September 2015 - Test - lists.nanog.org

internet visualization
by Jared Mauch 08 Sep '15

08 Sep '15

OT: hit delete, or shameless plug disclaimer one of my colleagues just posted this visualiation of the internet from the as_path view of 2914. if you are on a mobile, you have to physically move your device around. http://as2914.net/ If you love it, send Job your accolades. If you hate it, see above disclaimer. If in a country with a holiday on monday, enjoy it safely. - Jared -- Jared Mauch | pgp key available via finger from jared(a)puck.nether.net clue++; | http://puck.nether.net/~jared/ My statements are only mine.

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Re: Extraneous "legal" babble--and my reaction to it.
by Scott Weeks 08 Sep '15

08 Sep '15

--- rdrake(a)direcpath.com wrote: From: Robert Drake <rdrake(a)direcpath.com> Maybe people could adopt an unofficial-official end-of-signature flag. Then you could have procmail strip everything after the flag: ----------------------------------------- It could be much easier. Folks that care about the mailing list rules, want to be courteous to list folks and want to use their company email, rather than one that inserts no disclaimer, could put 15 lines of blank as part of their signature. This would force all the crap far enough down the page that it wouldn't be bothersome. scott

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Re: Extraneous "legal" babble--and my reaction to it.
by Scott Weeks 06 Sep '15

06 Sep '15

--- larrysheldon(a)cox.net wrote: From: Larry Sheldon <larrysheldon(a)cox.net> On 9/6/2015 14:18, Scott Weeks wrote: > --- rdrake(a)direcpath.com wrote: > From: Robert Drake <rdrake(a)direcpath.com> > > Maybe people could adopt an unofficial-official > end-of-signature flag. Then you could have > procmail strip everything after the flag: > ----------------------------------------- > > It could be much easier. Folks that care about the > mailing list rules, want to be courteous to list > folks and want to use their company email, rather > than one that inserts no disclaimer, could put 15 > lines of blank as part of their signature. This > would force all the crap far enough down the page > that it wouldn't be bothersome. Since nobody uses Telebit Trailblazers anymore--that is probably not a bad idea. ------------------------------------------- https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Times_They_Are_a-Changin'_%28song%29 :-) scott

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Re: Software Defined Networking
by Larry Sheldon 06 Sep '15

06 Sep '15

On 9/4/2015 09:40, Rod Beck wrote: > Can anyone provide references on this top so I can educate myself? > > This e-mail and any attachments thereto is intended only for use by > the addressee(s) named herein and may be proprietary and/or legally > privileged. If you are not the intended recipient of this e-mail, you > are hereby notified that any dissemination, distribution or copying > of this email, and any attachments thereto, without the prior written > permission of the sender is strictly prohibited. If you receive this > e-mail in error, please immediately telephone or e-mail the sender > and permanently delete the original copy and any copy of this e-mail, > and any printout thereof. All documents, contracts or agreements > referred or attached to this e-mail are SUBJECT TO CONTRACT. The > contents of an attachment to this e-mail may contain software viruses > that could damage your own computer system. While Hibernia Networks > has taken every reasonable precaution to minimize this risk, we > cannot accept liability for any damage that you sustain as a result > of software viruses. You should carry out your own virus checks > before opening any attachment. > All of that for 11 1/2 words? Ineducable. -- sed quis custodiet ipsos custodes? (Juvenal)

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Re: Extraneous "legal" babble--and my reaction to it.
by Larry Sheldon 06 Sep '15

06 Sep '15

On 9/6/2015 14:18, Scott Weeks wrote: > > > --- rdrake(a)direcpath.com wrote: > From: Robert Drake <rdrake(a)direcpath.com> > > Maybe people could adopt an unofficial-official > end-of-signature flag. Then you could have > procmail strip everything after the flag: > ----------------------------------------- > > > It could be much easier. Folks that care about the > mailing list rules, want to be courteous to list > folks and want to use their company email, rather > than one that inserts no disclaimer, could put 15 > lines of blank as part of their signature. This > would force all the crap far enough down the page > that it wouldn't be bothersome. Since nobody uses Telebit Trailblazers anymore--that is probably not a bad idea. -- sed quis custodiet ipsos custodes? (Juvenal)

