September 2013 - Test - lists.nanog.org

Re: [Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN"
by Eugen Leitl 08 Sep '13

08 Sep '13

----- Forwarded message from "Jeffrey I. Schiller" <jis(a)mit.edu> ----- Date: Sat, 7 Sep 2013 19:52:44 -0400 From: "Jeffrey I. Schiller" <jis(a)mit.edu> To: Gregory Perry <Gregory.Perry(a)govirtual.tv> Cc: "cryptography(a)metzdowd.com" <cryptography(a)metzdowd.com>, Phillip Hallam-Baker <hallam(a)gmail.com>, ianG <iang(a)iang.org> Subject: Re: [Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN" User-Agent: Mutt/1.5.21 (2010-09-15) -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 On Sat, Sep 07, 2013 at 09:14:47PM +0000, Gregory Perry wrote: > And this is exactly why there is no real security on the Internet. > Because the IETF and standards committees and working groups are all > in reality political fiefdoms and technological monopolies aimed at > lining the pockets of a select few companies deemed "worthy" of > authenticating user documentation for purposes of establishing > online credibility. > ... > Encrypting IPv6 was initially a mandatory part of the spec, > but then it somehow became discretionary. The nuts and bolts of > strong crypto have been around for decades, but the IETF and related > standards "powers to be" are more interested in creating a global > police state than guaranteeing some semblance of confidential and > privacy for Internet users. I’m sorry, but I cannot let this go unchallenged. I was there, I saw it. For those who don’t know, I was the IESG Security Area Director from 1994 - 2003. (by myself until 1998 after which we had two co-AD’s in the Security Area). During this timeframe we formed the TLS working group, the PGP working group and IPv6 became a Draft Standard. Scott Bradner and I decided that security should be mandatory in IPv6, in the hope that we could drive more adoption. The IETF was (and probably still is) a bunch of hard working individuals who strive to create useful technology for the Internet. In particular IETF contributors are in theory individual contributors and not representatives of their employers. Of course this is the theory and practice is a bit “noisier” but the bulk of participant I worked with were honest hard working individuals. Security fails on the Internet for three important reasons, that have nothing to do with the IETF or the technology per-se (except for point 3). 1. There is little market for “the good stuff”. When people see that they have to provide a password to login, they figure they are safe... In general the consuming public cannot tell the difference between “good stuff” and snake oil. So when presented with a $100 “good” solution or a $10 bunch of snake oil, guess what gets bought. 2. Security is *hard*, it is a negative deliverable. You do not know when you have it, you only know when you have lost it (via compromise). It is therefore hard to show return on investment with security. It is hard to assign a value to something not happening. 2a. Most people don’t really care until they have been personally bitten. A lot of people only purchase a burglar alarm after they have been burglarized. Although people are more security aware today, that is a relatively recent development. 3. As engineers we have totally and completely failed to deliver products that people can use. I point out e-mail encryption as a key example. With today’s solutions you need to understand PK and PKI at some level in order to use it. That is likely requiring a driver to understand the internal combustion engine before they can drive their car. The real world doesn’t work that way. No government conspiracy required. We have seen the enemy and it is... -Jeff _______________________________________________________________________ Jeffrey I. Schiller Information Services and Technology Massachusetts Institute of Technology 77 Massachusetts Avenue Room E17-110A, 32-392 Cambridge, MA 02139-4307 617.910.0259 - Voice jis(a)mit.edu http://jis.qyv.name _______________________________________________________________________ -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.11 (GNU/Linux) iD8DBQFSK7xM8CBzV/QUlSsRApyUAKCB6GpP/hUHxtOQNGjSB5FDZS8hFACfVec6 pPw4Xvukq3OqPEkmVZKl0c8= =9/UP -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- _______________________________________________ The cryptography mailing list cryptography(a)metzdowd.com http://www.metzdowd.com/mailman/listinfo/cryptography ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://ativel.com http://postbiota.org AC894EC5: 38A5 5F46 A4FF 59B8 336B 47EE F46E 3489 AC89 4EC5

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Caution! Don't attempt the Postini to Google Apps transition
by Matthew Kaufman 08 Sep '13

08 Sep '13

TL; DR: Email won't be delivered, No support I have two domains that I set up with Postini for spam filtering, and I was very happy for years. But Google purchased Postini, and has been increasingly insistent that I migrate to Google Apps. They have a transition process which is supposedly seamless, and which guarantees that mail will continue flowing throughout the transition. In reality, all of my email was offline for 24 hours, first into a black hole, and then bouncing with permanent failures. Calling Google support last night resulted in a long wait to finally talk to someone who told me that Postini support was too busy and who took down my name and number for a call back. Never got a call. This morning I opened a support ticket via the web site, and two hours later got a reply suggesting that it might be my MX records. Never mind that (according to the logs I could see) the mail was still flowing properly to Postini, passing through there to Google, and then being dumped at Google. When I called to escalate, I found a support agent who couldn't find the ticket I had opened via the website, and who then tried to transfer me. In the process, I sat on hold for 30 minutes, then the call was dropped. When I called right back, I went through the same phone tree and authentication process, and reached another agent. When he asked my problem, and I started to describe it, he said "oh, Postini" and then hung up on me. At that point it had been 24 hours, which is too long to have one's inbound email getting permanent failures, and so I've set my MX records to point directly at my own servers and will just live without spam filtering for a while. In the meantime, I strongly encourage anyone else who cares about reliable email delivery to avoid my fate. Matthew Kaufman matthew(a)matthew.at

