- Test - lists.nanog.org

net-neutrality
by Sven Olaf Kamphuis 12 Aug '10

12 Aug '10

Hi, considering the fact that several organisations have been severely undermining net-neutrality over the past few months, which they seem to see as less important than their copyright bullshit, we have decided to set an example: Should the following networks, to which list more will be added over the coming month, desire to exchange traffic with AS34109, they can obtain a traffic relay contract at sales(a)cb3rob.net, the costs of which amount to 10000 euros per month, excl. 19% VAT, if not, well, then it's simply no more internets for them... sorry peeps. 193.108.8.0/21#GEMA-NET 195.109.249.64/29#SONYMUSIC 195.143.92.160/27#SBMG1-NETS 212.123.224.240/29#Net-WEGENER-MEDIA-BV 212.123.227.64/29#BumaStemra2 212.136.193.216/29#BUMA 212.78.179.240/28#BUMA-STEMRA 213.208.242.160/29#NL-COLT-BUMA-STEMRA 217.148.80.112/28#NL-NXS-CUST-1004613 85.236.46.0/24#IX-UNIVERSAL-NET -- Greetings, Sven Olaf Kamphuis, CB3ROB Ltd. & Co. KG ========================================================================= Address: Koloniestrasse 34 VAT Tax ID: DE267268209 D-13359 Registration: HRA 42834 B BERLIN Phone: +31/(0)87-8747479 Germany GSM: +49/(0)152-26410799 RIPE: CBSK1-RIPE e-Mail: sven(a)cb3rob.net ========================================================================= <penpen> C3P0, der elektrische Westerwelle ========================================================================= Confidential: Please be advised that the information contained in this email message, including all attached documents or files, is privileged and confidential and is intended only for the use of the individual or individuals addressed. Any other use, dissemination, distribution or copying of this communication is strictly prohibited.