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Re: Extraneous "legal" babble--and my reaction to it.
by Larry Sheldon 06 Sep '15

06 Sep '15

On 9/6/2015 11:46, Robert Drake wrote: > Maybe people could adopt an unofficial-official end-of-signature flag. > Then you could have procmail strip everything after the flag: > -- > This is my signature > My phone number goes here > I like dogs > -- end of signature -- > Everything below here and to the right of here was inserted by my > mailserver, which is run by lawyers who don't understand you can't > enforce contracts through emails to public mailing lists. Please delete > if you're not the intended recipient. > > > Of course, when you route around something like this it usually comes > back 10 fold, but maybe if it became worthless they might do things the > right way and put stuff like this in email headers. > > X-Optional-Flags: Delete-if-not-intended-recipient, > might-contain-secret-company-information-we-didn't-bother-to-encrypt > > Then let the email clients try to work out what that means. Please see https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Signature_block I thought that was in rfc 2822, but I can not find it. > -- sed quis custodiet ipsos custodes? (Juvenal)

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Extraneous "legal" babble--and my reaction to it.
by Larry Sheldon 06 Sep '15

06 Sep '15

Y'all can stop thumping on me about it "because it is required by the employer". After contemplating my navel for a while, it dawned on me that my sensitivity is due to an old wound. Years ago, Faculty, Staff, Students, and myriad others more or less loosely connected with my employer complained that they could never make contact with me. As a defensive measure (among others) I crafted a .sig that contained all of the telephone numbers and email addresses by which I could be reached (included a pager number) 7 x 24 x 52 with (guaranteed) no more than 20 minute delay. It ran to 7 lines, including the dash dash space EOL protocol sentinel. I was banned from NANOG because of the excessive length. (And yes, I got banned for other things at other times as well, mostly having to to do with trying to protect the network I administered from abuse.) -- sed quis custodiet ipsos custodes? (Juvenal)

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Re: internet visualization
by Larry Sheldon 06 Sep '15

06 Sep '15

On 9/5/2015 19:15, Jared Mauch wrote: > > OT: hit delete, or shameless plug disclaimer > > one of my colleagues just posted this visualiation > of the internet from the as_path view of 2914. if you are on > a mobile, you have to physically move your device around. > > http://as2914.net/ > > If you love it, send Job your accolades. If you hate it, > see above disclaimer. If in a country with a holiday on monday, > enjoy it safely. FarOUT! Outstanding. Please forward my accolades. (Is a "you are here" possible?) > > - Jared > -- sed quis custodiet ipsos custodes? (Juvenal)

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weather.gov invalid ssl cert
by Grant Ridder 05 Sep '15

