January 2010 - Test - lists.nanog.org

IPv6 deployment scenarios
by Brian E Carpenter 21 Jan '10

21 Jan '10

Hi, Sheng Jiang (Huawei) and Brian Carpenter (University of Auckland, research consultant to Huawei) are currently running a questionnaire on IPv6 deployment, addressed to every ISP. The purpose is to provide facts for a document about deployment scenarios that we are drafting for discussion in the IETF. We will keep your reply strictly confidential and we will publish only combined results. We will not identify information about individual ISPs in any published results. If you request it, we will not mention you or the ISP in the acknowledgments. Please find the questionnaire at http://www.cs.auckland.ac.nz/~brian/ISP-v6-QQ.html Answers are requested ASAP. (Hmm. As I write, the IPv6 access to that server is broken. Hopefully it will be back soon.) btw, we know that the questionnaire is imperfect; all questionnaires are imperfect. Also, this is not a marketing survey; we are after technical information. Regards Brian Carpenter

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Hardware recommendations for DWDM
by Dylan Ebner 21 Jan '10

21 Jan '10

Hi everyone. I am looking for some recommendations on implementation and hardware to handle a DWDM at 500Mbps with growth to 1Gbps over the next 2 years. My experience stops at 100Mb Ethernet services but my company may be taking on a large account that would dramatically increase our needs for additional bandwidth. We will most likely have an Ethernet over PTP DWDM circuit with metro Ethernet as a backup via iBGP or EIGRP. The routers or switches need to be able to carry the traffic as well as stateless access list at the same time. There is the possibility a need of needed stateful inspect as well on one of the routers/switches. So, what kind of hardware do you guys think is needed? Any input is appreciated. thanks

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Speaking slots at APRICOT 2010 still available
by Philip Smith 21 Jan '10

21 Jan '10

Hi everyone, For those folks who may be going to NANOG 48 in Austin at the end of February, how about extending that trip a little and heading over to Kuala Lumpur in Malaysia for APRICOT which conveniently takes place the following week. :-) We still have a few speaking slots available for the main conference (which runs from Monday 1st to Thursday 4th March). If you have a presentation that you think might be of interest to the network operators in the Asia & Pacific region, the Program Committee would be delighted to hear from you. There is more info in the CfP: http://www.apricot2010.net/contribute/call-for-papers, but to submit a presentation proposal simply go to http://submission.apricot.net/paper/user/index.php?event=22 to submit title, abstract and your draft slides. Many thanks for reading, now back to regular programming... :-) philip For the APRICOT Program Committee --

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RE: Idiotic Newstar Networking Equipment Sales Droid
by Scott Weeks 21 Jan '10

21 Jan '10

If they see all of us saying we won't buy from them when they do idiotic things like spamming nanog folks (I can't think of too many groups it world be worse to spam... ;-) they will realize that doing this will not only not generate sales, it will actually prevent future sales from occurring. scott --- mylists(a)battleop.com wrote: From: "Richey" <mylists(a)battleop.com> These guys don't get it. IF they call and pester me they miss out on a lot of sales. -----Original Message----- From: Chris Adams [mailto:cmadams@hiwaay.net] option). Way to make sure I never buy from you!

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Re: 10Gbps Traffic Test Systems
by Jonathon Exley 20 Jan '10

20 Jan '10

I have done QoS testing using Endace DAG cards - they can do capture as well as traffic generation. See http://www.endace.com/dag-8.1sx.html Jonathon This email and attachments: are confidential; may be protected by privilege and copyright; if received in error may not be used, copied, or kept; are not guaranteed to be virus-free; may not express the views of Kordia(R); do not designate an information system; and do not give rise to any liability for Kordia(R).

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10Gbps Traffic Test Systems
by Brad Fleming 20 Jan '10

20 Jan '10

I am in the market for 10Gbps traffic testers. Here are some of the things I'd like to have: 1) Mixed packet sizes 2) Ramp TCP sessions up/down quickly 3) Many source and destination IPs 4) Ability to ramp traffic up and down 5) Simulate targeted SYN floods 6) 10,000+ packets per second We'll use these devices to test throughput and resource utilization on routers and firewalls/security systems. We'll also test and prove candidate QoS configurations (ie: DSCP41 still works well even when DSCP11 is saturating links). The catch is that I work for a charitable, non-profit with limited resources. I understand you can't have steak on a sardine budget; I'm just trying to find suggestions on a testing platform for "thrifty" customers! We do not have any existing testing systems other than iPerf on a Mac Mini. Any suggestions, either on-list or off, are welcome and appreciated. Brad Fleming

