March 2017 - Test - lists.nanog.org

Microsoft O365 labels nanog potential fraud?
by Mel Beckman 30 Mar '17

30 Mar '17

Is anyone else getting this message on every nanog post today? "This sender failed our fraud detection checks and may not be who they appear to be. Learn about spoofing at http://aka.ms/LearnAboutSpoofing<http://aka.ms/LearnAboutSpoofing]>" I don't know if this link itself is malware, as it goes to the MS store, or if something is broken in the Nanog Mail machine. If it's just me, never mind. I'll figure it out. -mel beckman

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EFF Call for sign-ons: ISPs, networking companies and engineers opposed to FCC privacy repeal
by Peter Eckersley 30 Mar '17

30 Mar '17

Dear network operators, I'm sure this is a controversial topic in the NANOG community, but EFF and a number of ISPs and networking companies are writing to Congress opposing the repeal of the FCC's broadband privacy rules, which require explicit opt-in consent before ISPs use or sell sensitive, non-anonymized data (including non-anonymized locations and browsing histories). If you or your employer would like to sign on to such a letter, please reply off-list by midday Monday with your name, and a one-sentence description of your affiliation and/or major career accomplishments. Back story on what's happening: https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2017/03/five-creepy-things-your-isp-could-do-… https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2017/03/senate-puts-isp-profits-over-your-pri… https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2017/02/congress-contemplating-making-it-ille… Summary of the FCC Broadband Privacy Rules themselves: https://apps.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-16-148A1.pdf -- Peter Eckersley pde(a)eff.org Chief Computer Scientist Tel +1 415 436 9333 x131 Electronic Frontier Foundation Fax +1 415 436 9993

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Re: EFF Call for sign-ons: ISPs, networking companies and engineers opposed to FCC privacy repeal
by Ryan Stoner 29 Mar '17

29 Mar '17

Sorry guys. A bit of Percocet on the brain here. Yay broken spine! I meant a tizzy about AT&T and their spying on home fiber customers. They claim they don't do it anymore and offer the lower price to everyone. -- Ryan Stoner On Mar 29, 2017 2:17 PM, <jason(a)schwerberg.com> wrote: > Ryan, > > No, we're in a tizzy over a house resolution that was passed just > yesterday. > > http://thehill.com/policy/technology/326145-house-votes- > to-send-bill-undoing-obama-internet-privacy-rule-to-trumps-desk > > > On 2017-03-29 04:34, Ryan Stoner wrote: > > All if you are in a tizzy over a policy that's been dead for a while. > > < > https://www.google.com/amp/amp.timeinc.net/fortune/2016/ > 09/30/att-internet-fees-privacy/%3Fsource%3Ddam > -- > Ryan Stoner > > > On Mar 29, 2017 6:26 AM, "Rich Kulawiec" <rsk(a)gsp.org> wrote: > > On Wed, Mar 29, 2017 at 05:48:11AM -0500, Mike Hammett wrote: > > What is lost if AT&T or Comcast sells my anonymized usage habits? > > > They're NOT anonymized. Aren't you paying attention? > > Anonymization -- *real* anonymization -- is hard. Hard means expensive. > It also reduces the sale price of the data. There is no reason for any > of these companies to spend the required money in order to sell the data > for less than they could get otherwise. Why should they reduce their > obscene profits? (a) Nobody's going to make them and (b) most people > are as ignorant as you are and therefore aren't demanding it. > > It's much easier and more profitable to *claim* that the data is > anonymized, > maybe make a token (and worthless) gesture at making it so, and laugh all > the way to the bank. > > And let me note that in passing that even if -- and this is a very faint > "if" -- they're really anonymizing your data, it's not anonymized > at the point of collection. Sooner or later, someone with access -- > whether authorized or not -- will tap into that. Of course they will, > it's far too valuable to be ignored indefinitely. Maybe it'll be an > insider operation, maybe it'll be just one person, maybe it'll be outside > attackers, maybe it'll be an intelligence or law enforcement agency. > > The point is that these data collection operations are obvious, > high-value targets, therefore they WILL be attacked, and given the > thoroughly miserable history of the security postures in play, they > WILL be attacked succcessfully. So even if you're foolish and naive > enough to believe the professional spokesliars at AT&T and Comcast, > you should always keep in mind that this data will *not* be confined to > those operations. It will be for sale, in raw unredacted form, on the > darknet to anyone who can pay and/or it will be loaded into the data > warehouses of any agency that chooses to acquire it. > > ---rsk > > >

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Fwd: [ARIN-consult] Community Consultation on CKN23-ARIN Now Open
by John Curran 27 Mar '17

