- Test - lists.nanog.org

Recall: the NANOG mess
by MARTENS, SUSAN, ATTOPS 25 Sep '08

25 Sep '08

MARTENS, SUSAN, ATTOPS would like to recall the message, "the NANOG mess".

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puck outage this am.
by virendra rode 25 Sep '08

25 Sep '08

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 Hi, You may or may not have noticed puck.nether.net (hosting outages.org mailing list) suffered an outage this am. This was caused due to a file system issue (possible inconsistence state) on a fairly large (1tb) filesystem which caused services on puck to be unresponsive. Many thanks to Jared Mauch in addressing this issue. Like always, appreciate your feedback and your constructive criticism. regards, /virendra -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.6 (GNU/Linux) Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla - http://enigmail.mozdev.org iD8DBQFI2wsgpbZvCIJx1bcRArpUAJsECd19nRQs06wkgvnfS3Xhk2TvOQCghhTC OyRIHk8YHPR72l+WRmh15qU= =fy4U -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: Atrivo/Intercage
by Scott Weeks 25 Sep '08

25 Sep '08

--- nenolod(a)systeminplace.net wrote: From: William Pitcock <nenolod(a)systeminplace.net> > I didn't whine. No, but others have, and it isn't helpful towards resolving this problem. ---------------------------------------- I also wrote you that in private, but you decided to make it public without asking me. That type of action makes your position less valid. scott

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Re: Atrivo/Intercage
by Scott Weeks 25 Sep '08

25 Sep '08

--- trelane(a)trelane.net wrote: From: Andrew D Kirch <trelane(a)trelane.net> > Basically is what it boils down to for me - its > easy to blame an NSP/ISP/Hoster for what their > clients do, it takes real dedication to find out > whats *actually* going on. : We did, and now we're solving the problem. ------------------------------------------ Apparently, this is what's going on. Making money at the expense of everyone else on the internet: --------------------------- > If I had the ability... I would cut Esthost as a > client... But, in doing so, it causes nearly a > quarter if not half of the company's monthly > revenue to be cut. That is not too good of a move > nor reasonably possible ;) > > People consider Atrivo/InterCage to be some abuse > supporting company... > > If only any of you knew what the position would be > in a company our size. > > It's not as easy as you believe it to be ;) > > Russell Mitchell - Russ[at]Atrivo.com > Atrivo Technologies ------------------------------ scott

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Renesys Blog Article [Was: Re: the Intercage mess]
by Paul Ferguson 25 Sep '08

25 Sep '08

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 On Wed, Sep 24, 2008 at 5:41 PM, Joe Provo <nanog-post(a)rsuc.gweep.net> wrote: > > The spine to do it left with suits minding the store & managing to > the tune of fickle investors. For the same reason just refusing > deaggregates has become difficult: the bad guys shield themselves > by sitting in the same prefix/ASNs with sites your paying customers > wish to reach. The suits are interested in > - avoiding PR hassles > - low call rates into the support centers > - lower customer-churn numbers for their investor calls > > Therefore anyone with time & energy to block badness where there > is collateral damage rarely has the stamina or internal political > capital to have the suits' spin machine on their side. More > network companies that are privately held with actual technocrats > at the helm might help bring a vision beyond commoditization and > marketing. > Just a side-note: Rensys has an interesting blog article up today on this Atrivo/Intercage "mess": http://www.renesys.com/blog/2008/09/internet_vigilantism_1.shtml FYI, - - ferg -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: PGP Desktop 9.6.3 (Build 3017) wj8DBQFI2uDeq1pz9mNUZTMRAjCxAKCFwIw4PahuGBTzbRwumog45mQp2QCg/K5D egFWNn4uBnN3Rfyi5Npjfes= =DvXt -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- -- "Fergie", a.k.a. Paul Ferguson Engineering Architecture for the Internet fergdawgster(at)gmail.com ferg's tech blog: http://fergdawg.blogspot.com/

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AOL NOC Contact Information
by A MacLeod 24 Sep '08

24 Sep '08

Could someone please send me AOL's NOC contact information off list?