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Idiotic Newstar Networking Equipment Sales Droid
by Scott Weeks 20 Jan '10

20 Jan '10

Did anyone here get spam from this idiot? It appears someone is harvesting email addresses from nanog. If you do get any contact from this company PLEASE do not do business with them and tell them you don't buy from spammers. The bottom line is the only thing idiots like this understand and if we buy from them, they'll be encouraged to spam more nanog folks. The guy knows it's wrong as he doesn't even use his own name on the email, so we have to deny purchasing from anyone in the company to have an effect. scott --- Begin forwarded message: From: broadcast(a)nstnetmail.com To: surfer(a)mauigateway.com Subject: XENPAK/X2/XFP Date: Wed, 20 Jan 2010 10:28:45 +0800 Hello, How are you? We have below items for hot sale, Sending you the list for reference, please check it, X2-10GB-SR X2-10GB-LR X2-10GB-ER XFP-10G-ER XFP-10G-LR XFP-10G-SR XENPAK-10GB-SR XENPAK-10GB-LR XENPAK-10GB-ER If you have any interested, please contact with me, we will try our best for you,thanks! B.R Helen Newstar Networking Technology Co., Ltd. Email:nstnetworksales@gmail.com Aol: Buyfromnewstar

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Cisco Security Advisory: Cisco IOS XR Software SSH Denial of Service Vulnerability
by Cisco Systems Product Security Incident Response Team 20 Jan '10