27 Mar '17

NANOGers - We have initiated a community consultation on a possible restructuring of existing information in the ARIN registry – this is to address the long-standing concern that some have expressed with the association of a “No Contact Known” point-of-contact (POC) in some registry records that may have potentially valid Admin and Tech contact information. If you have hold a strong view on this matter, please see the attached consultation announcement and participate in the discussion on the open arin-consult(a)arin.net<mailto:arin-consult@arin.net> mailing list <http://lists.arin.net/mailman/listinfo/arin-consult> Thanks! /John John Curran President and CEO ARIN === Begin forwarded message: From: ARIN <info(a)arin.net<mailto:info@arin.net>> Subject: [ARIN-consult] Community Consultation on CKN23-ARIN Now Open Date: 22 March 2017 at 1:24:12 PM EDT To: <arin-consult(a)arin.net<mailto:arin-consult@arin.net>> There are thousands of instances of the ARIN Point of Contact (POC) handle “No, Contact Known” or CKN23-ARIN registered in the ARIN database, most of them associated with legacy resource records. ARIN would like the community to review the history of this situation and the proposed solution and provide us with their feedback. The creation and addition of this POC handle was due to a combination of factors. * In 2002, a database conversion project was done at ARIN that created a new database structure and added a new record type (Organization ID) as well as new POC types (Admin, Tech, Abuse and NOC). When an Org ID didn’t have a clear POC that had been recently updated or vetted by ARIN staff, the original resource POC remained on the resource record only and no POCs were added to the Org record at all. * In a later 2011 database conversion, reverse DNS delegation switched from per-net to per-zone. This created significant hijacking potential by allowing resource POCs to change their reverse delegation without first being verified by staff as legitimate. * Also in 2011, ARIN added a new business rule that required an Admin and a Tech POC on all Org records as a way of enhancing data quality. * Policy 2010-14 was implemented in 2011 and required Abuse POCs on all Org records. In order to maintain ARIN’s business rules, comply with policy 2010-14, and prevent hijackings, several actions were initiated by staff: * CKN23-ARIN was created to become the Admin and Tech POC on Orgs that lacked them * Resource POCs of legacy networks that had never been updated or validated by ARIN were moved to the Organization record as the Abuse POC * ARIN’s verification and vetting requirements were thus reinstated as the Abuse POC had to be vetted before making any changes to the record, and therefore could not hijack the resource by adding or changing the nameservers Over time, the above actions have created several issues: * It is easy for hijackers to identify and target records with CKN23 (no contact known) as the handle * POCs that were moved from resource tech to Org abuse are not happy about no longer having control of their resource record There are several different courses of action that ARIN could take to resolve the current situation. Option 1 Retain the current status and do nothing Option 2 Restore the resource POCs back to their original state on the resource record keeping in mind that this would open up the hijacking risk by giving the original resource POC control of the network without a verification process * Retain the Abuse POC on the Org record * Retain CKN23-ARIN as Org POC Option 3 - **Recommended option** Restore the resource POC back to their original state on the resource record. This will allow contacts historically associated with a resource record to more readily administer that record going forward. * Retain the Abuse POC on the Org * Replace CKN23-ARIN with a handle that better explains the record’s status (e.g. “Legacy Record – See Resource POC”) * Lock all resources associated with these legacy records who have had their resource POC restored. This would ensure that any changes made by the resource POC would first have to be reviewed by ARIN. We would like to thank the ARIN Services Working Group (WG) for their helpful review of the proposed change – while the ARIN Services WG did not take a formal position in support of or in opposition of the proposed change, their review led to improvements in presentation of the options We are seeking community feedback on this proposed change (Option #3) to the ARIN Registry database. This consultation will remain open for 60 days - Please provide comments to arin-consult(a)arin.net<mailto:arin-consult@arin.net>. Discussion on arin-consult(a)arin.net<mailto:arin-consult@arin.net> will close on 22 May 2017. If you have any questions, please contact us at info(a)arin.net<mailto:info@arin.net>. Regards, John Curran President and CEO American Registry for Internet Numbers (ARIN) _______________________________________________ ARIN-Consult You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to the ARIN Consult Mailing List (ARIN-consult(a)arin.net<mailto:ARIN-consult@arin.net>). Unsubscribe or manage your mailing list subscription at: http://lists.arin.net/mailman/listinfo/arin-consult Please contact the ARIN Member Services Help Desk at info(a)arin.net<mailto:info@arin.net> if you experience any issues.