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The US government has betrayed the Internet. We need to take it back
by Eugen Leitl 08 Sep '13

08 Sep '13

http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/sep/05/government-betrayed-in… The US government has betrayed the Internet. We need to take it back The NSA has undermined a fundamental social contract. We engineers built the Internet – and now we have to fix it Bruce Schneier The Guardian, Thursday 5 September 2013 20.04 BST Internet business cables in California. 'Dismantling the surveillance state won't be easy. But whatever happens, we're going to be breaking new ground.' Photograph: Bob Sacha/Corbis Government and industry have betrayed the Internet, and us. By subverting the Internet at every level to make it a vast, multi-layered and robust surveillance platform, the NSA has undermined a fundamental social contract. The companies that build and manage our Internet infrastructure, the companies that create and sell us our hardware and software, or the companies that host our data: we can no longer trust them to be ethical Internet stewards. This is not the Internet the world needs, or the Internet its creators envisioned. We need to take it back. And by we, I mean the engineering community. Yes, this is primarily a political problem, a policy matter that requires political intervention. But this is also an engineering problem, and there are several things engineers can – and should – do. One, we should expose. If you do not have a security clearance, and if you have not received a National Security Letter, you are not bound by a federal confidentially requirements or a gag order. If you have been contacted by the NSA to subvert a product or protocol, you need to come forward with your story. Your employer obligations don't cover illegal or unethical activity. If you work with classified data and are truly brave, expose what you know. We need whistleblowers. We need to know how exactly how the NSA and other agencies are subverting routers, switches, the Internet backbone, encryption technologies and cloud systems. I already have five stories from people like you, and I've just started collecting. I want 50. There's safety in numbers, and this form of civil disobedience is the moral thing to do. Two, we can design. We need to figure out how to re-engineer the Internet to prevent this kind of wholesale spying. We need new techniques to prevent communications intermediaries from leaking private information. We can make surveillance expensive again. In particular, we need open protocols, open implementations, open systems – these will be harder for the NSA to subvert. The Internet Engineering Task Force, the group that defines the standards that make the Internet run, has a meeting planned for early November in Vancouver. This group needs to dedicate its next meeting to this task. This is an emergency, and demands an emergency response. Three, we can influence governance. I have resisted saying this up to now, and I am saddened to say it, but the US has proved to be an unethical steward of the Internet. The UK is no better. The NSA's actions are legitimizing the Internet abuses by China, Russia, Iran and others. We need to figure out new means of Internet governance, ones that makes it harder for powerful tech countries to monitor everything. For example, we need to demand transparency, oversight, and accountability from our governments and corporations. Unfortunately, this is going play directly into the hands of totalitarian governments that want to control their country's Internet for even more extreme forms of surveillance. We need to figure out how to prevent that, too. We need to avoid the mistakes of the International Telecommunications Union, which has become a forum to legitimize bad government behavior, and create truly international governance that can't be dominated or abused by any one country. Generations from now, when people look back on these early decades of the Internet, I hope they will not be disappointed in us. We can ensure that they don't only if each of us makes this a priority, and engages in the debate. We have a moral duty to do this, and we have no time to lose. Dismantling the surveillance state won't be easy. Has any country that engaged in mass surveillance of its own citizens voluntarily given up that capability? Has any mass surveillance country avoided becoming totalitarian? Whatever happens, we're going to be breaking new ground. Again, the politics of this is a bigger task than the engineering, but the engineering is critical. We need to demand that real technologists be involved in any key government decision making on these issues. We've had enough of lawyers and politicians not fully understanding technology; we need technologists at the table when we build tech policy. To the engineers, I say this: we built the Internet, and some of us have helped to subvert it. Now, those of us who love liberty have to fix it. • Bruce Schneier writes about security, technology, and people. His latest book is Liars and Outliers: Enabling the Trust That Society Needs to Thrive. He is working for the Guardian on other NSA stories

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RE: MTR for Android?
by Keith Medcalf 08 Sep '13

08 Sep '13

Look for TRACEROUTE by SRCGUARDIAN in the Play Store. It needs network access only... Doesn't do TCP but does ICMP and UDP traceroutes and displays ASN as well ...