20 Jan '10

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 Cisco Security Advisory: Cisco IOS XR Software SSH Denial of Service Vulnerability Advisory ID: cisco-sa-20100120-xr-ssh Revision 1.0 For Public Release 2010 January 20 1600 UTC (GMT) +--------------------------------------------------------------------- Summary ======= The SSH server implementation in Cisco IOS XR Software contains a vulnerability that an unauthenticated, remote user could exploit to cause a denial of service condition. An attacker could trigger this vulnerability by sending a crafted SSH version 2 packet that may cause a new SSH connection handler process to crash. Repeated exploitation may cause each new SSH connection handler process to crash and lead to a significant amount of memory being consumed, which could introduce instability that may adversely impact other system functionality. During this event, the parent SSH daemon process will continue to function normally. Cisco has released free software updates that address this vulnerability. This advisory is posted at http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20100120-xr-ssh.shtml. Affected Products ================= Vulnerable Products +------------------ This vulnerability affects Cisco IOS XR systems that are running an affected version of Cisco IOS XR Software and have the SSH server feature enabled. A system with the SSH server feature enabled will have the command ssh server [v2] present in its configuration. Refer to the "Cisco IOS XR System Security Configuration Guide" at http://www.cisco.com/en/US/docs/routers/crs/software/crs_r3.9/security/conf… for additional details regarding configuration of the SSH server in Cisco IOS XR Software. The SSH server can only be enabled in Cisco IOS XR Software if the "security" Package Information Envelope (PIE) is installed. Administrators can issue the show install summary command to confirm if the security PIE is installed. This command will display an active package similar to "<platform>-k9sec-<version>" or, for example, "c12k-k9sec-3.6.1" if the security PIE is installed. Refer to the "Software Version and Fixes" section of this advisory for information on specific affected software versions. Products Confirmed Not Vulnerable +-------------------------------- SSH server implementations in Cisco IOS Software and Cisco IOS XE Software are not affected by this vulnerability. No other Cisco products are currently known to be affected by this vulnerability. Details ======= Cisco IOS XR Software is a member of the Cisco IOS Software family that uses a microkernel-based distributed operating system infrastructure. Cisco IOS XR Software runs on the Cisco CRS-1 Carrier Routing System, Cisco 12000 Series Routers, and Cisco ASR 9000 Series Aggregation Services Routers. More information on Cisco IOS XR Software is available at http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/ps5845/index.html. The SSH protocol was developed as a secure replacement for the Telnet, FTP, rlogin, remote shell (rsh), and Remote Copy Protocol (RCP) protocols, which allow for remote device access. SSH varies from these older protocols in that it provides strong authentication and confidentiality and uses encrypted transactions. The SSH server implementation in Cisco IOS XR Software contains a vulnerability that an unauthenticated, remote user could exploit to cause a denial of service condition. The vulnerability is triggered when a new SSH handler process handles a crafted SSH version 2 packet, which may cause the process to crash. During this event, a significant amount of memory may be consumed. Repeated exploitation may impact other system functionality, depending upon the size of the available memory and the duration of attack. Although exploitation of this vulnerability does not require user authentication, the TCP three-way handshake must be completed, and some SSH protocol negotiation must occur. The SSH service will continue to function normally during an after an attack. During exploitation of this vulnerability, the system may generate the following messages: RP/0/RP1/CPU0:Jan 14 16:56:34.885 : dumper[59]: %OS-DUMPER-7-DUMP_ATTRIBUTE : Dump request with attribute 407 for process pkg/bin/sshd_child_handler RP/0/RP1/CPU0:Jan 14 16:56:34.897 : dumper[59]: %OS-DUMPER-7-SIGSEGV : Thread 1 received SIGSEGV RP/0/RP1/CPU0:Jan 14 16:56:34.901 : dumper[59]: %OS-DUMPER-7-BUS_ADRERR : Accessed BadAddr 50199000 at PC 4a280c64 RP/0/RP1/CPU0:Jan 14 16:56:34.906 : dumper[59]: %OS-DUMPER-4-CRASH_INFO : Crashed pid = 21733716 (pkg/bin/sshd_child_handler) This vulnerability is documented in Cisco bug ID CSCsu10574 and has been assigned Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) ID CVE-2010-0137. Vulnerability Scoring Details ============================= Cisco has provided scores for the vulnerability in this advisory based on the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS). The CVSS scoring in this Security Advisory is done in accordance with CVSS version 2.0. CVSS is a standards-based scoring method that conveys vulnerability severity and helps determine urgency and priority of response. Cisco has provided a base and temporal score. Customers can then compute environmental scores to assist in determining the impact of the vulnerability in individual networks. Cisco has provided an FAQ to answer additional questions regarding CVSS at: http://www.cisco.com/web/about/security/intelligence/cvss-qandas.html Cisco has also provided a CVSS calculator to help compute the environmental impact for individual networks at: http://intellishield.cisco.com/security/alertmanager/cvss * CSCsu10574 ("sshd_child_handler crashes with crafted SSHv2 packet") CVSS Base Score - 7.8 Access Vector - Network Access Complexity - Low Authentication - None Confidentiality Impact - None Integrity Impact - None Availability Impact - Complete CVSS Temporal Score - 6.4 Exploitability - Functional Remediation Level - Official-Fix Report Confidence - Confirmed Impact ====== Successful exploitation of the vulnerability described in this advisory could result in a crash of the SSH connection handler process. Repeated exploitation may impact other system functionality, depending upon the size of the available