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VPS plus email
by Samual Carman 27 Mar '17

27 Mar '17

Howdy y'all I would like to know if if anyone can recommend a good VPS to run a exchange server as well as host a website I would like to set up an exchange server with a professional email address unless you guys can recommend a different approach I should take to get a professional address so it would look better on resumes etc and I can consolidate all my various email accounts to one I could consider switching to google apps and or Microsoft outlook unless there are other better providers out there I am in college so if there are any special programs please feel free to advice me of such Feel free to private message me Not sure if this is allowed the rules where murkey on this Get Outlook for iOS

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How to secure link between switches in Layer2
by Pedro 25 Mar '17

25 Mar '17

Hello, Sometimes i have situation that i have to extend my layer2 (access, trunk mode) network to third parties with limited trust. Sometimes it's L2 MPLS links from isp (1x or 2x), sometimes it's just colocated switch. Mostly there are Juniper Ex4200/4300 or and Cisco 3750. Below i puts my config but maybe i miss something important ? Or i should correct ? Thanks for help 1. If two p2p links: aggregation with LACP 2. stp/rstp in portfast mode on access port stp/rstp without portfast mode on trunk port rstp root guard 3. on ports facing servers, in portfast mode, bpdu guard spanning-tree root guard 4. max amount of mac addresses ie 100 per port per vlan max mac address 5. 802.1q with vlans, but not vlan 1 6. broadcast storm for bum packets: 10 pps 7. static ip - no dhcp servers/clients in vlans 8. cpu monitoring with notification in ie zabbix 9. cdp disable (if cisco) dtp disable (if cisco) 10. eventually policer per port or per vlan. thanks in advance, Pedro

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BCP 38 coverage if top x providers ...
by Frank Bulk 24 Mar '17

24 Mar '17

My google fu is failing me, but I believe there was a NANOG posting a year or two ago that mentioned that if the top x providers would implement BCP 38 then y% of the traffic (or Internet) would be de-spoofed. The point was that we don't even need everyone to implement BCP 38, but if the largest (transit?) providers did it, then UDP reflection attacks could be minimized. If someone can recall the key words in that posting and dig it up, that would be much appreciated. Frank

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Weekly Routing Table Report
by cscora＠apnic.net 24 Mar '17