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AlbertaIX - no longer a Cybera project?
by Mark Leonard 07 Sep '13

07 Sep '13

It seems that AlbertaIX is no longer listed on Cybera's list of projects: http://www.cybera.ca/strategic-projects/ In fact, doing a search on Cybera's site yields a whole bunch of dead links: http://www.cybera.ca/search?q=albertaix Is AlbertaIX no longer part of the Cybera project inventory? Has Cybera pulled official support for AlbertaIX? Are AlbertaIX and Cybera still sharing an address? [1,2] Just curious. [1] http://www.cybera.ca/contact-us/locations/ [2] http://www.canada-companies-info.com/albertaix-6sh9/

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Re: The US government has betrayed the Internet. We need to take it back
by Scott Weeks 07 Sep '13

07 Sep '13

--- sam(a)circlenet.us wrote: From: Sam Moats <sam(a)circlenet.us> There only options are to: Disobey the law, unacceptable in my opinion Close down services, noble but I need to eat and you probably want to keep getting email Compromise your principles and obey the law, the path often choosen. ---------------------------------------- So, there's no choice except to get a 5-gallon bucket of gov't-ky jelly and take it? So many things come to mind on your flag-waving emails, I can't think of what to say first. And believe me, that's not usual... ;-) After a while, you'll become raw and probably change your mind. scott

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BGP Update Report
by cidr-report＠potaroo.net 07 Sep '13

07 Sep '13

BGP Update Report Interval: 29-Aug-13 -to- 05-Sep-13 (7 days) Observation Point: BGP Peering with AS131072 TOP 20 Unstable Origin AS Rank ASN Upds % Upds/Pfx AS-Name 1 - AS6866 122404 5.8% 683.8 -- CYTA-NETWORK Cyprus Telecommunications Authority 2 - AS27738 42369 2.0% 73.4 -- Ecuadortelecom S.A. 3 - AS9829 34878 1.7% 27.4 -- BSNL-NIB National Internet Backbone 4 - AS8402 34340 1.6% 20.0 -- CORBINA-AS OJSC "Vimpelcom" 5 - AS28573 26252 1.2% 7.9 -- NET Serviços de Comunicação S.A. 6 - AS14287 21002 1.0% 388.9 -- TRIAD-TELECOM - Triad Telecom, Inc. 7 - AS9416 19059 0.9% 560.6 -- MULTIMEDIA-AS-AP Hoshin Multimedia Center Inc. 8 - AS27941 18220 0.9% 1138.8 -- CONSULNETWORK LTDA 9 - AS36998 17919 0.8% 9.6 -- SDN-MOBITEL 10 - AS4775 16486 0.8% 229.0 -- GLOBE-TELECOM-AS Globe Telecoms 11 - AS6713 15677 0.7% 29.3 -- IAM-AS 12 - AS9498 13823 0.7% 15.2 -- BBIL-AP BHARTI Airtel Ltd. 13 - AS11664 12702 0.6% 33.7 -- Techtel LMDS Comunicaciones Interactivas S.A. 14 - AS10620 11860 0.6% 4.8 -- Telmex Colombia S.A. 15 - AS4434 10579 0.5% 155.6 -- ERX-RADNET1-AS PT Rahajasa Media Internet 16 - AS2118 10022 0.5% 7.3 -- RELCOM-AS OOO "NPO Relcom" 17 - AS48612 9892 0.5% 899.3 -- RTC-ORENBURG-AS CJSC "Comstar-Regions" 18 - AS33597 9872 0.5% 60.6 -- INFORELAY - InfoRelay Online Systems, Inc. 19 - AS23487 9700 0.5% 89.8 -- CONECEL 20 - AS50710 9254 0.4% 38.4 -- EARTHLINK-AS EarthLink Ltd. Communications&Internet Services TOP 20 Unstable Origin AS (Updates per announced prefix) Rank ASN Upds % Upds/Pfx AS-Name 1 - AS53008 8175 0.4% 8175.0 -- Pontal Cabo Ltda 2 - AS6174 7201 0.3% 3600.5 -- SPRINTLINK8 - Sprint 3 - AS42334 3226 0.1% 3226.0 -- BBP-AS Broadband Plus s.a.l. 4 - AS28698 6646 0.3% 2215.3 -- UUNETZM-AS 5 - AS7202 8766 0.4% 1252.3 -- FAMU - Florida A & M University 6 - AS27941 18220 0.9% 1138.8 -- CONSULNETWORK LTDA 7 - AS38654 6615 0.3% 1102.5 -- INES-NETWORK INES Corporation. 8 - AS37367 1072 0.1% 1072.0 -- CALLKEY 9 - AS43884 949 0.1% 949.0 -- EG-CONSULTING-AS EG Information Consulting Ltd 10 - AS6629 9219 0.4% 921.9 -- NOAA-AS - NOAA 11 - AS48612 9892 0.5% 899.3 -- RTC-ORENBURG-AS CJSC "Comstar-Regions" 12 - AS37374 746 0.0% 746.0 -- Liquid-zambia 13 - AS57201 713 0.0% 713.0 -- EDF-AS Estonian Defence Forces 14 - AS6866 122404 5.8% 683.8 -- CYTA-NETWORK Cyprus Telecommunications Authority 15 - AS18148 597 0.0% 597.0 -- FUKUOKA-U Fukuoka University 16 - AS9416 19059 0.9% 560.6 -- MULTIMEDIA-AS-AP Hoshin Multimedia Center Inc. 17 - AS47582 555 0.0% 555.0 -- KRAFT-S-TOGLIATTI Kraft-S JSC 18 - AS59699 535 0.0% 535.0 -- NICEBLUE-AS Nice Blue s.r.l. 19 - AS38000 1556 0.1% 518.7 -- CRISIL-AS [CRISIL Limited.Autonomous System] 20 - AS3 514 0.0% 307.0 -- CMED-AS Cmed Technology Ltd TOP 20 Unstable Prefixes Rank Prefix Upds % Origin AS -- AS Name 1 - 61.95.239.0/24 11974 0.5% AS9498 -- BBIL-AP BHARTI Airtel Ltd. 2 - 202.154.17.0/24 10391 0.5% AS4434 -- ERX-RADNET1-AS PT Rahajasa Media Internet 3 - 92.246.207.0/24 9854 0.4% AS48612 -- RTC-ORENBURG-AS CJSC "Comstar-Regions" 4 - 203.118.224.0/21 9537 0.4% AS9416 -- MULTIMEDIA-AS-AP Hoshin Multimedia Center Inc. 5 - 203.118.232.0/21 9427 0.4% AS9416 -- MULTIMEDIA-AS-AP Hoshin Multimedia Center Inc. 6 - 192.58.232.0/24 9127 0.4% AS6629 -- NOAA-AS - NOAA 7 - 120.28.62.0/24 8494 0.4% AS4775 -- GLOBE-TELECOM-AS Globe Telecoms 8 - 194.219.56.0/24 8178 0.4% AS1241 -- FORTHNET-GR Forthnet 9 - 177.185.160.0/20 8175 0.4% AS53008 -- Pontal Cabo Ltda 10 - 222.127.0.0/24 7906 0.4% AS4775 -- GLOBE-TELECOM-AS Globe Telecoms 11 - 41.216.64.0/19 7360 0.3% AS28698 -- UUNETZM-AS AS37374 -- Liquid-zambia 12 - 150.39.0.0/16 6610 0.3% AS38654 -- INES-NETWORK INES Corporation. 13 - 69.38.178.0/24 4710 0.2% AS19406 -- TWRS-MA - Towerstream I, Inc. 14 - 204.29.132.0/23 4594 0.2% AS1880 -- STUPI Svensk Teleutveckling & Produktinnovation, STUPI AB 15 - 200.29.234.0/24 4575 0.2% AS27941 -- CONSULNETWORK LTDA 16 - 200.29.238.0/24 4575 0.2% AS27941 -- CONSULNETWORK LTDA 17 - 200.29.236.0/24 4575 0.2% AS27941 -- CONSULNETWORK LTDA 18 - 200.29.239.0/24 4483 0.2% AS27941 -- CONSULNETWORK LTDA 19 - 168.223.206.0/23 4390 0.2% AS7202 -- FAMU - Florida A & M University 20 - 64.187.64.0/23 4385 0.2% AS16608 -- KENTEC - Kentec Communications, Inc. Details at http://bgpupdates.potaroo.net ------------------------------------ Copies of this report are mailed to: nanog(a)nanog.org eof-list(a)ripe.net apops(a)apops.net routing-wg(a)ripe.net afnog(a)afnog.org