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Reporting abuse to ISP that goes nowhere
by Brandon Galbraith 24 Sep '08

24 Sep '08

Apologies for the operational content. =) I've been working with a client who has been the victim of several SQL injection attacks. These attacks are being used to insert links to malicious javascript hosted elsewhere using the following domains: seekcc.com google9.info any-park.cn I've reported the abuse several times to the abuse contact listed by ARIN, but it seems to simply be a blackhole at Verizon Business (their address space). How have others handled this problem? Also, if there is a more appropriate forum for this question and forthcoming discussion, please let me know. Thanks! -brandon

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Silly PUCK/Outages question
by Tuc at T-B-O-H.NET 24 Sep '08

24 Sep '08

Hi, I hate to use NANOG for outages... But can anyone else get to puck.nether.net or the outages.org list? A traceroute gets me into Chicago with NTT and then dies...(Along with high ping times between NY and IL for NTT) I'm looking to see if anyone has more info about an S&D power event at 111 8th this morning. (And I contacted S&D and am getting nothing from them). Thanks, Tuc/TBOH

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Re: YAY! Re: Atrivo/Intercage: NO Upstream depeer
by Russell Mitchell 24 Sep '08

24 Sep '08

Hello Paul, Those are their IP Blocks. We were simply routing them, as they were our client. They've owned these blocks for quite a while. They seem to have moved that after a day of being down. I haven't been monitoring their blocks, and made the decision Sunday Night that they were no longer going to be allowed on our network. I believe the blocks your referring to are their 85.255 Blocks? Registered to "InHoster". I believe those prefixes are an entity of their's, though I don't know for sure. Perhaps ask them? Cernel is their own ASN. It's not associated with our company. Thank you for your time. Have a great day. --- Russell Mitchell InterCage, Inc. ----- Original Message ---- From: Paul Ferguson <fergdawgster(a)gmail.com> To: Russell Mitchell <russm2k8(a)yahoo.com> Cc: nanog(a)nanog.org Sent: Tuesday, September 23, 2008 9:22:03 PM Subject: Re: YAY! Re: Atrivo/Intercage: NO Upstream depeer -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 Hi Russ, While I think that is great and everything, can you explain why Cernel is now originating prefixes which were originally originated by Atrivo/Intercage? I'd be curious as to your explanation. Thanks, - - ferg On Tue, Sep 23, 2008 at 9:05 PM, Russell Mitchell <russm2k8(a)yahoo.com> wrote: > Apologies, Yahoo was set to "Rich Text" :( > > ----- > > Hello All, > > It seems you all missed the memo.As of about 11PM PST > Last night 09/22/08, Esthost has been ENTIRELY Shutdown. > They no longer have ANY Machine on my network. > > I'm currently starting to monitor some of the public media, such as > google, DroneBL, as well as several Anti-Malware community websites for > abuse. Being that Esthost is now entirely GONE, we should not have any > further issues. In the case that something does arise, such as an > exploited host, we're currently developing a game plan for response to > the issues. > > To make the best effort towards combatting abuse on our network, here's > what I have planned so far for ANY Type of abuse: Step 1, Suspend Power > to the affected machine. > Step 2, Call/Email the client whom the affected machine is leased to. > Step 3, Allow the client the option to investigate the machine further > (Nullroute access via KVM)= Step 4, Verify the reported content, domain, > user, or exploit is patched/eliminated from the machine. Step 5, Remove > the Nullroute. Allow the machine to return to the network. > > Any comments? This is the result of a zero tolerance policy regarding > abuse. > > If it's clear that the server owner is the cause of the abusive material > etc, the client will then be immediately cancelled. No questions. It > seems that this approach will be the best supported by the anti-abuse > communities, so please let me know your input. > > Thank you for your time. Have a great day. > > --- > Russell Mitchell > InterCage, Inc. > > > > > > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: PGP Desktop 9.6.3 (Build 3017) wj8DBQFI2cBUq1pz9mNUZTMRAtbAAJwKk/H/9Pz4YelIgnYvtuCCDhmuswCfcrfV PTUD/SyPo8+zHpACucRPqk4= =+rwg -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- -- "Fergie", a.k.a. Paul Ferguson Engineering Architecture for the Internet fergdawgster(at)gmail.com ferg's tech blog: http://fergdawg.blogspot.com/