10 17

RE: off-topic: summary on Internet traffic growth History
by John Lee 12 Aug '10

12 Aug '10

Andrew, Earlier this week I had a meeting with the ex-Director of the Network Operations Center for MFS-Datanet/MCI whose tenure was through 1999. From 1994 to 1998 they were re-architeching the Frame Relay and ATM networks to handle the growth in traffic including these new facilities called peering points of MAE-East and MAE-West. From roughly 1990 to then end of 1996 they saw traffic on their switches grow at 50-70% growth every 6 months. By the last half of 1996 there was a head of line blocking problem on the DEC FDDI switches that was "regularly" bringing down the Internet. The architecture had lower traffic circuits were going through concentrators while higher traffic circuits were directly attached to ports on the switchs. MFS-Datanet was not going to take the hit for the interruptions to the Internet and was going to inform the trade press there was a problem with DEC FDDI switches so Digital "gave" six switches for the re-architecture of the MAEs to solve the problem. Once this problem was solved the first quarter of 1997 saw a 70% jump in traffic that quarter alone. This "historical event" would in my memory be the genesis of the 100% traffic growth in 100 days legend. (So it was only 70% in 90 days which for the marketing folks does not cut it so 100% in 100 days sounds much better?? :) ) MCI bought MFS-Datanet because MCI had the customers and MFS-Datanet had all of the fiber running to key locations at the time and could drastically cut MCI's costs. UUNET "merged" with MCI and their traffic was put on this same network. MCI went belly up and Verizon bought the network. Personal Note: from 1983 to 90 I worked for Hayes the modem folks and became the Godfather to Ascend communications with Jeanette, Rob, Jay and Steve whose team produced the TNT line of modem/ISDN to Ethernet central site concentrators (in the early ninties) that drove a large portion of the user traffic to the Internet at the time, generating the "bubble". John (ISDN) Lee ________________________________________ From: Andrew Odlyzko [odlyzko(a)umn.edu] Sent: Wednesday, August 11, 2010 12:55 PM To: nanog(a)nanog.org Subject: off-topic: summary on Internet traffic growth myths Since several members of this list requested it, here is a summary of the responses to my request for information about Internet growth during the telecom bubble, in particular the perceptions of the O'Dell/Sidgmore/WorldCom/UUNet "Internet doubling every 100 days" myth. First of all, many thanks to all those who responded, on and off-list. This involved extensive correspondence and some long phone conversations, and helped fill out the picture of those very confusing times (and also made it even clearer than before that there were many different perspectives on what was happening). The entire message is rather long, but it is written in sections, to make it easy to get the gist quickly and neglect the rest. Andrew ------------------------------------------------------------------- 1. Short summary: People who got into the game late, or had been working at small ISPs or other enterprises, were generally willing to give serious credence to the "Internet doubling every 100 days" tale. The old-timers, especially those who worked for large ISPs or other large corporate establishment or research networks, were convinced by the late 1990s that this tale was false, but did not talk about it publicly, even inside the NANOG community. ------------------------------------------------------------------- 2. Longer version: The range of views was very wide, and hard to give justice to in full. But there seemed to be two distinct groups, and the consensus views (which obviously exclude quite a few people) appear to have been: 2A: Those who entered the field in the late 1990s, especially if they worked for small ISPs or other small enterprises, tended to regard the claim seriously. (But it should be remarked that hardly anybody devoted too much effort or thought to the claim, they were too busy putting out fires in their own backyards to worry about global issues.) They remembered periods of desperate efforts to keep up with exploding demand in their businesses. We saw just a few hours ago a post about LINX growing 5.5x in one year. Somebody else wrote about growing their business's traffic 1,000x in 2 years, or about 30x per year. People involved in such incidents often tended to think that their experience during such times might not have been untypical. 2B: Those who worked at places with large traffic, and especially those who got into the field in the early 1990s, were quite sure by the late 1990s that the UUNet fable was just that. Comments regarding everything emanating from UUNet during that period included phrases like "blowing smoke," "rolling our eyes," "taking it with a rock of salt." They had no direct knowledge of what went on inside UUNet, but from watching peering traffic, talking to salespeople about customer losses and wins, and to suppliers about deliveries of equipment, they could be pretty certain that neither the traffic nor the capacity of UUNet could be exploding at the mythical rates. They could see occasional spikes in traffic growth at some customers, or in some parts of their networks, but overall could see traffic growth settling down to a fairly regular doubling or a bit more than doubling each year. However, they did not discuss this in public, and I discuss that below, in point #4. ------------------------------------------------------------------- 3. Growth spurt in mid-1990s: The old-timers also provided very informative feedback about the global Internet traffic growth spurt in the 1995-96 time frame. It did hit suddenly and unexpectedly. (I am still trying to get confirmation on this, but I believe one of the informants said that before this