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The Cidr Report
by cidr-report＠potaroo.net 07 Sep '13

07 Sep '13

This report has been generated at Fri Sep 6 21:14:04 2013 AEST. The report analyses the BGP Routing Table of AS2.0 router and generates a report on aggregation potential within the table. Check http://www.cidr-report.org for a current version of this report. Recent Table History Date Prefixes CIDR Agg 30-08-13 479696 271236 31-08-13 479888 271502 01-09-13 479969 271415 02-09-13 480012 270940 03-09-13 479606 271654 04-09-13 479909 272113 05-09-13 480734 272243 06-09-13 481151 272602 AS Summary 45072 Number of ASes in routing system 18545 Number of ASes announcing only one prefix 4174 Largest number of prefixes announced by an AS AS7029 : WINDSTREAM - Windstream Communications Inc 117918976 Largest address span announced by an AS (/32s) AS4134 : CHINANET-BACKBONE No.31,Jin-rong Street Aggregation Summary The algorithm used in this report proposes aggregation only when there is a precise match using the AS path, so as to preserve traffic transit policies. Aggregation is also proposed across non-advertised address space ('holes'). --- 06Sep13 --- ASnum NetsNow NetsAggr NetGain % Gain Description Table 481041 272501 208540 43.4% All ASes AS6389 3068 65 3003 97.9% BELLSOUTH-NET-BLK - BellSouth.net Inc. AS28573 3233 473 2760 85.4% NET Serviços de Comunicação S.A. AS17974 2666 170 2496 93.6% TELKOMNET-AS2-AP PT Telekomunikasi Indonesia AS7029 4174 2025 2149 51.5% WINDSTREAM - Windstream Communications Inc AS4766 2919 939 1980 67.8% KIXS-AS-KR Korea Telecom AS22773 2044 138 1906 93.2% ASN-CXA-ALL-CCI-22773-RDC - Cox Communications Inc. AS18566 2065 468 1597 77.3% COVAD - Covad Communications Co. AS10620 2549 1015 1534 60.2% Telmex Colombia S.A. AS3356 3236 1714 1522 47.0% LEVEL3 Level 3 Communications AS36998 1862 423 1439 77.3% SDN-MOBITEL AS4323 2971 1534 1437 48.4% TWTC - tw telecom holdings, inc. AS18881 1430 69 1361 95.2% Global Village Telecom AS7303 1693 455 1238 73.1% Telecom Argentina S.A. AS4755 1768 589 1179 66.7% TATACOMM-AS TATA Communications formerly VSNL is Leading ISP AS2118 1179 75 1104 93.6% RELCOM-AS OOO "NPO Relcom" AS7552 1161 131 1030 88.7% VIETEL-AS-AP Vietel Corporation AS22561 1196 212 984 82.3% DIGITAL-TELEPORT - Digital Teleport Inc. AS1785 2013 1157 856 42.5% AS-PAETEC-NET - PaeTec Communications, Inc. AS11830 927 117 810 87.4% Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad y Telecom. AS18101 981 179 802 81.8% RELIANCE-COMMUNICATIONS-IN Reliance Communications Ltd.DAKC MUMBAI AS4808 1160 402 758 65.3% CHINA169-BJ CNCGROUP IP network China169 Beijing Province Network AS7545 2073 1351 722 34.8% TPG-INTERNET-AP TPG Telecom Limited AS701 1521 800 721 47.4% UUNET - MCI Communications Services, Inc. d/b/a Verizon Business AS13977 853 142 711 83.4% CTELCO - FAIRPOINT COMMUNICATIONS, INC. AS6147 734 44 690 94.0% Telefonica del Peru S.A.A. AS8151 1290 608 682 52.9% Uninet S.A. de C.V. AS855 732 55 677 92.5% CANET-ASN-4 - Bell Aliant Regional Communications, Inc. AS6983 1152 483 669 58.1% ITCDELTA - ITC^Deltacom AS24560 1090 433 657 60.3% AIRTELBROADBAND-AS-AP Bharti Airtel Ltd., Telemedia Services AS7738 764 135 629 82.3% Telemar Norte Leste S.A. Total 54504 16401 38103 69.9% Top 30 total Possible Bogus Routes 23.92.128.0/17 AS42981 RES-PL RES.PL ISP S.C. 27.54.116.0/22 AS55452 27.54.116.0/24 AS55452 27.54.119.0/24 