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Cisco Security Advisory: Cisco IOS IPS Denial of Service Vulnerability
by Cisco Systems Product Security Incident Response Team 24 Sep '08

24 Sep '08

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 Cisco Security Advisory: Cisco IOS IPS Denial of Service Vulnerability Advisory ID: cisco-sa-20080924-iosips http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20080924-iosips.shtml Revision 1.0 For Public Release 2008 September 24 1600 UTC (GMT) - --------------------------------------------------------------------- Summary ======= The Cisco IOS Intrusion Prevention System (IPS) feature contains a vulnerability in the processing of certain IPS signatures that use the SERVICE.DNS engine. This vulnerability may cause a router to crash or hang, resulting in a denial of service condition. Cisco has released free software updates that address this vulnerability. There is a workaround for this vulnerability. Note: This vulnerability is not related in any way to CVE-2008-1447 - Cache poisoning attacks. Cisco Systems has published a Cisco Security Advisory for that vulnerability, which can be found at http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/products_security_advisory09186a00809c2… This advisory is posted at http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20080924-iosips.shtml Note: The September 24, 2008 IOS Advisory bundled publication includes twelve Security Advisories. Eleven of the advisories address vulnerabilities in Cisco's IOS software, and one advisory addresses vulnerabilities in Cisco Unified Communications Manager. Each Advisory lists the releases that correct the vulnerability described in the Advisory. Please reference the following software table to find a release that fixes all published IOS software Advisories as of September 24th, 2008: http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20080924-bundle.shtml Individual publication links are listed below: * http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20080924-ssl.shtml * http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20080924-sip.shtml * http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20080924-cucm.shtml * http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20080924-vpn.shtml * http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20080924-mfi.shtml * http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20080924-ipc.shtml * http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20080924-ubr.shtml * http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20080924-multicast.shtml * http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20080924-sccp.shtml * http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20080924-iosfw.shtml * http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20080924-l2tp.shtml Affected Products ================= Vulnerable Products +------------------ Any Cisco IOS device configured with the Cisco IOS IPS feature is vulnerable, regardless if it is configured to use the built-in signatures or an external signature file. Devices using either version 4 or version 5 signatures are affected by this vulnerability. The Cisco IOS IPS feature is not enabled by default. The command show ip ips interfaces can be used to determine if the Cisco IOS IPS feature has been configured and applied to any interface on the device, as in the following example: Router#show ip ips interfaces Interface Configuration Interface FastEthernet0/0 Inbound IPS rule is ios-ips-incoming Outgoing IPS rule is not set Interface FastEthernet0/1 Inbound IPS rule is not set Outgoing IPS rule is ios-ips-outgoing Router# The output of the show ip ips interfaces command when the Cisco IOS IPS feature has not been configured is dependent on which Cisco IOS release is installed and running on the device. It may be similar to the following example: Router#show ip ips interfaces Router# or it may be similar to the following: Router#show ip ips interfaces Interface Configuration IPS is not configured on any interface Router# Any version of Cisco IOS prior to the versions which are listed in the Software Versions and Fixes section below is vulnerable. To determine the version of the Cisco IOS software running on a Cisco product, log in to the device and issue the show version command to display the system banner. Cisco IOS software will identify itself as "Internetwork Operating System Software" or simply "IOS". On the next line of output, the image name will be displayed between parentheses, followed by "Version" and the IOS release name. Other Cisco devices will not have the show version command or will give different output. The following example identifies a Cisco product running Cisco IOS Software release 12.3(26) with an installed image name of C2500-IS-L: Router#show version Cisco Internetwork