period, the engineers at that person's Tier-1 ISP would routinely double the forecasts provided by the marketing team. At the peak of the bubble, the marketers would demand that the engineers plan for double the capacity that the engineers thought was going to be necessary.) Moreover, the dramatic slowdown in traffic growth that took place in 1997 was, at least in a number of cases, due substantially to a capacity crunch. Router and photonic equipment manufacturers did not have the technology needed for the traffic, and ILECs were slow in supplying access as well as backbone links. Hence the traffic growth spurt in 1996-96 was followed by a capacity growth spurt in 1997-98, which helped provide more credibility for the myth. ------------------------------------------------------------------- 4. Information viscosity: This incident provides far more information confirming the concept of "information viscosity" that I wrote about in my paper, that important and relevant information was available, but was not widely dispersed. Why did the information that Internet traffic was not doubling every 100 days get out to the public? It was not a closely guarded national security secret, after all. There seemed to be many reasons operating. In the case of Genuity (as the quote from Scott Marcus in my paper explains) it was a high-level decision, that going public would hurt the company, as it might be suspected of losing market share. But that seemed to be unusual, in that Genuity, while a major Tier-1 ISP, was small and independent, and so had people like Scott who were engineers, yet involved in policy making. At other places, other dynamics operated. At AT&T, for example, I was called in to a meeting with the management of WorldNet, the AT&T ISP unit, at the end of 2000. They had been telling their customers that Internet traffic was growing 10x per year, and some of those customers asked them about the discrepancy between that claim and the estimates of some folks from AT&T Labs - Research (Kerry Coffman and myself) that growth was just 2x per year. Now it is an interesting perspective on "information viscosity" and AT&T (and other large bureaucratic organizations) that those folks had not heard of Kerry's and my work, even though we had publicized it at the company. But in any event, at that meeting, I did succeed in convincing them that Internet traffic was growing only 2x per year (using evidence in my papers with Kerry, as well as extensive additional data from within AT&T itself), and they agreed they would not propagate the myth among customers. But the interesting thing was that many of the attendees (who included quite a few engineering types, not just the management) seemed disappointed. That really surprised me. After all, AT&T's Internet traffic was growing just about 4x per year, which meant our market share was doubling, instead of being cut in half. But it seems that many of them had really bought into the Internet dream. And, furthermore, the story that we were losing market share was a good one to pry additional resources from the corporation. Several of the NANOG old-timers said that they felt constrained from speaking about the falsity of the myth of astronomical growth rates by group solidarity. After all, it was a small, select group, and bad-mouthing one of their own in front of outsiders or even NANOG newbies did not seem the right thing to do. Then there was the additional factor that one person discussed very explicitly, and that I infer also applied in other cases. The myth was useful. Back in the mid-1990s, when it was not a myth, it did spur equipment suppliers and ILECs to greater effort. And afterwards, it was handy in internal fights over power and resources. If the Internet was exploding, one should not worry about closely examining expansion plans. In some ways, the persistence of false perceptions about Internet traffic growth mirrors that of utilization rates of data networks. When I wrote the paper "Data networks are lightly utilized, and will stay that way," back in 1998, http://www.dtc.umn.edu/~odlyzko/doc/network.utilization.pdf the more clueful data network engineers all knew that utilization rates were generally low, and usually had a good understanding as to why. But top management, as well as the research community, were almost uniformly convinced that congestion was the rule. It took me a while to understand the dynamics of the situation, in which network engineers and managers found it easier to say that they were experiencing 80% utilization and 20% packet losses and needed to upgrade, without having to explain to CEOs, CIOs, and especially to clueless CFOs, that this referred just to the peak hour on one crucial corporate WAN link, and yet justified a big new investment. Few people were lying, but many had incentives to maintain delusions among the top levels of the hierarchy. These demonstrations of information viscosity of course undermine the foundations of much of modern economics, especially of the efficient markets hypothesis. But that last myth is even more durable than "Internet traffic doubling every 100 days," especially since it does not lead directly to lots of dark fiber lying around unused, and lots of companies bankrupt. Information viscosity in facts and ideas in economics is very high, so we should not expect any changes on that scene. ------------------------------------------------------------------- 5. As a reminder, the paper that led to this discussion is "Bubbles, gullibility, and other challenges for economics, psychology, sociology, and information sciences," http://www.dtc.umn.edu/~odlyzko/doc/mania03.pdf The page with source materials from the bubbles times, http://www.dtc.umn.edu/~odlyzko/isources/ now has, in addition to a transcript of the O'Dell lecture at Stanford in May 2000, a copy of the Sidgmore paper from the Vortex98 Conference of May 1998.