memory and the duration of attack. Software Versions and Fixes =========================== When considering software upgrades, also consult http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt and any subsequent advisories to determine exposure and a complete upgrade solution. In all cases, customers should exercise caution to be certain the devices to be upgraded contain sufficient memory and that current hardware and software configurations will continue to be supported properly by the new release. If the information is not clear, contact the Cisco Technical Assistance Center (TAC) or your contracted maintenance provider for assistance. This vulnerability can be addressed by applying the appropriate Software Maintenance Upgrade (SMU), per the table below. Installation of the appropriate SMU does not require a system reload. Refer to the document "Guidelines for Cisco IOS XR Software" (http://www.cisco.com/en/US/prod/collateral/iosswrel/ps8803/ps5845/product_b…) for additional information on Cisco IOS XR Software and SMUs. +---------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | Cisco | SMU Name and SMU ID | |IOS XR |-----------------------------------------------------------------------| | Release | CRS-1 | XR12000 | ASR 9000 | | | | | (*) | |---------+----------------------------+-----------------------------+------------| | | hfr-k9sec-3.4.1.CSCsu10574 | c12k-k9sec-3.4.1.CSCsu10574 | Not | | 3.4.1 | | | applicable | | | AA03509 | AA03532 | | |---------+----------------------------+-----------------------------+------------| | | hfr-k9sec-3.4.2.CSCsu10574 | c12k-k9sec-3.4.2.CSCsu10574 | Not | | 3.4.2 | | | applicable | | | AA03510 | AA03531 | | |---------+----------------------------+-----------------------------+------------| | | hfr-k9sec-3.4.3.CSCsu10574 | c12k-k9sec-3.4.3.CSCsu10574 | Not | | 3.4.3 | | | applicable | | | AA03511 | AA03530 | | |---------+----------------------------+-----------------------------+------------| | | hfr-k9sec-3.5.2.CSCsu10574 | c12k-k9sec-3.5.2.CSCsu10574 | Not | | 3.5.2 | | | applicable | | | AA03512 | AA03529 | | |---------+----------------------------+-----------------------------+------------| | | hfr-k9sec-3.5.3.CSCsu10574 | c12k-k9sec-3.5.3.CSCsu10574 | Not | | 3.5.3 | | | applicable | | | AA03513 | AA03528 | | |---------+----------------------------+-----------------------------+------------| | | hfr-k9sec-3.5.4.CSCsu10574 | c12k-k9sec-3.5.4.CSCsu10574 | Not | | 3.5.4 | | | applicable | | | AA03514 | AA03527 | | |---------+----------------------------+-----------------------------+------------| | | hfr-k9sec-3.6.0.CSCsu10574 | c12k-k9sec-3.6.0.CSCsu10574 | Not | | 3.6.0 | | | applicable | | | AA03515 | AA03526 | | |---------+----------------------------+-----------------------------+------------| | | hfr-k9sec-3.6.1.CSCsu10574 | c12k-k9sec-3.6.1.CSCsu10574 | Not | | 3.6.1 | | | applicable | | | AA03516 | AA03525 | | |---------+----------------------------+-----------------------------+------------| | 3.6.2 | Not affected | Not affected | Not | | | | | applicable | |---------+----------------------------+-----------------------------+------------| | 3.6.3 | Not affected | Not affected | Not | | | | | applicable | |---------+----------------------------+-----------------------------+------------| | | hfr-k9sec-3.7.0.CSCsu10574 | c12k-k9sec-3.7.0.CSCsu10574 | Not | | 3.7.0 | | | applicable | | | AA03519 | AA03522 | | |---------+----------------------------+-----------------------------+------------| | 3.7.1 | Not affected | Not affected | Not | | | | | affected | |---------+----------------------------+-----------------------------+------------| | 3.7.2 | Not affected | Not affected | Not | | | | | affected | |---------+----------------------------+-----------------------------+------------| | 3.8.x | Not affected | Not affected | Not | | | | | applicable | |---------+----------------------------+-----------------------------+------------| | 3.9.x | Not affected | Not affected | Not | | | | | affected | +---------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ (*) Not all Cisco IOS XR Software versions are supported by the Cisco ASR 9000 Aggregation Services Routers. Workarounds =========== There are no workarounds for this vulnerability. Network administrators are advised to apply mitigation techniques to help limit exposure to the vulnerability. Mitigation techniques consist of allowing only legitimate devices to connect to the routers. These access restrictions can be accomplished by using interface access control lists (ACLs) or the Management Plane Protection (MPP) feature that is available in Cisco IOS XR Software Release 3.5 and later. For information on MPP, refer to the configuration guide at http://www.cisco.com/en/US/docs/ios_xr_sw/iosxr_r3.8/security/configuration… and the MPP command reference at http://www.cisco.com/en/US/docs/ios_xr_sw/iosxr_r3.8/security/command/refer…. Infrastructure ACLs (iACLs) are also a useful technique to mitigate potential exploitation of this vulnerability. For more information on these mitigations, consult the Cisco Guide to Harden Cisco IOS XR Devices, which is available at http://www.cisco.com/web/about/security/intelligence/CiscoIOSXR.html. Note that access classes in line templates applied to VTY pools are not an effective mitigation for this vulnerability. Obtaining Fixed Software ======================== Cisco has released free software updates that address this vulnerability. Prior to deploying software, customers should consult their maintenance provider or check the software for feature set compatibility and known issues specific to their environment. Customers may only install and expect support for the feature sets they have purchased. By installing, downloading, accessing or otherwise using such software upgrades, customers agree to be bound by the terms of Cisco's software license terms found at http://www.cisco.com/en/US/docs/general/warranty/English/EU1KEN_.html, or as otherwise set forth at Cisco.com Downloads at http://www.cisco.com/public/sw-center/sw-usingswc.shtml. Do not contact psirt(a)cisco.com or security-alert(a)cisco.com for software upgrades. Customers with Service Contracts +------------------------------- Customers with contracts