Operating System Software IOS (tm) 2500 Software (C2500-IS-L), Version 12.3(26), RELEASE SOFTWARE (fc2) Technical Support: http://www.cisco.com/techsupport Copyright (c) 1986-2008 by cisco Systems, Inc. Compiled Mon 17-Mar-08 14:39 by dchih <output truncated> Router# The next example shows a product running Cisco IOS Software release 12.4(20)T with an image name of C1841-ADVENTERPRISEK9-M: Router#show version Cisco IOS Software, 1841 Software (C1841-ADVENTERPRISEK9-M), Version 12.4(20)T, RELEASE SOFTWARE (fc3) Technical Support: http://www.cisco.com/techsupport Copyright (c) 1986-2008 by Cisco Systems, Inc. Compiled Thu 10-Jul-08 20:25 by prod_rel_team <output truncated> Router# Additional information on the Cisco IOS release naming conventions can be found on the document entitled "White Paper: Cisco IOS Reference Guide", which is available at http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/620/1.html Products Confirmed Not Vulnerable +-------------------------------- The following Cisco products are confirmed not vulnerable: * Cisco IOS devices running the Intrusion Detection System feature * Cisco ASA Security Appliances running the Intrusion Detection System feature * Cisco PIX 500 Series Security Appliances running the Intrusion Detection System feature * Cisco IPS 4200 Sensors * Cisco AIP-SSM for ASA 5500 Series Adaptive Security Appliances * Cisco Catalyst 6500 Series Intrusion detection System (IDSM-2) Services Module * Cisco IPS Advanced Integration Module for Integrated Services Routers No other Cisco products are currently known to be affected by this vulnerability. Details ======= Cisco IOS Intrusion Prevention System (IPS) is an inline, deep-packet inspection feature that effectively mitigates a wide range of network attacks. A component of the Cisco IOS Integrated Threat Control framework and complemented by Cisco IOS Flexible Packet Matching feature, Cisco IOS IPS provides your network with the intelligence to accurately identify, classify, and stop or block malicious traffic in real time. Additional information on the Cisco IOS IPS feature can be found at http://www.cisco.com/en/US/docs/ios/12_3t/12_3t8/feature/guide/gt_fwids.html Previous to the introduction of the Cisco IOS IPS feature, Cisco IOS provided a similar feature, the Cisco IOS Intrusion Detection System (IDS). The Cisco IOS IDS feature is not affected by this vulnerability. Additional information on the Cisco IOS IDS feature can be found at http://www.cisco.com/en/US/docs/ios/12_0t/12_0t5/feature/guide/ios_ids.html Certain network traffic can trigger IPS signatures on the SERVICE.DNS signature engine which may cause the Cisco IOS device to crash or hang. This may cause a denial of service that results in disruption of network traffic. This vulnerability is documented in Cisco Bug ID CSCsq13348. This vulnerability has been assigned Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) ID CVE-2008-2739. Vulnerability Scoring Details ============================= Cisco has provided scores for the vulnerabilities in this advisory based on the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS). The CVSS scoring in this Security Advisory is done in accordance with CVSS version 2.0. CVSS is a standards-based scoring method that conveys vulnerability severity and helps determine urgency and priority of response. Cisco has provided a base and temporal score. Customers can then compute environmental scores to assist in determining the impact of the vulnerability in individual networks. Cisco has provided an FAQ to answer additional questions regarding CVSS at http://www.cisco.com/web/about/security/intelligence/cvss-qandas.html Cisco has also provided a CVSS calculator to help compute the environmental impact for individual networks at http://intellishield.cisco.com/security/alertmanager/cvss CSCsq13348 - Watchdog timeout with IPS configured CVSS Base Score - 7.8 Access Vector - Network Access Complexity - Low Authentication - None Confidentiality Impact - None Integrity Impact - None Availability Impact - Complete CVSS Temporal Score - 6.4 Exploitability - Functional Remediation Level - Official-Fix Report Confidence - Confirmed Impact ====== Successful exploitation of this vulnerability may cause a Cisco IOS device configured with the Cisco IOS IPS feature to crash or hang, resulting in a denial of service condition. Software Versions and Fixes =========================== When considering software upgrades, also consult http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt and any subsequent advisories to determine exposure and a complete upgrade solution. In all cases, customers should exercise caution to be certain the devices to be upgraded contain sufficient memory and that current hardware and software configurations will continue to be supported properly by the new release. If the