January 2024 - Test - lists.nanog.org

RPKI's 2023 Year in Review - growth, governments, and innovation
by Job Snijders 03 Jan '24

03 Jan '24

Dear all, Happy new year everyone! Having just closed chapter 2023 - let's look back at the previous year. In this memo I'll share some RPKI statistics, summarize highlights from the IETF Standards Development process, and reflect on emerging trends. Year to Year Growth of the distributed RPKI database =============================================================== A straight-forward method to compare to last year is to look at the RPKI's absolute numbers. The below table was constructed by comparing two December 31st RPKIviews.org snapshots [1] of validated RPKI caches, primed with the ARIN, AFRINIC, APNIC, LACNIC, and RIPE NCC Trust Anchors. 2022-12-31 2023-12-31 Total cache size (KiB): 1,240,572 1,546,728 (+25%) Total number of files (objects): 242,969 309,802 (+27%) Publication servers (FQDNs): 52 63 (+21%) Certification authorities: 34,901 40,511 (+16%) Route origin authorizations: 138,323 188,345 (+36%) Unique VRPs: 390,752 497,341 (+27%) IPv4 addresses covered: 1,354,270,410 2,502,293,068 (+85%) IPv6 addresses covered: 9,447 * 10^30 17,263 * 10^30 (+83%) Unique origin ASNs in ROAs: 34,455 40,656 (+18%) The number of IP addresses covered by ROAs almost doubled compared to last year. More than half the ASes in the global Internet routing system are listed as Origin AS in at least one ROA. EOY'23 more unique IPv6 prefix-origin pairs in the DFZ are covered by ROAs than not, with IPv4 likely to follow crossing this threshold in Q1 2024. Kentik [2] estimates that more than half of IP traffic is destined towards ROA covered destinations. APNIC Labs [3] estimates the global "I-Rov Filtering Rate" to be at 22.69% now. These numbers mean it will be worth your while to create and use ROAs for BGP Origin Validation. In short: it's all up and to the right. :-) Increased Government Interest in Internet Routing Security =============================================================== Following the FCC's launch of an inquiry into Internet Routing Vulnerabilities in 2022, in 2023 the agency followed up with a BGP Security Workshop hosted by the Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau [4], the industry seemed well represented with key players participating. While the USG is still sizing up the industry's posture and contemplating whether regulation is warranted, in the Netherlands the government itself aspires to lead by example: in 2023 the Dutch government committed to use RPKI by the end of 2024 on all new and existing IT systems it operates [5]. Note that this ambition includes both signing ROAs and validating BGP messages! I hope they succeed. Will more governments follow the Dutch lead in 2024? The Rise Of Initiatives Re-evaluating The RPKI Trust Model =============================================================== As the industry saw unprecedented turmoil in the realm of governance of Regional Internet Registries in 2023, two interesting initiatives arose, both aiming to reduce the risk surface associated with blindly trusting 'the RPKI Roots'. In the RPKI hierarchical structure, a Trust Anchor (a root) is an authority for which trust is assumed and not derived. The phrase "assumed trust" means that violation of that trust is out-of-scope for the threat model. On the other hand, the phrase "derived trust" refers to trust automatically and securely computed with subjective logic. In the context of the RPKI, trust is derived according to the rules for validation of RPKI Certificates and Signed Objects. One initiative is to impose 'locally configured constraints' which limit the effective signing authority of an RIR. The other initiative is to instantiate a sixth RPKI trust anchor - which chains up to the existing RIR-operated infrastructure - and impose inter-RIR consensus-driven constraints on that arc. Initiative #1 - operator imposed constraints: Cover letter & discussion: https://mailman.nanog.org/pipermail/nanog/2023-September/223354.html Running code - rpki-client 8.7 & higher https://cdn.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/rpki-client/rpki-client-8.7.txt An internet-draft detailing the implementation: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-snijders-constraining-rpki-trus… Initiative #2 - externally imposed constraints: Cover letter: https://labs.apnic.net/index.php/2023/12/13/models-of-trust-in-the-rpki/ Running code: https://labs.apnic.net/nro-ta/ A proposal for the validation algorithm to be less rigid & more robust: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-spaghetti-sidrops-rpki-validati… I personally don't care much *who* imposes constraints, but at the end of the day - someone's gotta do it. Keep watching this space! SIDROPS - Working Group developments =============================================================== Some quick updates from the IETF working group responsible for development and maintenance of the RPKI technology stack! Running code - now a requirement -------------------------------- The SIDROPS working group set a new rule: Standards Track internet-drafts can only progress towards RFC publication - after - interoperability was demonstrated between at least two independent implementations of the specification: https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/sidrops/54iqtt-Ug2lzMbr9KpQOnWsh2JM/ My expectation is that - because of this new rule - we'll see higher quality documents: the proposals more thoroughly tested, increased readability of the internet-draft texts, and less ambiguity in the specifications. Basing Standards Track documents on real implementation experiences (as opposed to gaining real experiences only after publication of as RFC) seems to be the right way to do things. ASPA - where we at? ------------------- In early 2023 a Canadian IXP, YYCIX, became the first to deploy ASPA validation on its IX Route Servers [6] - while this may seem a leap forward towards wider deployment, things are not all said and done. The IETF SIDROPS working group continues to expostulate over things like the ASPA RPKI-To-Router PDU layout. Still, my hope and expectation is that all ASPA-related documents can be finalized in the next few months. I continue to stand by this timeline: https://www.manrs.org/2023/05/estimating-the-timeline-for-aspa-deployment/ Optimizing RSYNC ---------------- RPKI data can be transported in two ways — an HTTPS-based distribution protocol called RRDP, and via RSYNC. Some argue that RSYNC is not the best fit for transport of RPKI files, but unfortunately RRDP isn't without its own issues either. With neither transport protocol being flawless, turns out RSYNC is perfect as a backup option for RRDP! As long as RSYNC is around, we should care for it and continue maintenance & innovation. Rpki-client as validator, and RIPE NCC & APNIC as publishers implemented a mechanism to smoothen switching from RRDP to RSYNC: https://blog.apnic.net/2023/12/04/using-timestamps-inside-rpki-objects-to-o… https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-sidrops-cms-signing-time My hope is that more validator projects and RIR repositories adopt this mechanism! Final words =============================================================== As more and more networks adopt RPKI, perhaps motivated by government pressure, our collective dependency on RPKI functioning properly and safely increases too. It is awesome to see so many volunteers contribute their valueable time to study, tinker & propose improvements to this wonderful global system. See you next year! - Job Sources: [1]: RPKI Views - http://rpkiviews.org/ http://josephine.sobornost.net/josephine.sobornost.net/rpkidata/2022/12/31/… http://dango.attn.jp/rpkidata/2023/12/31/rpki-20231231T235150Z.tgz [2]: https://www.kentik.com/blog/exploring-the-latest-rpki-rov-adoption-numbers/ [3]: https://stats.labs.apnic.net/rpki [4]: https://www.fcc.gov/news-events/events/2023/07/bgp-security-workshop [5]: https://www.forumstandaardisatie.nl/nieuws/secured-internet-routing-dutch-g… [6]: https://mailman.nanog.org/pipermail/nanog/2023-February/221471.html