AS55452 31.13.184.0/21 AS42981 RES-PL RES.PL ISP S.C. 62.61.220.0/24 AS24974 TACHYON-EU Tachyon Europe BV 62.61.221.0/24 AS24974 TACHYON-EU Tachyon Europe BV 62.182.96.0/23 AS15830 TELECITY-LON TELECITYGROUP INTERNATIONAL LIMITED 64.185.224.0/24 AS27431 JTLNET - JTL Networks Inc. 64.185.225.0/24 AS27431 JTLNET - JTL Networks Inc. 64.185.226.0/24 AS27431 JTLNET - JTL Networks Inc. 64.185.227.0/24 AS27431 JTLNET - JTL Networks Inc. 64.185.228.0/24 AS27431 JTLNET - JTL Networks Inc. 64.185.229.0/24 AS27431 JTLNET - JTL Networks Inc. 64.185.230.0/24 AS27431 JTLNET - JTL Networks Inc. 64.185.231.0/24 AS27431 JTLNET - JTL Networks Inc. 64.185.232.0/24 AS27431 JTLNET - JTL Networks Inc. 64.185.233.0/24 AS27431 JTLNET - JTL Networks Inc. 64.185.234.0/24 AS27431 JTLNET - JTL Networks Inc. 64.185.235.0/24 AS27431 JTLNET - JTL Networks Inc. 64.185.236.0/24 AS27431 JTLNET - JTL Networks Inc. 64.185.237.0/24 AS27431 JTLNET - JTL Networks Inc. 64.185.238.0/24 AS27431 JTLNET - JTL Networks Inc. 64.185.239.0/24 AS27431 JTLNET - JTL Networks Inc. 65.75.216.0/23 AS10494 AAI - Accurate Automation, Inc. 65.75.217.0/24 AS10494 AAI - Accurate Automation, Inc. 65.111.1.0/24 AS32258 SDNGLOBAL - SDN Global 66.180.239.0/24 AS35888 VIGNETTE - VIGNETTE CORPORATION 66.205.224.0/19 AS16526 BIRCH-TELECOM - Birch Telecom, Inc. 66.251.128.0/24 AS33227 BLUEBRIDGE-NETWORKS - Blue Bridge Networks 66.251.133.0/24 AS33227 BLUEBRIDGE-NETWORKS - Blue Bridge Networks 66.251.134.0/24 AS33227 BLUEBRIDGE-NETWORKS - Blue Bridge Networks 66.251.136.0/21 AS33227 BLUEBRIDGE-NETWORKS - Blue Bridge Networks 66.251.140.0/24 AS33227 BLUEBRIDGE-NETWORKS - Blue Bridge Networks 66.251.141.0/24 AS33227 BLUEBRIDGE-NETWORKS - Blue Bridge Networks 66.251.142.0/24 AS33227 BLUEBRIDGE-NETWORKS - Blue Bridge Networks 69.46.224.0/20 AS32592 HUNT-BROTHERS-OF-LOUISIANA-LLC - Hunt Brothers 69.46.236.0/24 AS32592 HUNT-BROTHERS-OF-LOUISIANA-LLC - Hunt Brothers 71.19.134.0/23 AS3313 INET-AS BT Italia S.p.A. 72.19.0.0/19 AS16526 BIRCH-TELECOM - Birch Telecom, Inc. 72.35.224.0/22 AS30097 NUWAVE - NuWave 72.35.229.0/24 AS30188 TELEVERGENCE - Televergence Solutions Inc. 72.35.232.0/21 AS6246 AVALONTEL - AvalonTel 72.44.16.0/20 AS15054 NORTHEAST-TEXAS-BROADBAND-LLC - Northeast Texas Broadband, LLC 74.115.124.0/23 AS46540 NARSASN - National Asset Recovery Services, Inc 82.103.0.0/18 AS30901 91.195.66.0/23 AS3356 LEVEL3 Level 3 Communications 91.197.36.0/22 AS43359 91.199.90.0/24 AS44330 91.200.188.0/22 AS44016 91.205.188.0/22 AS47983 91.207.0.0/23 AS174 COGENT Cogent/PSI 91.209.163.0/24 AS48445 91.212.54.0/24 AS21409 IKOULA Ikoula Net SAS 93.190.8.0/24 AS47254 93.190.9.0/24 AS47254 93.190.10.0/24 AS47254 100.100.0.0/24 AS4847 CNIX-AP China Networks Inter-Exchange 102.2.88.0/22 AS38456 PACTEL-AS-AP Pacific Teleports. 103.13.112.0/22 AS17676 GIGAINFRA Softbank BB Corp. 116.206.72.0/24 AS6461 MFNX MFN - Metromedia Fiber Network 116.206.85.0/24 AS6461 MFNX MFN - Metromedia Fiber Network 116.206.103.0/24 AS6461 MFNX MFN - Metromedia Fiber Network 117.120.56.0/21 AS4755 TATACOMM-AS TATA Communications formerly VSNL is Leading ISP 121.46.0.0/16 AS4134 CHINANET-BACKBONE No.31,Jin-rong Street 142.54.0.0/19 AS23498 CDSI - Cogeco Data Services LP 164.40.184.0/24 AS19821 172.102.0.0/22 AS4812 CHINANET-SH-AP China Telecom (Group) 172.111.111.0/24 AS8039 CCC-ASN-1 - Cinergy Communications 172.116.0.0/24 AS7018 ATT-INTERNET4 - AT&T