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Verizon fiber cut?
by mm_202 30 Mar '09

30 Mar '09

There seems to be a major fiber cut affecting New Jersey, (South Plainfield area). Its been down since yesterday morning. Our carriers (Paetec and Level3) say that its a Verizon fiber. Has anyone else heard anything on this?? Thank you, Sergei.

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iBGP Scaling
by tt tt 30 Mar '09

30 Mar '09

Hi List, We are looking to move our non infrastructure routes into iBGP to help with our IGP scalability (OSPF). We already run full BGP tables on our core where we connect to multiple upstream and downstream customers. Most of our aggregation and edge routers cannot hold full tables and it's certainly not possible to upgrade them. Is there any reason why we shouldn't filter iBGP routes between our core and aggregation layers (we plan to use route reflectors) or should we be look at using a private AS number per POP? Thanks Dave

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Oddly, this has been a complaint
by Joe Blanchard 30 Mar '09

30 Mar '09

Not that I care one way or another, but since I've gotten 20+ complaints. going to www.whitehouse.org yields something else. I know I know, perhaps old news. Should I just redirect or is our DNS corrupt? Darn it Thanks in advance

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RE: Oddly, this has been a complaint
by Joe Blanchard 30 Mar '09

30 Mar '09

Opps my bad sorry for the static. gov/org I should have seen that. Sorry again.

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cnn.com - Vast Spy System Loots Computers in 103 Countries
by Tony Patti 29 Mar '09