10 12

Re: off-topic: summary on Internet traffic growth History
by Deepak Jain 11 Aug '10

11 Aug '10

On my BB. I'm waiting for someone to correct this thread by saying MFS bought UUNET for ~2bill and WCOM absorbed MFS. That is all. ----- Original Message ----- From: Jeffrey S. Young <young(a)jsyoung.net> To: John Lee <john(a)internetassociatesllc.com> Cc: nanog(a)nanog.org <nanog(a)nanog.org>; Andrew Odlyzko <odlyzko(a)umn.edu> Sent: Wed Aug 11 19:26:29 2010 Subject: Re: off-topic: summary on Internet traffic growth History Worldcom bought MFS. Worldcom bought MCI. Worldcom bought UUnet. In your statement s/MCI/Worldcom/g I don't know if UUnet was part of Worldcom when MO first made statements about backbone growth, but I do know that internetMCI was still part of MCI and therefore, MCI was not a part of Worldcom. May seem like splitting hairs to some, but it is important to a few of us to point out that we never worked under Ebbers. Not that we had a choice :-). Growth of the NAPs during this period is a poor indicator of growth. Because of the glitch you mention in carrying capacity the tier 1's all but abandoned the NAPs for peering between themselves and from that point forward (mid '97) preferred direct peering arrangements. jy On 12/08/2010, at 4:13 AM, John Lee <john(a)internetassociatesllc.com> wrote: > Andrew, > > Earlier this week I had a meeting with the ex-Director of the Network Operations Center for MFS-Datanet/MCI whose tenure was through 1999. From 1994 to 1998 they were re-architeching the Frame Relay and ATM networks to handle the growth in traffic including these new facilities called peering points of MAE-East and MAE-West. From roughly 1990 to then end of 1996 they saw traffic on their switches grow at 50-70% growth every 6 months. By the last half of 1996 there was a head of line blocking problem on the DEC FDDI switches that was "regularly" bringing down the Internet. The architecture had lower traffic circuits were going through concentrators while higher traffic circuits were directly attached to ports on the switchs. > > > > MFS-Datanet was not going to take the hit for the interruptions to the Internet and was going to inform the trade press there was a problem with DEC FDDI switches so Digital "gave" six switches for the re-architecture of the MAEs to solve the problem. Once this problem was solved the first quarter of 1997 saw a 70% jump in traffic that quarter alone. This "historical event" would in my memory be the genesis of the 100% traffic growth in 100 days legend. (So it was only 70% in 90 days which for the marketing folks does not cut it so 100% in 100 days sounds much better?? :) ) > > > > MCI bought MFS-Datanet because MCI had the customers and MFS-Datanet had all of the fiber running to key locations at the time and could drastically cut MCI's costs. UUNET "merged" with MCI and their traffic was put on this same network. MCI went belly up and Verizon bought the network. > > > > Personal Note: from 1983 to 90 I worked for Hayes the modem folks and became the Godfather to Ascend communications with Jeanette, Rob, Jay and Steve whose team produced the TNT line of modem/ISDN to Ethernet central site concentrators (in the early ninties) that drove a large portion of the user traffic to the Internet at the time, generating the "bubble". > > > > John (ISDN) Lee > ________________________________________ > From: Andrew Odlyzko [odlyzko(a)umn.edu] > Sent: Wednesday, August 11, 2010 12:55 PM > To: nanog(a)nanog.org > Subject: off-topic: summary on Internet traffic growth myths > > Since several members of this list requested it, here is a summary > of the responses to my request for information about Internet growth > during the telecom bubble, in particular the perceptions of the > O'Dell/Sidgmore/WorldCom/UUNet "Internet doubling every 100 days" > myth. > > First of all, many thanks to all those who responded, on and off-list. > This involved extensive correspondence and some long phone conversations, > and helped fill out the picture of those very confusing times (and > also made it even clearer than before that there were many different > perspectives on what was happening). > > The entire message is rather long, but it is written in sections, > to make it easy to get the gist quickly and neglect the rest. > > Andrew > > > ------------------------------------------------------------------- > > 1. Short summary: People who got into the game late, or had been > working at small ISPs or other enterprises, were generally willing > to give serious credence to the "Internet doubling every 100 days" > tale. The old-timers, especially those who worked for large ISPs > or other large corporate establishment or research networks, were > convinced by the late 1990s that this tale was false, but did not > talk about it publicly, even inside the NANOG community. > > ------------------------------------------------------------------- > > 2. Longer version: The range of views was very wide, and hard to > give justice to in full. But there seemed to be two distinct > groups, and the consensus views (which obviously exclude quite > a few people) appear to have been: > > 2A: Those who entered the field in the late 1990s, especially > if they worked for small ISPs or other small enterprises, tended > to regard the claim seriously. (But it should be remarked that > hardly anybody devoted too much effort or thought to the claim, > they were too busy putting out fires in their own backyards to > worry about global issues.) They remembered periods of desperate > efforts to keep up with exploding demand in their businesses. > We saw just a few hours ago a post about LINX growing 5.5x in > one year. Somebody else wrote about growing their business's > traffic 1,000x in 2 years, or about 30x per year. People involved > in such incidents often tended to think that their experience > during such times might not have been untypical. > > 2B: Those who worked at places with large traffic, and especially > those who got into the field in the early 1990s, were quite sure > by the late 1990s that the UUNet fable was just that. Comments > regarding everything emanating from UUNet during that period > included phrases like "blowing smoke," "rolling our eyes," "taking > it with a rock of salt." They had no direct knowledge of what > went on inside UUNet, but from watching peering traffic, talking > to salespeople about customer losses and wins, and to suppliers > about deliveries of equipment, they could be pretty certain that > neither the traffic nor the capacity of UUNet could be exploding > at the mythical rates. They could see occasional spikes in > traffic growth at some customers, or in some parts of their > networks, but overall