should obtain upgraded software through their regular update channels. For most customers, this means that upgrades should be obtained through the Software Center on Cisco's worldwide website at http://www.cisco.com. Customers using Third Party Support Organizations +------------------------------------------------ Customers whose Cisco products are provided or maintained through prior or existing agreements with third-party support organizations, such as Cisco Partners, authorized resellers, or service providers should contact that support organization for guidance and assistance with the appropriate course of action in regards to this advisory. The effectiveness of any workaround or fix is dependent on specific customer situations, such as product mix, network topology, traffic behavior, and organizational mission. Due to the variety of affected products and releases, customers should consult with their service provider or support organization to ensure any applied workaround or fix is the most appropriate for use in the intended network before it is deployed. Customers without Service Contracts +---------------------------------- Customers who purchase direct from Cisco but do not hold a Cisco service contract, and customers who purchase through third-party vendors but are unsuccessful in obtaining fixed software through their point of sale should acquire upgrades by contacting the Cisco Technical Assistance Center (TAC). TAC contacts are as follows. * +1 800 553 2447 (toll free from within North America) * +1 408 526 7209 (toll call from anywhere in the world) * e-mail: tac(a)cisco.com Customers should have their product serial number available and be prepared to give the URL of this notice as evidence of entitlement to a free upgrade. Free upgrades for non-contract customers must be requested through the TAC. Refer to http://www.cisco.com/en/US/support/tsd_cisco_worldwide_contacts.html for additional TAC contact information, including localized telephone numbers, and instructions and e-mail addresses for use in various languages. Exploitation and Public Announcements ===================================== The Cisco PSIRT is not aware of any public announcements or malicious use of the vulnerability described in this advisory. This vulnerability was discovered by Cisco during internal testing. Status of this Notice: FINAL ============================ THIS DOCUMENT IS PROVIDED ON AN "AS IS" BASIS AND DOES NOT IMPLY ANY KIND OF GUARANTEE OR WARRANTY, INCLUDING THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR USE. YOUR USE OF THE INFORMATION ON THE DOCUMENT OR MATERIALS LINKED FROM THE DOCUMENT IS AT YOUR OWN RISK. CISCO RESERVES THE RIGHT TO CHANGE OR UPDATE THIS DOCUMENT AT ANY TIME. A stand-alone copy or Paraphrase of the text of this document that omits the distribution URL in the following section is an uncontrolled copy, and may lack important information or contain factual errors. Distribution ============ This advisory is posted on Cisco's worldwide website at: http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20100120-xr-ssh.shtml In addition to worldwide web posting, a text version of this notice is clear-signed with the Cisco PSIRT PGP key and is posted to the following e-mail and Usenet news recipients. * cust-security-announce(a)cisco.com * first-bulletins(a)lists.first.org * bugtraq(a)securityfocus.com * vulnwatch(a)vulnwatch.org * cisco(a)spot.colorado.edu * cisco-nsp(a)puck.nether.net * full-disclosure(a)lists.grok.org.uk * comp.dcom.sys.cisco(a)newsgate.cisco.com Future updates of this advisory, if any, will be placed on Cisco's worldwide website, but may or may not be actively announced on mailing lists or newsgroups. Users concerned about this problem are encouraged to check the above URL for any updates. Revision History ================ +------------------------------------------------------------+ | Revision 1.0 | 2010-January-20 | Initial public release | +------------------------------------------------------------+ Cisco Security Procedures ========================= Complete information on reporting security vulnerabilities in Cisco products, obtaining assistance with security incidents, and registering to receive security information from Cisco, is available on Cisco's worldwide website at http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/products_security_vulnerability_policy.…. This includes instructions for press inquiries regarding Cisco security notices. All Cisco security advisories are available at http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt. +-------------------------------------------------------------------- Copyright 2008-2010 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved. +-------------------------------------------------------------------- Updated: Jan 20, 2010 Document ID: 111459 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.9 (GNU/Linux) iEYEARECAAYFAktXJ54ACgkQ86n/Gc8U/uAIqgCfaWWIDTslxxJspwldh8PiHYJD WUcAn3jmQ+LHb8nCfKdp6fxuI4LZptpd =4zi1 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Grant Funding
by David Nguyen 19 Jan '10

19 Jan '10

Does anyone have any good suggestions on grant funding for a network refresh? NSF?

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[NANOG-announce] NANOG 48 is coming up
by David Meyer 19 Jan '10

19 Jan '10

Stretch your travel dollar further by registering now for NANOG 48, February 21-24, co-hosted by Data Foundry and Giganews in Austin, Texas. The early registration rate prevails through January 21, and the discounted hotel rate expires February 5 or when the room block is full. Rooms are limited so make your reservation soon. We have a great meeting planned, and you can review the draft agenda at http://www.nanog.org/meetings/nanog48/agenda.php. Hotel and travel information, meeting registration, and a list of meeting sponsors and sponsorship opportunities are available through http://www.nanog.org/meetings/nanog48/index.php. Look forward to seeing you there, David Meyer (for the NANOG Program Committee) _______________________________________________ NANOG-announce mailing list NANOG-announce(a)nanog.org http://mailman.nanog.org/mailman/listinfo/nanog-announce

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