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Join my network on LinkedIn
by Luis Palma Lopez via LinkedIn 03 Jan '13

03 Jan '13

LinkedIn ------------ Luis Palma Lopez requested to add you as a connection on LinkedIn: ------------------------------------------ I'd like to add you to my professional network on LinkedIn. Accept invitation from Luis Palma Lopez http://www.linkedin.com/e/-voa23o-hbghuaa4-6f/q0XU4EiXDUS2IbxL1NdPb3ZaZI/bl… View profile of Luis Palma Lopez http://www.linkedin.com/e/-voa23o-hbghuaa4-6f/rso/90277286/KLaW/name/500543… ------------------------------------------ You are receiving Invitation emails. This email was intended for Ted Fischer. Learn why this is included: http://www.linkedin.com/e/-voa23o-hbghuaa4-6f/plh/http%3A%2F%2Fhelp%2Elinke… (c) 2012, LinkedIn Corporation. 2029 Stierlin Ct, Mountain View, CA 94043, USA.

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Re: Gmail and SSL
by Keith Medcalf 03 Jan '13

03 Jan '13

No more difficult at all. A MITM is a MITM. The atack is the same and intteger-store-bought certificates make the process neither more nor less complicated. Sent from Samsung Mobile -------- Original message -------- From: William Herrin <bill(a)herrin.us> Date: To: George Herbert <george.herbert(a)gmail.com> Cc: John Levine <johnl(a)iecc.com>,nanog(a)nanog.org Subject: Re: Gmail and SSL

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Re: Gmail and SSL
by Keith Medcalf 03 Jan '13

03 Jan '13

Perhaps Googles other "harvesters" and the government agents they sell or give user credentials to, don't work against privately (not under the goverment thumb) encryption keys without the surveillance state expending significantly more resources. Perhaps the cheapest way to solve this is to apply thumbscrews and have google require the use of co-option freindly keying material by their victims errr customers errr users. Sent from Samsung Mobile -------- Original message -------- From: Christopher Morrow <morrowc.lists(a)gmail.com> Date: To: "John R. Levine" <johnl(a)iecc.com> Cc: nanog(a)nanog.org Subject: Re: Gmail and SSL

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ATT/Bellsouth Mail
by Nick Olsen 02 Jan '13

02 Jan '13

Looking for a contact at ATT/Bellsouth regarding email acceptance. (@bellsouth.net) I've been unable to send them mail with a 550 Error (Blocked for abuse) and have requested de-listing no less then 5 times. Not getting anywhere, Normal contact routes have failed. Nick Olsen Network Operations (855) FLSPEED x106

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[NANOG-announce] NANOG 57 Update
by Betty Burke <betty＠nanog.org> 02 Jan '13

02 Jan '13

Colleagues: Welcome to 2013! NANOG 57, our first meeting of the new year, scheduled for Monday, February 4-6, 2013 in sunny Orlando is well underway. The NANOG Program Committee will be sharing agenda information very soon. As always it will be linked to the NANOG 57 meeting page<http://www.nanog.org/meetings/nanog57/index.html> . I write today, sending along a few reminders regarding registration and hotel information for NANOG 57. The hotel information is as follows: - *Group Name:* NANOG - *Room Rate:* $199 single/double, plus taxes - *Group Rate Expires:* Saturday, January 12, 2013 - *Reservations:* - To call for hotel room reservations, please call 1-888-789-3090 and state that you will be attending NANOG 57. - *Online Reservations:* - Please click here <https://resweb.passkey.com/Resweb.do?mode=welcome_gi_new&groupID=10487120>for online reservations directly with the Renaissance Orlando at Seaworld. And lastly do not miss out on Registration savings: If you are not a NANOG member, consider joining by visiting *Join NANOG today <http://www.nanog.org/membership_main.html>** and receive a $25 discount on standard registration <http://www.nanog.org/membership_main.html>fees for any NANOG conference.* * * *For registration, * <http://www.nanog.org/login/> - Standard Registration starting December 17, 2012 (non-member $525, member $500, student $100) - Late Registration starting January 11, 2013 (non-member $600, member $575, student $100) - On-Site Registration starting February 1, 2013 (non-member $675, member $650, student $100) Look forward to seeing many of you in Orlando. Should you have any questions, please send email to nanog-support(a)nanog.org. Sincerely, Betty Betty Burke NANOG Executive Director 48377 Fremont Boulevard, Suite 117 Fremont, CA 94538 Tel: +1 510 492 4030 _______________________________________________ NANOG-announce mailing list NANOG-announce(a)mailman.nanog.org http://mailman.nanog.org/mailman/listinfo/nanog-announce

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Join my network on LinkedIn
by glauber gabriel via LinkedIn 02 Jan '13

02 Jan '13

LinkedIn ------------ glauber gabriel requested to add you as a connection on LinkedIn: ------------------------------------------ I'd like to add you to my professional network on LinkedIn. Accept invitation from glauber gabriel http://www.linkedin.com/e/-voa23o-hbggy9vf-4c/q0XU4EiXDUS2IbxL1NdPb3ZaZI/bl… View profile of glauber gabriel http://www.linkedin.com/e/-voa23o-hbggy9vf-4c/rso/83706038/sJhI/name/500543… ------------------------------------------ You are receiving Invitation emails. This email was intended for Ted Fischer. Learn why this is included: http://www.linkedin.com/e/-voa23o-hbggy9vf-4c/plh/http%3A%2F%2Fhelp%2Elinke… (c) 2012, LinkedIn Corporation. 2029 Stierlin Ct, Mountain View, CA 94043, USA.