could see traffic growth settling down > to a fairly regular doubling or a bit more than doubling each > year. > > However, they did not discuss this in public, and I discuss that > below, in point #4. > > ------------------------------------------------------------------- > > 3. Growth spurt in mid-1990s: The old-timers also provided very > informative feedback about the global Internet traffic growth > spurt in the 1995-96 time frame. It did hit suddenly and > unexpectedly. (I am still trying to get confirmation on this, > but I believe one of the informants said that before this > period, the engineers at that person's Tier-1 ISP would routinely > double the forecasts provided by the marketing team. At the peak > of the bubble, the marketers would demand that the engineers plan > for double the capacity that the engineers thought was going > to be necessary.) Moreover, the dramatic slowdown in traffic > growth that took place in 1997 was, at least in a number of > cases, due substantially to a capacity crunch. Router and > photonic equipment manufacturers did not have the technology > needed for the traffic, and ILECs were slow in supplying > access as well as backbone links. Hence the traffic growth > spurt in 1996-96 was followed by a capacity growth spurt > in 1997-98, which helped provide more credibility for the > myth. > > ------------------------------------------------------------------- > > 4. Information viscosity: This incident provides far more > information confirming the concept of "information viscosity" > that I wrote about in my paper, that important and relevant > information was available, but was not widely dispersed. > > Why did the information that Internet traffic was not doubling > every 100 days get out to the public? It was not a closely > guarded national security secret, after all. > > There seemed to be many reasons operating. In the case of > Genuity (as the quote from Scott Marcus in my paper explains) > it was a high-level decision, that going public would hurt > the company, as it might be suspected of losing market share. > But that seemed to be unusual, in that Genuity, while a > major Tier-1 ISP, was small and independent, and so had > people like Scott who were engineers, yet involved in > policy making. At other places, other dynamics operated. > > At AT&T, for example, I was called in to a meeting with > the management of WorldNet, the AT&T ISP unit, at the > end of 2000. They had been telling their customers that > Internet traffic was growing 10x per year, and some of > those customers asked them about the discrepancy between > that claim and the estimates of some folks from AT&T > Labs - Research (Kerry Coffman and myself) that growth > was just 2x per year. Now it is an interesting perspective > on "information viscosity" and AT&T (and other large > bureaucratic organizations) that those folks had not > heard of Kerry's and my work, even though we had publicized > it at the company. But in any event, at that meeting, > I did succeed in convincing them that Internet traffic > was growing only 2x per year (using evidence in my papers > with Kerry, as well as extensive additional data from > within AT&T itself), and they agreed they would not > propagate the myth among customers. But the interesting > thing was that many of the attendees (who included quite > a few engineering types, not just the management) seemed > disappointed. That really surprised me. After all, > AT&T's Internet traffic was growing just about 4x per > year, which meant our market share was doubling, instead > of being cut in half. But it seems that many of them > had really bought into the Internet dream. And, furthermore, > the story that we were losing market share was a good one > to pry additional resources from the corporation. > > Several of the NANOG old-timers said that they felt constrained > from speaking about the falsity of the myth of astronomical > growth rates by group solidarity. After all, it was a > small, select group, and bad-mouthing one of their own > in front of outsiders or even NANOG newbies did not seem > the right thing to do. Then there was the additional > factor that one person discussed very explicitly, and > that I infer also applied in other cases. The myth was > useful. Back in the mid-1990s, when it was not a myth, > it did spur equipment suppliers and ILECs to greater > effort. And afterwards, it was handy in internal fights > over power and resources. If the Internet was exploding, > one should not worry about closely examining expansion > plans. > > In some ways, the persistence of false perceptions about > Internet traffic growth mirrors that of utilization rates > of data networks. When I wrote the paper "Data networks > are lightly utilized, and will stay that way," back in 1998, > > http://www.dtc.umn.edu/~odlyzko/doc/network.utilization.pdf > > the more clueful data network engineers all knew that > utilization rates were generally low, and usually had > a good understanding as to why. But top management, as > well as the research community, were almost uniformly > convinced that congestion was the rule. It took me a > while to understand the dynamics of the situation, in > which network engineers and managers found it easier > to say that they were experiencing 80% utilization and > 20% packet losses and needed to upgrade, without having > to explain to CEOs, CIOs, and especially to clueless > CFOs, that this referred just to the peak hour on one crucial > corporate WAN link, and yet justified a big new investment. > Few people were lying, but many had incentives to maintain > delusions among the top levels of the hierarchy. > > These demonstrations of information viscosity of course > undermine the foundations of much of modern economics, > especially of the efficient markets hypothesis. But that > last myth is even more durable than "Internet traffic > doubling every 100 days," especially since it does not > lead directly to lots of dark fiber lying around unused, > and lots of companies bankrupt. Information viscosity > in facts and ideas in economics is very high, so we > should not expect any changes on that scene. > > > ------------------------------------------------------------------- > > 5. As a reminder, the paper that led to this discussion is > "Bubbles, gullibility, and other challenges for economics, > psychology, sociology, and information sciences," > > http://www.dtc.umn.edu/~odlyzko/doc/mania03.pdf > > The page with source materials from the bubbles times, > > http://www.dtc.umn.edu/~odlyzko/isources/ > > now has, in addition to a transcript of the O'Dell lecture > at Stanford in May 2000, a copy of the Sidgmore paper from > the Vortex98 Conference of May 1998. >