information is not clear, contact the Cisco Technical Assistance Center (TAC) or your contracted maintenance provider for assistance. Each row of the Cisco IOS software table (below) names a Cisco IOS release train. If a given release train is vulnerable, then the earliest possible releases that contain the fix (along with the anticipated date of availability for each, if applicable) are listed in the "First Fixed Release" column of the table. The "Recommended Release" column indicates the releases which have fixes for all the published vulnerabilities at the time of this Advisory. A device running a release in the given train that is earlier than the release in a specific column (less than the First Fixed Release) is known to be vulnerable. Cisco recommends upgrading to a release equal to or later than the release in the "Recommended Releases" column of the table. +-------------------------------------------------------------------+ | Major | Availability of Repaired Releases | | Release | | |------------+------------------------------------------------------| | Affected | | Recommended | | 12.0-Based | First Fixed Release | Release | | Releases | | | |-------------------------------------------------------------------| | There are no affected 12.0 based releases | |-------------------------------------------------------------------| | Affected | | Recommended | | 12.1-Based | First Fixed Release | Release | | Releases | | | |-------------------------------------------------------------------| | There are no affected 12.1 based releases | |-------------------------------------------------------------------| | Affected | | Recommended | | 12.2-Based | First Fixed Release | Release | | Releases | | | |-------------------------------------------------------------------| | There are no affected 12.2 based releases | |-------------------------------------------------------------------| | Affected | | Recommended | | 12.3-Based | First Fixed Release | Release | | Releases | | | |------------+--------------------------------------+---------------| | 12.3 | Not Vulnerable | | |------------+--------------------------------------+---------------| | 12.3B | Not Vulnerable | | |------------+--------------------------------------+---------------| | 12.3BC | Not Vulnerable | | |------------+--------------------------------------+---------------| | 12.3BW | Not Vulnerable | | |------------+--------------------------------------+---------------| | 12.3EU | Not Vulnerable | | |------------+--------------------------------------+---------------| | 12.3JA | Not Vulnerable | | |------------+--------------------------------------+---------------| | 12.3JEA | Not Vulnerable | | |------------+--------------------------------------+---------------| | 12.3JEB | Not Vulnerable | | |------------+--------------------------------------+---------------| | 12.3JEC | Not Vulnerable | | |------------+--------------------------------------+---------------| | 12.3JK | Not Vulnerable | | |------------+--------------------------------------+---------------| | 12.3JL | Not Vulnerable | | |------------+--------------------------------------+---------------| | 12.3JX | Not Vulnerable | | |------------+--------------------------------------+---------------| | | | 12.4(15)T7 | | 12.3T | Vulnerable; first fixed in 12.4 | | | | | 12.4(18c) | |------------+--------------------------------------+---------------| | 12.3TPC | Not Vulnerable | | |------------+--------------------------------------+---------------| | 12.3VA | Not Vulnerable | | |------------+--------------------------------------+---------------| | 12.3XA | Not Vulnerable | | |------------+--------------------------------------+---------------| | 12.3XB | Not Vulnerable | | |------------+--------------------------------------+---------------| | 12.3XC | Not Vulnerable | | |------------+--------------------------------------+---------------| | 12.3XD | Not Vulnerable | | |------------+--------------------------------------+---------------| | 12.3XE | Not Vulnerable | | |------------+--------------------------------------+---------------| | 12.3XF | Not Vulnerable | | |------------+--------------------------------------+---------------| | 12.3XG | Not Vulnerable | | |------------+--------------------------------------+---------------| | 12.3XI | Not Vulnerable | | |------------+--------------------------------------+---------------| | 12.3XJ | Not Vulnerable | | |------------+--------------------------------------+---------------| | 12.3XK | Not Vulnerable | | |------------+--------------------------------------+---------------| | | | 12.4(15)T7 | | 12.3XL | Vulnerable; first fixed in 12.4 | | | | | 12.4(18c) | |------------+--------------------------------------+---------------| | | | 12.4(15)T7 | | 12.3XQ | Vulnerable; first fixed in 12.4 | | | | | 