24 Mar '17

This is an automated weekly mailing describing the state of the Internet Routing Table as seen from APNIC's router in Japan. The posting is sent to APOPS, NANOG, AfNOG, AusNOG, SANOG, PacNOG, MENOG, SAFNOG, SdNOG, BJNOG, CaribNOG and the RIPE Routing WG. Daily listings are sent to bgp-stats(a)lists.apnic.net For historical data, please see http://thyme.rand.apnic.net. If you have any comments please contact Philip Smith <pfsinoz(a)gmail.com>. Routing Table Report 04:00 +10GMT Sat 25 Mar, 2017 Report Website: http://thyme.rand.apnic.net Detailed Analysis: http://thyme.rand.apnic.net/current/ Analysis Summary ---------------- BGP routing table entries examined: 639326 Prefixes after maximum aggregation (per Origin AS): 249732 Deaggregation factor: 2.56 Unique aggregates announced (without unneeded subnets): 309219 Total ASes present in the Internet Routing Table: 56642 Prefixes per ASN: 11.29 Origin-only ASes present in the Internet Routing Table: 49032 Origin ASes announcing only one prefix: 21726 Transit ASes present in the Internet Routing Table: 7610 Transit-only ASes present in the Internet Routing Table: 213 Average AS path length visible in the Internet Routing Table: 4.3 Max AS path length visible: 41 Max AS path prepend of ASN ( 55644) 36 Prefixes from unregistered ASNs in the Routing Table: 75 Numnber of instances of unregistered ASNs: 76 Number of 32-bit ASNs allocated by the RIRs: 17833 Number of 32-bit ASNs visible in the Routing Table: 13867 Prefixes from 32-bit ASNs in the Routing Table: 56285 Number of bogon 32-bit ASNs visible in the Routing Table: 46 Special use prefixes present in the Routing Table: 0 Prefixes being announced from unallocated address space: 412 Number of addresses announced to Internet: 2839257668 Equivalent to 169 /8s, 59 /16s and 162 /24s Percentage of available address space announced: 76.7 Percentage of allocated address space announced: 76.7 Percentage of available address space allocated: 100.0 Percentage of address space in use by end-sites: 98.5 Total number of prefixes smaller than registry allocations: 212171 APNIC Region Analysis Summary ----------------------------- Prefixes being announced by APNIC Region ASes: 175163 Total APNIC prefixes after maximum aggregation: 50255 APNIC Deaggregation factor: 3.49 Prefixes being announced from the APNIC address blocks: 174442 Unique aggregates announced from the APNIC address blocks: 72098 APNIC Region origin ASes present in the Internet Routing Table: 7950 APNIC Prefixes per ASN: 21.94 APNIC Region origin ASes announcing only one prefix: 2232 APNIC Region transit ASes present in the Internet Routing Table: 1126 Average APNIC Region AS path length visible: 4.5 Max APNIC Region AS path length visible: 41 Number of APNIC region 32-bit ASNs visible in the Routing Table: 2789 Number of APNIC addresses announced to Internet: 762323332 Equivalent to 45 /8s, 112 /16s and 33 /24s APNIC AS Blocks 4608-4864, 7467-7722, 9216-10239, 17408-18431 (pre-ERX allocations) 23552-24575, 37888-38911, 45056-46079, 55296-56319, 58368-59391, 63488-64098, 64297-64395, 131072-137529 APNIC Address Blocks 1/8, 14/8, 27/8, 36/8, 39/8, 42/8, 43/8, 49/8, 58/8, 59/8, 60/8, 61/8, 101/8, 103/8, 106/8, 110/8, 111/8, 112/8, 113/8, 114/8, 115/8, 116/8, 117/8, 118/8, 119/8, 120/8, 121/8, 122/8, 123/8, 124/8, 125/8, 126/8, 133/8, 150/8, 153/8, 163/8, 171/8, 175/8, 180/8, 182/8, 183/8, 202/8, 203/8, 210/8, 211/8, 218/8, 219/8, 220/8, 221/8, 222/8, 223/8, ARIN Region Analysis Summary ---------------------------- Prefixes being announced by ARIN Region ASes: 195124 Total ARIN prefixes after maximum aggregation: 93482 ARIN Deaggregation factor: 2.09 Prefixes being announced from the ARIN address blocks: 197529 Unique aggregates announced from the ARIN address blocks: 90549 ARIN Region origin ASes present in the Internet Routing Table: 17854 ARIN Prefixes per ASN: 11.06 ARIN Region origin ASes announcing only one prefix: 6629 ARIN Region transit ASes present in the Internet Routing Table: 1771 Average ARIN Region AS path length visible: 3.8 Max ARIN Region AS path length visible: 23 Number of ARIN region 32-bit ASNs visible in the Routing Table: 1862 Number of ARIN addresses announced to Internet: 1107930528 Equivalent to 66 /8s, 9 /16s and 173 /24s ARIN AS Blocks 1-1876, 1902-2042, 2044-2046, 2048-2106 (pre-ERX allocations) 2138-2584, 2615-2772, 2823-2829, 2880-3153 3354-4607, 4865-5119, 5632-6655, 