1 0

MPLS providers between Portland OR and NYC
by Brent Jones 11 Aug '10

11 Aug '10

Does anyone have any recommendations or experience to share about any L2 providers in the Portland OR, and NYC markets? Specifically, providers that can do 1Gbit between those cities, with reasonable SLAs. Comments off-list would be greatly appreciated! -- Brent Jones brent(a)servuhome.net

1 0

I went so you don't have to -- ICANN Bruxelles pour les nuls
by Eric Brunner-Williams 11 Aug '10

11 Aug '10

There are a few people who have some passing interest in ICANN so I will inflict upon the list my few paragraph summary of things that matter. All the past large dragons appear to have been killed or reduced to largish lizards. The Four Over Arching Issues, of which only one was real, protection of trademark holders, are sufficiently solved. On the other hand, biting off fingers as usual, are two new shiny objects for the jays and daws to chase: vertical integration of registries and registrars (VI, like, you know, the visual mode of ex, not the evil EMACS cult) and morality and decency (MoDo). How big a thrill MoDo is going to be is still TBD. Content regulation via names. Whoopie! VI is going to be put to bed one way or another by Labor Day. About VI, which has consumed my every waking hour since ... the Nairobi meeting. Prior to Nairobi the rules reflected the NetSol/VGRS breakup, and allowed registries to own approximately 15% of a registrar, and registrars to own registries. Afilias (.info) and NeuLevel (.biz) were formed under these equity restrictions. At Nairobi the Board voted that there be no cross ownership in new gTLD registries, and just prior to the Brussels meeting last week, ICANN released the 4th version of the Draft Applicant Guide, which put the cross-ownership limit at 2%. The VI activity is an attempt to articulate an alternate to the 0%, now 2%, and still fluid rule the Board may adopt prior to starting the next application round. The broad choices (and venomous camps) are: 1. things pretty much stay the same, the 15% rule with some change continues, for .com-like and .coop-like registries, insiders rule, 2. things pretty much change, with 100% cross-ownership allowed, with various proposals for the prevention of abuse by the integrated entity, for .com-like and .coop-like registries, hurray for the revolution, and 3. who cares about 1 and 2? corporations and TLD consultants want lots (like hundreds) of brands in the root, now. The VI Working Group is about as fun as USENET, though the face-to-face meetings in Brussels were surprisingly civil. Of interest to some here is covert wiggling of a subscriber-type TLD through the semi-mythical loophole for "brand" TLDs. There are walled garden serpents working the issue towards ".my-walled-garden". The ISPSG (that's the ISP -- Internet.Service.Providers Stakeholders Group) continued to drift into senility and decay with ISPs still staffing ICANN issue advocacy out of their IP (Intellectual Property) in-house counsels rather than their IP (4&6&BGP&tone&stuff) operational sides, so wakeful behavior remains confined to the ASO input to ICANN, and limited to the last v4 /8s known to LGBT and other persons. Those are the big ticket items. The Board approved adding the Han Script labels requested by .cn (China), .tw (Taiwan) and .hk (Hong Kong), which made a lot of people, me included, feel good. This is the continuation of the approvals (and awkward delegations) of Arabic Script labels and Cyrillic Script labels made earlier. The security weenies continue to whine that all the new registries should be armored up to prevent abuses that overwhelmingly occur in .com, and surprise steer well clear of treading on Verisign's toes, so in vast areas of policy life in the playpen is quite surreal. The next meeting is in December, so I finally get a Halloween at home, in Cartagena, Columbia. The usual self-and-corporate-promotion-as-news is going on over CircleID, which everyone is free to read or avoid, and if you read today's CIDR and BGP reports with more than a passing interest, and this "pour les nuls", remember the first is reality based and the second is not. And no, there still is no firm date for ICANN to start the public announcement and four months later, start accepting applications and $185,000 checks. This sentence appears to age well, I've used it without sending it out for cleaning since the Paris meeting, six meetings in a row. This exchange: > On 2 Jul 2010, at 13:34, Bret Clark wrote: > >> 28.8k Modem users... > > AT&T iPhone users... the new 14.4 modem of the internet. Had me laughing! Have a nice weekend everyone! Eric

