June 2006 - Test - lists.nanog.org

Nationwide Routing issues with Wiltel
by Vincent India 28 Jun '06

28 Jun '06

Anyone experiencing problems with Wiltel Backbone, or know of any issues with the Wiltel Backbone? I called their NOC and was told they are experiencing a nationwide routing problem that they are working on but couldn't get any further details?

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Contact for newsfeed.wirehub.nl
by Nicolas DEFFAYET 28 Jun '06

28 Jun '06

Hello, Does anyone have the contact of the adminstrator of newsfeed.wirehub.nl ? Thank you Best regards, -- Nicolas DEFFAYET NDSoftware http://www.ndsoftware.com/

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Looking for Jim Flemming (no, really) - Please don't flame
by Cerebus cerebus 27 Jun '06

27 Jun '06

I have a legal issue, which I need to contact Jim Flemming, This is a serious, urgent issue, thank you for your cooperation. I've tried google searches, contacting several emails he had before, even contacting the providers there, without any luck. I even tried contacting Richard Sexton (shudder) without any luck. No one has yet responded to the emails or posts. This is a last effort, and I know his name often incites flames and other issues here as well, but this is a last resort. If someone knows how to contact him, please email this address. Yahoo won't allow me to put in my full name in the "from" field, So if you know how to find him, or if Jim is reading this, please contact John Palmer via email at cerebus_8(a)yahoo.com thats cerebus_8 AT yahoo DOT com (in case filters mangle it) Again this is a serious legal issue which I need to resolve personally with Jim. --------------------------------- Yahoo! Messenger with Voice. Make PC-to-Phone Calls to the US (and 30+ countries) for 2¢/min or less.

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Re: IP failover/migration question.
by Gregory Hicks 27 Jun '06

27 Jun '06

> From: Valdis.Kletnieks(a)vt.edu > Date: Tue, 27 Jun 2006 11:20:38 -0400 > > On Tue, 27 Jun 2006 14:51:30 BST, Andy Davidson said: > > Popular web browsers running on popular desktop operating systems > > also display extra-long dns cache time 'bugs'. > > A well known fact, which leads right into your next comment... > > > 24 hours + outage whilst stale dns disappears will never do in > > internet retail. > > And yet, with 90% of the net implementing the "will never do" scenario, > we manage to get a lot of internet retail done anyhow. I'm obviously going > to need a *lot* more caffeine to sort through that conundrum.... OR, it *could* be that the retailers know about the way 'things' operate and don't make many changes once they get their site up... ------------------------------------------------------------------- I am perfectly capable of learning from my mistakes. I will surely learn a great deal today. "A democracy is a sheep and two wolves deciding on what to have for lunch. Freedom is a well armed sheep contesting the results of the decision." - Benjamin Franklin "The best we can hope for concerning the people at large is that they be properly armed." --Alexander Hamilton

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AboveNet and Level(3) in Chicago
by Mike Hammett 27 Jun '06

27 Jun '06

Can anyone confirm if AboveNet and Level(3) have added or improved peering in Chicago? I don't have a previous traceroute to compare to, but a new one from my ISP network singlehomed on AboveNet to a server with several carriers including Level(3) seems to suggest that. Traceroutes always included Level(3), but now they're a few hops shorter and maybe 20 - 30 ms faster. ---- Mike Hammett Intelligent Computing Solutions http://www.ics-il.com

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"Virtual routers" from Cisco
by MARLON BORBA 27 Jun '06

27 Jun '06

Fellow NANOGers, A friend of mine told me about a new "breed" of routers from Cisco which have two "virtual machines" over the same physical hardware -- sort of a VMWare or Xen host with guests. Does someone know about that, or had a practical experience with that new Cisco product? Abraços, Marlon Borba, CISSP. -- Virtual é legal: Virtual PC, VMWare, Xen! --

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Network Solution contact (offline)
by Ricardo Patara 27 Jun '06

27 Jun '06

If there is any Network Solutions contact in this list, could you please contact me offline? Thanks Ricardo Patara LACNIC - RSG Manager --

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RE: key change for TCP-MD5
by Bora Akyol 27 Jun '06

27 Jun '06

> > Another potential attack is an attempt to insert information > into a BGP session, such as to introduce bogus routes, or to > even become a "man in the middle" of a BGP session. One issue > that worries me about this is that if this allows routing to > be compromised, then I can figure out how to make money off > of this (and if I can think of it, someone even nastier will > probably also think of this). Of course this would be much > more difficult to pull off, and might require viewing packets > between routers to pull off, but if pulled off and not > quickly detected could be unfortunate. > > Ross This one is hard to pull off. I think the general conclusion a couple years ago in the study that Sean Convery and Matt Franz did was that it was less work to try to own the router or buy your own AS ;) Bora

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RE: key change for TCP-MD5
by Ross Callon 26 Jun '06

26 Jun '06

At 12:12 PM 6/20/2006 -0700, Bora Akyol wrote: >The draft allows you to have a set of keys in your keychain and >the implementation tries all of them before declaring the segment >as invalid. DoS against routers is of course a major concern. Using encryption has the potential of making DoS worse, in the sense that the amount of processing that a bogus packet can cause is increased by the amount of processing needed to check the authentication. If the router needs to check multiple keys in the keychain before declaring the segment as invalid, then this multiplies the effect of the DOS by the number of keys that need to be checked. >No time synchronization required. No BGP message required. > >The added cost for CPU-bound systems is that they have to try >(potentially) multiple keys before getting the **right** key >but in real life this can be easily mitigated by having a rating >system on the key based on the frequency of success. This mitigates the effect of authenticating valid packets. However, this does not appear to help at all in terms of minimizing the DOS effect of an intentional DoS attack that uses authenticated packets (with the processing time required to check the keys the intended damage of the attack). Ross > > -----Original Message----- > > From: owner-nanog(a)merit.edu [mailto:owner-nanog@merit.edu] On > > Behalf Of Iljitsch van Beijnum > > Sent: Monday, June 19, 2006 10:22 AM > > To: Randy Bush > > Cc: NANOG list > > Subject: Re: key change for TCP-MD5 > > > > > > On 19-jun-2006, at 19:10, Randy Bush wrote: > > > > >>> try reading more carefully > > > > >> Didn't help... > > > > > how sad, as the whole document is about how to usefully be able to > > > introduce and roll to new keys without agreeing on a narrow time. > > > > Well, as you can tell from my message just now, I don't think > > going from agreeing on a narrow time to agreeing on a wider > > time is worth the trouble, especially since by adding a BGP > > message it would be possible to roll over if and as soon as > > both sides are ready, removing the "wait for some time and > > then see whether the other end really installed the new key" > > part from the proceedings. > > > >

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Who wants to be in charge of the Internet today?
by Sean Donelan 26 Jun '06

26 Jun '06

http://online.wsj.com/article/SB115102893799688389.html In Event of Big Web Disruption, U.S. Is Ill-Prepared, Study Says By VAUHINI VARA June 23, 2006; Page B2 The U.S. is poorly prepared for a major disruption of the Internet, according to a study that an influential group of chief executives will publish today. The Business Roundtable, composed of the CEOs of 160 large U.S. companies, said neither the government nor the private sector has a coordinated plan to respond to an attack, natural disaster or other disruption of the Internet. While individual government agencies and companies have their own emergency plans in place, little coordination exists between the groups, according to the study. "It's a matter of more clearly defining who has responsibility," said Edward Rust Jr., CEO of State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., who leads the Roundtable's Internet-security effort. [...]

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