29 Mar '09

I hope that today's cnn.com article cited below meets the criteria of sufficient "Internet operational and technical issues" pursuant to NANOG AUP criteria #1 http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/29/technology/29spy.html?_r=2&hp Tony Patti CIO S. Walter Packaging Corp. tony(a)swalter.com March 29, 2009 Vast Spy System Loots Computers in 103 Countries By JOHN MARKOFF TORONTO - A vast electronic spying operation has infiltrated computers and has stolen documents from hundreds of government and private offices around the world, including those of the Dalai Lama, Canadian researchers have concluded. In a report to be issued this weekend, the researchers said that the system was being controlled from computers based almost exclusively in China, but that they could not say conclusively that the Chinese government was involved. The researchers, who are based at the Munk Center for International Studies at the University of Toronto, had been asked by the office of the Dalai Lama, the exiled Tibetan leader whom China regularly denounces, to examine its computers for signs of malicious software, or malware. Their sleuthing opened a window into a broader operation that, in less than two years, has infiltrated at least 1,295 computers in 103 countries, including many belonging to embassies, foreign ministries and other government offices, as well as the Dalai Lama's Tibetan exile centers in India, Brussels, London and New York. The researchers, who have a record of detecting computer espionage, said they believed that in addition to the spying on the Dalai Lama, the system, which they called GhostNet, was focused on the governments of South Asian and Southeast Asian countries. Intelligence analysts say many governments, including those of China, Russia and the United States, and other parties use sophisticated computer programs to covertly gather information. The newly reported spying operation is by far the largest to come to light in terms of countries affected. This is also believed to be the first time researchers have been able to expose the workings of a computer system used in an intrusion of this magnitude. Still going strong, the operation continues to invade and monitor more than a dozen new computers a week, the researchers said in their report, "Tracking 'GhostNet': Investigating a Cyber Espionage Network." They said they had found no evidence that United States government offices had been infiltrated, although a NATO computer was monitored by the spies for half a day and computers of the Indian Embassy in Washington were infiltrated. The malware is remarkable both for its sweep - in computer jargon, it has not been merely "phishing" for random consumers' information, but "whaling" for particular important targets - and for its Big Brother-style capacities. It can, for example, turn on the camera and audio-recording functions of an infected computer, enabling monitors to see and hear what goes on in a room. The investigators say they do not know if this facet has been employed. The researchers were able to monitor the commands given to infected computers and to see the names of documents retrieved by the spies, but in most cases the contents of the stolen files have not been determined. Working with the Tibetans, however, the researchers found that specific correspondence had been stolen and that the intruders had gained control of the electronic mail server computers of the Dalai Lama's organization. The electronic spy game has had at least some real-world impact, they said. For example, they said, after an e-mail invitation was sent by the Dalai Lama's office to a foreign diplomat, the Chinese government made a call to the diplomat discouraging a visit. And a woman working for a group making Internet contacts between Tibetan exiles and Chinese citizens was stopped by Chinese intelligence officers on her way back to Tibet, shown transcripts of her online conversations and warned to stop her political activities. The Toronto researchers said they had notified international law enforcement agencies of the spying operation, which in their view exposed basic shortcomings in the legal structure of cyberspace. The F.B.I. declined to comment on the operation. Although the Canadian researchers said that most of the computers behind the spying were in China, they cautioned against concluding that China's government was involved. The spying could be a nonstate, for-profit operation, for example, or one run by private citizens in China known as "patriotic hackers." "We're a bit more careful about it, knowing the nuance of what happens in the subterranean realms," said Ronald J. Deibert, a member of the research group and an associate professor of political science at Munk. "This could well be the C.I.A. or the Russians. It's a murky realm that we're lifting the lid on." A spokesman for the Chinese Consulate in New York dismissed the idea that China was involved. "These are old stories and they are nonsense," the spokesman, Wenqi Gao, said. "The Chinese government is opposed to and strictly forbids any cybercrime." The Toronto researchers, who allowed a reporter for The New York Times to review the spies' digital tracks, are publishing their findings in Information Warfare Monitor, an online publication associated with the Munk Center. At the same time, two computer researchers at Cambridge University in Britain who worked on the part of the investigation related to the Tibetans, are releasing an independent report. They do fault China, and they warned that other hackers could adopt the tactics used in the malware operation. "What Chinese spooks did in 2008, Russian crooks will do in 2010 and even low-budget criminals from less developed countries will follow in due course," the Cambridge researchers, Shishir Nagaraja and Ross Anderson, wrote in their report, "The Snooping Dragon: Social Malware Surveillance of the Tibetan Movement." In any case, it was suspicions of Chinese interference that led to the discovery of the spy operation. Last summer, the office of the Dalai Lama invited two specialists to India to audit computers used by the Dalai Lama's organization. The specialists, Greg Walton, the editor of Information Warfare Monitor, and Mr. Nagaraja, a network security expert, found that the computers had indeed been infected and that intruders had stolen files from personal computers serving several Tibetan exile groups. Back in Toronto, Mr. Walton shared data with colleagues at the Munk Center's computer lab. One of them was Nart Villeneuve, 34, a graduate student and self-taught "white hat" hacker with dazzling technical skills. Last year, Mr. Villeneuve linked the Chinese version of the Skype communications service to a Chinese government operation that was systematically eavesdropping on users' instant-messaging sessions. Early this month, Mr. Villeneuve noticed an odd string of 22 characters embedded in files created by the malicious software and searched for it with Google. It led him to a group of computers on Hainan Island, off China, and to a Web site that would prove to be critically important. In a puzzling security lapse, the Web page that Mr. Villeneuve found was not protected by a password, while much of the rest of the system uses encryption. Mr. Villeneuve and his colleagues figured out how the operation worked by commanding it to infect a system in their computer lab in Toronto. On March 12, the spies took their own bait. Mr. Villeneuve watched a brief series of commands flicker on his computer screen as someone - presumably in China - rummaged through the files. Finding nothing of interest, the intruder soon disappeared. Through trial and error, the researchers learned to use the system's Chinese-language "dashboard" - a control panel reachable with a standard Web browser - by which one could manipulate the more than 1,200 computers worldwide that had by then been infected. Infection happens two ways. In one method, a user's clicking on a document attached to an e-mail message lets the system covertly install software deep in the target operating system. Alternatively, a user clicks on a Web link in an e-mail message and is taken directly to a "poisoned" Web site. The researchers said they avoided breaking any laws during three weeks of monitoring and extensively experimenting with the system's unprotected software control panel. They provided, among other information, a log of compromised computers dating to May 22, 2007. They found that three of the four control servers were in different provinces in China - Hainan, Guangdong and Sichuan - while the fourth was discovered to be at a Web-hosting company based in Southern California. Beyond that, said Rafal A. Rohozinski, one of the investigators, "attribution is difficult because there is no agreed upon international legal framework for being able to pursue investigations down to their logical conclusion, which is highly local."