8 17

LACNOC 2010 - Meeting Registration
by LACNOG 2010 11 Aug '10

11 Aug '10

Dear colleagues, LACNOG is pleased to announce the opening of registration to participate in the LACNOG 2010 meeting to be held in conjunction with LACNIC XIV and the 4th Brazilian PTT Forum. This joint event will take place from 19 to 22 October 2010, at the Caesar Park International Airport Hotel in Guarulhos, Sao Paulo, Brazil. Register now at: http://www.lacnog.org/en/eventos/lacnog-2010/registro Book your hotel at: http://www.lacnog.org/en/eventos/lacnog-2010/hospedaje Information and other details are available at the meeting website: http://www.lacnog.org/en/eventos/lacnog-2010/inicio LACNOG Program Committee

1 0

off-topic: summary on Internet traffic growth myths
by Andrew Odlyzko 11 Aug '10

11 Aug '10

Since several members of this list requested it, here is a summary of the responses to my request for information about Internet growth during the telecom bubble, in particular the perceptions of the O'Dell/Sidgmore/WorldCom/UUNet "Internet doubling every 100 days" myth. First of all, many thanks to all those who responded, on and off-list. This involved extensive correspondence and some long phone conversations, and helped fill out the picture of those very confusing times (and also made it even clearer than before that there were many different perspectives on what was happening). The entire message is rather long, but it is written in sections, to make it easy to get the gist quickly and neglect the rest. Andrew ------------------------------------------------------------------- 1. Short summary: People who got into the game late, or had been working at small ISPs or other enterprises, were generally willing to give serious credence to the "Internet doubling every 100 days" tale. The old-timers, especially those who worked for large ISPs or other large corporate establishment or research networks, were convinced by the late 1990s that this tale was false, but did not talk about it publicly, even inside the NANOG community. ------------------------------------------------------------------- 2. Longer version: The range of views was very wide, and hard to give justice to in full. But there seemed to be two distinct groups, and the consensus views (which obviously exclude quite a few people) appear to have been: 2A: Those who entered the field in the late 1990s, especially if they worked for small ISPs or other small enterprises, tended to regard the claim seriously. (But it should be remarked that hardly anybody devoted too much effort or thought to the claim, they were too busy putting out fires in their own backyards to worry about global issues.) They remembered periods of desperate efforts to keep up with exploding demand in their businesses. We saw just a few hours ago a post about LINX growing 5.5x in one year. Somebody else wrote about growing their business's traffic 1,000x in 2 years, or about 30x per year. People involved in such incidents often tended to think that their experience during such times might not have been untypical. 2B: Those who worked at places with large traffic, and especially those who got into the field in the early 1990s, were quite sure by the late 1990s that the UUNet fable was just that. Comments regarding everything emanating from UUNet during that period included phrases like "blowing smoke," "rolling our eyes," "taking it with a rock of salt." They had no direct knowledge of what went on inside UUNet, but from watching peering traffic, talking to salespeople about customer losses and wins, and to suppliers about deliveries of equipment, they could be pretty certain that neither the traffic nor the capacity of UUNet could be exploding at the mythical rates. They could see occasional spikes in traffic growth at some customers, or in some parts of their networks, but overall could see traffic growth settling down to a fairly regular doubling or a bit more than doubling each year. However, they did not discuss this in public, and I discuss that below, in point #4. ------------------------------------------------------------------- 3. Growth spurt in mid-1990s: The old-timers also provided very informative feedback about the global Internet traffic growth spurt in the 1995-96 time frame. It did hit suddenly and unexpectedly. (I am still trying to get confirmation on this, but I believe one of the informants said that before this period, the engineers at that person's Tier-1 ISP would routinely double the forecasts provided by the marketing team. At the peak of the bubble, the marketers would demand that the engineers plan for double the capacity that the engineers thought was going to be necessary.) Moreover, the dramatic slowdown in traffic growth that took place in 1997 was, at least in a number of cases, due substantially to a capacity crunch. Router and photonic equipment manufacturers did not have the technology needed for the traffic, and ILECs were slow in supplying access as well as backbone links. Hence the traffic growth spurt in 1996-96 was followed by a capacity growth spurt in 1997-98, which helped provide more credibility for the myth. ------------------------------------------------------------------- 4. Information viscosity: This incident provides far more information confirming the concept of "information viscosity" that I wrote about in my paper, that important and relevant information was available, but was not widely dispersed. Why did the information that Internet traffic was not doubling every 100 days get out to the public? It was not a closely guarded national security secret, after all. There seemed to be many reasons operating. In the case of Genuity (as the quote from Scott Marcus in my paper explains) it was a high-level decision, that going public would hurt the company, as it might be suspected of