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Sufficient Buffer Sizes
by Mike Hammett 03 Jan '24

03 Jan '24

While attempting to ascertain how big of switch buffers I needed in a 100G switch, I rediscovered this article where I first learned about switch buffers. https://fasterdata.es.net/network-tuning/router-switch-buffer-size-issues/#…. It suggests that 60 meg is what you need at 10G. Is that per interface? Would it be linear in that I would need 600 meg at 100G? Some 100G switches I was looking at only had 36 megs, so that's insufficient either way you look at it. ----- Mike Hammett Intelligent Computing Solutions http://www.ics-il.com Midwest-IX http://www.midwest-ix.com

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Rackspace contact
by Nathan Book 03 Jan '24

03 Jan '24

Can someone at Rackspace contact me off list? We have issues reaching a Rackspace customer's site. Thanks, *Nathan Book* | IT/Broadband Specialist | GMN Broadband

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Hiring: Machine Learning Engineer ICANN Office CTO
by Samaneh Tajalizadehkhoob 02 Jan '24

02 Jan '24

Greetings and happy new year! I lead the Security Stability and Resiliency (SSR) Research team within ICANN’s office of CTO (OCTO). We are now hiring a machine learning engineer who is also familiar with the DNS and routing industry. The position is remote and we rather hire in Europe. But US is an option too. Please take a look and share with whoever would be interested. https://www.linkedin.com/jobs/view/3672913207 Cheers, Samaneh Tajalizadeh Director, Security Stability Resiliency Research ICANN

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Password Reset
by Luiz Rosas 02 Jan '24

02 Jan '24

Hello, I'm trying to reset a password for username "guga0071", but the email address that is attached to this account I no longer have access to. Can you please update my account with the new email address " lrosas0071(a)gmail.com" and provide me with a link to reset my password. Regards Luiz Rosas

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