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Fiber cut on Irish Sea
by Ken Gilmour 29 Mar '09

29 Mar '09

Hi There, Since we use a vendor of "the vendor" of two Irish sea submarine cables I am wondering if anyone has first hand information on the fiber cut this morning? Does anyone have a status update on what is happening? I am getting some Chinese whispers going on here. Thanks! Ken

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Request for data : Earth Hour - traffic stats [28 March 2009 20:30-21:30 local]
by jamie rishaw 29 Mar '09

29 Mar '09

Ninjas, I'm compiling some data re this year's "Earth Hour"[1] . For those not in the know, or those that dismissed it, "Earth Hour" is something the World Wildlife Fund cooked up, suggesting that the world "turn off" all non-essential electrical devices, to demonstrate some global-warming hypothesis. I'm looking for data - either compiled or raw - of activity between 8:30 (20:30) and 9:30 (21:30) "local" time. Power usage (and comparisons against previous weeks if available) and probably easier to push out - bandwidth info (and, again, comparisons against previous 2030-2130-saturday-night data). All data will be anonymized. Sources, if you send from $work email, will not be included in any summarizations. I think this will turn out to be some rather interesting info. I'll post findings to nanog, of course, or at least, appropriate urls and such. TIA, -jamie [1] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Earth_Hour | http://www.earthhour.org/about/ -- Jamie Rishaw // .com.arpa@j <- reverse it. ish. [Impressive C-level Title Here], arpa / arpa labs

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REVERSE DNS Practices.
by Beavis 28 Mar '09

28 Mar '09

hi, I want to ask some folks out there that maintain reverse DNS queries of their respective IP blocks. I want to know if there is a need for me to contact my upstream provider. I am in charge of 2 /24's under LACNIC. I've already registered my DNS servers on LACNIC. but for some weird reason it's not owning reverse resolves. any tips would be gladly appreciated. thanks, b -- () ascii ribbon campaign - against html e-mail /\ www.asciiribbon.org - against proprietary attachments

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Re: Gigabit speed test anybody?
by Charles＠thewybles.com 28 Mar '09

28 Mar '09

Owamp? ------Original Message------ From: Frank Bulk - iName.com To: 'Steve Bertrand' Cc: nanog(a)nanog.org ReplyTo: frnkblk(a)iname.com Subject: RE: Gigabit speed test anybody? Sent: Mar 27, 2009 3:33 PM I believe there is an ITU standard for testing that could be looked at, but if you went with the same test gear that SPs use to test their circuits, I think you would be safe. Hence my mention of JDSU, but I could also add Agilent (more engineering focused), Anritsu, EXFO, Fluke (more enterprise focused), and SR Telecom. Frank -----Original Message----- From: Steve Bertrand [mailto:steve@ibctech.ca] Sent: Wednesday, March 25, 2009 11:51 PM To: Frank Bulk Cc: 'Robert M. Enger'; ernst(a)easystreet.com; nanog(a)nanog.org Subject: Re: Gigabit speed test anybody? Frank Bulk wrote: > If you're turning up a 10 GigE circuit, as a customer I would be asking for > that circuit to be tested with some modern tools such as the JDSU T-BERD. > For the price you're probably paying, it's probably not unreasonable to have > it as part of the turn-up fee. What is it then that one would classify as an 'industry standard' test for turning up 100Mb-1Gb connections over optical? Is there an industry approved standard application in which the results can be backed up by the "big" SP's? Something that can be passed to the client that explains that "even though your VPN gateway is doing 20Mbps, we can get 856Mbps over the connection without it". (My chosen setup is two FBSD boxes that boot/run from removable media into 2-4GB of RAM using Iperf and/or the 'netrate' tools). Steve ps. I've toyed with small deployments of MPLS VPNs and SP owned CE with encrypted tunnels, but the hardware to do such at any scale is out of reach for us at this point. The theory in practise is fantastic though ;) Sent via BlackBerry from T-Mobile

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[NANOG-announce] VERP now active on all NANOG mailing lists
by kris foster 27 Mar '09

27 Mar '09

Hi everyone All NANOG mailing lists were updated to use VERP (variable envelope return paths) at the beginning of the week. This will aid in bounce detection and help identify the subscriber. A more detailed description of VERP can be found here: http://wiki.list.org/display/DOC/So+what+is+this+VERP+stuff With this change some headers have changed. Depending on how you are performing your filtering this may or may not affect you. The header changes are: Old Return-Path: LISTNAME-bounces(a)nanog.org New Return-Path: LISTNAME-bounces+USERID=DOMAIN(a)nanog.org Old Errors-To: : LISTNAME-bounces(a)nanog.org New Return-Path: LISTNAME-bounces+USERID=DOMAIN(a)nanog.org I hope that this change does not cause any serious issues for you. The mailing list admins are always reachable at admins(a)nanog.org if you have any technical questions. Thanks! Kris Foster MLC Chair _______________________________________________ NANOG-announce mailing list NANOG-announce(a)nanog.org http://mailman.nanog.org/mailman/listinfo/nanog-announce

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