6912-7466 7723-8191, 10240-12287, 13312-15359, 16384-17407 18432-20479, 21504-23551, 25600-26591, 26624-27647, 29696-30719, 31744-33791 35840-36863, 39936-40959, 46080-47103 53248-55295, 62464-63487, 64198-64296, 393216-397212 ARIN Address Blocks 3/8, 4/8, 6/8, 7/8, 8/8, 9/8, 11/8, 12/8, 13/8, 15/8, 16/8, 17/8, 18/8, 19/8, 20/8, 21/8, 22/8, 23/8, 24/8, 26/8, 28/8, 29/8, 30/8, 32/8, 33/8, 34/8, 35/8, 38/8, 40/8, 44/8, 45/8, 47/8, 48/8, 50/8, 52/8, 53/8, 54/8, 55/8, 56/8, 57/8, 63/8, 64/8, 65/8, 66/8, 67/8, 68/8, 69/8, 70/8, 71/8, 72/8, 73/8, 74/8, 75/8, 76/8, 96/8, 97/8, 98/8, 99/8, 100/8, 104/8, 107/8, 108/8, 128/8, 129/8, 130/8, 131/8, 132/8, 134/8, 135/8, 136/8, 137/8, 138/8, 139/8, 140/8, 142/8, 143/8, 144/8, 146/8, 147/8, 148/8, 149/8, 152/8, 155/8, 156/8, 157/8, 158/8, 159/8, 160/8, 161/8, 162/8, 164/8, 165/8, 166/8, 167/8, 168/8, 169/8, 170/8, 172/8, 173/8, 174/8, 184/8, 192/8, 198/8, 199/8, 204/8, 205/8, 206/8, 207/8, 208/8, 209/8, 214/8, 215/8, 216/8, RIPE Region Analysis Summary ---------------------------- Prefixes being announced by RIPE Region ASes: 171945 Total RIPE prefixes after maximum aggregation: 84500 RIPE Deaggregation factor: 2.03 Prefixes being announced from the RIPE address blocks: 167206 Unique aggregates announced from the RIPE address blocks: 101222 RIPE Region origin ASes present in the Internet Routing Table: 23840 RIPE Prefixes per ASN: 7.01 RIPE Region origin ASes announcing only one prefix: 11007 RIPE Region transit ASes present in the Internet Routing Table: 3375 Average RIPE Region AS path length visible: 4.3 Max RIPE Region AS path length visible: 28 Number of RIPE region 32-bit ASNs visible in the Routing Table: 5667 Number of RIPE addresses announced to Internet: 710463104 Equivalent to 42 /8s, 88 /16s and 206 /24s RIPE AS Blocks 1877-1901, 2043, 2047, 2107-2136, 2585-2614 (pre-ERX allocations) 2773-2822, 2830-2879, 3154-3353, 5377-5631 6656-6911, 8192-9215, 12288-13311, 15360-16383 20480-21503, 24576-25599, 28672-29695 30720-31743, 33792-35839, 38912-39935 40960-45055, 47104-52223, 56320-58367 59392-61439, 61952-62463, 64396-64495 196608-207259 RIPE Address Blocks 2/8, 5/8, 25/8, 31/8, 37/8, 46/8, 51/8, 62/8, 77/8, 78/8, 79/8, 80/8, 81/8, 82/8, 83/8, 84/8, 85/8, 86/8, 87/8, 88/8, 89/8, 90/8, 91/8, 92/8, 93/8, 94/8, 95/8, 109/8, 141/8, 145/8, 151/8, 176/8, 178/8, 185/8, 188/8, 193/8, 194/8, 195/8, 212/8, 213/8, 217/8, LACNIC Region Analysis Summary ------------------------------ Prefixes being announced by LACNIC Region ASes: 80179 Total LACNIC prefixes after maximum aggregation: 17733 LACNIC Deaggregation factor: 4.52 Prefixes being announced from the LACNIC address blocks: 81383 Unique aggregates announced from the LACNIC address blocks: 38177 LACNIC Region origin ASes present in the Internet Routing Table: 5728 LACNIC Prefixes per ASN: 14.21 LACNIC Region origin ASes announcing only one prefix: 1539 LACNIC Region transit ASes present in the Internet Routing Table: 1045 Average LACNIC Region AS path length visible: 5.3 Max LACNIC Region AS path length visible: 36 Number of LACNIC region 32-bit ASNs visible in the Routing Table: 3250 Number of LACNIC addresses announced to Internet: 170312864 Equivalent to 10 /8s, 38 /16s and 196 /24s LACNIC AS Blocks 26592-26623, 27648-28671, 52224-53247, 61440-61951, 64099-64197, 262144-266652 + ERX transfers LACNIC Address Blocks 177/8, 179/8, 181/8, 186/8, 187/8, 189/8, 190/8, 191/8, 200/8, 201/8, AfriNIC Region Analysis Summary ------------------------------- Prefixes being announced by AfriNIC Region ASes: 16805 Total AfriNIC prefixes after maximum aggregation: 3699 AfriNIC Deaggregation factor: 4.54 Prefixes being announced from the AfriNIC address blocks: 18354 Unique aggregates announced from the AfriNIC address blocks: 6815 AfriNIC Region origin ASes present in the Internet Routing Table: 1028 AfriNIC Prefixes per ASN: 17.85 AfriNIC Region origin ASes announcing only one prefix: 319 AfriNIC Region transit ASes present in the Internet Routing Table: 203 Average AfriNIC Region AS path length visible: 4.8 Max AfriNIC Region AS path length visible: 22 Number of AfriNIC region 32-bit ASNs visible in the Routing Table: 299 Number of AfriNIC addresses announced to Internet: 87706880 Equivalent to 5 /8s, 58 /16s and 77 /24s AfriNIC AS Blocks 36864-37887, 327680-328703 & ERX transfers AfriNIC Address Blocks 41/8, 102/8, 105/8, 154/8, 196/8, 197/8, APNIC Region per AS prefix count