The Things I Think RFC 2100 Ashworth & Associates http://baylink.pitas.com '87 e24 St Petersburg FL USA http://photo.imageinc.us +1 727 647 1274 Those who cast the vote decide nothing. Those who count the vote decide everything. -- (Josef Stalin)

1 0

Re: Revealed: The Internet's Biggest Security Hole
by Hank Nussbacher 28 Aug '08

28 Aug '08

At 09:40 PM 27-08-08 -0400, marcus.sachs(a)verizon.com wrote: I beg to differ. What will change is a serious uptick in the number of prefixes (279K) in the routing tables as everyone rushes to deaggregate to /24 size. A year ago we were at 230K, how much you wanna bet we don't just add 40K routes over the next 12 months. -Hank >Nothing will change. You think DNSSEC is hard? Try getting support for >the deployment of S-BGP or soBGP. Without a trust anchor and lots of >community support it will remain largely an academic interest area. > >Marc > >------Original Message------ >From: Gadi Evron >To: Frank >Cc: NANOG list >Sent: Aug 27, 2008 20:54 >Subject: Re: Revealed: The Internet's Biggest Security Hole > >hehe >"new". hehe > >Maybe something will change now' though, it was a great and impressive >presentation, hijacking the defcon network and tweaking TTL to hide it.

2 1

RE: Revealed: The Internet's well known BGP behavior
by Bogdanov, Oleg (IT) 28 Aug '08

28 Aug '08

First, thank you all for the usually intelligent/enlightening discussion. My first post to this list and apologies in advance if discussion of end point (customer) networks is off-topic: I haven't seen the presentation that some of you have referred to. If someone can provide a link that would be helpful. What is the as-prepend piece of the puzzle? Insert AS numbers of ISPs in the path from hijacker to intended recipient so snooped data doesn't boomerang back to the hijacker (exploit BGP loop detection mechanism)? Theoretically, can one hijack both sender and receiver space to get inline on the whole conversation? And maybe the more relevant question: Can the customer do anything? What would my ISPs tell me if I asked them to take measures (magic ones?) to mitigate my exposure? Thanks, Oleg Bogdanov Morgan Stanley | Technology 1 Pierrepont Plaza, 12th Floor | Brooklyn, NY 11201 oleg.bogdanov(a)morganstanley.com -------------------------------------------------------- NOTICE: If received in error, please destroy and notify sender. Sender does not intend to waive confidentiality or privilege. Use of this email is prohibited when received in error.

1 0

Service Outage in Indiana
by Elijah Savage 28 Aug '08

28 Aug '08

Anyone know what is going on there. Sprint Verizon data and voice circuits affected in the Fort Wayne area.

1 1

interger to I P address
by kcc 28 Aug '08

28 Aug '08

Hi all ls it possible t convert the interger to ip Thank you

27 33

reviving the botnets@ mailing list: a new statregy in fighting cyber crime
by Gadi Evron 28 Aug '08

28 Aug '08

The public botnets@ mailing list, where malicious activity on the Internet can be openly shared, has been revived, and boy is it active. Warning: live samples and malicious URLs are openly shared there. NANOG relevance: These can be operationally used by ISP security operators not of those "in the know" to block new attacks and to identify abusers in their own networks. Reminder: this mailing list was started to take off-topic traffic from NANOG. Mailing list URL: http://www.whitestar.linuxbox.org/mailman/listinfo/botnets Reasons, thinking and explanations: http://gadievron.blogspot.com/2008/08/public-sharing-and-new-statregy-in.ht… Excerpt: ------ A couple of years ago I started a mailing list where folks not necessarily involved with the vetted, trusted, closed and snobbish circles of cyber crime fighting (some founded by me) could share information and be informed of threats. In this post I explore some of the history behind information sharing online, and explain the concept behind the botnets mailing list. Feel free to skip ahead if you find the history boring. Also, do note the history in this post is mixed with my own opinions. As I am one of the only people who where there in the beginning though and lived through all of it, I feel free to do so (in my own blog post). As I conclude, we may not be able to always share our resources, but it is time to change the tide of the cyber crime war, and strategize. One of the strategies we need to use, or at least try, is public information sharing of "lesser evils" already in the public domain. .. .. To fight a war, you have to be involved and engaged. On the Internet that is very difficult, but the Russians found a way. It is a fact that while we made much progress in our efforts fighting cyber crime, we had nearly no effect what-so-ever on the criminals and the attackers. Non. They maintain their business and we play at writing analysis and whack-a-mole. Using the botnets mailing list, I am burrowing a page from the apparent Russian cyber war doctrine, getting people involved, engaged. Personally aware and a part of what's going on. It can't hurt us, and perhaps now, four years over-due and two years after the previous attempt, we may be ready to give it a go and test the concept. ------- Gadi Evron. -- "You don't need your firewalls! Gadi is Israel's firewall." -- Itzik (Isaac) Cohen, "Computers czar", Senior Deputy to the Accountant General, Israel's Ministry of Finance, at the government's CIO conference, 2005. (after two very funny self-deprication quotes, time to even things up!) My profile and resume: http://www.linkedin.com/in/gadievron