losing market share. But that seemed to be unusual, in that Genuity, while a major Tier-1 ISP, was small and independent, and so had people like Scott who were engineers, yet involved in policy making. At other places, other dynamics operated. At AT&T, for example, I was called in to a meeting with the management of WorldNet, the AT&T ISP unit, at the end of 2000. They had been telling their customers that Internet traffic was growing 10x per year, and some of those customers asked them about the discrepancy between that claim and the estimates of some folks from AT&T Labs - Research (Kerry Coffman and myself) that growth was just 2x per year. Now it is an interesting perspective on "information viscosity" and AT&T (and other large bureaucratic organizations) that those folks had not heard of Kerry's and my work, even though we had publicized it at the company. But in any event, at that meeting, I did succeed in convincing them that Internet traffic was growing only 2x per year (using evidence in my papers with Kerry, as well as extensive additional data from within AT&T itself), and they agreed they would not propagate the myth among customers. But the interesting thing was that many of the attendees (who included quite a few engineering types, not just the management) seemed disappointed. That really surprised me. After all, AT&T's Internet traffic was growing just about 4x per year, which meant our market share was doubling, instead of being cut in half. But it seems that many of them had really bought into the Internet dream. And, furthermore, the story that we were losing market share was a good one to pry additional resources from the corporation. Several of the NANOG old-timers said that they felt constrained from speaking about the falsity of the myth of astronomical growth rates by group solidarity. After all, it was a small, select group, and bad-mouthing one of their own in front of outsiders or even NANOG newbies did not seem the right thing to do. Then there was the additional factor that one person discussed very explicitly, and that I infer also applied in other cases. The myth was useful. Back in the mid-1990s, when it was not a myth, it did spur equipment suppliers and ILECs to greater effort. And afterwards, it was handy in internal fights over power and resources. If the Internet was exploding, one should not worry about closely examining expansion plans. In some ways, the persistence of false perceptions about Internet traffic growth mirrors that of utilization rates of data networks. When I wrote the paper "Data networks are lightly utilized, and will stay that way," back in 1998, http://www.dtc.umn.edu/~odlyzko/doc/network.utilization.pdf the more clueful data network engineers all knew that utilization rates were generally low, and usually had a good understanding as to why. But top management, as well as the research community, were almost uniformly convinced that congestion was the rule. It took me a while to understand the dynamics of the situation, in which network engineers and managers found it easier to say that they were experiencing 80% utilization and 20% packet losses and needed to upgrade, without having to explain to CEOs, CIOs, and especially to clueless CFOs, that this referred just to the peak hour on one crucial corporate WAN link, and yet justified a big new investment. Few people were lying, but many had incentives to maintain delusions among the top levels of the hierarchy. These demonstrations of information viscosity of course undermine the foundations of much of modern economics, especially of the efficient markets hypothesis. But that last myth is even more durable than "Internet traffic doubling every 100 days," especially since it does not lead directly to lots of dark fiber lying around unused, and lots of companies bankrupt. Information viscosity in facts and ideas in economics is very high, so we should not expect any changes on that scene. ------------------------------------------------------------------- 5. As a reminder, the paper that led to this discussion is "Bubbles, gullibility, and other challenges for economics, psychology, sociology, and information sciences," http://www.dtc.umn.edu/~odlyzko/doc/mania03.pdf The page with source materials from the bubbles times, http://www.dtc.umn.edu/~odlyzko/isources/ now has, in addition to a transcript of the O'Dell lecture at Stanford in May 2000, a copy of the Sidgmore paper from the Vortex98 Conference of May 1998.

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Google wants your Internet to be faster
by Mark Boolootian 10 Aug '10

10 Aug '10

Cringely has a theory and it involves Google and Verizon, but it doesn't involve net neutrality: http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/08/opinion/08cringeley.html?_r=2

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Recommended 1Gb SFP for ~115km?
by Abello, Vinny 10 Aug '10

10 Aug '10

Hello, Any pointers on real world experience on this topic would greatly be appreciated. What are people using successfully out there as far as third party SFP's go to hit a distance of approximately 115km? This would be for a Catalyst 6506. Cisco's solution was a much more costly EDFA solution, but I see plenty of vendors that make SFP's for Gigabit Ethernet that range from 115km to 150km and more. I know these are not supported by Cisco and TAC won't troubleshoot if they are in the switch. I'm willing to work around that should I need TAC assistance on the switch. What works well for a single wavelength solution at this distance without having to switch to DWDM? This circuit will have duplex fibers. Thanks! -Vinny

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Send NANOG mailing list submissions
by KANDE Baya 10 Aug '10

10 Aug '10

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