summary ---------------------------------------- ASN No of nets /20 equiv MaxAgg Description 4538 5563 4190 74 ERX-CERNET-BKB China Education and Rese 7545 3773 391 262 TPG-INTERNET-AP TPG Telecom Limited, AU 17974 2998 905 72 TELKOMNET-AS2-AP PT Telekomunikasi Indo 4766 2761 11150 755 KIXS-AS-KR Korea Telecom, KR 9829 2719 1499 540 BSNL-NIB National Internet Backbone, IN 9808 2276 8649 45 CMNET-GD Guangdong Mobile Communication 4755 2069 421 220 TATACOMM-AS TATA Communications formerl 45899 1902 1325 112 VNPT-AS-VN VNPT Corp, VN 9583 1571 121 540 SIFY-AS-IN Sify Limited, IN 24560 1563 579 256 AIRTELBROADBAND-AS-AP Bharti Airtel Ltd Complete listing at http://thyme.rand.apnic.net/current/data-ASnet-APNIC ARIN Region per AS prefix count summary --------------------------------------- ASN No of nets /20 equiv MaxAgg Description 22773 3678 2969 152 ASN-CXA-ALL-CCI-22773-RDC - Cox Communi 6327 3355 1333 83 SHAW - Shaw Communications Inc., CA 18566 2186 405 109 MEGAPATH5-US - MegaPath Corporation, US 6389 2068 3671 39 BELLSOUTH-NET-BLK - BellSouth.net Inc., 20115 1981 2086 407 CHARTER-NET-HKY-NC - Charter Communicat 209 1783 5067 641 CENTURYLINK-US-LEGACY-QWEST - Qwest Com 16509 1779 3325 568 AMAZON-02 - Amazon.com, Inc., US 30036 1726 320 391 MEDIACOM-ENTERPRISE-BUSINESS - Mediacom 6983 1690 854 231 ITCDELTA - Earthlink, Inc., US 701 1577 10586 649 UUNET - MCI Communications Services, In Complete listing at http://thyme.rand.apnic.net/current/data-ASnet-ARIN RIPE Region per AS prefix count summary --------------------------------------- ASN No of nets /20 equiv MaxAgg Description 39891 3334 171 18 ALJAWWALSTC-AS, SA 20940 3064 1129 2171 AKAMAI-ASN1, US 9121 2670 1691 17 TTNET, TR 34984 2004 328 382 TELLCOM-AS, TR 8551 1648 377 40 BEZEQ-INTERNATIONAL-AS Bezeqint Interne 13188 1647 99 59 TRIOLAN, UA 12479 1533 1043 53 UNI2-AS, ES 12389 1351 1273 553 ROSTELECOM-AS, RU 9198 1306 352 23 KAZTELECOM-AS, KZ 6849 1265 355 21 UKRTELNET, UA Complete listing at http://thyme.rand.apnic.net/current/data-ASnet-RIPE LACNIC Region per AS prefix count summary ----------------------------------------- ASN No of nets /20 equiv MaxAgg Description 10620 3540 545 179 Telmex Colombia S.A., CO 8151 2510 3385 547 Uninet S.A. de C.V., MX 11830 1819 369 57 Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad 7303 1554 1002 247 Telecom Argentina S.A., AR 6503 1542 437 53 Axtel, S.A.B. de C.V., MX 6147 1252 377 27 Telefonica del Peru S.A.A., PE 28573 1066 2292 189 CLARO S.A., BR 3816 1002 479 183 COLOMBIA TELECOMUNICACIONES S.A. ESP, C 11664 990 280 35 Techtel LMDS Comunicaciones Interactiva 17072 936 118 409 TOTAL PLAY TELECOMUNICACIONES SA DE CV, Complete listing at http://thyme.rand.apnic.net/current/data-ASnet-LACNIC AfriNIC Region per AS prefix count summary ------------------------------------------ ASN No of nets /20 equiv MaxAgg Description 24863 1312 399 43 LINKdotNET-AS, EG 36903 717 360 127 MT-MPLS, MA 37611 698 67 6 Afrihost, ZA 36992 601 1375 26 ETISALAT-MISR, EG 24835 497 722 14 RAYA-AS, EG 8452 442 1474 16 TE-AS TE-AS, EG 37492 399 318 73 ORANGE-, TN 29571 367 36 10 CITelecom-AS, CI 15399 340 35 7 WANANCHI-, KE 2018 287 327 74 TENET-1, ZA Complete listing at http://thyme.rand.apnic.net/current/data-ASnet-AFRINIC Global Per AS prefix count summary ---------------------------------- ASN No of nets /20 equiv MaxAgg Description 4538 5563 4190 74 ERX-CERNET-BKB China Education and Rese 7545 3773 391 262 TPG-INTERNET-AP TPG Telecom Limited, AU 22773 3678 2969 152 ASN-CXA-ALL-CCI-22773-RDC - Cox Communi 10620 3540 545 179 Telmex Colombia S.A., CO 6327 3355 1333 83 SHAW - Shaw Communications Inc., CA 39891 3334 171 18 ALJAWWALSTC-AS, SA 20940 3064 1129 2171 AKAMAI-ASN1, US 17974 2998 905 72 TELKOMNET-AS2-AP PT Telekomunikasi Indo 4766 2761 11150 755 KIXS-AS-KR Korea Telecom, KR 9829 2719 1499 540 BSNL-NIB National Internet Backbone, IN Complete listing at http://thyme.rand.apnic.net/current/data-ASnet Global Per AS Maximum Aggr summary ---------------------------------- ASN No of nets Net Savings Description 22773 3678 3526 ASN-CXA-ALL-CCI-22773-RDC - Cox Communications 7545 3773 3511 TPG-INTERNET-AP TPG Telecom Limited, AU 10620 3540 3361 Telmex Colombia S.A., CO 39891 3334 3316 ALJAWWALSTC-AS, SA 6327 3355 3272 SHAW - Shaw Communications Inc., CA 17974 2998 2926 TELKOMNET-AS2-AP PT Telekomunikasi Indonesia, I 9121 2670 2653 TTNET, TR 9808 2276 2231 CMNET-GD Guangdong Mobile