12.4(18c) | |------------+--------------------------------------+---------------| | | | 12.4(15)T7 | | 12.3XR | Vulnerable; first fixed in 12.4 | | | | | 12.4(18c) | |------------+--------------------------------------+---------------| | | | 12.4(15)T7 | | 12.3XS | Vulnerable; first fixed in 12.4 | | | | | 12.4(18c) | |------------+--------------------------------------+---------------| | 12.3XU | Not Vulnerable | | |------------+--------------------------------------+---------------| | 12.3XW | Not Vulnerable | | |------------+--------------------------------------+---------------| | | | 12.4(15)T7 | | 12.3XX | Vulnerable; first fixed in 12.4 | | | | | 12.4(18c) | |------------+--------------------------------------+---------------| | 12.3XY | Not Vulnerable | | |------------+--------------------------------------+---------------| | 12.3XZ | Not Vulnerable | | |------------+--------------------------------------+---------------| | | | 12.4(15)T7 | | 12.3YA | Vulnerable; first fixed in 12.4 | | | | | 12.4(18c) | |------------+--------------------------------------+---------------| | 12.3YD | Vulnerable; first fixed in 12.4T | 12.4(15)T7 | |------------+--------------------------------------+---------------| | 12.3YF | Not Vulnerable | | |------------+--------------------------------------+---------------| | | Releases prior to 12.3(8)YG7 are | | | 12.3YG | vulnerable, release 12.3(8)YG7 and | 12.4(15)T7 | | | later are not vulnerable; first | | | | fixed in 12.4T | | |------------+--------------------------------------+---------------| | 12.3YH | Vulnerable; first fixed in 12.4T | 12.4(15)T7 | |------------+--------------------------------------+---------------| | 12.3YI | Vulnerable; first fixed in 12.4T | 12.4(15)T7 | |------------+--------------------------------------+---------------| | 12.3YJ | Not Vulnerable | | |------------+--------------------------------------+---------------| | 12.3YK | Vulnerable; first fixed in 12.4T | 12.4(15)T7 | |------------+--------------------------------------+---------------| | | | 12.3(14)YM13; | | 12.3YM | 12.3(14)YM13; Available on 30-SEP-08 | Available on | | | | 30-SEP-08 | |------------+--------------------------------------+---------------| | 12.3YQ | Not Vulnerable | | |------------+--------------------------------------+---------------| | 12.3YS | Vulnerable; first fixed in 12.4T | 12.4(15)T7 | |------------+--------------------------------------+---------------| | 12.3YT | Vulnerable; first fixed in 12.4T | 12.4(15)T7 | |------------+--------------------------------------+---------------| | 12.3YU | Not Vulnerable | | |------------+--------------------------------------+---------------| | 12.3YX | Not Vulnerable | | |------------+--------------------------------------+---------------| | 12.3YZ | Vulnerable; contact TAC | | |------------+--------------------------------------+---------------| | 12.3ZA | Vulnerable; first fixed in 12.4T | 12.4(15)T7 | |------------+--------------------------------------+---------------| | Affected | | Recommended | | 12.4-Based | First Fixed Release | Release | | Releases | | | |------------+--------------------------------------+---------------| | | 12.4(18b) | | | | | | | 12.4 | 12.4(19a) | 12.4(18c) | | | | | | | 12.4(21) | | |------------+--------------------------------------+---------------| | 12.4JA | Not Vulnerable | | |------------+--------------------------------------+---------------| | 12.4JK | Not Vulnerable | | |------------+--------------------------------------+---------------| | 12.4JL | Not Vulnerable | | |------------+--------------------------------------+---------------| | 12.4JMA | Not Vulnerable | | |------------+--------------------------------------+---------------| | 12.4JMB | Not Vulnerable | | |------------+--------------------------------------+---------------| | 12.4JMC | Not Vulnerable | | |------------+--------------------------------------+---------------| | 12.4JX | Not Vulnerable | | |------------+--------------------------------------+---------------| | 12.4MD | Not Vulnerable | | |------------+--------------------------------------+---------------| | 12.4MR | 12.4(19)MR | 12.4(19)MR | |------------+--------------------------------------+---------------| | 12.4SW | Not Vulnerable | | |------------+--------------------------------------+---------------| | | 12.4(15)T6 | | | 12.4T | | 12.4(15)T7 | | | 12.4(20)T | | |------------+--------------------------------------+---------------| | 12.4XA | Vulnerable; first fixed in 12.4T | 12.4(15)T7 | |------------+--------------------------------------+---------------| | 12.4XB | Not Vulnerable | | |------------+--------------------------------------+---------------| | 12.4XC | Vulnerable; first fixed in 12.4T | 12.4(15)T7 | |------------+--------------------------------------+---------------| | | | 12.4(4)XD11; | | 12.4XD | 12.4(4)XD11; Available on 