Services, Inc. 174.138.144.0/20 AS701 UUNET - MCI Communications Services, Inc. d/b/a Verizon Business 185.34.168.0/22 AS35224 SALLANDXS SallandXS B.V. 190.3.160.0/21 AS27975 SYNAPSIS COLOMBIA LTDA 190.15.72.0/21 AS15146 CABLEBAHAMAS - Cable Bahamas 190.124.252.0/22 AS7303 Telecom Argentina S.A. 193.0.227.0/24 AS34476 193.33.66.0/23 AS39874 193.33.112.0/23 AS8586 OBSL-AS TalkTalk Communications Limited 193.109.15.0/24 AS12690 MKSNET-AS MKS Autonomous System 193.109.224.0/24 AS47427 193.111.125.0/24 AS44581 SE-ALLTELE AllTele Allmanna Svenska Telefonaktiebolaget 193.111.155.0/24 AS44581 SE-ALLTELE AllTele Allmanna Svenska Telefonaktiebolaget 193.164.152.0/24 AS3356 LEVEL3 Level 3 Communications 193.178.217.0/24 AS20737 194.50.82.0/24 AS16276 OVH OVH Systems 194.79.48.0/22 AS39117 194.113.27.0/24 AS12518 SHLINK SHLINK Internet Service 194.117.250.0/23 AS41412 MIVITEC-AS MIVITEC GmbH 194.126.219.0/24 AS34545 194.146.220.0/22 AS29692 194.169.237.0/24 AS12968 CDP Netia SA 195.216.234.0/24 AS31309 NMV-AS New Media Ventures BVBA 200.1.112.0/24 AS29754 GO2TEL GO2TEL.COM INC. 200.58.248.0/21 AS27849 201.71.16.0/20 AS28638 EMTEC EMPRESA DE TECNOLOGIA EMPREENDIMENTOS DE COM 201.77.96.0/20 AS28639 Daniela Ropke da Rosa 202.8.106.0/24 AS9530 SHINSEGAE-AS SHINSEGAE I&C Co., Ltd. 202.43.124.0/24 AS38193 TWA-AS-AP Transworld Associates (Pvt.) Ltd. 202.43.127.0/24 AS36351 SOFTLAYER - SoftLayer Technologies Inc. 202.58.113.0/24 AS19161 202.83.120.0/21 AS37972 202.83.124.0/24 AS37972 202.83.125.0/24 AS37972 202.83.126.0/24 AS37972 202.84.16.0/24 AS4808 CHINA169-BJ CNCGROUP IP network China169 Beijing Province Network 202.84.17.0/24 AS17781 XINHUA Xinhua News Agency 202.94.1.0/24 AS4808 CHINA169-BJ CNCGROUP IP network China169 Beijing Province Network 202.174.125.0/24 AS9498 BBIL-AP BHARTI Airtel Ltd. 202.179.134.0/24 AS23966 LDN-AS-PK LINKdotNET Telecom Limited 203.23.1.0/24 AS18111 NETSPEED-AS-AP Netspeed Internet Communications 203.24.38.0/24 AS18111 NETSPEED-AS-AP Netspeed Internet Communications 203.30.127.0/24 AS18111 NETSPEED-AS-AP Netspeed Internet Communications 203.32.86.0/23 AS18111 NETSPEED-AS-AP Netspeed Internet Communications 203.32.86.0/24 AS18111 NETSPEED-AS-AP Netspeed Internet Communications 203.32.87.0/24 AS18111 NETSPEED-AS-AP Netspeed Internet Communications 203.142.219.0/24 AS45149 203.191.48.0/20 AS24175 VINAREN-AS-AP VietNam Research and Education Network 203.191.56.0/21 AS38042 INCOMNET-MONGOLIA-AS-AP Incomnet LLC, Mongolia, VSAT and Wireless service 204.9.116.0/22 AS30097 NUWAVE - NuWave 204.10.88.0/21 AS3356 LEVEL3 Level 3 Communications 204.10.92.0/23 AS30097 NUWAVE - NuWave 204.10.94.0/23 AS30097 NUWAVE - NuWave 204.10.112.0/21 AS27027 ANBELL ASN-ANBELL 204.15.208.0/22 AS13706 COMPLETEWEBNET - CompleteWeb.Net LLC 204.187.11.0/24 AS51113 ELEKTA-AS Elekta 205.211.160.0/24 AS30045 UHN-ASN - University Health Network 206.81.112.0/20 AS32618 ADKNO-KC - Adknowledge, Inc. 206.197.184.0/24 AS23304 DATOTEL-STL-AS - Datotel LLC, a NetLabs LLC Company 206.221.176.0/24 AS27431 JTLNET - JTL Networks Inc. 206.221.177.0/24 AS27431 JTLNET - JTL Networks Inc. 206.221.178.0/24 AS27431 JTLNET - JTL Networks Inc. 206.221.179.0/24 AS27431 JTLNET - JTL Networks Inc. 206.221.180.0/24 AS27431 JTLNET - JTL Networks Inc. 206.221.181.0/24 AS27431 JTLNET - JTL Networks Inc. 206.221.182.0/24 AS27431 JTLNET - JTL Networks Inc. 206.221.183.0/24 AS27431 JTLNET - JTL Networks Inc. 