Communication Co.Ltd. 9829 2719 2179 BSNL-NIB National Internet Backbone, IN 18566 2186 2077 MEGAPATH5-US - MegaPath Corporation, US Complete listing at http://thyme.rand.apnic.net/current/data-CIDRnet List of Unregistered Origin ASNs (Global) ----------------------------------------- Bad AS Designation Network Transit AS Description 65001 PRIVATE 5.143.176.0/20 15468 KLGELECS-AS 38, Teatralnaya st 65602 UNALLOCATED 8.225.192.0/24 30372 SUNESYS2 - Sunesys, LLC, US 65001 PRIVATE 31.172.192.0/20 15468 KLGELECS-AS 38, Teatralnaya st 65001 PRIVATE 31.172.192.0/21 15468 KLGELECS-AS 38, Teatralnaya st 65001 PRIVATE 31.172.200.0/21 15468 KLGELECS-AS 38, Teatralnaya st 65001 PRIVATE 31.172.208.0/21 15468 KLGELECS-AS 38, Teatralnaya st 65001 PRIVATE 31.172.216.0/21 15468 KLGELECS-AS 38, Teatralnaya st 65555 UNALLOCATED 37.142.172.0/24 21450 MIRS-AS, IL 65555 UNALLOCATED 37.142.175.0/24 21450 MIRS-AS, IL 65001 PRIVATE 46.237.32.0/20 13118 ASN-YARTELECOM PJSC Rostelecom Complete listing at http://thyme.rand.apnic.net/current/data-badAS Advertised Unallocated Addresses -------------------------------- Network Origin AS Description 23.157.128.0/17 393899 -Reserved AS-, ZZ 23.161.128.0/17 393899 -Reserved AS-, ZZ 27.100.7.0/24 56096 UNKNOWN 41.76.232.0/21 203496 AB-TELECOM, RU 41.77.248.0/21 203496 AB-TELECOM, RU 41.78.12.0/23 203496 AB-TELECOM, RU 41.78.180.0/23 37265 -Reserved AS-, ZZ 41.242.132.0/23 203496 AB-TELECOM, RU 43.224.140.0/24 38197 SUNHK-DATA-AS-AP Sun Network (Hong Kong) Limited - 43.224.141.0/24 38197 SUNHK-DATA-AS-AP Sun Network (Hong Kong) Limited - Complete listing at http://thyme.rand.apnic.net/current/data-add-IANA Number of prefixes announced per prefix length (Global) ------------------------------------------------------- /1:0 /2:0 /3:0 /4:0 /5:0 /6:0 /7:0 /8:16 /9:13 /10:36 /11:103 /12:281 /13:538 /14:1050 /15:1824 /16:13235 /17:7569 /18:13369 /19:24586 /20:38323 /21:41168 /22:75594 /23:62679 /24:357567 /25:554 /26:415 /27:296 /28:35 /29:23 /30:25 /31:1 /32:26 Advertised prefixes smaller than registry allocations ----------------------------------------------------- ASN No of nets Total ann. Description 6327 3147 3355 SHAW - Shaw Communications Inc., CA 39891 2896 3334 ALJAWWALSTC-AS, SA 22773 2848 3678 ASN-CXA-ALL-CCI-22773-RDC - Cox Communications 18566 2079 2186 MEGAPATH5-US - MegaPath Corporation, US 9121 1886 2670 TTNET, TR 30036 1533 1726 MEDIACOM-ENTERPRISE-BUSINESS - Mediacom Communi 10620 1457 3540 Telmex Colombia S.A., CO 6389 1375 2068 BELLSOUTH-NET-BLK - BellSouth.net Inc., US 13188 1371 1647 TRIOLAN, UA 6983 1327 1690 ITCDELTA - Earthlink, Inc., US Complete listing at http://thyme.rand.apnic.net/current/data-sXXas-nos Number of /24s announced per /8 block (Global) ---------------------------------------------- 1:1615 2:844 4:26 5:2484 6:34 8:1057 12:1815 13:92 14:1790 15:22 16:2 17:113 18:129 19:1 20:55 23:2142 24:1856 25:2 27:2373 31:1890 32:89 33:5 35:19 36:386 37:2563 38:1354 39:45 40:100 41:2942 42:460 43:1900 44:64 45:2451 46:2709 47:114 49:1212 50:971 51:18 52:780 54:360 55:7 56:4 57:41 58:1630 59:991 60:388 61:1941 62:1499 63:1923 64:4587 65:2206 66:4545 67:2272 68:1195 69:3333 70:1305 71:578 72:2173 74:2635 75:406 76:425 77:1434 78:1647 79:1316 80:1354 81:1403 82:966 83:724 84:859 85:1757 86:485 87:1146 88:794 89:2056 90:172 91:6138 92:1029 93:2383 94:2380 95:2818 96:570 97:359 98:952 99:85 100:155 101:1256 103:14044 104:2781 105:165 106:489 107:1567 108:821 109:2598 110:1292 111:1719 112:1165 113:1328 114:1029 115:1735 116:1771 117:1688 118:2067 119:1604 120:969 121:1092 122:2358 123:2053 124:1539 125:1821 128:741 129:619 130:418 131:1399 132:521 133:190 134:605 135:221 136:519 137:428 138:1871 139:417 140:374 141:538 142:739 143:921 144:768 145:170 146:1030 147:666 148:1378 149:563 150:703 151:946 152:730 153:306 154:754 155:979 156:563 157:605 158:443 159:1434 160:562 161:735 162:2445 163:521 164:789 165:1199 166:389 167:1235 168:2583 169:771 170:3020 171:285 172:982 173:1812 174:803 175:730 176:1802 177:4022 178:2493 179:1130 180:2183 181:1913 182:2245 183:1050 184:835 185:9163 186:3215 187:2192 188:2506 189:1784 190:8120 191:1281 192:9366 193:5779 194:4661 195:3861 196:1981 197:1252 198:5555 199:5867 200:7421 201:4119 202:10244 203:9801 204:4480 205:2760 206:3004 207:3109 208:3912 209:3965 210:3959 211:2109 212:2802 213:2471 214:856 215:64 216:5929 217:2034 218:834 219:619 220:1705 221:906 222:723 223:1164 End of report