1 0

RE: Revealed: The Internet's well known BGP behavior
by Hank Nussbacher 28 Aug '08

28 Aug '08

At 11:32 PM 27-08-08 -0500, John Lee wrote: >Thanks guys, going back to my Comer one more time. My issue, question was >whether the organization doing the hijacking controlled all of the routers >in the new modified path or only some of them? > >John (ISDN) Lee They didn't have control of any routers other than their own. What they had to find is a single clueless upstream ISP that would allow them to announce prefixes that didn't belong to them. -Hank

4 3

RE: Revealed: The Internet's well known BGP behavior
by Paul Ferguson 28 Aug '08

28 Aug '08

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 - -- Hank Nussbacher <hank(a)efes.iucc.ac.il> wrote: >At 11:32 PM 27-08-08 -0500, John Lee wrote: >>Thanks guys, going back to my Comer one more time. My issue, question was >> whether the organization doing the hijacking controlled all of the >>routers in the new modified path or only some of them? >> >>John (ISDN) Lee > >They didn't have control of any routers other than their own. What they had to find is a single clueless upstream ISP that would allow them to announce prefixes that didn't belong to them. > *bing* Trust is the major exploit here. That has never been "new". - - ferg -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: PGP Desktop 9.6.3 (Build 3017) wj8DBQFItkFQq1pz9mNUZTMRAgqHAJ4ogryvjftxw5CQTWhf0c7VyBBXyQCfUo9w qdK2kEWHY/B1AU/rGNikOlg= =d/L7 -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- -- "Fergie", a.k.a. Paul Ferguson Engineering Architecture for the Internet fergdawg(at)netzero.net ferg's tech blog: http://fergdawg.blogspot.com/

1 0

ATT.net
by tbeecher＠localnet.com 28 Aug '08

28 Aug '08

Any known issues across AT&T's network? Got a couple calls for some access issues, I'm seeing roughly 15% loss at a couple of paths at the AT&T network edge.

3 3

Re: Revealed: The Internet's Biggest Security Hole
by marcus.sachs＠verizon.com 28 Aug '08

28 Aug '08

I'll have to admit that the TTL manipulation was something I had not thought about. But why not? If you are going to purloin EVERY packet then why not re-write byte 8 in every IP header to a value of your choosing? Very cool. Marc ------Original Message------ From: Jason Ross To: Sachs, Marcus H. (Marc) Cc: Gadi Evron Cc: nanog(a)merit.edu Sent: Aug 27, 2008 22:21 Subject: Re: Revealed: The Internet's Biggest Security Hole On Wed, Aug 27, 2008 at 9:52 PM, <marcus.sachs(a)verizon.com> wrote: > Yes, wonderful preso! My biggest take-away was the fact that the > vast majority of the attendees did not understand the gravity of the > demo. Agreed on both counts: the presentation was great, and largely not understood it seemed. >> >> hehe >> "new". hehe >> >> Maybe something will change now' though, it was a great and >> impressive presentation, hijacking the defcon network and tweaking >> TTL to hide it. >> Notably, Alex and Tony both mentioned that the BGP tricks were not new during the presentation, and commented that it would essentially not be surprising to anyone that groks routing at the level that most of the folks on this list does. What was new though according to their presentation (and it was new to me certainly, but I'm still fairly green) was the AS Path prepending to complete the circuit, and as you mentioned, the TTL magicks to hide the hops. I was suitably impressed at that. -- Jason -------------------------- Marcus H. Sachs Verizon 202 515 2463 Sent from my BlackBerry

2 1