05 Sep '15

If someone that works with or knows someone who works with weather.gov (National Weather Service) please take a look at this. I did a whois on weather.gov and there is no contact info. www.weather.gov is serving an akami cert weather.gov is serving a NWS SAN cert that does not cover weather.gov (includes www though) username@hostname ~ $ echo quit | openssl s_client -connect weather.gov:443 | openssl x509 -text depth=3 /C=US/O=The Go Daddy Group, Inc./OU=Go Daddy Class 2 Certification Authority verify error:num=19:self signed certificate in certificate chain verify return:0 DONE Certificate: Data: Version: 3 (0x2) Serial Number: 07:a2:c1:cb:fa:c1:18 Signature Algorithm: sha256WithRSAEncryption Issuer: C=US, ST=Arizona, L=Scottsdale, O=GoDaddy.com, Inc., OU= http://certs.godaddy.com/repository/, CN=Go Daddy Secure Certificate Authority - G2 Validity Not Before: Nov 13 20:54:35 2014 GMT Not After : Nov 17 17:33:22 2015 GMT Subject: OU=Domain Control Validated, CN=ucc.weather.gov Subject Public Key Info: Public Key Algorithm: rsaEncryption RSA Public Key: (2048 bit) Modulus (2048 bit): 00:9d:36:e8:eb:5d:00:1d:ce:ab:f2:6a:3f:83:5a: 39:29:dd:95:e9:bd:58:d7:2b:0f:67:5a:16:20:97: 2d:4c:96:e1:3c:cc:8f:2f:16:88:ae:fe:9c:15:d0: 67:f1:c9:0d:5c:c0:ae:3f:36:32:aa:90:1d:03:bb: d2:91:73:86:74:5f:e3:41:f2:e2:77:b3:5e:1c:a9: cc:9c:68:3a:99:3a:de:7a:19:bd:6a:70:a1:9f:3f: 1f:ec:c3:63:fd:e9:f5:e6:44:14:0d:db:ae:b4:46: fe:a8:b0:d7:07:01:ea:68:10:7f:9f:c8:f7:5a:20: 05:1d:77:47:d7:13:d1:f0:b8:8f:d2:94:a0:36:29: 95:c2:fd:3e:bc:80:14:1f:22:a2:5a:d0:56:5b:e6: 51:e1:94:3c:4c:dd:63:ae:81:42:7c:5e:87:f5:0c: b8:6f:37:f4:a6:53:f6:56:5e:c8:ec:57:f8:ec:0c: 7d:e0:11:7f:3d:07:8c:37:38:4e:05:8e:cd:46:b3: 21:a3:c1:2f:96:ee:e2:d7:5f:ed:8c:1c:6d:88:d7: 17:ba:90:d8:cb:49:2e:8d:4f:ca:bf:8c:53:da:f7: 38:9c:bc:e1:6c:ac:8a:62:27:d1:ec:dc:59:a9:3b: 62:07:68:3b:bd:d0:06:35:79:26:2d:83:4d:69:00: f3:d7 Exponent: 65537 (0x10001) X509v3 extensions: X509v3 Basic Constraints: critical CA:FALSE X509v3 Extended Key Usage: TLS Web Server Authentication, TLS Web Client Authentication X509v3 Key Usage: critical Digital Signature, Key Encipherment X509v3 CRL Distribution Points: URI:http://crl.godaddy.com/gdig2s1-87.crl X509v3 Certificate Policies: Policy: 2.16.840.1.114413.1.7.23.1 CPS: http://certificates.godaddy.com/repository/ Authority Information Access: OCSP - URI:http://ocsp.godaddy.com/ CA Issuers - URI: http://certificates.godaddy.com/repository/gdig2.crt