26-SEP-08 | Available on | | | | 26-SEP-08 | |------------+--------------------------------------+---------------| | 12.4XE | Vulnerable; first fixed in 12.4T | 12.4(15)T7 | |------------+--------------------------------------+---------------| | 12.4XF | Vulnerable; first fixed in 12.4T | 12.4(15)T7 | |------------+--------------------------------------+---------------| | 12.4XG | Not Vulnerable | | |------------+--------------------------------------+---------------| | 12.4XJ | Vulnerable; first fixed in 12.4T | 12.4(15)T7 | |------------+--------------------------------------+---------------| | 12.4XK | Vulnerable; first fixed in 12.4T | 12.4(15)T7 | |------------+--------------------------------------+---------------| | 12.4XL | Not Vulnerable | | |------------+--------------------------------------+---------------| | 12.4XM | Not Vulnerable | | |------------+--------------------------------------+---------------| | 12.4XN | Not Vulnerable | | |------------+--------------------------------------+---------------| | 12.4XP | Not Vulnerable | | |------------+--------------------------------------+---------------| | 12.4XQ | Not Vulnerable | | |------------+--------------------------------------+---------------| | 12.4XT | Vulnerable; first fixed in 12.4T | 12.4(15)T7 | |------------+--------------------------------------+---------------| | 12.4XV | Vulnerable; contact TAC | | |------------+--------------------------------------+---------------| | 12.4XW | 12.4(11)XW9 | 12.4(11)XW9 | |------------+--------------------------------------+---------------| | 12.4XY | 12.4(15)XY4 | 12.4(15)XY4 | |------------+--------------------------------------+---------------| | 12.4XZ | 12.4(15)XZ2 | 12.4(15)XZ2 | |------------+--------------------------------------+---------------| | 12.4YA | 12.4(20)YA1 | 12.4(20)YA1 | +-------------------------------------------------------------------+ Workarounds =========== The workaround consists of adding an Access Control List (ACL) to every Cisco IOS IPS policy configured on the device so that traffic destined to ports 53/udp or 53/tcp is not inspected by the Cisco IOS IPS feature. The following ACL would need to be added to the device configuration: ! deny inspection of traffic with a destination port of 53/udp access-list 177 deny udp any any eq 53 ! deny inspection of traffic with a destination port of 53/tcp access-list 177 deny tcp any any eq 53 ! allow all other traffic to be inspected access-list 177 permit ip any any Every instance of a Cisco IOS IPS policy on the device would then need to be modified in order to reference the previous ACL. In order to determine which Cisco IOS IPS policies are configured on the device, execute the command show running-config | include ip ips name as in the following example: Router#show running-config | include ip ips name ip ips name ios-ips-incoming ip ips name ios-ips-outgoing Router# In the previous example, two Cisco IOS IPS policies are configured on the device. The following example shows the addition of an ACL to each one of the Cisco IOS IPS policies previously identified: Router#configure terminal Enter configuration commands, one per line. End with CNTL/Z. Router(config)#ip ips name ios-ips-incoming list 177 Router(config)#ip ips name ios-ips-outgoing list 177 Router(config)#end Router# As a verification step, the command show ip ips interfaces can be executed again to verify the ACL has been properly attached to each one of the Cisco IOS IPS policies: Router#show ip ips interfaces Interface Configuration Interface FastEthernet0/0 Inbound IPS rule is ios-ips-incoming acl list 177 Outgoing IPS rule is not set Interface FastEthernet0/1 Inbound IPS rule is not set Outgoing IPS rule is ios-ips-outgoing acl list 177 Router# Note: Disabling or deleting individual or all signatures using the SERVICE.DNS engine of the Cisco IOS IPS feature is not a recommended workaround. The previous workaround is the only Cisco-recommended workaround for this vulnerability. Obtaining Fixed Software ======================== Cisco has released free software updates that address these vulnerabilities. Prior to deploying software, customers should consult their maintenance provider or check the software for feature set compatibility and known issues specific to their environment. Customers may only install and expect support for the feature sets they have purchased. By installing, downloading, accessing or otherwise using such software upgrades, customers agree to be bound by the terms of Cisco's software license terms found at http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/prod_warranties_item09186a008088e31f.ht… or as otherwise set forth at Cisco.com Downloads at http://www.cisco.com/public/sw-center/sw-usingswc.shtml Do not contact psirt(a)cisco.com or security-alert(a)cisco.com for software upgrades. Customers with