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Re: Gmail and SSL
by Keith Medcalf 02 Jan '13

02 Jan '13

Non prime number store certificates are acceptd for SMTP (25) both to and from google. Perhaps this is CYA to prevent compromised gmail accounts from giving credentials from hijacked accounts to unknown servers. I have no idea how credentials for gmails pop pickup work but perhaps having hijacked a gmail account the hijacker can just change the target pop server address without needing to know the target crefentials. Changing to a malicious pop server would allow the credentials for that account to be compromised. Of course if this were the case I should think fixing the underlying brokedness in the UI might be a good idea as well. Sent from Samsung Mobile -------- Original message -------- From: Scott Howard <scott(a)doc.net.au> Date: To: "John R. Levine" <johnl(a)iecc.com> Cc: nanog(a)nanog.org Subject: Re: Gmail and SSL

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GeekTools Whois Proxy and RIPE/RIPE-NCC
by Rodney Joffe 01 Jan '13

01 Jan '13

NANOG and ARIN Friends, 14 Years ago, at the suggestion of Jon Postel and some of the early participants in NANOG, we developed the GeekTools Whois proxy to make it easier for *us* - network security and abuse techs - to deal with the expanding number of gtlds and registrars and the varied whois servers that were appearing. The service had both a CLI and web interface. The service also led directly to the creation of whois-servers.net, which now seems to be part of a number of *nix distributions. The service has been up for 14 years, and over that time we have fulfilled the requirements of all of the whois server operators in regards to minimizing and stopping abuse of the GT whois proxy by domain scrapers, spammers, etc, while enabling the security folks to do their jobs. In some cases we have even written code to pass the ip address of the requestor to the whois server registry operator when they wanted to manage quota's directly. We think we have a really good relationship with all of the whois server operators, and I think we provide a useful service to the community, and is widely used. And in 14 years we have never been tarred as an enabler of abuse of "the whois" system. There has obviously never been any kind of charge or fee for using the proxy, or any of the other tools on GeekTools. In about 2002 we started placing a banner ad on the web interface page to offset some of the costs for the bandwidth that the proxy consumes. An average of about $70 a month for over the last 10 years. Actual bandwidth costs are higher than that of course, but it was a thought in 2002 that we had frankly forgotten about until recently. Two weeks ago RIPE-NCC, who provide the whois data for IP addresses in the RIPE region, informed us that based on decisions by their members, as of January 1st 2013, tomorrow, they would no longer provide whois proxy query response services to GeekTools unless we ponied up $1,800 a year for RIPE membership. I don't work very well above layer 7. It is what it is. So I wanted to let you know that as of midnight tonight, apparently, you won't be able to use GeekTools for RIPE related queries. If you have automated scripts, and you are one of the users who has expanded access to GeekTools, you'll need to find an alternative for RIPE queries *today*. My guess is that you will be able to query RIPE directly, once you have worked out that the address space is within RIPE's assignments. I think its wrong to have to pay for whois data that is part of a community resource . So I won't do it.

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Happy new year (and contact at 7018/20057)
by Drew Weaver 31 Dec '12

31 Dec '12

Howdy and Happy New Year. We're having some IP/routing issues with AS 20057/7018 and so far attempts at hitting noc(a)att.net<mailto:noc@att.net> and noc(a)attglobal.net<mailto:noc@attglobal.net> haven't been successful. Does anyone have a contact at 20057 or 7018 or if anyone from those orgs are reading this can you please contact me off list? Thanks, -Drew

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Re: Gmail and SSL
by Keith Medcalf 30 Dec '12

30 Dec '12

While i will agree that the client being able to validate the certificate directly is the best place to be, I do not see any advantage of requiring purchased certificates over self-signed certificates. IMO it provides no realistic security benefit at all. Then again I don't award points for certificate verification having anything to do with identity verification of the remote party. In other words, if I didn't sign it then the certificate posseses no more validity than an ephemeral self-signed certificate. Of course, others are free to delude themselves with additional "theatrics" and false assumtions if they want to do so. Sent from Samsung Mobile -------- Original message -------- From: Christopher Morrow <morrowc.lists(a)gmail.com> Date: To: kmedcalf <kmedcalf(a)dessus.com> Cc: mysidia@gmail.com,nanog@nanog.org Subject: Re: Gmail and SSL

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