X509v3 Authority Key Identifier: keyid:40:C2:BD:27:8E:CC:34:83:30:A2:33:D7:FB:6C:B3:F0:B4:2C:80:CE X509v3 Subject Alternative Name: DNS:ucc.weather.gov, DNS:www.ucc.weather.gov, DNS: alerts.weather.gov, DNS:nwschat.weather.gov, DNS:vpn.weather.gov, DNS: www.weather.gov X509v3 Subject Key Identifier: 01:7D:76:D9:61:68:EB:50:F7:C4:26:02:DC:94:56:62:45:0B:5B:58 Signature Algorithm: sha256WithRSAEncryption 96:4e:70:45:46:f8:69:80:48:b8:88:86:cd:06:2b:7b:d6:f1: 6b:0b:d8:89:ab:e8:9a:c0:f1:a8:99:0c:69:45:f8:a7:fb:ef: af:b3:6b:0d:41:bd:4d:3c:76:11:10:89:fa:8f:12:a5:47:27: 50:44:e7:37:93:f3:6b:84:f2:66:34:0d:99:69:13:da:dd:08: 32:6c:30:be:2e:af:8b:25:aa:9a:40:bf:61:35:a9:d9:2d:da: 97:b0:0c:e6:98:72:54:fe:44:21:6d:ad:9a:0a:cd:0b:18:74: be:f2:58:b0:d6:10:9b:dc:b7:fe:ae:81:b3:c0:21:f9:c8:eb: d5:54:bc:9e:d6:d0:ca:12:5c:c0:0d:94:93:03:9b:54:46:b8: af:86:46:e6:e0:4b:52:97:c2:8e:16:89:3c:8d:06:f8:f9:59: d6:21:39:4c:25:82:58:49:59:07:43:db:63:8d:98:aa:04:c1: 42:f5:4f:8a:4d:35:5b:f7:79:e5:e1:31:13:72:50:87:bd:68: 3f:bd:23:e2:88:3e:cf:72:00:a7:c8:1d:40:b6:34:00:5b:7b: 73:9f:8f:17:05:53:13:a1:70:15:59:66:88:61:6a:d7:d0:bf: df:89:1a:28:af:a8:cb:c7:95:e4:f9:01:7b:c2:99:51:93:33: 8f:94:fa:0b -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- MIIFdzCCBF+gAwIBAgIHB6LBy/rBGDANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADCBtDELMAkGA1UE BhMCVVMxEDAOBgNVBAgTB0FyaXpvbmExEzARBgNVBAcTClNjb3R0c2RhbGUxGjAY BgNVBAoTEUdvRGFkZHkuY29tLCBJbmMuMS0wKwYDVQQLEyRodHRwOi8vY2VydHMu Z29kYWRkeS5jb20vcmVwb3NpdG9yeS8xMzAxBgNVBAMTKkdvIERhZGR5IFNlY3Vy ZSBDZXJ0aWZpY2F0ZSBBdXRob3JpdHkgLSBHMjAeFw0xNDExMTMyMDU0MzVaFw0x NTExMTcxNzMzMjJaMD0xITAfBgNVBAsTGERvbWFpbiBDb250cm9sIFZhbGlkYXRl ZDEYMBYGA1UEAxMPdWNjLndlYXRoZXIuZ292MIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOC AQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEAnTbo610AHc6r8mo/g1o5Kd2V6b1Y1ysPZ1oWIJctTJbhPMyP LxaIrv6cFdBn8ckNXMCuPzYyqpAdA7vSkXOGdF/jQfLid7NeHKnMnGg6mTreehm9 anChnz8f7MNj/en15kQUDduutEb+qLDXBwHqaBB/n8j3WiAFHXdH1xPR8LiP0pSg NimVwv0+vIAUHyKiWtBWW+ZR4ZQ8TN1jroFCfF6H9Qy4bzf0plP2Vl7I7Ff47Ax9 4BF/PQeMNzhOBY7NRrMho8Evlu7i11/tjBxtiNcXupDYy0kujU/Kv4xT2vc4nLzh bKyKYifR7NxZqTtiB2g7vdAGNXkmLYNNaQDz1wIDAQABo4ICAjCCAf4wDAYDVR0T AQH/BAIwADAdBgNVHSUEFjAUBggrBgEFBQcDAQYIKwYBBQUHAwIwDgYDVR0PAQH/ BAQDAgWgMDYGA1UdHwQvMC0wK6ApoCeGJWh0dHA6Ly9jcmwuZ29kYWRkeS5jb20v Z2RpZzJzMS04Ny5jcmwwUwYDVR0gBEwwSjBIBgtghkgBhv1tAQcXATA5MDcGCCsG