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September 2025

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The state-level attack on the SSL CA security model
by Martin Millnert 12 Dec '25

12 Dec '25

To my surprise, I did not see a mention in this community of the latest proof of the complete failure of the SSL CA model to actually do what it is supposed to: provide security, rather than a false sense of security. Essentially a state somewhere between Iraq and Pakistan snatched valid certs for: - mail.google.com - www.google.com - login.yahoo.com - login.skype.com - addons.mozilla.org - login.live.com - "global trustee" https://blog.torproject.org/blog/detecting-certificate-authority-compromise… http://www.comodo.com/Comodo-Fraud-Incident-2011-03-23.html http://www.imperialviolet.org/2011/03/18/revocation.html (on epic failure of cert revocation lists implementations in browsers, failing open (!)) http://blog.mozilla.com/security/2011/03/22/firefox-blocking-fraudulent-cer… http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/advisory/2524375.mspx For over a week users of browsers, and the internet at large, were/was not informed by COMODO that their security was compromised. "Why not" is beyond many of us. Announcing this high and loud even before fixes were available would not have exposed more users to threats, but less. Conclusion: protecting people must not be a priority in the SSL CA model. In some places, failure of internet security means people die, and it is high time to start serious work to replace this time-and-time again proven flawed model with something that, at the very least, does not fail this tragically. DNSSEC is a good but insufficient start in this particular case. Regards, Martin

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testing
by Bryan Fields 02 Oct '25

02 Oct '25

-- Bryan Fields 727-409-1194 - Voice http://bryanfields.net

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