206.221.184.0/24 AS27431 JTLNET - JTL Networks Inc. 206.221.185.0/24 AS27431 JTLNET - JTL Networks Inc. 206.221.186.0/24 AS27431 JTLNET - JTL Networks Inc. 206.221.187.0/24 AS27431 JTLNET - JTL Networks Inc. 206.221.188.0/24 AS27431 JTLNET - JTL Networks Inc. 206.221.189.0/24 AS27431 JTLNET - JTL Networks Inc. 206.221.190.0/24 AS27431 JTLNET - JTL Networks Inc. 206.221.191.0/24 AS27431 JTLNET - JTL Networks Inc. 207.174.131.0/24 AS26116 INDRA - Indra's Net Inc 207.174.132.0/23 AS26116 INDRA - Indra's Net Inc 207.174.152.0/23 AS26116 INDRA - Indra's Net Inc 207.174.154.0/24 AS26116 INDRA - Indra's Net Inc 207.174.155.0/24 AS26116 INDRA - Indra's Net Inc 207.174.200.0/24 AS22658 EARTHNET - Earthnet, Inc. 207.174.248.0/21 AS6653 PRIVATEI - privateI, LLC 207.231.96.0/19 AS11194 NUNETPA - NuNet Inc. 207.254.128.0/21 AS30689 FLOW-NET - FLOW 207.254.128.0/24 AS30689 FLOW-NET - FLOW 207.254.136.0/21 AS30689 FLOW-NET - FLOW 208.68.244.0/22 AS17140 208.68.244.0/23 AS17140 208.68.246.0/23 AS17140 208.76.20.0/24 AS31812 208.76.21.0/24 AS31812 208.77.164.0/24 AS22659 208.77.165.0/24 AS22659 208.77.166.0/24 AS22659 208.77.167.0/24 AS22659 208.83.53.0/24 AS40569 YGOMI-AS - Ygomi LLC 208.85.116.0/23 AS25956 ALPHEUS - Alpheus Data Services, L.L.C. 208.85.212.0/22 AS32618 ADKNO-KC - Adknowledge, Inc. 208.89.32.0/24 AS27431 JTLNET - JTL Networks Inc. 208.89.33.0/24 AS27431 JTLNET - JTL Networks Inc. 208.89.34.0/24 AS27431 JTLNET - JTL Networks Inc. 208.89.35.0/24 AS27431 JTLNET - JTL Networks Inc. 208.90.64.0/22 AS16415 PRCNET-DOM - Precision Response Corporation 208.91.72.0/24 AS17361 BRASS - Sungard Trading System (ASC) 208.91.73.0/24 AS17361 BRASS - Sungard Trading System (ASC) 208.91.76.0/23 AS21681 ANDOVER-TRADING - ANDOVER TRADING 209.177.64.0/20 AS6461 MFNX MFN - Metromedia Fiber Network 209.209.51.0/24 AS18687 MPOWER-2 - MPOWER COMMUNICATIONS CORP. 209.209.64.0/20 AS46851 IPARADIGMS - iParadigms, LLC 209.212.63.0/24 AS16467 ASN-NEXTWEB-R1 - Nextweb, Inc 209.213.0.0/20 AS33005 ELTOPIA - Eltopia.com, LLC 209.234.112.0/23 AS32252 209.234.114.0/23 AS32252 209.234.116.0/24 AS32252 209.234.117.0/24 AS32252 209.234.118.0/24 AS32252 209.234.119.0/24 AS32252 209.234.120.0/24 AS32252 209.234.121.0/24 AS32252 209.234.122.0/24 AS32252 213.150.204.0/24 AS29338 AFOL-AS Used by Africaonline Operations 216.12.163.0/24 AS26627 AS-PILOSOFT - Pilosoft, Inc. 216.146.0.0/19 AS11915 TELWEST-NETWORK-SVCS-STATIC - TEL WEST COMMUNICATIONS LLC 216.151.192.0/21 AS701 UUNET - MCI Communications Services, Inc. d/b/a Verizon Business 216.151.200.0/21 AS701 UUNET - MCI Communications Services, Inc. d/b/a Verizon Business 216.152.24.0/22 AS22773 ASN-CXA-ALL-CCI-22773-RDC - Cox Communications Inc. 216.170.96.0/24 AS4565 MEGAPATH2-US - MegaPath Networks Inc. 216.170.101.0/24 AS4565 MEGAPATH2-US - MegaPath Networks Inc. 216.170.104.0/24 AS4565 MEGAPATH2-US - MegaPath Networks Inc. 216.170.105.0/24 AS4565 MEGAPATH2-US - MegaPath Networks Inc. 216.234.128.0/22 AS14545 ADR-DRIVING-RECORDS - AMERICAN DRIVING RECORDS, INC. 216.234.132.0/24 AS14545 ADR-DRIVING-RECORDS - AMERICAN DRIVING RECORDS, INC. 216.234.139.0/24 AS14545 ADR-DRIVING-RECORDS - AMERICAN DRIVING RECORDS, INC. Please see http://www.cidr-report.org for the full report ------------------------------------ Copies of this report are mailed to: nanog(a)nanog.org eof-list(a)ripe.net apops(a)apops.net routing-wg(a)ripe.net afnog(a)afnog.org