AQUFBwIBFitodHRwOi8vY2VydGlmaWNhdGVzLmdvZGFkZHkuY29tL3JlcG9zaXRv cnkvMHYGCCsGAQUFBwEBBGowaDAkBggrBgEFBQcwAYYYaHR0cDovL29jc3AuZ29k YWRkeS5jb20vMEAGCCsGAQUFBzAChjRodHRwOi8vY2VydGlmaWNhdGVzLmdvZGFk ZHkuY29tL3JlcG9zaXRvcnkvZ2RpZzIuY3J0MB8GA1UdIwQYMBaAFEDCvSeOzDSD MKIz1/tss/C0LIDOMHoGA1UdEQRzMHGCD3VjYy53ZWF0aGVyLmdvdoITd3d3LnVj Yy53ZWF0aGVyLmdvdoISYWxlcnRzLndlYXRoZXIuZ292ghNud3NjaGF0LndlYXRo ZXIuZ292gg92cG4ud2VhdGhlci5nb3aCD3d3dy53ZWF0aGVyLmdvdjAdBgNVHQ4E FgQUAX122WFo61D3xCYC3JRWYkULW1gwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQELBQADggEBAJZOcEVG +GmASLiIhs0GK3vW8WsL2Imr6JrA8aiZDGlF+Kf776+zaw1BvU08dhEQifqPEqVH J1BE5zeT82uE8mY0DZlpE9rdCDJsML4ur4slqppAv2E1qdkt2pewDOaYclT+RCFt rZoKzQsYdL7yWLDWEJvct/6ugbPAIfnI69VUvJ7W0MoSXMANlJMDm1RGuK+GRubg S1KXwo4WiTyNBvj5WdYhOUwlglhJWQdD22ONmKoEwUL1T4pNNVv3eeXhMRNyUIe9 aD+9I+KIPs9yAKfIHUC2NABbe3OfjxcFUxOhcBVZZohhatfQv9+JGiivqMvHleT5 AXvCmVGTM4+U+gs= -----END CERTIFICATE----- username@hostname ~ $ echo quit | openssl s_client -connect www.weather.gov:443 | openssl x509 -text depth=2 /C=IE/O=Baltimore/OU=CyberTrust/CN=Baltimore CyberTrust Root verify error:num=20:unable to get local issuer certificate verify return:0 DONE Certificate: Data: Version: 3 (0x2) Serial Number: 03:bf:3a:ef:2f:a2:7c:96:b8:ca:8f:b9:59:cd:33:2c:9d:50:11:38 Signature Algorithm: sha1WithRSAEncryption Issuer: C=NL, L=Amsterdam, O=Verizon Enterprise Solutions, OU=Cybertrust, CN=Verizon Akamai SureServer CA G14-SHA1 Validity Not Before: Jun 19 16:52:07 2015 GMT Not After : Jun 19 16:52:05 2016 GMT Subject: C=US, ST=MA, L=Cambridge, O=Akamai Technologies Inc., CN= a248.e.akamai.net Subject Public Key Info: Public Key Algorithm: rsaEncryption RSA Public Key: (2048 bit) Modulus (2048 bit): 00:d9:a2:c4:90:e0:90:c6:41:34:9d:f3:d5:95:fa: da:c3:81:bb:e4:ee:09:11:e4:a5:45:6d:73:2a:19: f9:3a:20:9e:8d:14:4f:17:b8:5a:d3:82:3c:d0:d5: f3:a4:b0:3f:b7:3a:6c:b5:7a:3a:ea:d3:14:89:b2: ac:1c:b6:08:6d:5b:41:f2:84:88:a7:1f:3a:c4:a7: aa:f0:1a:25:cb:13:78:07:7b:fb:04:2f:5f:73:5e: ed:19:d2:54:ec:f7:9b:ec:e9:14:f3:ca:53:46:15: 54:88:e4:1f:bc:8f:18:c4:c5:35:c9:cc:b1:b6:7e: 8b:ef:21:75:ad:55:e9:52:08:8c:47:dc:48:a0:c7: 8f:b6:b9:87:c2:6c:45:3e:20:63:8f:51:62:e4:37: 9a:9b:8f:80:b9:ee:17:02:1d:39:16:c9:8a:6b:69: fc:eb:2a:d5:99:17:ad:6d:3f:db:29:13:c1:7d:4b: ab:39:56:8d:59:43:bb:7f:81:71:7e:28:8a:9a:88: 3b:08:ec:bc:f0:d8:5e:e8:4b:09:4d:27:66:07:b9: 20:de:2f:90:81:cc:de:a8:c8:bb:77:c6:26:c3:5e: c8:38:35:e0:a2:b0:a5:a9:14:08:19:d4:c8:5e:73: 