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TRILL
by nanog-isp＠mail.com 24 Mar '17

24 Mar '17

Hi all! Can anybody recommend any good resources on TRILL? Particularly anything that addresses do's and don'ts or any problems and pitfalls. Also any experiences deploying and using TRILL in networks that anybody would like to share would be welcome. For clarity, this is the TRILL I'm referring to: https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/TRILL_(computing) Jared

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nanog: SixXS is shutting down
by Pim van Pelt 23 Mar '17

23 Mar '17

Colleagues of nanog, In 1999, Jeroen and I started SixXS, a project which aimed to provide IPv6 connectivity to users who wanted to learn about the network protocol and gain experience operating IPv6 networks. Our vision was to facilitate migration to IPv6 in content and access providers. We were able to provide IPv6 to 50’000+ individual users and companies in 140+ countries, using servers hosted at 40+ Internet providers in 30+ countries. We are incredibly proud of what we’ve accomplished together, and how many people have gotten to know all about IPv6 due to our combined efforts. We have completed a retrospective and rationale document, which details our experience developing and operating the SixXS tunnelbroker over the last 18 years. We have worked through our plans with the many dedicated ISPs that have been involved: https://www.sixxs.net/sunset/ We have reached out to users recently, giving them 6 weeks to make alternative plans. We have chosen a somewhat symbolic date of 2017-06-06 to turn down the SixXS service. Our website will remain as a tombstone. Please feel free to pass this along to any group or list you feel would benefit from it, and reach out to <info(a)sixxs.net> or to myself directly <pim(a)ipng.nl> if you have thoughts you’d like to share between now and then. Kindest Regards, Pim van Pelt and Jeroen Massar (SixXS founders) -- Pim van Pelt <pim(a)ipng.nl> PBVP1-RIPE - http://www.ipng.nl/

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