Service Contracts +------------------------------- Customers with contracts should obtain upgraded software through their regular update channels. For most customers, this means that upgrades should be obtained through the Software Center on Cisco's worldwide website at http://www.cisco.com/ Customers using Third Party Support Organizations +------------------------------------------------ Customers whose Cisco products are provided or maintained through prior or existing agreements with third-party support organizations, such as Cisco Partners, authorized resellers, or service providers should contact that support organization for guidance and assistance with the appropriate course of action in regards to this advisory. The effectiveness of any workaround or fix is dependent on specific customer situations, such as product mix, network topology, traffic behavior, and organizational mission. Due to the variety of affected products and releases, customers should consult with their service provider or support organization to ensure any applied workaround or fix is the most appropriate for use in the intended network before it is deployed. Customers without Service Contracts +---------------------------------- Customers who purchase direct from Cisco but do not hold a Cisco service contract, and customers who purchase through third-party vendors but are unsuccessful in obtaining fixed software through their point of sale should acquire upgrades by contacting the Cisco Technical Assistance Center (TAC). TAC contacts are as follows. * +1 800 553 2447 (toll free from within North America) * +1 408 526 7209 (toll call from anywhere in the world) * e-mail: tac(a)cisco.com Customers should have their product serial number available and be prepared to give the URL of this notice as evidence of entitlement to a free upgrade. Free upgrades for non-contract customers must be requested through the TAC. Refer to http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/687/Directory/DirTAC.shtml for additional TAC contact information, including localized telephone numbers, and instructions and e-mail addresses for use in various languages. Exploitation and Public Announcements ===================================== The Cisco PSIRT is not aware of any public announcements or malicious use of the vulnerability described in this advisory. This vulnerability was reported to Cisco by a customer. Status of this Notice: FINAL ============================ THIS DOCUMENT IS PROVIDED ON AN "AS IS" BASIS AND DOES NOT IMPLY ANY KIND OF GUARANTEE OR WARRANTY, INCLUDING THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR USE. YOUR USE OF THE INFORMATION ON THE DOCUMENT OR MATERIALS LINKED FROM THE DOCUMENT IS AT YOUR OWN RISK. CISCO RESERVES THE RIGHT TO CHANGE OR UPDATE THIS DOCUMENT AT ANY TIME. A stand-alone copy or Paraphrase of the text of this document that omits the distribution URL in the following section is an uncontrolled copy, and may lack important information or contain factual errors. Distribution ============ This advisory is posted on Cisco's worldwide website at: http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20080924-iosips.shtml In addition to worldwide web posting, a text version of this notice is clear-signed with the Cisco PSIRT PGP key and is posted to the following e-mail and Usenet news recipients. * cust-security-announce(a)cisco.com * first-bulletins(a)lists.first.org * bugtraq(a)securityfocus.com * vulnwatch(a)vulnwatch.org * cisco(a)spot.colorado.edu * cisco-nsp(a)puck.nether.net * full-disclosure(a)lists.grok.org.uk * comp.dcom.sys.cisco(a)newsgate.cisco.com Future updates of this advisory, if any, will be placed on Cisco's worldwide website, but may or may not be actively announced on mailing lists or newsgroups. Users concerned about this problem are encouraged to check the above URL for any updates. Revision History ================ +----------------------------------------+ | Revision | | Initial | | 1.0 | 2008-September-24 | public | | | | release | +----------------------------------------+ Cisco Security Procedures ========================= Complete information on reporting security vulnerabilities in Cisco products, obtaining assistance with security incidents, and registering to receive security information from Cisco, is available on Cisco's worldwide website at http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/products_security_vulnerability_policy.… This includes instructions for press inquiries regarding Cisco security notices. All Cisco security advisories are available at http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.8 (Darwin) iEYEARECAAYFAkjaLb4ACgkQ86n/Gc8U/uCOcQCfVtBrGIC3MJQr9jaPkMlt3ikc XrEAn1XOyW6nTAO/lsY5edWYzRoTuLDe =HgRp -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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