21:0b:ad:c2:84:a4:57:c9:c6:59:00:24:1b:54:61: 4f:2b Exponent: 65537 (0x10001) X509v3 extensions: X509v3 Basic Constraints: critical CA:FALSE X509v3 Certificate Policies: Policy: 1.3.6.1.4.1.6334.1.50 CPS: https://secure.omniroot.com/repository Authority Information Access: OCSP - URI:http://vassg141.ocsp.omniroot.com CA Issuers - URI:https://cacert.a.omniroot.com/vassg141.crt CA Issuers - URI:https://cacert.a.omniroot.com/vassg141.der X509v3 Subject Alternative Name: DNS:a248.e.akamai.net, DNS:*.akamaihd.net, DNS:*. akamaihd-staging.net, DNS:*.akamaized.net, DNS:*.akamaized-staging.net X509v3 Key Usage: critical Digital Signature, Key Encipherment X509v3 Extended Key Usage: TLS Web Server Authentication, TLS Web Client Authentication X509v3 Authority Key Identifier: keyid:DD:6C:80:7C:BA:B5:32:17:A5:84:41:40:F0:D2:04:66:13:2F:A9:90 X509v3 CRL Distribution Points: URI:http://vassg141.crl.omniroot.com/vassg141.crl X509v3 Subject Key Identifier: 03:B6:4A:9C:80:0C:60:18:88:0A:64:CD:AE:28:62:8A:7A:6C:C0:18 Signature Algorithm: sha1WithRSAEncryption 1c:64:ce:c3:76:4d:8c:29:fc:76:d1:3c:24:83:57:8e:3e:77: 21:0e:d6:83:f1:42:b9:2e:21:9d:14:96:c1:53:49:e8:16:20: 53:40:f2:e5:01:b7:df:01:07:77:49:6d:ea:53:10:c9:00:05: 0f:bb:c8:21:1d:38:9c:07:78:9c:0a:ad:e1:91:91:8b:95:f9: a8:e4:02:64:e2:15:0b:a9:7f:13:b8:03:ae:95:c5:45:47:33: fb:65:dd:30:bc:6c:cc:96:bb:c3:bc:52:77:74:03:86:ab:9d: dc:16:6f:04:49:b9:9f:8f:3c:b6:1e:5b:97:e9:f1:8e:e9:ba: 59:da:76:d4:7c:a6:7a:ce:2f:5e:d8:66:62:06:ff:c1:18:60: f8:ad:1e:31:d3:ba:ee:06:b2:75:1a:0f:05:6a:a9:61:7a:27: eb:a6:bd:f7:7c:05:c7:2c:bb:fd:ff:2d:1e:b4:b5:b4:a9:cf: 91:5b:0e:9e:e3:de:94:fa:95:b6:99:26:be:e5:7c:27:03:e9: b8:96:fa:17:6b:85:e9:1e:ed:d4:e3:41:9f:db:be:89:76:ed: e8:86:85:c1:86:1d:29:2b:17:d1:2c:0b:cf:07:cd:8a:52:89: 93:e1:72:79:c5:31:7d:f1:fa:34:ce:d9:37:94:50:0b:71:c7: 49:c8:6a:cb -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- MIIFvDCCBKSgAwIBAgIUA7867y+ifJa4yo+5Wc0zLJ1QETgwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEF BQAwgY0xCzAJBgNVBAYTAk5MMRIwEAYDVQQHEwlBbXN0ZXJkYW0xJTAjBgNVBAoT HFZlcml6b24gRW50ZXJwcmlzZSBTb2x1dGlvbnMxEzARBgNVBAsTCkN5YmVydHJ1 c3QxLjAsBgNVBAMTJVZlcml6b24gQWthbWFpIFN1cmVTZXJ2ZXIgQ0EgRzE0LVNI QTEwHhcNMTUwNjE5MTY1MjA3WhcNMTYwNjE5MTY1MjA1WjBtMQswCQYDVQQGEwJV UzELMAkGA1UECBMCTUExEjAQBgNVBAcTCUNhbWJyaWRnZTEhMB8GA1UEChMYQWth bWFpIFRlY2hub2xvZ2llcyBJbmMuMRowGAYDVQQDExFhMjQ4LmUuYWthbWFpLm5l dDCCASIwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEBBQADggEPADCCAQoCggEBANmixJDgkMZBNJ3z1ZX6 2sOBu+TuCRHkpUVtcyoZ+Togno0UTxe4WtOCPNDV86SwP7c6bLV6OurTFImyrBy2 CG1bQfKEiKcfOsSnqvAaJcsTeAd7+wQvX3Ne7RnSVOz3m+zpFPPKU0YVVIjkH7yP GMTFNcnMsbZ+i+8hda1V6VIIjEfcSKDHj7a5h8JsRT4gY49RYuQ3mpuPgLnuFwId ORbJimtp/Osq1ZkXrW0/2ykTwX1LqzlWjVlDu3+BcX4oipqIOwjsvPDYXuhLCU0n Zge5IN4vkIHM3qjIu3fGJsNeyDg14KKwpakUCBnUyF5zIQutwoSkV8nGWQAkG1Rh TysCAwEAAaOCAjEwggItMAwGA1UdEwEB/wQCMAAwTAYDVR0gBEUwQzBBBgkrBgEE AbE+ATIwNDAyBggrBgEFBQcCARYmaHR0cHM6Ly9zZWN1cmUub21uaXJvb3QuY29t 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IN A ;; ANSWER SECTION: weather.gov. 1 IN A 204.227.127.201 ;; Query time: 1317 msec ;; SERVER: 8.8.8.8#53(8.8.8.8) ;; WHEN: Sat Sep 5 14:36:38 2015 ;; MSG SIZE rcvd: 45 username@hostname ~ $ dig www.weather.gov @8.8.8.8 ; <<>> DiG 9.8.3-P1 <<>> www.weather.gov @8.8.8.8 ;; global options: +cmd ;; Got answer: ;; ->>HEADER<<- opcode: QUERY, status: NOERROR, id: 55243 ;; flags: qr rd ra; QUERY: 1, ANSWER: 4, AUTHORITY: 0, ADDITIONAL: 0 ;; QUESTION SECTION: ;www.weather.gov. IN A ;; ANSWER SECTION: www.weather.gov. 32 IN CNAME www.weather.gov.edgesuite.net. www.weather.gov.edgesuite.net. 1193 IN CNAME a895.g.akamai.net. a895.g.akamai.net. 19 IN A 23.61.194.171 a895.g.akamai.net. 19 IN A 23.61.194.208 ;; Query time: 808 msec ;; SERVER: 8.8.8.8#53(8.8.8.8) ;; WHEN: Sat Sep 5 14:36:45 2015 ;; MSG SIZE rcvd: 136 username@hostname ~ $ -Grant

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Re: Software Defined Networking
by Scott Weeks 05 Sep '15

05 Sep '15

--- ignactro(a)gmail.com wrote: From: Ignacio de castro <ignactro(a)gmail.com> For a more academic perspective: "Software-defined networking: A comprehensive survey" http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/xpls/abs_all.jsp?arnumber=6994333&tag=1 ------------------------------------------ Can't read it. They suck: You have been redirected to this page for one of the following reasons: Either cookies are not enabled on your browser or Your network configuration is causing cookies to be lost or not function properly. IEEE Xplore requires cookies to maintain sessions and to access licensed content. Cookies are used temporarily to maintain sessions in IEEE Xplore and for no other purpose. The cookies will not persist after a session ends. Please change your browser settings to accept cookies before you access IEEE Xplore. scott

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