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Re: The US government has betrayed the Internet. We need to take it back
by Larry Sheldon 06 Sep '13

06 Sep '13

On 9/6/2013 8:08 AM, John Peach wrote: > On Fri, 6 Sep 2013 07:46:59 -0500 Jorge Amodio <jmamodio(a)gmail.com> > wrote: > >> http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/sep/05/government-betrayed-in… >>> >>> >> >> The US government has betrayed the Internet. We need to take it back >>> >> >> Who is we ? > > If you bothered to read the 1st paragraph you would know. I did "bother".....the first 'graf after the link reads, in toto: > The US government has betrayed the Internet. We need to take it > back[sic] You apparently use the silent "period" at the ends of 'grafs so I took the blank lime as the 'graf delimiter. Who is "we". I lave learned to distrust the generic "we" as doers of stuff. What is your part of the recovery? What do you see as mine. (I like "you" and "me" as identifiers for doers of stuff. Third party identifiers are acceptible and tenatives, pending conversion to "me" or "you". -- Requiescas in pace o email Two identifying characteristics of System Administrators: Ex turpi causa non oritur actio Infallibility, and the ability to learn from their mistakes. (Adapted from Stephen Pinker)

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[Q] Any good resource of info ref LECs, in different US areas?
by Stefan 06 Sep '13

06 Sep '13

Trying to build diversity in some very odd places, about which the big names tell me exclusively about other bug names, but cannot easily verify. Thank you, ***Stefan

4 3